The Islamist movement in Sudan : the impact of Dr Hassal al-Turabi's personality on the movement. by Kobayashi, Masaki
Durham E-Theses
The Islamist movement in Sudan : the impact of Dr
Hassal al-Turabi’s personality on the movement.
Kobayashi, Masaki
How to cite:
Kobayashi, Masaki (1996) The Islamist movement in Sudan : the impact of Dr Hassal al-Turabi’s
personality on the movement. Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1042/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN SUDAN:
The Impact of Dr Hassan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement
MASAKI KOBAYASHI
The copyright of this thesis rests
with the author. No quotation
from it should be published
without the written consent of the
author and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.
Submitted by Nasaki Kobayashi
to the University of Durham
as a thesis towards the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
in Middle East Politics, 1996.
Supervisor: Professor Tim Niblock
PhD Thesis 1996
Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
University of Durham
10 OCT 1997
1
Abstract
Abstract
The research focuses on the Sudanese Islamist movement which has been
led by Dr Hassan al-Turabi. The researcher believes that a better
understanding of the Sudanese Islamist movement requires a better
understanding of the personality of Dr al-Turabi. In this thesis, the
Sudanese Islamist movement is analyzed in terms of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality.
The research includes two analyses: the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's
personality and that of the Islamist movement. The former is used as
the basic tool of the latter.
In personality analysis, a psychological approach is employed. Dr
al-Turabi's personality is analyzed by means of a psychological theory
- NcAdams' "life-story model of identity". The research constitutes
an innovational attempt at applying McAdams' model, and may suggest a
new type of approach in the field of social science. One of the
unique characters of this approach is the distinction between his-
torical information and psychological information. Most of Dr al-
Turabi's acçnunt is regarded as psychological information and used in
order to understand his personality. The significance of psycho l ogi
-cal information lies in its "meaning" rather than in its historical
accuracy.
In the six chapters of the thesis, the Sudanese Islamist movement
from 1964 to 1995 is divided into five periods. The main developments
(or key developments) in the Islamist movement are described in each
chapter. This latter material, regarded as "historical information",
is used as a basis for the analysis of the Islamist movement. The
analysis draws conclusions about the impact of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality on the movement during each period.
The researcher concludes that a number of unique aspects of the
Sudanese Islamist movement can be better understood by making
reference to Dr al-Turabi's personality.
3-3-
Contents
Table of contents
Page
Title ±
Abstract........................................................ii
Table of contents
Listof tables, diagrams, arid maps .............................. Xli
Declaration xv
Statementof copyright .......................................... XV±
Acknowledgement................................................. XV].1.
Preface........................................................
Photographs..................................................... XXV
Maps............................................................ XXX
Definitions.................................................... XXX.3
CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION ..........................................1
1.1 FOCUS AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY .............................2
1.2 METHODOLOGY ................................................3
1.2.1 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH .......3
1.2.2 MCADANS' LIFE-STORY MODEL OF IDENTITY ..................
1.2.3 PERSONALITY AND LIFE-STORY .............................13
(1) DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY ...............................13
(2) EXAMPLES OF PERSONALITY .................................13
(a) Agentic personality ....................................13
(b) Communal personality ...................................15
(3) NUCLEAR EPISODES ........................................16
1.2.4 RESEARCHER'S APPROACH ..................................17
(1) BASIC LOGIC OF THE APPROACH .............................17
(a) Finding out Dr al-Turabi's personjtY .................17
(b) Assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personalitY
onthe movement ........................................18
lii
Contents
	
(2) MATERIAL ................................................	 19
(a) Location of the materials .............................. 	 19
(b) Qualification of the materials ......................... 	 20
(i) General description
(ii) Dr al-Turabi's account
	
(3) ANALYSES ................................................ 	 21
(a) Analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality ................. 	 21
(b) Analysis of the key developments
	
ofthe Islamist movement ...............................	 22
1.3 CHAPTER PLAN ...............................................22
CHAPTER2: PERSONALITY BUILDING ..................................24
2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (UP TO 1964) ...........................25
	
2.1.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY ............................ 	 25
	
U) TRIBAL ORIGIN ........................................... 	 25
(2) FANLY HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS THINKING ................... 27
2.1.2 CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ABDALLA AND HASSAN 29
(1) ABDALLA ................................................. 	 32
(2) HASSAN .................................................. 	 33
22 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT .....................................34
	
2.2.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY ............................ 	 34
	
2.2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S LIFE STORY .............................. 	 36
	
(1) INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD ................................... 	 36
	
(2) ADOLESCENCE ............................................. 	 38
(a) Intermediate education ................................. 	 38
(b) Secondary education .................................... 	 39
	
(C) Hi gher education ....................................... 	 40
	
(3) EARLY ADULTHOOD ......................................... 	 42
	
La) London period ..........................................	 42
	
(b) Paris period ........................................... 	 46
lv
Contents
2.3 ANALYSES ...................................................49
2.3.1 FACTORS OF DR AL-TURABI'S IDENTITY	 ................... 49
2.3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY .............................53
2.4 SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE ........................................55
2.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S OWN ASSESSMENT ON HIS IDENTITY .......... 55
2.4.2 DR AL-TURABItS PERSONALITY DESCRIBED BY HIS SUPPORTERS
	
57
(1) YASSIN OMAR AL-IMAN ..................................... 	 57
(2) ABD AL- RAHIM MAHMUD HAND I ............................... 	 58
(3) HASSAN MAKKI ............................................ 	 59
CHAPTER 3: BEGINNING OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT ....................60
	
3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1964-69) ............................. 	 61
3,1.1 CHRONOLOGY ............................................. 	 61
3.1.2 SU1MARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ........................ 63
(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION ................... 63
(a) Background .............................................	 63
(b) Revolution .............................................	 64
(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE ..................................... 	 66
3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT .....................................68
3.2.1 INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION ..................68
3.2.2 LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE ....................................70
3.3 ANALYSES ...................................................72
	
3.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY .............................	 72
3.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
	
ONTHE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ................................ 	 76
(1) iNVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION ................... 76
(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE ..................................... 	 77
v
Contents
CHAPTER 4: ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND LEARNING PERIOD ..............79
4.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1969-771 ..............................79
4.1.1 CHRONOLOGY .............................................79
4.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT ..........80
4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT:
ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT ..............85
4.2.1 IN PRISON (1969-72) ....................................85
4.2.2 FREE (1972-73) .........................................85
4.2.3 IN PRISON (1973-74) ....................................86
4.2.4 FREE (1974-75) .........................................86
4.2.5 IN PRISON (1975-77) ....................................86
4.2.6 FREE (1977-) ...........................................88
4.2.7 THE ISLANISTS INSIDE PRISON ............................88
4.3 ANALYSES ...................................................89
4.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY .............................89
' 4.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ONTHE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ................................92
CHAPTER 5: THE ISLANIST MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NIMAIRI REGIME:
EXPANSIONAND PRACTICE ................................95
5.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1977-85) ..............................95
5.1.1 CHRONOLOGY .............................................95
5.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: EXPANSION AND PRACTICE 97
(1) EDUCATION ...............................................98
(2) ISLANIC LEGAL INSTITUTIONS ..............................99
vi
Contents
(3) ISLAMIC ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS ...........................101
5.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT .....................................106
5.3 ANALYSES ...................................................107
5 .3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY .............................107
5.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ONTHE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ................................110
CHAPTER 6: TRANSITION PERIOD AND POWER STRUGGLE ..................113
6.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1985-89) ..............................113
6.1.1 CHRONOLOGY .............................................113
6.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ........................115
(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS . 115
(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89) ................................121
6.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT .....................................123
6 .2.1 DR AL-TURABI'S MAIN GOAL ...............................123
6.2.2 THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS 123
6.2.3 POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89) ...............................124
6.3 ANALYSES ...................................................126
6.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONAI..ITY .............................126
6.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ONTHE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ................................129
(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS . 129
(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89) ................................130
vu.
Contents
CHAPTER 7: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE:
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS ......................132
7.1 THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE ...........................134
7.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-95) ..............................135
7.2.1 CHRONOLOGY .............................................135
7.2.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS .......................136
(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM .................................... 136
(a) Non-party democracy with Islamism: popular participation
and consensus based on popular congresses ..............138
(b) Non-party democracy with Islamism: popular participation
and consensus based on a federal system ................144
f2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS ......................................147
(a) Apostasy ...............................................147
jb) Blasphemy ..............................................148
(c) Theft ..................................................149
(3) ECONOMY (ISLAMIC ECONOMY) ...............................151
14jEDUCATION ..............................................155
(5) DEFENCE .................................................158
(a) Regular army ...........................................159
(b) Popular Defence Force ..................................161
"	 (C) War in the South .......................................163
7.3 DR AL-TURABI ' S ACCOUNT ......... ............................167
7.3.1 DOMESTIC POLICY ........................................167
7.3.2 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ...................................170
7.3.3 LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS ......................................172
7.3.4 ECONOMY ................................................174
7.3.5 EDUCATION ..............................................175
7.3.6 DEFENCE ................................................176
7.3.7 DR AL-TURABI'S SATISFACTION WITH THE SITUATION IN SUDAN
INJANUARY 1995 ........................................177
viii
Contents
7.4 ANALYSES ...................................................177
7.4.1 DR AL-TURABPS PERSONALITY .............................177
7.4.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ONTHE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ................................181
(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ....................................181
(2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS.......................................182
(3) ECONOMY .................................................183
(4) EDUCATION ...............................................184
(5) DEFENCE .................................................184
CHAPTER 8: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE:
EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER ...........................186
8.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-951 ..............................187
8.1.1 CHRONOLOGY .............................................187
8.1.2 SWMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
EXPANSIONBEYOND THE BORDER ............................189
(1) THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY .........................189
(2) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (89-93) .........................190
(a) Sudan and its nei ghbors ................................191
(1) Egypt, (ii) Libya, (iii) Chad, (iv) CAR, (v) Zaire,
(vi) Uganda, (vii) Kenya, (viii) Ethiopia, (ix) Eritrea,
(x) Saudi Arabia.
(b) Sudan and the Middle East ..............................208
(i) Algeria, (ii) Iran, (iii) Iraq, (iv) PLO,
(v) Tunisia, (vi) Yemen.
(3) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC1...............221
8.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT .....................................224
8.2.1 FOREIGN POLICY .........................................224
8.2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ................................227
8.2.3 POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC) .............236
lx
Contents
8.3 ANALYSES ...................................................239
8.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY .............................239
8.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ONTHE KEY DEVELOPMENTS ................................243
(1) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .................................244
(2) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC) ..............245
CHAPTER9: CONCLUSION ............................................246
Notes ............................................................ 252
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
I.....................................................253
2	 ..................................................... 255
26].
264
268
6	 .....................................................274
7	 .....................................................278
8	 .....................................................284
Appendices.......................................................296
Appendix	 (1): The Turabi family ...............................297
Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools
inthe northern Sudan ...........................299
Appendix(3) The Rufaa incident ..............................300
Appendix (4): Development of the GMC ..........................301
Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations .....................302
Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution ...............308
Appendix(7): Military ranks ..................................310
x
Contents
Appendix (7) : Military ranks ..................................310
Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure .........311
Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan .............................314
Appendix (10): Original diagram of the Sudanese popular
congresses......................................323
Appendix (11): Sadig al-Mandi's account of the position
of the Umina Party and the Islamist movement
ledby Dr al-Turabi .............................324
Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions
ofthe Second PAIC ..............................328
Abbreviations....................................................334
Glossaryof Arabic terms ... . .................................... 337
Chronology.......................................................340
Bibliography................354
'S.
xi.
Tables, Diagrams, & Maps
List of tables, diagrams, and maps
Tables	 Page
2.l.(1): Moves of Abdalla and Hassan ...........................30
2.3.(].): Dr al-Turabi's personality described by ad j ectives	 54
3.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-64)	 73
3.3.(2): Possible adj ectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's
personality(1932-64) .................................73
3.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1964-69) .. 75
4.3.(l): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-69) .... 89
4.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's
personality(1932-69) .................................90
4.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1969-77) .. 92
5.1.(l): Senior staff of the FIBS (1984) .......................103
5.3.(1): Dr al-TurabPs main characters (imagoes) (1932-77) .... 108
5.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's
personality (1932-77) .................................108
5.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1977-85) .. 110
6.1.(1): The 1986 elections: the NIF's performance
(territorial constituencies) ..........................117
6.1.(2): The 1986 elections: comparison between the parties
(territorial constituencies) ..........................118
6.3.(l): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-85) .... 126
6.3.(2): Possible adiect jves which describe Dr al-Turabi's
personality(1932-85) .................................127
6.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi t s personality (1985-89) .. 129
5.1.(3): The 1986 elections: Dr al-Turabi's performance ........120
7.2.(1): Regions and states ....................................145
7.2.(2): Universities in Sudan (May 1995) ......................157
7.4.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-89) .... 178
7.4.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's
personalit y (1932-89) .................................178
7.4.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95J .. 181
xii
4-
Tables, Diagrams, & Maps
8.1.(1): Military balance between Sudan and E gypt (1993-94) .... 195
8.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (ima goes) (1932-89) 239
8.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-TurabI's
personalit y (1932-89) .................................240
8.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-.Turabi's personality f1989-95) 	 243
9.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (ima goes) (1932-95)	 248
9.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's
personalit y (1932-95) .................................248
9.(3): The characters representing each period ...............250
A.2.(1): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan
	 299
A.7.(1): Military ranks ........................................310
C.(1): Sources and abbreviations .............................340
C.(2): Chronology (1932-951 ..................................341
Diagrams
1.2.(1): The position of the researcher t s approach .............4
1.2.(2): The position of McAdams' life-story model .............4
l.2.(3): A simplified structure of the life-story model ........9
1.2.(4): Relations between life-story and personality...........18
12.(5): Relations between Dr al-Turabi's personality and the
Islamistmovement .....................................19
2.1.(1): Tribal origin of the Turabi family ....................27
2.1.(2): Family heritage in terms of religious thinking ........28
2.2.(].): Si gnatures of the boycott declaration .................38
3.1.(].): The structure of the organization (after 1962) ........67
7.2.(1): Structure of the congresses ...........................139
7.2.(2): The Second Civil War (1989-94) ........................164
7.3.(1): Development of the movement ...........................168
A.1.(1): The Turabi family .....................................297
A.4.(1): Development of the GMC ................................301
A.8.(1): The first structure ...................................311
A.8.(2): The second structure (after 1962) .....................311
A.8.(3): The third structure (after 1974) ......................312
A.9.(1): Civil wars in Sudan ...................................314
A.10.(1): Congresses ...........................................323
xiii
Tables, Diagrams, & Maps
Maps
P.(1): Sudan ................................................. xxx
P.(2): Tn-city area (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman) xxxi
2.1.(1): Places of the moves of Abdalla and Hassan .............31
6.l.(l): Al-Sahafa and Jabra ...................................120
7.2.(1): Sudanese states .......................................146
7.2.(2): Increase of government-controlled area ................165
A.9.(l): SPLA-controlled areas in March 1986 ...................316
A.9.(2): Drop of SPLA-controlled area ..........................320
xiv
Declaration
Declaration
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my
own work has been identified and that no material is included
for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.
xv
Copyright
Statement of copyright
"The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without his
prior written consent and information derived from it
should be acknowledged."
xvi
Acknowledgement
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my academic supervisor, Professor Tim Niblock,
for the advice and encouragement he has given throughout, and to thank
other academic and non-academic staff in the University of Durham for
their help, particularly in the Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies, the University Library, the Middle East Documentation Unit,
and the Sudan Archive. I am also obliged to Professor Dan P. NcAdams
(Northwestern University, US), who gave me useful advice on the
psychological approach which I have employed.
My special thanks must go to Dr Hassan Abdalla al-Turabi who
sacrificed his time for more than seven hours for my intensive inter-
views with him. Without his help, I could not have written even one
chapter. I owe much to Dr Abd al-Wahhab al-Afandi and Mr Ainin Hassan
Omar who made initial contact with Dr al-Turabi possible. Mr Amin
Hassan Omar also helped me to have an interview with President Omar
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir.
This work is also the result of many other valuable contributions.
I would like to thank the help and cooperation given by the following
people (alphabetical order):
Mr Abd al-Rahim Mahinud Hamdi, Dr Ahmad Ali Abdalla, Dr Ahmad
Majzub Ahmad, Mr Babikir Musa, Professor Dafalla al-Turabi,
Cardinal Francis Arinze, Dr Hassan Nakki, Dr Izz al-Din Amin,
Dr Musa Otnar, Dr al-Mikashifi Taha al-Kabbashi, Dr Muhammad
Birayma, Dr Muhi al-Din Abdalla, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail,
Dr Mustafa Zakariya, 	 President Omar al-Bashir,	 Mr Sadiq
al-Nandi, Mrs Wisal al-Turabi, and Mr Yassin Omar al-Imam.
This work would also not have been made possible without the
encouragement and support which I have received from many other
people, especially from my colleagues, friends, parents (Chuzo and
Miyoko), and brother (Yoshiyuki).
The final acknowledgement is due to the Overseas Research Students
Awards Scheme (ORS) for financial support which the researcher has
received.
xviiI.
Preface
Preface
The researcher has employed a set of rules on the usage of titles (Dr,
Mr, and Nrs), an English transliteration system of Arabic words (used
for linguistic correctness), and an English spelling system of Arabic
words. The English spelling system is a simplification of the trans-.
literation system (see III. Spelling System).
I. Titles (Dr, Mr, and Mrs)
In general, titles like Dr, Nr, and Mrs will be omitted. However, the
researcher will use these titles in the following cases:
1. In the text, except for the section of chronology,
"Dr Hassan al-Turabi" will be used, because he is widely
known by followers, supporters, and observers as such.
2. In the notes, "Dr", "Mr", and "Mrs" will be used only when
the reference is to an interview.
e.g. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mandi, 19 January 1995.
e.g. Interview with Mrs al-Turabi, 25 May 1994.
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U. English transliteration system
The researcher employs the following English transliteration system.
1. Letters
CONSONANTS	 VOWELS
z	 q	 /	 a
b	 a	 k	 /	 i
1
th	 s	 m
j	 d	 3	 n	 (long)
h	 t	 o	 h	 I 1_ aa
i	 u- ii
d	 C	 y	 j_.	 uu
r	 f
a ( at in construct state)
31	 al- (article)
C 
= superscript
2. Marks
(a) " " Double quotation marks will be used instead of single
quotation marks.
e.g. " 'Ansaar
(b) -	 Hyphen will be used after the definite article ' al
and to connect some kinds of words ( wa, fa, bi, hu, ...)
to the main words.
e.g. al-Haraka
e.g. qalam-hu wa-qalam-haa
e.g. al-Qamar wa-al-Shams	 not wal-ams nor waal-Shams
e.g. madiinat-hum 	 ( not madiinathum
xix
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3. Presentations
(a) B ; b There is no difference between capital letters and small
letters in terms of their pronunciations. The usage of
capital letters follows the same rules of English.
e.g. Hasan Nakkii (first letters of the names)
Definite articles will remain in small letters except for
when they come out the beginning of the sentence.
e.g. Al-Turaabii wa-al-Mandii
(b) al	 Definite articles in front of " Sun Letters " will not be
changed and the first letter after the definite article
will not be doubled.
e.g. al-. Zuhr	 ( not	 az-Zuhr nor al-lluhr
(C) o	 Taa' marbuuta will be normally written as	 a ".
e.g. Haraka	 ( not Harakah nor Harak-a )
In the case of 'Idaafa, i.e. in construct state, it will
be written as at ".
e.g. Harakat al-'Islaamiiya
(d) Standard Presentations
First appearance:
e.g.	 Hamas (Hamaas)
Mixture with both Arabic and English
e.g.	 the Umma ('Ununa) Party
e.g.	 the Turabi family
Name of place or person,
e.g.	 Khartoum (Al-Khartuum)
e.g.	 Al-Turabi (Al-Turaabii)
Second appearance:
e.g. Harass
e.g. the Umma Party
e.g. Khartoum
e.g. Al-Turabi
After second appearance:
The form of the first appearance will be sometimes used
in order to remind the reader.
xx
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(e) *** Authors' names for references will follow the same spelling
used in their publications, even though they may be
different from common spelling or the spelling based on my
spelling system (see II. Spelling System).
e.g. Abdeiwahab el-Affendi (for reference)
cAbd al-Wahhaab al-'Afandii (transliteration)
Abd al-Wahhab al-Afandi (by Spelling System)
(f) Quotations from Arabic Books
Quotations will be presented in the form of English
transliteration.
4. References of Arabic Books
e.g. Note:
Hasan al-Turaabii, Al-Haraka al-'Islaamiiya f ii al-Suudaan
(The Islamic Movement in Sudan) (Al-Kuwayt: Daar al-Qalam,
1988), p. 15.
Bibliography:
Al-Turaabii, Hasaa, Al-Haraka al-'Islaamiiya f ii
al-Suudaan (The Islamic Movement in Sudan) (Al-Kuwayt:
Daar al-Qalam, 1988).
S	 xxi
exceptions
e.g.	 c:,—'—	 Hasan
e.g.	 Al-Khartuum
Hassan
(see Customary Usage)
Khartoum
(see Customary Usage)
Preface
III. Spelling System
English spelling of Arabic words and names of people and places fol-.
lows a system of spelling based on my transliteration system, however,
the spelling which has been accepted widely as customary usage remains
unchanged.
1. Letters
CONSONANTS	 VOWELS
/	 .	 /
	
______ /
	
z	 q	 a
	
b	 s	 k	 /	 i
t	 sh	 J	 1	 u
th	 s	 r	 m
j	 d	 n	 (long)
h	 ..,	 t	 h	 1L	 a
kh	 .3;	 z	 w	 i
d	
/"	
y	 u
dh	 gh
r	 L	 f
a ( at in construct state)
al- (article)
Arabic
	
Transliteration System Spelling System
e.g.	 A1-Turaabii
	
Al-Turabi
e.g.	 'Ahmad
	
Ahina d
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2. Customary Usage
In the following cases, the researcher will use the spellings of cus-
tomary usage which he and his supervisor have decided as fairly common
usage and exceptions.
(a) Names of People
Customary	 Transliteration System	 Spelling System
Abdalla	 CAbd Allaah	 Abd Allah
Awadalla	 CAwad Allaah	 Awad Allah
Dafalla	 DafC Allaah	 Daf Allah
Faisal	 Faysal	 Faysal
Hassan	 Hasan	 Hasan
Husain	 Husayn	 Husayn
Nasser	 Naasir	 Nasir
Omar	 CUmar	 Umar
Osman	 cTithmaan	 Uthman
Shaikh	 Shaykh	 Shaykh
Yassin	 Yaasiin	 Yasin
Zain	 Zayn	 Zayn
Abdel Nasser
Anwar Sadat
Chadli Bendjedid
Habib Bourguiba
Malik Bennabi
Muainmar Qadhafi
Jafar Ninlairi
Zain Ben Au
CAbd al-Naasir
Anwar al-Saadaat
Shaadhilii bin Jadiid
Habiib buu Ruqayba
Naalik bin Nabii
MUC ammar al-Qadhdhaafii
Jac far Numayrii
Zayn bin cAli
Abd al-Nasir
Anwar al-Sadat
Shadhili bin Jadid
Habib bu Ruqayba
Malik bin Nabi
Muainxnar al-Qadhdhafi
Jafar Numayri
Zayn bin All
(b) Names of Places and States
Customary	 Transliteration System	 Spelling System
El-Hasaheisa	 Al-Haaa Hiisaa	 Al-Hasa Hisa
El-Nahud	 Al-Nahuud	 Al-Nahud
El-Obeid	 Al-.'Ubayyid	 Al-Ubayyid
El-Roseires	 Al-Ruuiiri	 Al-Rusiris
Halaib	 Halaayb	 Halayb
Hantoub	 liantuub	 Hantub
Kassala	 Kasalaa	 Kasala
Khartoum	 Al-Kharuum	 Al-Khartum
Nimule	 Nimuulay	 Nimulay
Mecca	 Maicka	 Nakka
Omdurman	 'Umm Durmaafl	 Uirim Durman
Torit	 Tawriit	 Tawrit
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Umm Ruwaba	 'Umm Rawwaaba	 Umm Rawwaba
Equatoria	 Al ? Istiwaa' iiya	 Al-Istiwaiya
Gedaref
	
Al - Qadaari f	 Al -Qadar if
Gezira	 Al - Jaz ii ra	 Al-Jaz Ira
Jonglei
	
Juunqli.i
	
Junqli
Kordofan	 Kur dfaan	 Kurdfan
Nile	 Nayl
	
Nayl
Sennar	 S innaar	 S inna r
Sudan	 Al-Suudaan	 Al - Sudan
(Definite articles will remain in capital letters.)
(c) Other Words
Customary	 Transliteration System
	 Spelling System
dura	 dhura	 dhura
Fatah	 Fath	 Fath
Hizbolla	 Hizb Allaah	 Hizb Allah
Koran	 al-Qur'aan	 al-Quran
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The following photographs were taken by the researcher.
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(1) Khartoum Mosque in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)
(2) Satellite dish on top of the house at Al-Aminarat
in Khartoum, Sudan. (Nay 1994)
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(3) Public transport running on Africa Road at Al-Ainniarat
in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994) (fare: Sf 10)
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(4) Public transport running on Africa Road at A1-Ammarat
in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994) (fare: S 10)
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(5) Street stall and a stallkeeper at A1-Ammarat
in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)
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(6) Water jars at Al-Anunarat in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)
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(7) Dr I-{assan al-Turabi at his PAIC office
in Khartoum, Sudan. (25 January 1995)
(8) President Omar al-Bashir and the researcher at the
Presidential Palace in Khartoum, Sudan. (4 February 1995)
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(9) Dr Hassan al-Turabi and the researcher at the PAIC
office in Khartoum, Sudan. (14 May 1994)
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Maps
Map P.(1): Sudan
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Sudan,
1994/1995 (London: ELU, 1994). (photocopy)
N.B.: Some spellings of the place names are different from the
researcher's usage (see Preface).
The names of Abu Hamad, El Nahud, Halaib, Umm Ruwaba, and
ERITREA are added to the original map.
xxx
Maps
Map P.(2): Tn-city area (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurinan)
Source: Scott Wayne, Egypt and Sudan: A Travel Survival Kit,
(Australia: Lonely Planet, 1990), pp. 386-387. (photocopy)
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Definitions
"Islamism"
The term Islaaism is used to refer to political ideology which advo-
cates the establishment of an Islamic political order, such as an
Islamic state or an Islamic community, umzna ('umma), which clearly
contradicts secularism.
"Islamist"
An Islamist is a person who adopts Islamnism as his or her political
ideology. For example, Dr Hassan al-Turabi (Hasan al-Turaabii) is an
Islamist, but Sadiq al-Mabdi (Saadiq al-Mandii) is not.
"Islamist movement"
An Islamnist movement is an Islamic movement led by an Islamist leader
(or leaders). An Islamic movement led by Dr al-Turabi is an Islamist
movement. In this sense, any movement led by Sadiq al-Mandi can not
be regarded as an Islamist movement.
"Personality"
The researcher defines the term "personality" as the behavioral
tendencies which stem from factors of identity, particularly "motives"
and "characters (imagoes)" (see 1.2.3 for further details).
xxxii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 FOCUS AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Dr Hassan Abdalla al-Turabi (Hasan cAbd Allaah al-Turaabii) is the
most prominent and powerful Islamist' leader in Sudan. Many western
scholars believe that Dr al-Turabi is the real leader of the country
and that the 1989 military coup was planned by him. Whatever the
truth is, there is no doubt that he has a great influence on Sudanese
politics and government. He organized the first Popular Arab and
Islamic Conference (PAIC) 2 in 1991 in Khartoum, and in the second con-
ference in 1993 approximately 500 participants came from all over the
world to attend. Among the movements represented was the Palestinian
Hamas (Hamaas), the Lebanese Hizbolla (Hizb Allaah), and the Islamic
Salvation Front of Algeria (FIS). 3 The occasion demonstrated that Dr
al-Turabi and Sudan had considerable influence on the Islamist move-
ments 4 of the world.
The focus of the study is on the Islamist movement led by Dr Has-
san al-Turabi from 1964 to 1995. Since 1964, the Islamist movement
has been effectively under the influence of Dr al-Turabi, and Sudan
today may be regarded as a state shaped by the Islamist movement.
Compared to other Islamist movements in the world, the Sudanese
Islamist movement has some unique aspects. The Sudanese movement was
able to establish an Islamic state in 1989, while other movements,
such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (established in 1928), are
still struggling as opposition movements. The current Sudanese
government has been claiming and emphasizing that its economy is com-
pletely Islamic, even the Iranian government does not emphasize this
point any more. 5 Despite Sudan's strong advocacy of Islam, the
actual application of Islam in some fields seems to be more moderate
than that in some other Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and
Iran.	 For example, Sudanese women wear less restricted Islamic
clothes than do Saudi women.	 Unlike Iran, Sudan has never banned
video or satellite equipment.
.4.	
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Because Dr al-Turabi has been playing a very important role in the
Sudanese Islarnist movement, and is the most prominent and influential
leader of the movement, the researcher believes that a better
understanding of the Islamist movement requires a better understanding
of Dr al-Turabi himself, starting with his personality.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
Because the researcher believes that the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's
personality is very important, a psychological approach will be
employed. This is then used to throw light on the Islamist movement
led by Dr al-Turabi.
1.2.1 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
In the history of political science, a variety of psychological meth-
ods have been introduced into the field. There are many different
approaches in this respect. An approach based on "personality theory"
is deemed most suitable here, because the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's
personality is seen as important.
" Psychob iography "6 is one approach based on personality theory.
This approach is associated with Freudian psychoanalysis and has many
shortcomings. 7 The researcher believes that psychobiography relies
too much on the interpretation of one's childhood. Although childhood
influences are important for understanding personality, the researcher
believes that behaviour is not determined wholly by childhood
influences and that it is necessary to examine a longer period of
life. McAdams points this out:
'Early experience does not determine the quality of identity.
Instead, early experience provides "raw materials" or
"resources" for the making of identity in adolescence and
adulthood. Other resources come from biology and culture.
Many different forces and factors, some within the person and
some in the person's environment, may help shape identity by
providing raw materials for the making of the self.'8
3
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After examining various kind of psychological approaches based on
personality theory, and with the help of Professor McAdams, 9 the
researcher has chosen MeAdams' life-story model of identity as the
most suitable theory to understand Dr al-Turabi's personality.
Diagram l.2.(l) is intended to show the position of the
researcher's approach in political science, and Diagram l.2.(2) is
meant to show the position of McAdams' life-story model in psychology.
Diagram 1.2.(l): The position of the researcher's approach
Political science
P sycho logi cal approach
Researcher' s approach
using
McAdams' life-story model
Diagram 1.2.(2): The position of McAdams' life-story model
r.__ _t.. -,
£
Personality psychology
Narrative approach
McAdams' life-story model
The researcher will employ a psychological approach based on
McAdams' life-story model of identity in order to understand Dr al-
Turabi. The Sudanese Islamist movement will be analyzed in terms of
Dr al-Turabi's personality by using the life-story model.
McAdams' life-story model is a new theory and his major book on
the theory was published in 1993. The researcher could not find any
application of NcAdanis' model in a suitable political field when
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developing his theoretical framework. 	 Therefore, his research con-
stitutes an innovational attempt at applying the model.
1.2.2 MCADANS' LIFE-STORY MODEL OF IDENTITY
McAdams' life-story model is a theory of human identity and 'is built
around the idea that each of us comes to know who he or she is by
creating a heroic story of the
McAdams says:
'We are all tellers of tales. We each seek to provide our
scattered and often confusing experiences with a sense of
coherence by arranging the episodes of our lives into
stories.	 This is not the stuff of delusion or self-
deception. We are not telling ourselves lies. Rather,
through our personal myths, each of us discovers what is true
and what is meaningful in life. In order to live well, with
unity and purpose, we compose a heroic narrative of the self
that illustrates essential truths about ourselves.'1'
Although a life story is based on facts and truth, the significance of
it lies rather in the "meaning" of the story, i.e. it may tell us how
the teller saw, understood, or wanted to understand the experienced
facts and truth. In psychological research, the "narrative mode or
approach" opens a way for the analysis of human action and intention'2
and is suitable to understand human needs and goals.' 3 McAdams says:
'if you want to know me, then you must know my story, for my Story
defines who I am." 4 This suggests that if we want to understand Dr
al-Turabi, then we must know his story.
The main material in this approach is the verbal account. McAdams
says: 'I ask people to tell me the stories of their lives because I
believe their verbal accounts hold the outlines of internalized per-
sonal myths. ... An interview can elicit aspects of that myth,
offering me hints concerning the truth already in place in the mind of
the teller." 5
	Dr al-Turabi's verbal account will be the main
material used in analyzing his personality.
According to McAdams, a person's identity is the story itself'6
and evolves gradually over tjme.' 7 A life story is a 'patterned
integration of our remembered past, perceived present, and anticipated
future." 8	The development of life story (or personal myth) is
4.	 5
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explained through the following five periods: (1) infancy and early
childhood (preschool age), (2) childhood (elementary school age), (3)
adolescence (teenage), (4) early adulthood (ages approx. 20-40), and
(5) middle adulthood and beyond (ages approx. 40-65). To understand
how the theory can be used to analyze personality, the researcher will
quote McAdams. Each period of development will be explained by two
paragraphs which are written from slightly different angles. (Impor-
tant terms are put in bold letters by the researcher.)
(1) INFANCY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD (PRESCHOOL AGE)
'The development of personality myth may be traced from
infancy to old age. ... [In infancy and early childhood,]
even before we consciously know what a story is, we are
gathering material for the self-defining story we will some-
day compose. From the early bond of attachment formed with
our parents, our first year of life leaves a legacy of
optimism or pessimism that will influence the narrative tone
we later adopt as adults. A second legacy of our earliest
years may be the distinctive emotionally charged imagery we
employ in our personal myth, whose roots lie in the fantasy
play of preschoolers.'19
'In their first relationships of love and trust, infants
develop unconscious attitudes about hope and despair. Babies
learn the first unconscious lessons about how the world works
and how human beings can be expected to behave. An infant's
relationship with mother and father is likely to influence
the long-term development of a myth's narrative tone. Every
personal myth has a pervasive narrative tone, ranging from
hopeless pessimism to boundless optimism. For Margaret
Sands, the general tone is pessimistic, as she seeks meaning
and purpose within a narrative couched in insecurity and
framed in tragic terms. Preschool children collect the cen-
tral images that someday will animate their personal myths.
Arresting images make stories memorable to children of this
age. The plots of many stories may be too hard to grasp in
toto, but preschoolers remember the images. Four-year-olds
make sense of their experience in terms of the emotionally
charged symbols and images they collect - representations,
for instance, of home and school, mommy and daddy, God and
the devil ... While much of this early imagery passes into
oblivion as children grow up, some significant images and
representations survive into adulthood and are incorporated
into the personal myth. We catch a glimpse of self-defining
imagery in Margaret Sands's return to the chapel. The reli-
gious icons and symbols from her childhood are invested with
deep feelings of loathing and regret.'2°
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(2) CHILDHOOD (ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AGE)
'The central themes of power [agency] and love [communion]
run as motivational currents through our personal myth in
adulthood, and ... their sources may be followed back to the
stories we hear, learn, and create in elementary school.'2'
'As children begin formal schooling, they develop
increasingly logical and systematic thought, and they come to
appreciate stories as thematically organized wholes. They
recognize that story characters are striving to reach certain
goals over a period of time. From stories, as well as from
other sources, school-age children begin to establish their
own motivational patterns.	 Goals and desires are con-
solidated into stable dispositions centered on the needs for
power [agency) and love [communion]. These patterns of
desire will ultimately be reflected thematically in their
personal myths. Motivated by a strong desire for intimacy,
Margaret has constructed a personal myth that underscores
caregiving and helping others. Yet she is still quite
ambivalent about establishing long-term intimate relation-
ships with friends or lovers.'22
(3) ADOLESCENCE (TEENAGE)
'In adolescence, we create an ideological setting for our
personal myth to situate our story in a context of what we
believe to be true and good. Adolescence heralds the
beginning of mythmaking proper in the human life cycle, as
teenagers begin to see their lives in stories, historical
terms. '23
'We first become self-conscious mythmakers in our late-
adolescent years, when we confront head-on the problem of
identity in human lives. The adolescent begins by con-
sciously and unconsciously working through an ideological
setting for the myth - a backdrop of fundamental beliefs that
situates the story within a particular ethical and religious
location. Therefore, the transition from adolescence to
young adulthood is an especially significant phase in the
development of human identity. A fundamental challenge of
mythmaking in adolescence and young adulthood is to formulate
personally meaningful answers to ideological questions so
that one's identity can be built on a stable foundation.
People tend to establish the ideological setting in late
adolescence and very early adulthood, and for most the set-
ting remains relatively intact and constant for the rest of
their years. Margaret's hardheaded agnosticism provides an
ideological setting for her personal myth. It remains today
an unquestioned backdrop for the plot of her story.'24
(4) EARLY ADULTHOOD (AGES APPROX. 20-40)
the fashioning and refinement of main characters in per-
sonal myth, a process we begin in early adulthood. Main
4.
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characters work to personify our basic desires for power and
for love. These main characters, or internalized "imagoes",
may assume such prototypical guises as the warrior, the sage,
the lover, the caregiver, the humanist, the healer, and the
survivor, among others. The kind of main characters we
script into our self-defining stories help determine the
quality of our overall identity. Discontent and malaise in
our early adult years may often signal problems in the
scripting of our characters. ... Such problems may also bear
on issues of human faith and the quest for meaning.'25
'Young adults in their twenties and thirties concentrate
their mythmaking energies on the creation and refinement of
main characters. Our myths and our lives are generally too
complex to be populated by a single main character. Myths
draw their characters from an individual's imagoes, which are
internalized complexes of actual or imagined personas. Many
personal myths contain more than one dominant imago, as cen-
tral protagonists within the self interact and sometimes con-
flict in the making of identity. We see a vivid example of
this in the narrative tension between Margaret the caregiver
and Margaret the hell-raising rebel. Indeed, the richest and
most dynamic personal myths are populated by a number of con-
flicting and elaborate imagoes.'26
(5) MIDDLE ADULTHOOD AND BEYOND (AGES APPROX. 40-65)
't In our middle-adult years and beyond,) personal mythmaking
may become more integrative ... as we seek to bring opposing
parts of our story together into a vitalizing and harmonious
whole. We also become concerned at mid-life with the
anticipated ending of the life story and the new beginnings
that we may be able to generate in our work lives, in family,
and in community. Effective parenting, teaching and mentor-
ing, long-term friendships, occupational commitments and
achievements, creative contributions in the arts and
sciences, volunteer work - all of these activities and a host
of others, some grand and some humble, can be part of what I
call ... the "generativity script" of personal myths. The
generativity script links the individual personal myth to the
collective stories and myths of society as a whole and to the
enterprise of promoting and improving human life and welfare
from one generation to the next. ... The personal myth con-
tinues to develop and change through most of our adult years.
But some of us, in the last years of our lives, will suspend
the making of myth and begin to take final stock of what we
have made. ... As I see it, to find integrity in life is to
look back upon one's personal myth and determine that, for
all its shortcomings and limitations, it is good. The per-
spective is that of the creator looking back upon the fruits
of his or her creation and gracefully accepting what has been
made. If the creator rejects the creation, the creator expe-
riences despair. The identity is not worth accepting, and it
is too late to create a new one. I suspect that most of us
will look back on the creation of our personal myths with a
4.	 8
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mixture of acceptance and rejection. Until we reach those
postmythic days, however, we wait in suspense for the time
when each of us must adopt the role of literary critic, and
offer the definitive analysis and review of the identity each
of us has labored to write and live.'27
'Integrating and making peace among conflicting imagoes
in one's personal myth is a hallmark of mature identity in
the middle-adult years. All good stories require a satisfy-
ing ending. As we move into and through our middle-adult
years, we become increasingly preoccupied with our own myth's
denouement. Yet all of us are profoundly ambivalent about
the sense of an ending. Few of us are eager to die. Mature
identity requires that we leave a legacy that will, in some
sense, survive us. Many individuals, at this stage in their
lives, refashion their myths to ensure that something of per-
sonal importance is passed on. As we see in Margaret's
story, a child may come to represent the transmission of
something good within the self into the next generation.
Like the religious and cosmic myths that humankind has
created across the ages, a personal myth can carry forward
something about humankind that is worth preserving and
improving. The stories we create influence the stories of
other people, those stories give rise to still others, and
soon we find meaning and connection within a web of story
making and story living. Through our personal myths, we help
to create the world we live in, at the same time that it is
creating us.'28
Diagram 1.2.(3) is intended to show a simplified structure of the
life-story model.
Diagram l.2.(3): A simplified structure of the life-story model
I
 raw materials for shaping personality
e.g. early experience, culture, biology,
religion, family heredity, etc.
internal & external factors
con tinued
•1•
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Diagram l.2.(3): continued
(1) Infancy and early childhood
Narrative Tone
unconscious attitudes about hope and despair
e.g. optimistic, pessimistic
Imagery
emotionally charged images
e.g. solemn image of Islam
honorable image of father
(2) Childhood (elementary school age)
— Central Themes of Power (Agency)
I	 and Love (Communioni
motivational currents or patterns
agentic motives: self-strivings, seeking to I for
conquer, master, control, overcome, create,
produce, explore, persuade, advocate,
analyze, understand, win;
power, achievement, expansion, etc.
e.g. to control a movement, to expand Islam, etc.
communal motives: other-oriented things, seeking
to I for
unite with others, nurture, cooperate,
encourage, communicate, share;
longing for contact, love, intimacy, etc.
e.g. to unite Muslims, etc.
(3) Adolescence (teenage)
Ideological Set
what we believe to be true and good
e.g. Islamic values
continued
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Diagram l.2.(3): continued
(4) Early adulthood (ages 20-40) I
- 
Main Characters (Imagoes)
acting and thinking as if he or she is the
character
agentic characters: described by adjectives;
aggressive, ambitious, adventurous, wise,
assertive, autonomous, clever, courageous,
daring, dominant, enterprising, forceful,
independent, resourceful, restless,
sophisticated, stubborn, etc.
e.g. the revolutionary, the hero,
the winner, the reformer, etc.
communal characters: described by adjectives;
affectionate, charming, altruistic,
enticing, gentle, kind, loyal, sensitive,
sociable, sympathetic, warm, etc.
e.g. the friend, the caregiver,
the lover, etc.
(5) Middle adulthood and beyond (ages 40-65)
- Ending and Generativjflr
People tend to become increasingly concerned
with their own mortality and
with what they will be able to leave behind.
looking back
acceptance -- satisfaction
rejection -- despair
Sources: McAdams, The Person and The Stories We Live By.
The researcher added some examples relating to
the case of Dr al-Turabi.
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The factors of identity, such as narrative tone, imagery,
ideological setting, motives, and characters are shaped from
"p sychologi cal" raw materials, such as culture, religion, family
heredity, biology, parents' influence, experiences in life, and so on.
To quote McAdams:
'The tone, imagery, and themes of an adult's life story are
not a direct result of experiences from infancy and child-
hood. Instead, early experience provides "raw materials" or
"resources" for the making of identity in adolescence and
adulthood. Other resources come from biology and culture.
Many different forces and factors, some within the person and
some in the person's environment, may help shape identity by
providing raw materials for the making of the self. In
adolescence, people begin to draw upon the resources at hand
to make their own identities. Identities are always made in
a psychological context, in relationships with others, in the
midst of an interpersonal world. Our friends, families,
teachers, pastors; and many others influence our
identities. '29
For example, parents, family, society, culture, and religion are
all major sources of images. 3 ° Religion is an important source of
ideological setting. 3 ' Main characters or imagoes often reflect one's
ideology, and are often fashioned on models provided by significant
people. To quote McAdams:
'Imagoes often reflect personal values and beliefs. Sig-
nificant aspects of an adult's ideological setting may be
clearly expressed in imagoes. A fundamentalist Christian may
develop an imago of the evangelist, a character devoted to
spreading the Christian gospel to all who have yet to accept
it. ... Adults fashion their imagoes on models provided by
parents, teachers, siblings, friends, and many other sig-
nificant people they have known.'32
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1.2.3 PERSONALITY AND LIFE-STORY
(1) DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY
According to Reber, "personality" is 'a term so resistant to defini-
tion and so broad in usage that no coherent simple statement about it
can be made.'33
In the researcher's approach, however, the term "personality" is
used to refer to the "behavioral tendencies" stemming from factors of
identity, particularly "motives" and "characters (imagoes)" - terms
used in McAdams' life-story model of identity.
The term "personality" is not used in I4cAdams's life-story model
of identity, but the researcher uses the term as the bridge between
McAdams' model and the researcher's approach.
(2) EXAMPLES OF PERSONALITY
In the McAdams' model, motives and characters are basically classified
into two categories, "agentic" motives and characters and "communal"
motives and characters. He describes some examples of behavioral
tendencies (personality) which stem from these motives and characters.
(a) Agentic personality
Agentic motives include two main motivations - "power" motivation and
"achievement" motivation.34
McAdams explains power motives and the behavioral tendencies (per-
sonality) derived from them as follows:
'The power motive is a desire for feeling strong and having
impact on the world.'35
'People high in power motivation show a strong and con-
sistent preference for experiences of feeling strong and
having impact on the environment, compared with people low in
power motivation. They tend to be highly conscious of
prestige and status in life; they are likely to take bold
13
Chapter 1
risks; they are drawn to positions of high leadership and
influence; they tend to be quite dominant in social groups;
they perceive their own friendship in powerful, agentic
terms. '36
'"Helping one's friend" is a central activity in accounts
of friendship provided by people high in power motivation.
For power-driven people, the proof of good friendship is
the ability to come to the rescue of one's friend.'37
According to NcAdams, achievement motives and the behavioral
tendencies (personality) stemming from them are explained as follows:
'The achievement motive is a desire for feeling competent and
doing things better than others do them.'38
'People high in achievement motivation tend to prefer and
show high performance in tasks of moderate challenge that
provide immediate feedback concerning success and failure;
they tend to be persistent and efficient in many kinds of
performance, sometimes cutting corners or even cheating a
little in order to maximize productivity; they tend to
exhibit high self control and focus their energies on careful
planning for the future; and they tend to be restless,
innovative, and drawn towards change and movement. ... [In
a research] students high in achievement motivation appear to
have more realistic career aspirations, adopting a level-
headed and pragmatic manner in career choice. ... [A sur-
vey] indicates that men high in achievement motivation report
more job satisfaction, evaluate their jobs as more interest-
ing, and prefer work to leisure.'39
'People high in achievement motivation show a strong and
consistent preference for experiences of feeling competent
and doing better in the performance of tasks compared with
people low in achievement motivation. They tend to be very
efficient and levelheaded in their career pursuits; they are
likely to take prudent and moderate risks; they tend to plan
carefully for the future; they are innovative; and they
derive great satisfaction from their work, in general prefer-
ring work to leisure.'4°
McAdams describes agentic characters as follows:
'[Agentic characters] are characters who seek to conquer,
master, control, overcome, create, produce, explore, per-
suade, advocate, analyze, understand, win. They are
described by such adjectives as aggressive, ambitious,
adventurous, assertive, autonomous, clever, courageous,
daring, dominant, enterprising, forceful, independent,
resourceful, restless, sophisticated, stubborn, and wise,
among many others.'4'
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(b) Communal personality
Communal motives include two main motivations - "intimacy" motivation
and "love" motivation. 42
	McAdams does not say much about love
motives, perhaps because intimacy and love can not be clearly sepa-
rated (as power and achievement motivations were). McAdams points out
that: 'Intimacy improves love.143
To quote ?Ic.Adams:
'Human communion, research indicates, involves overlapping
desires for intimacy and love. Though love and intimacy,
each of us is able to relate to others in warm, close, and
supportive ways. Some people seem to be more communal in
their life motivations than others. They may show markedly
high levels of intimacy motivation, revealed in the ways they
act and speak with their friends and in social groups,
Intimacy and love are not precisely the same experiences.
But both are born of communion and remain part of an extended
family of human experiences, all tied together for their
emphasis on human ties.'44
The following are descriptions of intimacy motives and the behav-
ioral tendencies (personality) derived from them. To quote McAdams:
'The intimacy motive is a recurrent desire for warm, close,
and sharing interaction with other human beings.
People high in intimacy motivation are described by their
friends and acquaintances as especially "loving", "sincere,"
"natural," and "appreciative," and are rated especially low
on adjectives such as "self-centred" and "dominant." In
small groups, they tend to promote friendly relations and
build group solidarity, sometimes at the expense of their own
prestige and status. Rather than dominate others, they pre-
fer to surrender control in many interpersonal situations,
adopting the role of the listener or the person who works
behind the scenes to promote interpersonal harmony and good-
will. ... People high in intimacy motivation tend to spend
more time thinking about other people and their relationships
with them. ... In the eyes of the person high in intimacy
motivation, the ideal friend is the person with whom you can
share the most personal information [i.e. secretj, knowing
that the friend will listen, accept, and never betray your
confidence. '45
McAdams explains communal characters as follows:
'There are numberless characters who act, think, and feel in
communal ways. Oriented towards love and intimacy, these are
characters who seek to unite with others in passionate
embrace, who love and care for others, who nurture,
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cooperate, encourage, communicate, and share with others.
They work to provide settings for love and intimacy, and to
cultivate the best in human intercourse. They are described
by adjectives such as affectionate, charming, altruistic,
enticing, gentle, kind, loyal, sensitive, sociable,
sympathetic, and warm, among many others.'46
In one's life, agentic motives and characters often coexist with
communal motives and characters, although these are quite opposite in
nature. Opposite or conflicting elements of characters are, there-
fore, often found in the same life-story. McAdams points out the corn-
plex nature of life-story as follows:
'Our myths and our lives are generally too complex to be
populated by a single main character. Myths draw their
characters from an individual's imagoes, which are internal-
ized complexes of actual or imagined personas. Many personal
myths contain more than one dominant iniago, as central
protagonists within the self interact and sometimes conflict
in the making of identity. We see a vivid example of this in
the narrative tension between Margaret the caregiver
[communal character]	 and the hell-raising rebel [agentic
character]. Indeed, the richest and most dynamic personal
myths [life stories] are populated by a number of conflicting
and elaborate imagoes [main characters].'47
(3) NUCLEAR EPISODES
One's personality - behavioral tendencies stemming from factors of
identity, particularly motives and characters - is often expressed in
the "nuclear episodes" (McAdams' term), of which a life-story was
made. 48 In other words, the clues or signs of personality are starred
in life-story.49
MeAdams explained the term "nuclear episodes" as follows:
'As we begin to adopt a historical perspective on the self in
adolescence and young adulthood, we select and reconstruct
those scenes from our past that are the climaxes of different
acts of the life story. 	 I call these scenes nuclear
episodes. These past episodes represent our subjective
memories of particular events, in particular times and
places, which have assumed especially prominent positions in
our understanding of who we were and, indeed, who we are.'50
'Nuclear episodes often reveal central thematic lines in
identity. The superordinate themes of agency and communion
run through many accounts of nuclear episodes of continuity
and of change.	 Therefore, narrative accounts of nuclear
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episodes are windows into the organization of human desire.
Agentic needs for power and achievement and communal needs
for love and intimacy are expressed clearly in many accounts
of life-story high points, low points, and turning points.''
According to McAdams, people with strong power motivation tend to
recall nuclear episodes characterized by the next four agentic motifs:
(1) strength I impact, (2) status / recognition, (3) autonomy I inde-
pendence, (4) competence / accomplishment. 52
 On the other hand,
people with strong intimacy motivation tend to recall nuclear episodes
characterized by the next four communal motifs: (1) love 1 friendship,
(2) dialogue / sharing, (3) care / support, (4) unity / togeth-
erness.
1.2.4 RESEARCHER'S APPROACH
This sub-section will explain the following three points: (1) how the
researcher's approach is going to work and (2) what kinds of material
are going to be used, and (3) how the material is used in analyses.
(1) BASIC LOGIC OF THE APPROACH
The approach has two steps: firstly (a) finding out Dr al-Turabi's
personality and then (b) assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality on the movement. McAdams's model is used in the first step.
(a) Finding out Dr al-Turabi's personality
Diagram l.2.(4) is meant to show the relations between life-story and
personality.
As discussed in Section 1.2.3, one's personality (behavioral
tendencies stemming from factors of identity, particularly motives and
characters) is often expressed in the nuclear episodes, of which a
life-story is made, and in which the clues or signs of personality are
featured.
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Dr al-Turabi's personality, therefore, will be found by analyzing
his life-story.
Diagram l.2.(4): Relations between life-story and personality
life-story (Dr al-Turabi's account)
infancy and early childhood,
childhood,
adolescence,
early adulthood,
middle adulthood and beyond
life story reflects
factors of identity
factors of identity
narrative tone,
imagery,
ideological setting,
motives,
characters
indicate personality
(b) Assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality
on the movement
Diagram l.2.(5) is intended to show the researcher's "hypothesis" that
Dr al-Turabi's personality has had some impact on the Islamist move-
ment in Sudan, in other words, the movement has reflected Dr al-
Turabi' s personality.
The researcher, therefore, tries to assess the impact of Dr al-
Turabi's personality on the movement, by analyzing the developments,
particularly the key events, of the movements in terms of Dr al-
Turabi s personality.
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Diagram 1.2.(5): Relations between Dr al-Turabi's personality
and the Islamist movement
[	
Dr al-Turabi's personality
imp act
The Islamist movement in Sudan
L2) MATERIAL
In the research, there are two main materials: one is general descrip-
tion of the Islamist movement, and one is Dr al-Turabi's account on
his life and the movement. Both materials are dealt with differently
and are used for different purposes. For this reason, care is taken
to keep the general description of events separate from Dr al-Turabi's
account.
(a) Location of the materials
Between Chapter 2 and Chapter 8, the two materials are basically put
together in the following chapter structure.
(1) General description
(2) Dr al-Turabi's account
(3) Analyses
Chapter 2, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8, however, involve some excep-
tional elements and require further qualifications, which will be
explained later.
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(b) Qualification of the materials
(i) General description
The material under "general description" is subject to the following
qualifications.
Contents: developments (particularly key developments) of the
Islamist movement, excluding Dr al-Turabi's account
Regarded as: historical information or data
Purpose: to understand the development and details of
the events
Chapter 2, however, is exceptional, because the chapter deals with
the period before the emergence of the Islamist movement, and focuses
only on Dr al-Turabi's personality. The contents of general descrip-
tion in Chapter 2, therefore, cover only aspects related to his family
and his life.
Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, the key developments of the
Islamist movement, which are chosen by the researcher based on his
assessment, are presented in the sections of general description.
(ii) Dr al-Turabi's account
The material under "Dr al-Turabi's account" is subject to the follow-
ing qualifications.
Contents: Dr al-Turabi's verbal account on his life and
the movement (regarded as life-story)
Regarded as: psychological information or data,
Purpose: to understand Dr al-Turabi's personality
(Notes under both general description and Dr al-Turabi's
account may include both historical data and psychological
data.)
Dr al-Turabi's verbal accounts were obtained in the researcher's
interviews and were taped. In the interviews, Dr al-Turabi was
allowed to speak "freely" with minimum guidance given by the
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researcher.	 Therefore, Dr al-Turabi talked about his life and the
movement continuously as a "story".
In most of the chapters, Dr al-TurabPs accounts obtained in the
researcher's interviews are presented as a life-story with minimum
modification of the original tape script. Because of this, Dr al-
Turabi's accounts include historical information, too. For this
reason, some readers may feel the need for further ex planation about
some statements in Dr al-Turabi's account. 	 The researcher tries to
meet this demand through notes.
In Chapter 2, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, use is made of Dr al-
Turabi's accounts obtained from published materials. Strictly speak-
ing, these published materials can not be regarded as "life-story",
but the researcher still deals with these materials as psychological
information, in which he believes some signs of personality will be
found.
The contents of Dr al-Turabi's account basically correspond to the
contents of general description, but because of the limitations stem-
ming from the nature of interview and published material, Dr al-
Turabi's account does not necessarily cover every aspect found in the
general description. This occurs particularly in Chapters 5, 7, and
8.
(3) ANALYSES
The research contains analysis in the following two fields: (a) the
analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality and (b) the analysis of the key
developments of the Islamist movement. Both t ypes of analysis are
given in the sections which follows the general description and Dr al-
Turabi's account.
(a) Analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality
The analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality is carried out by using the
material of Dr al-Turabi's account.
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Although Chapter 2 is devoted to analyzing Dr al-Turabi t s per-
sonality, because his life-story does not end in Chapter 2 alone but
continues up to Chapter 6, and to some extent up to Chapter 8, the
analysis of his personality will be continued up to Chapter 8.
(b) Analysis of the key developments of the Islamist movement
The analysis of the key developments of the Islamist movement is
carried out in order to assess the impact of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality on the movement, by using the material of general description
and the results of the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality.
The results of the analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality in the
earlier chapters will be used in the later chapters for the assessment
of the impact of his personality on the movement.
Chapter 2 does not have this kind of analysis.
1.3 CHAPTER PLAN
The purpose and methodology of the study have been discussed in this
chapter (Chapter 1).
In Chapter 2, Dr al-Turabi's personality will be analyzed, based
on McAdams' life-story model of identity. The chapter covers the
origin of the Turabi family (a factor shaping personality) and Dr al-
Turabi's life-story from 1932 to 1964, which roughly corresponds to
the period from early childhood to early adulthood.
Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on Dr al-Turabi's personality alone,
Chapters 3 - 8 bring together aspects related to his personality and
the development of the Islamist movement which Dr al-Turabi led.
Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, the Sudanese Islamist movement
from 1964 to 1995 is divided into five periods and six chapters.
Chapter 3 covers the Islamist movement during the period from the
eve of the 1964 October Revolution to the establishment of the May
regime in 1969. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1964 to
1969.
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Chapter 4 covers the Islamist movement during the period from 1969
to the national reconciliation in 1977. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's
life-story from 1969 to 1977.
Chapter 5 covers the Islamist movement during the period from 1977
to the collapse of the Nimairi (Numayrii) regime in 1985. It also
covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1977 to 1985.
Chapter 6 covers the Islamist movement during the period from 1985
to the 1989 military coup. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story
from 1985 to 1989.
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 cover the Islamist movement during the
period from 1989 to 1995 at the latest. In these chapters, Sudan is
regarded as a state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi (see
Section 7.1 for the reason). Chapter 7 covers domestic matters and
Chapter 8 covers foreign matters. Dr al-Turabi's accounts in these
chapters also cover domestic matters and foreign matters respectively.
The final chapter, Chapter 9, contains the conclusion of this
thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: PERSONALITY BUILDING
Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the personality of Dr Hassan
al-Turabi. The chapter consists of four sections.
Section 2.1 covers general description concerning the origin of
the Turabi family (a factor shaping personality) and the chronological
developments affecting Hassan and his father, Abdalla (cAbd Allaah).
Because Chapter 2 deals with the period before the emergence of the
Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi, it does not follow the same
pattern as the general descriptions in other chapters (see Sub-section
1.2.4.(2)).
Section 2.2 covers Dr al-Turabi's account of the origin of the
Turabi family and his life story from 1932 to 1964.
Section 2.3 covers analyses of factors affecting Dr al-Turabi's
identity and his personality.
Section 2.4 provides some supportive evidence for the analyses in
the previous section.
The usage of "Hassan" instead of "Dr al-Turabi" (especially in
Section 2.1 and 2.2) refers to the period from Dr al-Turabi's birth to
his obtaining the PhD degree - a period which may be regarded as that
from his infancy to his early adulthood.
2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (UP TO 1964)
2.1.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY
(1) TRIBAL ORIGIN
Dr al-Turabi's tribe came from Saudi Arabia about 300 years ago and
his tribe belonged to the Bidiriya (Bidiiriiya) tribal grouping.'
According to Macmichael, the Bidiriya tribal grouping belongs to the
Jaaliyin (Jac aliyiin) group, and the Jaaliyin group is the largest and
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most widely distributed "Arab" tribal group in Sudan. 2 Although the
Jaaliyin group claims to have Abbasi ( c Abbaasii) origin - its members
claim to be descended from al-Abbas (al_ cAbbaas), one of the uncles of
the Prophet Muhammad (Muhammad) and the originator of the Abbasi fam-
ily - there is no evidence to prove ±t.
The name of Dr al-Turabi's direct ancestor, seven generations back
(the researcher will use the phrase "7th grandfather"), can be found
in the book entitled The Book of the Stories of the Holy People, the
Good People, the Scholars, and the Poets in Sudan (known by the name
Tabaqat ( abaqaat)). 4 This is a critical biography of the famous
people who lived under the rule of the Funj (Fuunj) sultanate; it
records many episodes in the life of Dr al-Turabi's ancestor. Dr al-
Turabi's 7th grandfather was a famous Sudanese sufi (suufii: Islamic
mystic) 5 called Hamad al-Nahian bin Muhammad al-Bidiri (Hamad al-
Nahlaan bin Muhammad al-Bidiirii) who was known as Ibn al-Turabi.6
Diagram 2.l.(l) is intended to show the tribal origin of the Turabi
family.
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Diagram 2.1.(1): Tribal origin of the Turabi family
A1-Ab 'as (A1_ cAbbaas)	 Abdalla'(cAbd Allaah)
Prophet Muhammad (Muhammad)
Fatima (Faatima)
Ashraf (Ashraaf)]
[ Jaaliyin (Jac aliyiin) Group ]( in Sudan )
Bidiriya''(Ridiiriiya) Trib ]
Hamad al-Naflan bin Muhammad al-Bidiri
(Hamad al-Nahlaan bin Muhammad al-Bidiirii)
He was known as Ibn al-Turabi. )(d.1704 A.D.)
(6th descendant)
Abdalla al-Turabi
( cAbd Allaah al-Turaabii)(d.1986)
(7th descendant)
Hassan al-Turabi
(Hasan al-Turaabii)(b.1932)
(2) FAMILY HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHTS
According to Karrar, Hamad al-Nahian (Hamad al-Nahlaan al-Turaabii)
was a prominent follower of the Qadiriya (Qaadiriiya) order 7 which was
introduced to Sudan by al-Bahari (al-Bahaarii) in the 16th century.8
According to Lbn Dayf Allah (Ibn Dayf Allaah), al-Bahari travelled to
Taqali (Taqalii) in southern Kordofan (Kurdfaan) and instructed
Abdalla al-Hammal (cAbd Allaah al-Hammaal), the grandfather of Hamad
al-Nahlan. 9 Diagram 2.i..(2) is meant to show Dr al-Turabi's family
heritage in terms of religious thinking.
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Diagram 2.1(2): Family herita ge in terms of reli gious thinking
12th c.
	 Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani
(CAbd al-Qaadir al-Jiilaanii) (1077-1166)
(b. in Persia, d. in Baghdad)
inid-l6th c.	 ,
Taj al-Din al-Bahari
(Taaj al-Dim al-Bahaarii)(b. at Baghdad)
came to Sudan
Abdalla al-Hainmal	 [9th g.f.J
(cAbd Allaah al-Hainmaal)
Muhammad al-Bidiri	 [8th g.f.]
(Muhammad al-Bidiirii)
late-l7th c.	 -	 Hamad a'l'-Nahlan	 —i [7th g.f.1
I	 (Hamad al-Nahlaan al-Turaabii)(d.1704)
20th c.
	
Abdtlla	 [fat*erj( cAbd Allaah al-Turaabii)
* -i
	
Hassan
-	 (Hasan al-Turaabii)
* = Although the Turabi family originated
from the religious line of the Qadiriya order,
the family after Hamad al-Nahian seems to
have abandoned its association with the
Qadiriya order (see Dr al-Turabi's account).
The Tabaqat records some episodes relating to Dr al-Turabi's 7th
grandfather, Hamad al-Nahlan al-Turabi. According to the Tabaqat, he
did not accept gifts.'° He is also known as the first man who
declared himself as the Nandi (Nandii)" in Sudan. According to the
Tabaqat, he travelled to Mecca (Makka) as a pilgrim and there declared
himself the Mandi. As a result, he was beaten by the people and was
ordered to be killed by the Funj king, ICing Badi (Baadii) II (d.1680).
However, partly because he successfully forecast rain and partly
because the king died, he was saved.' 2	The Tabaqat also records an
episode of the resistance activity of Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather
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against the Funj state. According to the record, Hamad al-Turabi lead
the people to sabotage the unfair tax collection of the Funj state.13
It is said that he threatened to break the King's head if he tormented
Muslims again.'4
It is interesting to note that Dr al-Turabi's wife is a sister of
Sadiq al-Mandi (Saadiq al-Mandii) and a great-granddaughter of Muham-
mad Ahmad (Muhammad 'Ahmad) who declared himself the I'Iandi in 1881 and
established the Mandist state in Sudan.
2.1.2 CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ABDALLA AND HASSAN
This sub-section covers the chronological developments affecting
Abdalla and Hassan. The contents of 2.1.2 are based on the
researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi and his elder brother
Professor Dafalla al-Turabi (Daf Allaah al-Turaabii).' 5 The contents
are presented as historical information and are used to help the
understanding of Dr al-Turabi's life story in the next section.
Dr al-Turabi's father, Abdalla al-Turabi, who served as a family-
law judge under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, was transferred to
many different places around the country. As a result, 1-lassan moved
with his father during his infancy and childhood. In his adolescence,
however, Hassan had to separate from his father because Hassan entered
an intermediate school which was located far from his father's working
place. Table 2.1.(1) and Diagram 2.1.(].) are intended to show the
moves of Abdalla and Hassan.
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Table 2.l.(1): Moves of Abdalla and Hasan
Abdalla al-Turabi	 I Hassan al-Turabi
Wad al-Turabi: Birth
Omdurman: Graduation (1924)
{1} Wad Madani: Start of career
{2} several places
3} Kassala
{4} El-Hasaheisa
{5} El-Nahud
{6} Umm Ruwaba
{7} El-Roseires:
Remarriage
{8} Abu Hamad: End of career
Al-Kamlin: Retirement
Death (1986)
(number)	 year
{1} Kassala: Birth (1932)
{2} El-Hasaheisa
{3} El-Nahud
{4} Umm Ruwaba: Elementary
school (39)
{5} El-Roseires: Elementary school
Mother's death (43)
(6} Wad Madani: Intermediate
school (44)
{7} Rufaa: Boarding Intermediate
school
{8} Hantoub: Boarding Secondary
School(48)
{9} Khartoum: Gordon Memorial
College (51)
{lO} London: University of London
(5557)
{11} Paris: University of Sorbonne
(59-64)
{12} Khartoum: (1964 - )
30
ad ('Abuu Hamad)
Chapter 2
Nap 2l.(l): Places of the moves of Abdalla and Hassan
Khartoum (Al-Khartuum)
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Urarn Ruwaba
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(1) ABDALLA
Abdalla ( cAbd Allaah) was born in Wad al-Turabi (Wad al-Turaabii)
which was named after Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather and is located 52
miles south-east from Khartoum (al-Khartuum). Abdalla was the first
graduate of the village school. Later, he went to Omdurman ('Umm
Durmaan) to study Islamic law and graduated from the Islamic higher
educational institute (which later became Omdurinan Islamic University)
in 1924. He wanted to be a teacher, but he was appointed as a family-
law judge by the Anglo-Egyptian authority. He started his career in
Wad Madani (Wad Madanii), south of Khartoum along the Blue Nile.
After serving in several other places, Abdalla was transferred to Kas-
sala (Kasalaa) in Eastern Sudan where Hassan was born in 1932. He was
then transferred to El-Hasaheisa (A1-asaa Hiiaa), then to El-Nahud
(Al-Nahuud) in Western Sudan. After that, he was transferred to Umm
Ruwaba ('Umni Rawwaaba) where Hassan started to take his elementary
education. When Abdalla moved to El-Roseires (Al-Rusiiris), Hassan
had to change his elementary school. In 1943, Hassan's mother, Nafisa
(Nafilsa), died at El-Roseires, leaving her husband and 7 children
behind. When Abdalla was ordered to move to Abu Hamad ('Abuu Hamad)
in Northern Sudan, he decided to remarry. However, when he remarried
there was trouble with the family of his second wife, as they did not
want her to leave her home area. He therefore decided to marry a
third wife. Abdalla brought his third wife with him to Abu Hamad.
After bis retirement, Abdalla bêcame reconciled with his second wife's
family, and then lived with his two wives and children in Al-Icamlin
(Al-Kaaxnliin) near his home town. Abdalla had 7 children (3 male and
4 female) from his first wife Nafisa, 6 children (4 male and 2 female)
from the second wife, and 5 children (3 male and 2 female) from the
third wife. In 1986, Abdalla died, leaving his two wives and 18 chil-
dren.'6
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(2) HASSAN
Hassan (Hasan) was born, the third son of Abdalla, at Kassala in 1932.
He spent his pre-school age at El-Hasaheisa and El-Nahud. He entered
an elementary school at Umm Ruwaba in 1939, 17 then moved to El-
Roseires with his family where he later lost his mother (1943).18
After that, when his father moved to Abu Hamad, Hassan moved to Wad
Madani because his intermediate school was located there. He left his
home and started a relatively independent life at the age of 12 in
1944. While at school in Wad Nadani he lived in his father's friend's
house because he had no relatives there. However, he later moved to
an intermediate boarding school in Rufaa (Rufaa c a). 19 Hassan joined
the riot (the Rufaa incident) 20
 in 1946 which was led by Nabmud Muham-
mad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the leader of the Republican Party I
Brothers. After completing his intermediate education, he moved to
Hantoub (Hantuub) secondary school in 1948. He skipped the third
grade of the school and completed his secondary education in three
years, although this normally took four years. 21
 After that, he
became a student in the law department of the Gordon Memorial Col-
lege22 in Khartoum in 1951. The college was officially a part of the
University of London at that time, but later became the University of
Khartoum (Jaamiaat al-Khartuum). After his graduation from the GMC
with an LLB (Bachelor of Laws) degree in 1955, he went to London in
the summer to start his LLM (Master of Laws) at the University of
London. In 1957, he came back to Sudan with an LLM degree, and
immediately became a lecturer in the law department of the University
of Khartoum. After two years, in 1959, he went to Paris to study for
a PhD degree in law at the Sorbonne University. He married Wisal al-
Mandi in 1961, then returned to Sudan for about one year as a break.
He finally came back to Sudan with his PhD degree in 1964. It was
just before the October revolution which made him famous for the first
time. Dr al-Turabi was 32 years old at this time and had a wife and a
son.
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2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT
Sub-section 2.2.1 includes not only material obtained from
researcher's interviews, but also published material. These materials
are presented separately, i.e. not in "one continuous story". The
published materials are Dr al-Turabi's account, but may be not his
life story.	 They still constitute important psychological informa-
tion.
In Sub-section 2.2.2, the main text is only composed of the
material obtained from researcher's interviews. The material is pre-
sented continuously as a life story.
2.2.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAI"IILY
At a meeting with American academics, Dr al-Turabi told them about the
ethnic identity of the Sudanese people, in a manner which indicated
his perception of his own ethnic background. To quote Dr al-Turabi
(in Lowrie):
'Western Sudan is not part of East Africa or North Africa; it
is part of West Africa. ... Eastern Sudan is part of East
Africa. ... Some of them are probably Arab in descent also,
but all of them are colored peoples, unlike the Arabs who are
very fair, very different. Even the Egyptians in Sudan look
so different from Sudanese. And there is no divide in the
Sudan between Arab and African, anywhere.'23
As far as the sectarian issue is concerned, Dr al-Turabi in his
interview with the researcher said that his direct ancestor, nine gen-
erations back (9th grandfather), might have been influenced by the
Qadiriya order, however his 7th grandfather did not belong to a par-
ticular sufi order because he preferred to be a scholar rather than a
sufi.24
Dr al-Turabi's father, Abdalla al-Turabi (CAbd Allaah al-Turaabii)
who learned the law of the Maliki (Maalikii) school, 25 also preferred
to be neutral and did not belong to a particular sufi order.26
As for Dr al-Turabi himself, he said that he had never regarded
himself as belonging to a particular school or sect, such as Sunni
(Sunnii), Shia (Shi± c a), Maliki, Hanafi (Hanafii), Shafii (Shaaficii),
34
Chapter 2
and Hanbali (Hanbalii) and always respected all of them. 27	Dr al-
Turabi said:
'The Sudan was Haliki, but most of the judges were Egyptians,
so they adopted the Hanafi school of personal law with a few
elements of Maliki practice. But now, there is a new code
which has borrowed freely from all sources of Islamic juris-
prudence, Sunni, or Shi'i, or whatever with respect to the
law of divorce, marriage, parenthood and inheritance.'28
With respect to the stories concerning his 7th grandfather, Dr al-
Turabi said that like his 7th grandfather his father also did not
accept any gift because he wanted to be neutral as a judge and Dr al-
Turabi emphasized this point. 29 As for Dr al-Turabi himself, it seems
that he also was not very pleased with accepting gifts.3°
According to Dr al-Turabi, his 7th grandfather was jailed for
about 7 years because he criticized some injustices in Makka. Dr al-
Turabi said that his own political detention was an "inheritance" of
his ancestor.31
Dr al-Turabi laid emphasis on the reason for his father's trans-
fer. This was, according to Dr al-Turabi, his father's defiant atti-
tude towards the Anglo-Egyptian authority. 32 The authority wanted to
control him, but he always kept his way, did what he believed, and did
not obey the authority. For this reason the authority transferred his
father as a sort of punishment. 33
 Like Dr al-Turabi's 7th grand-
father, Abdalla had a strong spirit of resistance against the author-
ities and foreign intervention.34
With respect to Abdalla's 'remarriage, Dr al-Turabi explained that
since the original family of his father's second wife did not agree
with her accompanying him to Abu Hamad, his father had to decide to
have another wife who could follow him to the town. 35
 According to Dr
al-Turabi, his father did not necessarily support polygamy, but there
was no other choice for him - Abdalla could not have pursued his job
with 7 children without a wife.36
Dr al-Turabi related this to his own position as follows:
'I do not oppose it [polygamy]. My wife herself is the same.
She is also not against polygamy at all. She says that she
does not mind even if her husband takes another wife. The
Koran allows it subject to conditions. If you cannot fulfill
the conditions, you should not do it. It is permissible
legally, but I have no intention.'37
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2.2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S LIFE STORY
This sub-section covers Dr al-Turabi's life story from 1932 to 1964,
which roughly corresponds to the period from infancy to early
adulthood.	 Dr al-Turabi's accounts are presented as one continuous
story, organized in this form by the researcher.
	 For the latter
reasons the researcher does not use the form of quotation.
The contents of this sub-section are obtained from the
researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi in Nay 1994. 38
 As it was
mentioned in Section l.2.4.(2), the contents are regarded as
psychological information ("meaning" is more important than the fac-
tual accuracy) in order to understand Dr al-TurabPs personality.
(1) INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD (1932-43)
Hassan (Hasan) was born the third son of Abdalla and Nafisa (Nafiisa)
at Kassala on 1 February 1932. Although the official birth certifi-
cate was dated 1 January, the real birthday was 1 February. He spent
his pre-school age at El-Hasaheisa and El-Nahud. He started his
elementary education in Uinm Ruwaba at the beginning of 1939 and com-
pleted it in El-Roseires at the end of 1943. Because of the move of
his family, his elementary education took five years (normally four
years). Dr al-Turabi did not r'member much about his mother who died
in 1943. What he remembered most was his father, his father's image,
and his experiences with his father.
Hassan was taught many things by his father, such as Arabic,
Arabic literature, the Koran (al-Qur'aan), and Islamic jurisprudence.
He learned much more Arabic from his father than from any other
teachers he had. His father's knowledge of these subjects was very
advanced in both quality and quantity. When Hassan was an elementary
school pupil, he wrote an Arabic poem for his teacher. The teacher
was very pleased with Hassan's poem and memorized it. Hassan used to
visit his father at his office after his classes, and used to observe
what his father was doing. At that time, the main job of a family-law
judge was to reconcile disputes among parties, and not merely to judge
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who was wrong and who was right. Therefore, the judge was quite
close, emotionally and physically, to the community and was respected
by the members of the community. Hassan saw many people almost every-
day who came to see his father. Hassan's interest in law and justice
was gradually cultivated in this manner.
Abdalla's education of Hassan not only included intellectual
knowledge, but also farming. Even during the fast of Ramadan
(Ramadaan), HasSan used to weed and cultivate the fields with his
father from the early morning to sunset. He grew cereals and vege-
tables. He carried water. He did almost every element of farming
work, including breeding domestic animals and milking a goat. He also
contributed to building the family house by baking and laying bricks.
Hassan speit much time with his father every day, studying and farming
together.
Hassan mainly lived in the urban area, but he sometimes lived
among the poor farmers near his home town, who had little education
(most of them were illiterate or at most educated at the elementary
level). Hassan therefore had experience of life in both urban and
rural areas, and of living in different parts of the country.
Hassan argued with his father about many things - more so than his
brothers did. However, Abdalla was quite pleased with his son's chal-
lenges. Hassan always rained questions to his father as well as to
his teachers. He always asked "Why ?" and criticized them if he was
not satisfied with the answers. He always learned things critically
and did not memorize information'without evaluating it.
Hassan was critical about his father's treatment towards his
sisters because Abdalla did not send his daughters to school.39
Although Abdalla gave his daughters a minimum education including
reading and writing, he did not even allow them to attend his open
classes in the house. Hassan felt this was unfair.
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(2) ADOLESCENCE (1944-55)
(a) Intermediate education (1944-47)
When Abdalla ( CAbd Allaah al-Turaabii) was transferred to Abu Hamad
('Abuu Hamad), Hassan moved to Wad Nadani (Wad Madanli) where an
intermediate school was located. He left his family and started a
relatively independent life at the age of 12, in 1944. At that time,
only 40 students (out of several thousand applicants) were allowed to
enter the intermediate school. He went to school from the house of a
friend of his father, because he had no relatives in Wad Madani.
However, he later moved to an intermediate boarding school in Rufaa
(Rufaac a) because he felt that schooling from his father's friend's
house was uncomfortable.
When Hassan was in Rufaa, he organized a boycott of his class for
the first time in his life. He boycotted an Arabic class with his
classmates, because they were not satisfied with their Sudanese
teacher and were frustrated in the way in which they were taught.
Hassan thought that he knew much more about Arabic than his teacher.
When they finished their class, they left behind a "boycott declara-
tion", putting their names in a circle in order to avoid recognition
of the leader, i.e. Hassan (see Diagram 2.2.(1)).
Diagram 2.2.(l): Si gnatures of the boycott declaration
'S
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Hassan also joined a riot (the Rufaa incident) 40 in 1946 which was
led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad laha), the leader of the
Republican Party / Brothers. In the riot, he joined in the destruc-
tion of the local government office building of the Anglo-Egyptian
authorities in El-Hasaheisa. He had known Mahmud Muhammad Taha from
that time.
Hassan's activities resulted in his suspension from school for a
few weeks as a punishment. He was sent to Wad Nadani to see the
educational authorities.
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(b) Secondary education (1948-50)
After the completion of his intermediate education, he moved to
Hantoub (Hantuub) and entered Hantoub Secondary School in 1948. At
that time, there were only 3 secondary schools in Sudan.
As soon as he entered the school, the communists of the school
tried to persuade him to join their group, but failed to do so. Has-
san was always arguing with the communists.41
When the Palestine War occurred in May 1948, he felt hostile
towards the conspiracy made by the British imperialists and the Jews.
Some Sudanese joined the war as volunteers, but Hassan did not.
At Hantoub Secondary School, there were a few Sudanese teachers
including those who taught Arabic language. Most of the teachers
including the headmaster were British and all subjects, except for
Arabic language, were taught in English.
Hassan bad the ability to understand different viewpoints: the
western viewpoint which was taught by his British teachers and the
traditional viewpoint which had been taught by his father. He always
tried to examine issues from the two different viewpoints. He
examined western concepts in terms of traditional viewpoints, and
examined traditional concepts in terms of western viewpoints. The two
different educational experiences were inseparably integrated within
him.
The British authorities of the secondary school had a policy of
separate education - the British did not allow their pupils to have
much contact with people outside the school, and they always separated
the pupils from the village people near the school. Because of this,
Hassan had little contact with people outside the school.
Hassan was very active inside the school, arguing about the food,
school regulations, and some political matters. He did not understand
much about political matters at that time, but he nonetheless fre-
quently organized demonstrations inside the school. He sometimes
boycotted his classes. Despite his radical activities in the school,
unlike in the Rufaa period he did not receive any severe punishment.
Hassan thought the headmaster, Mr Lewis Brown, was a gentleman and a
nice man.42
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He also enjoyed some sports, such as swimming and football. Has-.
San sometimes played football with Jafar Muhammad Nimairi (Jacfar
Muhammad Nuinayrii), 43 who was studying at the same secondary school
with Hassan and was two years older than him.
He skipped the third grade of the school and completed his sec-
ondary education in three years, which normally took four years.
(C) Higher education (1951-55)
Since he obtained very good marks in the examinations of Sudan School
Certificate, he could choose any faculty in the GNC (the Gordon
Memorial College within the University College of Khartoum). 44 Hassan
was interested in medicine, arts, and law, but he finally chose the
faculty of law. 65 He started his college life at Khartoum in 1951.
In the college, he received two invitations, one from the Islamic
Liberation Movement (the ILM) 46 and the other from the communist move-
ment. Because Hassan was quite well-known among the students for his
radical activities (but not in terms of Islamism) in the secondary
school, both sides wanted to gain his support. A couple of months
later, he decided to join the ILM partly because of his traditional
and Islamic background, and partly because of the weakness of the ILM.
Hassan initially wondered whether it was worth joining the ILM,
because he thought that the level of their knowledge and practice
about Islam was less than his' However, when he saw the struggle
between the ILN and the communist movement and the weak position of
the ILM towards its opponents, he felt that he should help the ILN to
confront the strong communist movement.
Hassan neither refused to talk with the communists, nor neces-
sarily acted against them. At the time, there was little difference
in the activities of the communist movement and the Islamic movement
in the college. For example, the founder of the IL?!, Babikir Karrar
(Baabikir Karraar), bad himself been a member of the communist move-
Inent, as he had not been aware of the notion of atheism in com-
munism. 47
 The communists in the college mainly advocated anti-
imperialism and anti-Western sentiments, and did not mention atheism.
Because of this, many students joined the communist movement.
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However, when these students discovered that communism involved
atheism, many of them suddenly left the communist movement and joined
the Islamic one.
In the early 1950s, there were some exchanges between the ILM in
the GMC and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. At that time, the com-
munists in the GMC called the ILM a "religious movement". Hassan and
other members of the movement rejected such an assessment and asserted
that their movement was an "Islamic movement". Although Islam is a
religion, they insisted on using the term "Islamic" because the term
"religion" had to some extent a negative image (implying "backward"
and "reactionary") at that time.
When the 1952 Egyptian revolution occurred, since there existed a
strong co-operative relationship between the Free Officers who carried
out the military coup and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan and
other members of the ILM supported the revolution and the unionist
advocacy of the unification between Egypt and Sudan. However, when
the conflict between the regime and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
began and Jamal Abdel Nasser (Jamaal cAbd al-Naasir) attacked the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan and others began to have strong
sympathies with the independence movement in Sudan.
Nasser called the ILM in the GMC a Sudanese "Muslim Brother-
hood". 48
 The communists in the GMC took advantage of this
opportunity, using the term "Muslim Brotherhood" in order to create a
negative image about the ILM. However, the ILM was completely inde-
pendent from the Egyptian Musim Brotherhood, and it was neither a
part nor a branch. 49
 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood tried to estab-
lish their branch inside the GNC, but they failed to do so and made a
small branch outside the college. Nonetheless, by 1954 because of the
successful propaganda by the opponents, most people called the ILN a
"Muslim Brotherhood" movement.
In August 1954, the ILN and the branch of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood held an Id ( d id) Congress and officially adopted the
name	 "the Muslim Brotherhood	 (al-'IKhwaan al-Muslimuun)" for a
united organization.	 Muhammad	 Khayr Abd	 al-Qadir (Muhammad
Khayr cAbd al-Qaadir)	 was chosen as the first leader of the new
organization.	 Despite the negative image of the name, Hassan
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agreed to adopt the name because he saw it as expressing an antago-
nistic attitude to Nasser and a sympathetic attitude to the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood which had been banned in January.
At the Id Congress, Hassan became the actual leader 5 ° of the new
Islamic movement. However, partly because he knew that he was going
to go to London next year for his LLM degree, and partly because Abd
al-Qadir was older than Hassan, was a graduate of an Egyptian
university and had some experience in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
Hassan did not claim the initial leadership of the new Islamic move-
ment and gave way to Abd al-Qadir. Up to 1964, Hassan concentrated on
his studies.
When Flassan was in the GMC, he studied the literature of famous
Islamic thinkers, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali (Muhammad al-Ghazaalii),
Muhammad Abduh (Muhammad CAbduh), Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi ('Abuu al-
t Ac laa al-Mawduudii), Hassan al-Banna (Hasan al-Bannaa'), and Sayyid
Qutb (Sayyid Qutb). 5 ' He also studied many issues related to the
Islamic revivalist movement, especially covering the anti-religious
and anti-Islamic approaches on these issues. This was partly Hassan's
preparation for the theoretical dispute with the communists, because
the communists in the college were very powerful. The challenge by
the communists was very stimulating for him, and the debates with them
were very useful for him. Hassan felt that the Islamic inclination
had come to life within him and had began to move. He graduated from
the GMC in 1955.
(3) EARLY ADULTHOOD (1955-64)
(a) London period (1955-37)
In the summer of 1955, Hassan went to London in order to start his
postgraduate study in law at the University of London. He was a stu-
dent at King's College and studied four subjects (jurisprudence,
criminal law, constitutional law, and international law) 52 in the
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the College.
When Hassan started his LLM at the University of London , Sadiq
al-Mandi (Saadiq al-Mandii) 53 was already in Oxford. Sadiq had trans-
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ferred from the University College of Khartoum 54 to the University of
Oxford as a first year student.
	
Despite Sadiq's entrance into the
University College of Khartoum in l953, he escaped from Sudan
because of the trouble between the Mandi family and the police (Dr al-
Turabi's account of this is not the same as that given by Sadiq - see
note). 56
 At that time, the Umma ('Uinina) Party57 was opposing the
Egyptian regime and the unionist cause. On 1 March 1954, when Muham-
mad Najib (Muhammad Najiib) 58 visited Khartoum, a series of bloody
crashes occurred between the ansar ('ansaar) 59 , led by the Umina Party,
and the police.
Despite Sadiq's family heritage in Mandism, 6 ° Sadiq's ideas were
theoretically inclined to Marxism. His religiosity was less than Has-
san's, and Hassan often argued with Sadiq and tried to bring his ideas
back to more traditional Islamic ideas. At that time, Hassan was a
member of the Inter-Arab Islamic Group 61
 and often visited the Islamic
centre in London where a regular meeting was held every week.
The London period was very important in terms of the inter-
nationalization of Hassan's Islamic activity. He met Muslim activists
from many different countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iran,
and Pakistan. He met some internationally well-known scholars. He
argued with some British people (Muslims and non-Muslims) who visited
the mosque. He also made contact with many Muslim students from
around the world, including Asia. He helped in bringing together an
Algerian Muslim community in London in order to support the cause of
Algeria from France.
Hassan became the secretary general of the Sudanese Students Union
in Britain, which was a member of the International Students Union.
He and his colleagues were invited to the International Students' Con-
gress which was held in Prague (the capital of Czechoslovakia) in
August 1956. There, Hassan met Yasir Arafat (Yaasir cArafaat) 62 for
the first time. Arafat was the president of the Palestinian Students'
League in Cairo. 63 Because Hassan and his friends could speak English
quite well and had some experiences in presentation, his group was
welcomed by Arafat 1 s group and helped their presentation on the
Palestinian cause in the conference.64
In the mid-1950s, mainly because of the influence of Jamal Abdel
Nasser (Jamaal cAbd al-Naasir) and the Suez War, the Arab nationalist
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movement was very popular. There were many Arab nationalists but few
Islamists in the student movement. Hassan cooperated with the Arab
nationalists, but he also tried to contact others people, such as
Africans and Asians. Hassan tried to bring about unity on the basis
of "Islam", and not Arab nationalism. This went against the general
trend at that time, where the Arab nationalists were limited their
contact to only the Arabs.
Hassan's impression of the British people and society in those
days were as follows: he found discrimination against his skin color,
an anti-Islamic spirit, and an Orientalist bias against Islam. The
British were anti-Islam and anti-African, and they did not think of
people like Hassan as human beings. The British were very reserved
and their society was very exclusive and closed. It was very diffi-
cult to make friends with British people. Conversations and relation-
ships with them never developed beyond the surface level.
During Hassan's absence, the new Islamic movement (official name
was the Muslim Brotherhood) 65 in Sudan faced an internal crisis.
Muhammad Abd al-Qadir (Muhammad CAbd al-Qaadir), the first secretary
general of the new Islamic movement, became the victim of a dispute
between the ex-ILM wing (inside the college) and the ex-branch of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (outside the college). As a result, in
late 1955, Abd al-Qadir resigned and al-Rashid al-Tahir (al-Rashiid
al
-Iaahir ) 66 became the new leader. In December 1955, the Islamic
Front for the Constitution (IFC) was set up by the movement and was
led by Omar Bakhit (ctlmar Bakhiit: a graduate of an Egyptian
university). However, a personal conflict between al-Tahir (a gradu-
ate of the GMC) and Bakhit developed, and as a result Bakhit left the
movement.
As soon as he came back to Sudan in 1957, Hassan became an
assistant lecturer in law at the University of Khartoum and started to
teach constitutional law and criminal law. In those days, the staff
of the department were almost all British and the subjects were taught
in English. 67 Hassan was not satisfied with the westernized nature of
Sudanese education and always questioned why he had to teach his sub-
jects in English. He wanted to Arabize education and started to teach
criminal law in Arabic, saying there was no regulation about teaching
medium. Because of his defiant attitude towards the British members
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of staff in his faculty, he could not become the Dean of the Faculty
of Law until 1964. The British were always looking for a British Dean
and ignored him.
On 17 November 1958, a military coup was carried out by General
Ibrahim Abbud ('Ibraahiim cAbbuud). This coup was welcomed by many
people, including Hassan himself, because of the impotence of the
previous government.
Hassan spent about two years (up to the Summer 1959) in Khartoum.
During this period, he started to give lectures on the "liberation of
women", for the first time in Sudan. He advocated that women had the
same basic rights as men, and the audiences were shocked by his radi-
cal ideas about women. His radical attitude towards the liberation of
women partly stemmed from his strong feeling over his sisters not
receiving official education. Hassan examined the status of women in
the early period of the Islamic history, keeping in mind the question
"Is it really Islam ?", and found differences between "real Islam" and
conventional Islam. As a result, he concluded that many restrictions
on Muslim women belonged to conventional Islam and not real Islam.
Muslim women in the early times were much more liberated than in the
later period - for example, in early Islam, women did participate in
the election of the third Khalifa (Khaliifa).
During Hassan's stay in Khartoum, he met Wisal al-Nandi (Wisaal
al-Mandii), a sister of Sadiq al-Nandi, for the first time. She
entered the faculty of law in the University of Khartoum as his stu-
dent"68
Al-Rashid al-Tahir had been one of Hassan's closest friends. Has-
san initially thought al-Tahir was democratic, and therefore supported
his leadership of the Islamic movement. Hassan thought that the
leader should behave in a democratic way. Al-Tahir, however, who was
not so democratic, began to act in an individualistic way.
	 Con-
sequently, Hassan had to become the mediator to bring al-Tahir and the
other leaders together. Al-Tahir liked political manoeuvres very
much69 and became involved with coup attempts. Hassan suggested to
al-Tahir that he should consult with his colleagues about what he was
going to do. However, al-Tahir kept his own way. Al-Tahir's individ-
ualistic behaviour resulted in Hassan's plan for restructuring the
organization.
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Preparation for the future was important at this stage of Hassan's
life. He was now preparing for his next postgraduate study, in Paris.
In fact, he started his preparation when he was in London, learning
French at night. After returning to Sudan, he used to attend French
language classes at the French Embassy in Khartoum. In those days,
because the British in the university were hostile to Hassan, it was
quite difficult to obtain permission to study in Paris from the
academic committee. Hassan worked on the French wife of the Dean of
the School of Science to persuade the committee, and finally he suc-
ceeded in obtaining permission. The main reason for his further post-
graduate studies abroad was his desire to improve himself by learning
new things, such as French law, French language and French culture.
He wanted to study French law, because he thought that British law was
not very theoretical, and that it was a mishmash of historical cases.
(b) Paris period (1959-64)
Hassan arrived in Paris in the Summer of 1959. At that time, he was
the only Sudanese student in Paris. He often visited the Sudanese
Embassy and the ambassador. He first took a diploma course in public
law at Sorbonne University. Despite his preparation for the French
language, the language was still his big problem. Although he was
relatively good at "reading" in French, he found oral communication
difficult. At the beginning, he could not understand what his
teachers were talking about. With effort, he managed to overcome his
language problem.
After the completion of the diploma course, he started his PhD in
law. He chose "comparative emergency law" as the topic for his PhD
thesis. He wanted to compare emergency laws in three countries:
Britain, France and America.
As during his London period, Hassan was very active in Islamic
activities in Paris. He established the first official Islamic stu-
dent organization in France, obtaining permission from the Council of
Ministers. 70 In those days the student activists in France came from
North Africa and were mostly communists, mainly because they were
opposed to French imperialism (they did not necessarily approve of all
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communist ideas). Hassan met these students as well as some Islamists
and Islamic scholars.
In the Summer of 1960, Hassan visited the United States for the
first time. His main purpose was to learn more about American law.
He stayed there for about two months. He visited many places and
institutions - universities, prisons, courts, firms, Indian reserva-
tions, and Islamic centres - and met many people. He saw black
people's demonstrations and talked with the demonstrators. He argued
with many people, including some Orientalists. As a result, he came
to know the discrimination against those of Indian and African descent
in the United States. He found the conditions of the prisons very
bad. He learned many things within just two months. He was very
satisfied with his own achievement, because he thought that ordinary
people might have taken two years to reach what he achieved in the US.
Hassan's impressions about America were these: American society
was very diverse, very open, very simple and naive; American people
worked harder than French people; however, they were the most ignorant
people in the world: they did not know anything about other countries.
In early 1961, Hassan married Wisal. 7 ' They held their wedding in
Sudan, but quickly went back to Paris and started their new life. In
October 1961, their first son was born and they came back to Sudan
again later in that year. They stayed in Sudan for about one year,
and went back to Paris in early 1963.
When Hassan was in Sudan in 1962, al-Tahir, the leader of the new
Islamic movement, was still in a jail - he was imprisoned in November
1959 when he became involved in a coup attempt. 72 Hassan made a great
effort towards changing the structure of the organization of the move-
ment. Because the structure of the organization was copied from that
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the leader could in theory
exercise strong power. Partly because of al-Tahir's individualistic
behaviour, and partly because Hassan did not like an autocratic lead-
ership in the movement, Hassan tried to weaken the power of the leader
and introduce a collective leadership. He wanted to make the organi-
zation more democratic. As a result of Hassan's effort towards chang-
ing the structure, al-Tahir was officially replaced as the leader by
Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (Muhammad Yuusuf Muhammad) while he was still
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in the jail. 73
 The power of the new leader was much less than that of
his predecessors.
During Hassan's Paris period, he used to go to cinemas, theaters
and concerts, partly because he wanted to improve his French, and
partly because he loved artistic entertainment. Musical films were
one of his favorite entertainments. Despite his long stay in Paris
(59-61, 63-64), he had few contacts with French people. Nonetheless,
Hassan had some impressions of the French people and society. He
found that the atmosphere in France was freer and a bit more chaotic
than that in Britain, and that the French, in general, were more
friendly than the British.
When Hassan was in Paris, he studied much and read not only legal
books, but also other books, such as historical books. He studied and
analyzed the Reformation and the French Revolution. 74 Hassan thought
that the detailed analyses of these events would be very useful for
his future activities. He examined the good points and bad points of
these big events in Western history.
He thought that although there were many differences between the
two religions (Christianity and Islam), something could be learned
from the other's history. He thought that it might be possible to
regard the current world-wide Islamic movement as, in a sense, "the
Reformation" in Islam. He thought religions sometimes became ill, and
the problems that happened in the Christian world might happen in the
Muslim world. He also thought that if one wanted to reform Islam, the
conflict between the traditionalist and the reformist would be
inevitable.
His final return to Sudan was just before the October revolution
(1964) which made him famous as a politician. Dr al-Turabi was then
32 years old and had a wife and a son.
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2.3 ANALYSES
This section has two sub-sections.
	 The first sub-section gives the
researcher's analysis of the factors of identity - narrative tone,
imagery, motives, ideological setting, and characters (imagoes). In
the second sub-section, the researcher will summarize Dr al-Turabi's
personality stemming from the factors of identity, especially motives
and characters (imagoes).
2.3.1 FACTORS OF DR AL-TURABI'S IDENTITY
Before moving to the analysis, it may be important to note two points.
According to NcAdams, there are individual differences in the develop-
ment of life story, 75 and the sign or evidence of the development in a
particular period tends to appear in the later periods.76
For example, "ideological setting" was explained in Section 1.2.2
above where the period of adolescence was covered. However the actual
development took place over both periods of adolescence and early
adulthood. The basis of "narrative tone" is theoretically developed
in infancy and early childhood, but the sign of the tone tends to
appear in the later periods.
Although Dr al-Turabi's life story was divided into sub-sections
and presented in accordance with the theoretical periods of the devel-
opment, it is not practical to analyze his life story by rigidly
sticking to those chronological periods.
(1) NARRATIVE TONE
A life story normally has either an optimistic narrative tone or a
pessimistic narrative tone. A story which has an optimistic narrative
tone (optimistic story) often involves good things and successful
episodes; even though bad things happen the person remains hopeful.77
Throughout Dr al-Turabi's life story so far, there were a number
of optimistic episodes and no sign of pessimism. In his life story,
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the pattern of "efforts and success" appeared again and again. His
successful stories seem to indicate his unconscious belief of hope for
his future and belief that when he tried to do things he would
ultimately succeed.
The episodes of the admission to famous schools or universities
and his successful studies in Sudan and abroad seem to indicate an
optimistic narrative tone. His successful episode of skipping the
third grade in his secondary school may suggest his optimistic atti-
tude and an optimistic narrative tone of the story. In an episode
concerning his intermediate school period, despite the punishments he
received which stemmed from his radical activities in the school,
there was no sign of despondency. He did not change his attitude in
his secondary school, but continued radical activities. This episode
may also indicate an optimistic narrative tone and his optimistic
attitude.
(2) IMAGERY
Dr al-Turabi was very proud of his 7th grandfather and his father.
His accounts of these people indicated his strong admiration and
respect for them.
His description of his father suggested (or perhaps he wanted to
emphasize) that his father was the most important and influential per-
son in his personality building. His life story seems to suggest some
"images" of his father, such as the honorable, strict, energetic, and
strong father.78
The deep commitments of his loved and honorable ancestors and
father to Islam, and the Islamic heritages of his family and society
appear to have made positive and solemn images of Islamic religion for
him.79
(3) NOTIVESBO
With regard to the "motives", it seems that in Dr al-Turabi's life
story, his "agentic motives" were much stronger than "communal
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motives". His life story, especially covering his adolescence and
early adulthood, suggests that he had strong agentic motives, such as
"to change or correct what he thought to be wrong", "to achieve his
goals", and "to take leadership".
On the other hand, there were some signs of communal motives, such
as "to unite" and "to interact with different kinds of people". Has-
san's commitment to international student movements and his approach
to non-Islamist Arabs and non-Arab Muslims indicate that communal
motives were also present.
(4) IDEOLOGICAL SETTING
Dr al-Turabi's life story suggests the important position of Islam in
his life. The positive attitude of those who were close to him
towards Islam and the positive Islamic heritages surrounding him may
have put Islamic values into the centre of his "ideological set-
ting". 8 ' His pious father, a devotee of Islam, might have played an
important role in this respect. His involvement in the Islamic Liber-
ation Movement and his ideological disputes with the communists at the
GMC appear to have helped to consolidate his Islamic ideology.
The researcher believes that what Dr al-Turabi learned from the
ideologies of famous Islamic thinkers also contributed to his own
ideology. The thoughts of those who inspired him, such as Muhammad
al-Ghazali, Muhammad Abduh, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna,
and Sayyid Qutb, might have influenced Dr al-Turabi's vision of an
Islamic state and the means how to achieve it.82
His experiences in Western education (especially from secondary
school) may also have contributed to his "ideological setting" to some
extent. Although he started from a basis of Islamic values, he did
not necessarily refuse things which were different from his basis and
sometimes skillfully assimilated them. This tendency was found espe-
cially in his secondary school period and his Paris period. As Dr al-
Turabi suggested in his life story, his study of past Western experi-
ences, particularly the Reformation and the French Revolution, also
seem to have affected his "ideological setting".83
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(5) CHARACTERS (IMAGOES)84
With respect to Dr al-Turabi's "main characters (imagoes)", it appears
that there were signs of a number of main characters in his life
story.
The accounts of the class boycott in his intermediate school, his
participation in the Rufaa incident, and his active involvement in
many demonstrations in his secondary school seem to suggest some
characters, such as "the critic", "the resistant", "the reformer", and
"the revolutionary".
The account of his active involvement in many demonstrations also
suggests the character of "the passionate". This is clear from his
rather contradictory admission, namely that he did not understand much
about political matters, but he nonetheless frequently organized
demonstrations. He could become excited I heated easily.
The episode about his idea of signing the names who took part in
the class boycott implies his character of "the man behind the
scenes".
The stories about his positive involvement in the Islamic move-
ments in Sudan, Britain, and France, indicate his character of "the
strong believer".
The episodes about his successful achievements, such as in skip-
ping the third grade in his secondary school, in obtaining LLN and
LLD, 1
 and in establishing the first official Islamic student organiza-
tion in France, appear to suggest his character of "the winner".
The account of his active involvement in international student
movements (Islamic and non-Islamic) seems to imply his inter-
nationalist character - "the internationalist".
The stories about his immediate admission to the GMC and his
preparation for the next study in Paris when he was in London suggest
his character of "the good planner".
The episode of Hassan's efforts to bring al-Tahir and the other
leaders in the movement together indicates a character of "the
mediator".
The accounts of an Islamic initiative for the liberation of women
in Sudan, his efforts to change the structure of the new Islamic move-
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ment, and his passionate study about the Reformation and the French
Revolution in Paris, imply his characters of "the reformer" and "the
revolutionary".
His stress on "first" in the life story, such as the first offi-
cial Islamic student organization and the first movement for the
women's liberation, appears to suggest another character of "the first
person".
2.3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
As the researcher has defined the term "personality", it here means
the behavioral tendencies stemming from factors of identity, particu-
larly "motives" and "characters (imagoes)". There may exist some ele-
ments of personality which derive from "imagery" and "ideological set-
ting (or ideology)" - e.g. personality stemming from having an
Islamist ideology - but the researcher limits the discussion to
"motives" and "characters" (as conveyed, for example, by "narrative
tone").
As we have found in the previous sub-section, Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality appears to have quite an "optimistic" tendency and to be
dominated by strong "agentic" motives and characters. This suggests
that Dr al-Turabi will have the following behavioral tendencies:
to be optimistic
to be quite dominant in scial groups
to seek positions of high leadership and influence
to be persistent and efficient in many kinds of performance
to focus energies on careful planning for the future
to prefer and show high performance in tasks
to be innovative, and drawn towards change and movement
to be levelheaded
to adopt pragmatic manner to achieve goals
to be restless
to prefer work to leisure
to exhibit high self control
to derive satisfaction from own work
to think that the proof of good friendship is the ability
to come to the rescue of one's friends
(see Section 1.2.3)
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Dr al-Turabi's life story from 1932 to 1964 showed a number of
signs of his main characters (imagoes).
Each "main character" naturally indicates some aspects of per-
sonality which can be described by adjectives. For example, "the
critic" indicates adjectives such as "critical", "aggressive", and
"assertive".	 "The revolutionary" suggests adjectives such as "radi-
cal" and "courageous".
In the same way, the researcher attempts to describe Dr al-
Turabi's personality by using adjectives. Table 2.3.(l) shows some of
the possible adjectives which may describe Dr al-Turabi's personality,
stemming from his main characters found in his life story between 1932
and 1964.
Table 2.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's personality described by adjectives
Main characters (1932-64)
Agentic characters
the critic
the resistant
the passionate
the believer
the winner
the reformer
the revolutionary
the first person
the good planner
the man behind the scenes
continued
Adj ectives
critical, aggressive, assertive
defiant, resolute, determined,
offensive
passionate, zealous
faithful, pious, serious
strong, clever, patient,
confident, optimistic
innovative, progressive, radical,
critical, originative, creative
radical, courageous, critical,
explosive
adventurous, ambitious, assertive
proud
I foresighted, careful, clever
shrewd, careful
(see following explanation)
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Table 2.3.(l): continued
Communal characters
the mediator	 balanced, harmonious, sociable,
kind, conciliatory
the internationalist	 internationalist, open,
cooperative, sociable
McAdams suggests that "The man behind the scenes" is a communal
character by saying that: 'Rather than dominate others, they [people
high in intimacy motivation] prefer to surrender control in many
interpersonal situations, adopting the role of the listener or the
person who works behind the scenes to promote interpersonal harmony
and goodwill.' 85 The researcher, however, thinks this character can
be seen in a different way. In the case of the episode about Hassan's
idea of signing the names who took part in the class boycott, this
seems to suggest a shrewd (or careful) aspect of his personality
involving avoidance of being accused of being the leader of the
boycott. The researcher, therefore, has classified this character as
an agentic character.
2.4 SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE
This section is going. to provide some supportive evidence for the
analyses in the previous section, 2.3.
2.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S OWN ASSESSMENT ON HIS IDENTITY
The researcher carried out a survey about Dr al-Turabi's identity by
using a questionnaire on 14 May 1994.	 The term "identity" here is
used in a more general sense, compared to McAdams's usage. 86 	The
following is the questionnaire and Dr al-Turabi's response.
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Questionnaire about identity
What do you think about your identity order ?
Could you number the identities from 1 to 8 787
The strongest is "1".
Categories 
J 
Identities
Class	 The intelligentsia
Religion	 : Muslim
Ethnicity	 Arab / African
Nationality : Sudanese
Tribe	 : Bidiriya
Family role Father
Job	 : Secretary Gene. of PAIC
Leader of N1F88
Ideology	 : Islamist
Order
5)
].	 )
4 ) Arab-African
4)
8)
5)
5)
none)
1)
Do you think there are some changes in this order throughout
your life 2
Dr al-Turabi's comment: 'Yes. The weakness of the identities
is a development.	 Everything except the Muslim and Islamist
identities has become weak. 	 The role as the leader of the
NIF has completely finished.'89
Concerning his class identity, Dr al-Turabi said that be would
admit his belonging to the intelligentsia class, but he had been per-
sonally opposed to the existence of exclusive classes and had always
tried to be a member of the masses.
His religious identity, "Muslim", and ideological identity,
"Islamist", were imaginably the strongest.
He chose "Arab-African"(not "Arab") as his ethnic identity and it
was not so strong.
His national identity, "Sudanese", was also not so strong.
His tribal identity was the weakest, although tribal identities of
the people in the Middle East are normally quite strong. 9 ° According
to Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii), the Bidiriya (Bidiiriiya) tribe has
provided many important figures in the Sudanese history, such as
Ismail al-Azhari ('Ismaa c iil al-'Azharii: a founder of the National
Unionist Party), and Suwar al-Dhahab (Suwaar al-Dhabab: ex-Defence
Minister and head-of-state, 1985.-86).9'
With respect to his job identity (career identity), he put "5" for
"Secretary General of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC)",
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but emphasized that the role as the leader of the National Islamic
Front (NIF) had completely finished and was almost "zero". He added
that the historical role of the NIF had finished. He told the
researcher that he did not want to be associated with a "particular
group" and that he wanted to be the leader of the Islamist movement as
a whole.
In response to the question concerning the changes in his identity
order, Dr al-Turabi clearly suggested that his Muslim and Islamist
identities had not changed and had been always the strongest.
Dr al-Turabi's response appears to support the important position
and role of his "Islamist ideology" in his life and personality. His
response may also indicate his negative attitude against sectarianism.
2.4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY DESCRIBED BY HIS SUPPORTERS
The following descriptions of Dr al-Turabi's personality were given by
his close associates, Yassin Omar al-Imam (Yaasiin CjJr al-'Imaam),
Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi ( cAbd al-Rahiim Mahmuud Hamdii), and Hassan
Nakki (Hasan Nakkii) in the researcher's interviews in 1994 and 1995.
(1) YASSIN OMAR AL-IMAM
Al-Imam was born on 7 March 1931. He was initially a member of the
Sudan Communist Party (SCP), but later joined the early Islamic move-
ment in 1950. He met Hassan in 1951 for the first time. Since the
1964 October Revolution, especially after the establishment of the
Islamic Charter Front (ICF), he became very close to Dr al-Turabi. At
the time of the interview with the researcher, al-Imam was the chief
director of the printing section of Al-Sudan Al-Hadith newspaper. He
described Dr al-Turabi's personality as follows:
'Dr al-Turabi is very courageous. He is never afraid of any
danger. He never once feared the two military regimes of
Abbud and Nimairi. He was one of the first to criticize
Abbud's policy in public. Even when he was put in prison by
Nimairi, he maintained his dignity. He can adapt to any kind
of environment. He has never grumbled about little things.
While most of the inmates complained about the prison food,
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he never did so. He blankly refused to go out through the
small gate of the prison and went out through the main gate.
He refused to have his belongings examined by the police when
he returned from a short visit outside the prison.
He is very clever. He has a wide and deep knowledge of
various kinds of subjects, especially Islam and Arabic. He
holds a PhD in Law and speaks English and French fluently.
He has a very broad outlook. He is an international thinker.
He has never thought only about Sudan. He always thinks
about the world.
He has a very strong will and extreme patience. He does
what he wants regardless of time or how difficult it will be.
If he says he wants to do something, he will keep trying no
matter how long it takes. He is very reliable. He will do
what he says. He has tremendous powers of persuasion. I-re
can convince people of his opinion.
He has always trusted his friends and supporters. As the
leader of the Islamist movement, once he has shown directions
and goals of the movement, he gives total freedom to his sup-
porters, and never dictates detailed points. He expects
people to find out the best way to achieve goals. He never
complains to his supporters about their faults. He always
cares about them, even their private problems.
He never works without a plan. He always works within
the range of plans and sticks to them. He always consults
the members of the movement about his plans. He has never
carried out a plan without consulting them. He never speaks
first, but always lets other people express themselves before
him. He always tries to reach a consensus. He prefers doing
this to voting.
He is never satisfied with the present situation. He
always seeks a better situation and looks ahead. He likes
progressive change, such as reform, innovation, and improve-
ment. He pursues efficiency in all areas. He does not like
to copy or repeat what other people have done before. He
always tries to create better things.
He likes to choose substance over appearance. He prefers
to find the real meaniffg of words behind the literal sense.
He never hesitates to adopt new interpretations of tradi-
tional views in accordance with the current situation, if
necessary. He was the first Islamist leader to talk about
women's rights and liberation.'92
(2) ABD AL-RAHIM MAHMIJD HAND I
Hamdi was born on 19 June 1939. He joined the early Islamic movement
in 1954. In July 1964, he became a member of the executive bureau of
the movement and became close to Dr al-Turabi.	 He served as the
Finance Minister between 1990 and 1993 under the Islamist government.
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At the time of the interview with the researcher, he was the chairman
of the Khartoum Stock Exchange (KSE). The following statements are
Hamdi's views on Dr al-Turabi's personality.
'He is very intelligent, has a sharp tongue, and is critical,
confrontational and very patient. He is a good planner and
hard worker. He is always thinking change and seeks it. He
is not a man who is influenced, but a man who influences
others. He has capacity. His thinking is mechanistic. His
analysis is sharp and precise.'93
(3) HASSAN MAKKI
Nakki was born in 1950. He joined the Islamist movement around mid-
1960s, when he was a student at Hantoub Secondary School. He met Dr
al-Turabi in 1966 for the first time. When he was a student at
Khartoum University, he was very active in the student branch of the
movement. At the time of the interview with the researcher, he was on
the teaching staff of the International African University in
Khartoum. He described Dr al-Turabi's personality as follows:
'He is very patient, intelligent, and courageous. For 30
years, he has been the same person. He has kept the same
quality and the same personality. I think he is basically
revolutionary, but he acts step by step in order to achieve
his goals. In this sense, he may be evolutionary. He is a
very good organizer.	 He never cares doing things from
nothing. He values the power of the masses and organiza-
ions. '
The views of Dr al-Turabi's close associates on Dr al-Turabi's
personality seem to correspond in a great deal with the researcher's
analysis in Section 2.3.
Although personality is not rigid, the descriptions above appear
to support the idea that the basic personality are quite stable and
have remained throughout Dr al-Turabi's life.
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CHAPTER 3: BEGINNING OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT
Chapter 3 has three sections. The first section, Section 3.1, gives
the general description of the key developments concerning the
beginning of the Islamist movement led by Dr a1-Turabi, which covers
the period from the eve of the 1964 October Revolution to the estab-
lishment of the May regime in 1969. The involvement of the Islamic
movement (see below) in the October Revolution and the leadership
struggle in the movement are regarded as the key developments during
the period.
Section 3.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account about those described in
the previous section.
The final section, Section 3.3, gives the researcher's analyses of
Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the
impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.
The phrase, "the Islamist movement", will be used to refer to the
Islamic movement led by Dr a1-Turabi after the October Revolution,
especially after he became the official leader of the movement in
November 1964.
3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1964-69)
3.1.1 CHRONOLOGY
1964/Su	 :Al-Turabi returned to Sudan and became a member of
the Executive Bureau (EB) of the Islamic movement.
Al-Turabi was a lecturer at the Department of
Public Law and Administration in the Faculty of
Law in the University of Khartoum.'
1964/ 9/ 9:A symposium on the question of the South was held
at the University of Khartoum.
l964/1O/14:The Patriotic Women's Front (PWF) was set up.
l964/1O/21:A student meeting was held at the University of
Khartoum, was attacked by the police, and a
student was killed by the police.
1964/1O/22:A1-Turabi was in the funeral parade.
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1964/lO/30:A civilian transitional cabinet was formed.
1964/**/**:Al_Turabi became the Dean of the Faculty of Law at
the University of Khartoum. Al-Turabi became a
member of the parliament.
1964/].1/25:Al-Turabi was officially elected as the
secretary general of the Islamic movement.2
(beginning of the Sudanese Islamist movement)
1964/12/ 6:The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was set up, and
al-Turabi became the secretary general.
1965/early:Al-Turabi quitted his job at the University of
Khartoum and started to concentrate on the
Islamist movement.
The Islamic Charter written by Dr al-Turabi was
published by the movement.
1965/ 2/**:Al_Turabi issued his first communique as the
leader of the movement.
1965/ 2/23;Al .-Tahir was chosen to represent the movement in
the second al-Khalifa cabinet.
1965/ 4/21:The ICF took part in the elections for the first
time and won 7 seats.
1965/ 5/**:Mahjub formed a cabinet. (First Mahjub Cabinet)
1965/ 7/18:Al-Tahir resigned from the movement and joined
the National Unionist Party (NW').
1955/**/**:The movement established the Patriotic Youth
Organization (PYO).
1965/11/ 8:The movement started its campaign against the
Sudanese Communist Party (SC?).3
1965/11/ 9:The movement led demonstrations against the SCP.
1965/11/11:The SCP was banned.
1966/**/**:A1_Turabi resigned as the secretary general of the
main body, but remained as a member of the EB and
as the secretary general of the ICF.
Struggle and split between "the educationalist
school (anti-Turabi)" and "the political school
(pro-Turabi)" continued up to 1969.
1966/ 4/**:The ICF launched an anti-government campaign.
1966/ 6/**:Sadiq al-Mandi formed a cabinet.
1967/ 1/**:Sadiq formed the constitutional commission.
1967/ 5/**:Mahjub formed a cabinet. (Second Mahjub Cabinet)
1967/ 4/**:Babikir Awadalla, the chief justice of the Supreme
Court, resigned in protest against the ban of the
SC?.
1968/ 4/**:In the elections, al-Turabi could not get a seat
in Al-Masid (near his home town, Wad al-TurabiY
constituency.
1968/ S/**:Mahjub formed a cabinet. (Third Mahjub Cabinet)
1969/ 4/**:A1_Turabi was re-elected to the leadership of both
the main body and the ICF (i.e. the whole
movement).
1969/ 5/23:An Islamic constitution was basically agreed by
the parties and the deal was announced.
1969/ 5/25:A military coup led by Colonel Nimairi 4 occurred.
It was seen by the Islarnists as a communist coup.
1969/ 5/26:Al-Turabi was put in jail for the first time.
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The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring	 Su = Summer Au = Autumn
	 Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
Sources: See Table C.(l): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).
3.1.2 SUARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
To understand the October Revolution and the involvement of the
Islamic movement in the revolution properly, it will be useful to know
the background and trace the chronological development of the revolu-
tion.
La) Background
The 1958 military coup was originally prompted by the secretary gen-
eral of the Umrna ('Umma) Party, Abdaila Khalil (cAbd Aliaah Khaiiil),
who was the prime minister at that time. 5 However, Abdalla Khalil's
action had nothing to do with the Umina Party. It was Khaiii's own
decision and he acted as an individual, according to Sadiq al-Nandi
(Saadiq al-Mandii). 6 The Uinrna party, therefore, started to oppose the
military regime and participated in the establishment of a national
front in 1960. Ruth First describes the background of the October
revolution as follows:
'[The completion of Egypt's High Dam] created the problem of
removing and resettling a population of 50,000 in [Wadi Hai-
fa]. ... [During 1960] the Wadi Halfans had been unanimous
in rejecting [the resettlement area chosen by the military
regime] out of hand. Demonstrations ensued in Wadi Halfa,
supported by others in Khartoum and other towns openly chal-
lenging the junta. ... The following year, 1961, the
workers on the railways went on strike for higher wages.
Trade unions had been declared abolished a month after the
army take over, ... 	 The railways workers' union, ...
ignored the ban, brought its 27,000 workers out on strike
The University of Khartoum became the open target of the
regime: the students' union was declared dissolved; student
meetings were consistently interfered with by the police,
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The government amended the university act to control the
institution directly, putting it under the Ministry of Educa-
tion. ... [In 1963) When the regime refused [the demands of
the Gezira tenants], the Gezira farmers responded with a
strike ... Both the Uinma and the NUP boycotted the [council]
elections. The Communist Party contested them in order to
use the councils as instruments with which to attack and
undermine the regime. ... The atmosphere of repression had
become all-pervading. ... In six years ... a national
deficit of more than £75 million was accumulated. Expensive
schemes misfired when factories were wrongly sited or too
hastily planned.	 The costs of administration soared.
Corruption, never before entirely absent but never present on
a dramatic scale, thrived under the military in a variety of
ways: ... By the end of 1963, the Southern protest had taken
the form of organized rebellion headed by a guerrilla force,
the Anya Nya. ... The war became intense around April 1964,
During September 1964, a student meeting made outspoken
attacks on the government. On 10 October the security
authorities banned a discussion circle, and the police dis-
persed a meeting in the science faculty. .. . 17
It seems that by October 1964, the discontent and frustration of
the people in various parts of society had accumulated.
I b) Revolution
Unfortunately, there are some disagreements among scholars about the
exact dates of events which occurred in the revolution. 8	To trace
developments, Yusuf Hasan's article will be used, because it was
mainly based on Arabic daily newspapers and official broadcasts at the
time. 9 To quote Hasan:
'Despite the ban, the university students (including both
Muslim Brothers and Communists) and others continued to defy
the Government. At 8.30 p.m. on 21 October 1964, they
assembled in a square within the university precinct, intend-
ing to discuss further the southern issue. There they found
themselves encircled by police, who ordered them to disperse.
On their refusal to move, tear gas was used. The students
retaliated by throwing stones, bricks, and empty bottles, and
shouting anti-government slogans. Then the police opened
fire, killing one student, Ahmad al-Qurashi, and wounding a
considerable number of others. ... On 22 October the
university was closed, by government order, ... At the same
time the Sudanese staff tendered their resignations,
[demanding] the dismantling of the military regime ... [and]
the university's independence.	 This was in effect the
beginning of a civil strike, ...	 Al-Qurashi's funeral
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procession, joined by tens of thousands of citizens, was an
anti-government demonstration of the first magnitude.
By Friday 23 October, though rioting continued, better organ-
ization in the ranks of the demonstrations was noticeable.
The university staff, with other teacher, judges, lawyers,
engineers, doctors, and the former representatives of the
Sudan Trade Union Federation and Gezira Tenants' Association,
had now come together as the National Front for Profes-
sionals, and called for a general civil strike. At the same
time, the traditional parties - the LTrm'na, the N.U.P., the
Communists, and the Muslim Brothers - revived their old Oppo-
sition Front, now styled the National Front of Political
Parties. To forestall any rivalry the two groups now began
to work together under the name of the United National Front
until the revolution was successfully carried out. ... On
Saturday 24 October, ... A general strike was ... declared,
By Sunday the general strike was so effective that the
government machinery and general communications had stopped,
At 8.30 p.m. on Monday 26 October, the President broad-
cast to the nation the dissolution of the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces and the Council of Ministers. ... Negotia-
tions between the United National Front and representatives
of the armed forces ... began on Tuesday 27 October ... by
Friday morning, 29 October, all difficulties had disappeared.
On 30 October 1964 a transitional government, embracing
all shades of political opinion, was inaugurated. The
Revolution had achieved its immediate objectives with speed
and remarkably little bloodshed.'10
The 15-member transitional government, which was the first outcome
of the revolution, was headed by Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa (Sirr al-
jaatim al-Khaliifa), a former Director of Education." It was com-
posed of al-Khalifa, 7 members from the professionals' front, 5 mem-
bers from the political parties - one member each from the Umma Party,
the National Unionist Party, the People's Democratic Party, the
Islamic movement (Muslim Brotherhood), and the Sudanese Communist
Party - and 2 southerners. 12 Since the members of the professionals'
front tended to associate themselves with the Communist party, the
transitional government had a strongly radical tendency.'3
Despite the small size of the membership of the Islamic movement -
there were only about 2,000 hard-core members of the Islamic movement
in 1964' - the movement was allocated one ministerial position (an
equal number to other parties) in the transitional government. This
seemed to be very significant for the movement.
There are different views on the role of the Islamic movement in
the October revolution, and many of them are quite different from Dr
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al-Turabi's views - his views will be given in the section of Dr al-
Turabi's account, Section 3.2. For example, Niblock points out: 'The
overthrow of the 'Abbud regime was largely the work of radical politi-
cal forces.' 15 Yusul Hasan states that: 'Although every sector of the
population participated, the Communists played the most effective role
in the organising demonstrations and gatherings."6
(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
After his release from prison in l963,' al-Rashid al-Tahir Cal-
Rashiid al-Taahir), the former leader of the Islamic movement, had
left Khartoum and gone to Gedaref. He was not satisfied with the
change which had occurred in the movement, and preferred to stay away
from the capital.'8
On 25 November 1964, Dr al-Turabi was elected as the official
leader of the Islamic movement.' 9 According to the structure of the
organization (see Diagram 3.l.(l)), Dr al-Turabi was elected by the
executive bureau, which in turn had been elected by the shura
(shuuraa) council. The shura council had been elected at the conven-
ing of the constituent assembly of the Islamic movement. To the
knowledge of the researcher, this procedure is not mentioned in any
other non-Islamist sources. It may be suspected that the constituent
assembly and associated bodies were not formalized institutions, but
perhaps more informal meetings convened by Dr al-Turabi.
On 6 December, the Islamic Charter Front was established, which
was in charge of politics, and Dr al-Turabi became the secretary gen-
eral of the ICF. 2 ° He now held both posts of secretary general of the
main body and the ICF. Diagram 3.1.(1)) is intended to show the
structure of the organization after 1962.21
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Diagram 3.l.(l: The structure of the organization (after 1962)
Constituent Assembly
elect
Shura (Shuuraa) Council
Movement' s
elect
	
main body
collective
leadership
Executive Bureau
elkt
1'
secretary general
(weak power, almost nominal)
branch organizations
(64)	 ItF(64)	 c.
PWF	 Patriotic Women's Front
ICF = Islamic Charter Front
( )
	
the year of establishment
Source: This Diagram was drawn by the researcher, based on the
description written by el-Affendi and later approved by
Dr al-Turabi.	 El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution,
pp. 67 and 97.	 Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.
Despite Dr al-Turabi's promotion to Dean of the Faculty of Law at
the University of Khartoum just after the October Revolution, in early
1965, he resigned in order to devote more time to the Islamist move-
ment 22
In April 1965, the ICf took part in the parliamentary elections,
and gained 5 seats in the assembly on the basis of the territorial
constituencies and 2 seats in the graduates' constituencies. 23 Dr al-
Turabi stood in the graduates' constituencies in Khartoum and secured
his seat, while al-Rashid al-Tahir stood in the territorial con-
stituencies, Central Gedaref, and was also elected. 24 After the elec-
tions, al-Tahir was chosen as the leader of the ICF MPs in the
assembly. 25 It is said that the decision to make al-Tahir the leader
of the ICF MPs was intended to satisfy his sensitivities regarding the
changes in leadership. 26 However, al-Tahir resigned from the movement
and joined the National Unionist Party (NUP) in July 1965.27
In late 1966, Dr al-Turabi was forced to resign the post of the
secretary general of the main body by discontented members, but he
67
Chapter 3
remained as a member of the executive bureau of the main body and the
secretary general of the ICF (see Dr al-Turabi's account for further
details) 28
In April 1969, Dr al-Turabi was re-elected to the leadership of
both the main body and the ICF.29
3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT3°
3.2.1 INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
Dr al-Turabi came back from France in 1964 with his passion for "free-
dom" deepened by the history of the French Revolution. He had two
liberation plans: the liberation of the country from the military
regime of Abbud ( CAbbuud) and the liberation of the new Islamic move-
ment, which developed from the ILN, from the influence of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood .3
Dr al-Turabi was a lecturer at the Department of Public Law and
Administration in the University of Khartoum. On 9 September 1964, he
was invited to a symposium organized by the Society of Social Studies
at the University of Khartoum, on the question of the South. The rep-
resentatives of the military regime were also at the symposium. 32 He
advocated that the Southern problem should be solved though the estab-
lishment of a regional government, although the Southern social par-
ticularity should not be emphasized too much. 33
 After the symposium,
be was warned by his colleagues in the faculty of agriculture that he
bad said too much, i.e. something very dangerous to his life and the
whole system of the state. The students in the symposium were very
moved by Dr al-Turabi t s speech. The military regime was shocked.
Within a couple of days, a summary of the symposium was published by
the Arabic daily newspaper, A1-Ayyarn (Al-'Ayyaam). Because the news-
paper did not write the critical points of what Dr al-Turabi had said,
he requested the newspaper to write exactly what he had said and gave
a summary of his own speech to the newspaper. However, the newspaper
did not publish his statements. 	 The military regime asked Dr al-
Turabi's uncle, who was teaching at an Islamic university, to warn his
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nephew that he should not say anything further against the regime or
he would be imprisoned. Dr al-Turabi did not care about it. The stu-
dents were highly wrought up and supported him. The students
immediately started holding meetings against the regimes His speech
in the symposium was the actual start of the revolution.
On 21 October, a students' meeting on the Southern situation held
in the University of Khartoum was attacked by the police and many stu-
dents were shot. Dr al-Turabi asked other people, who had cars, to
carry wounded students to the hospital. Dr al-Turabi immediately
started to protest against the regime and to mobilize the masses. He
shouted anti-regime slogans on the street. As he himself did not have
a car, he asked a colleague to take him to the police office to con-
demn the shootings against the students and ask for the release of the
arrested. When he heard that someone had died on that day he thought
he had to do something about it. Inside the university, he assembled
the whole university staff including foreigners and wrote the first
memorandum against the government advocating the independence of the
university. Outside the university, he visited influential
politicians and asked them to take part in the funeral parade, which
was going to be held next morning, and he also called for a general
strike. He visited the judiciary where he met the secretary general
of the Communist Party for the first time. The communists did not
know what was happening at the time. 34 He visited the Gezira Tenants
Union and asked the leader, who was a communist, to support the
strike, but he refused. He also tried to mobilize the trade unions,
but failed to do so. Although the communists and the others later
joined the general strike, and helped to form the transitional
government, the initiative of the revolution was taken by Dr al-Turabi
and the members of the Islamic movement.
Despite his leading role in the revolution, 35 he did not know what
the consequences of the revolution would be at that time, and had
hardly any plans for the aftermath of the revolution. He did not even
expect that a revolution would happen so quickly and so easily. He
had an impression that the revolution had "just happened".
During discussions on the new government, Dr al-Turabi, the
spokesman of the Islamic movement, visited the Ministry of Defense as
a member of a delegation and met Abbud. Abbud did not want any bloody
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clashes and promised to hand over power to the civilians. 	 Dr al-
Turabi wrote the transitional constitution.
Dr al-Turabi refrained from becoming a minister because the mili-
tary officers were afraid of him. The officers were saying that if he
became a minister he might execute them. Despite the officers' worry,
Dr al-Turabi was the only man who defended the officers. 36
 Muhammad
Salih Omar (Muhammad Saalih cUfflar), a member of the Islamic movement,
became the Minister of Animal Resources whose rank was the lowest
among the ministers. Dr al-Turabi thought that if anyone from the
movement could join the government it was enough at this stage,
because he knew that they did not have enough experiences and that
they were still too young.
After the October revolution, Dr al-Turabi became the Dean of the
Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum after his British
predecessor had run away from Sudan.37
3.2.2 LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE38
The structure of the organization of the Islamic movement before 1962
was a copy of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of the
movement had great power and controlled the movement like a dictator.
When al-Rashid al-Tahir, who had been the leader of the Islamic move-
ment since 1955, took part in a coup attempt and was imprisoned in
l959, Dr al-Turabi thought that the structure of the organization
should be changed. Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (Muhammad Yuusuf Muhammad)
became the acting leader of the movement and was later officially
chosen as the leader. Dr al-Turabi, meanwhile, committed himself to
the re-structuring of the organization, advocated the introduction of
the collective leadership, and finally succeeded in reducing the power
of the leader. When the new structure was completed in 1962, al-Tahir
was still in the prison.
Dr al-Turabi wanted to liberate the Islamic movement from Egyptian
influence. He did not want the movement to be seen as a branch of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Because of this, he and his supporters
had intentionally avoided using the name "the Muslim Brotherhood",
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which was officially adopted in 1954, and used other names, such as
"the Islamic movement" and "the Islamic current".
He initially wanted to set up an Islamic popular front, but he
felt it was premature. He decided to write an Islamic charter to
begin with, wanting it to form the basis of the Sudanese state. In
December 1964, the Islamic Charter Front was set up. This constituted
a first step towards building up a mass movement. Dr al-Turabi wrote
The Islamic Charter and published it in early 1965.
In April 1965, the ICF participated in the elections and won 3
seats (al-Turabi, al-Tahir, and Muhammad Yusuf) in the elections.
Later, two independents (one from the Northern Sudan and the other
from the Eastern Sudan), one sufi (suufii) leader, and one teacher
from the Western Sudan joined the 1CF. Therefore the ICF held 7 seats
in the parliament. In those days, there were tensions between al-
Tahir's supporters and Dr al-Turabi's supporters. Some members of the
movement seemed to feel jealous of Dr al-Turabi and advocated that al-
Tahir should become the leader of the opposition group. Dr al-Turabi
agreed with their claim and al-Tahir became the opposition leader.
However, al-Tahir soon decided to withdraw from the movement and
joined the NIJP. Because of al-Tahir's withdrawal from the movement,
the dispute within the movement did not become worse for the moment.
In 1966, the issue of the leadership separation between the main
body of the movement and the ICF was raised by members of the anti-
Turabi group, who wanted to limit Dr al-Turabi's influence. In short,
it was a result of their resentment against Dr al-Turabi. In the
1960s, Jafar Shaikh Idris (Jac far Shaykh 'Idriis) was the main
activist among the discontented members against Dr al-Turabi, who
formed an anti-Turabi group and cooperated with al-Tahir. Idris was
older than Dr al-Turabi and was strongly influenced by the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood. Malik Badri (Maalik Badri), a "discontented mem-
ber", who became the secretary general of the main body for a short
period after Dr al-Turabi had been forced to resign, wanted to put
more emphasis on education rather than politics. Muhammad Shaikh Omar
(Muhammad Shaykh cUmar), another discontented member, had a disagree-
ment with Dr al-Turabi about the movement's strategy, arguing that the
movement was against the government too much.
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In April 1969, however, the unification of the leadership between
the main body and the ICF was decided and Dr al-Turabi became the
leader of the whole movement again. Dr al-Turabi concluded that the
initial mixture in the Islamic movement between the ILM and a branch
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood set up outside the GMC in the 1950s
was a mistake.
'4hen Colonel Jafar Nimairi (Jacfar Numayrii) carried out a mili-
tary coup in May 1969, it was completely a surprise to Dr al-Turabi.
He was preoccupied by the internal issues and was too busy to find out
what had been going on outside the movement. In those days, there
were few supporters of the Islamist movement inside the army and they
were not organized.	 Therefore, the information from the army was
extremely limited.
3.3 ANALYSES
3.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-64)
It has been established in the previous chapter that Dr al-Turabi
developed a strong agentic personality from his infancy to his early
adulthood, 1932 - 1964.
	
His agentic personality stems from his
agentic motives and characters (imagoes). The main characters
(imagoes) which emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality
from his life story up to 1964 are those listed in Table 3.3.(1). It
will be noted that most of these characters reflect an agentic per-
sonality (marked by (a) in the table), while a smaller number reflect
a communal personality (marked by (c) in the table). Table 3.3.(2)
lists adjectives (describing personality elements) associated with
those characters.
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Table 3.3.(l): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (ima goes) (1932-64)
Period Main characters (imagoes)
1932	 the critic (a),	 the resistant (a),
-	 the passionate (a),	 the believer (a),
1964	 the winner (a),
	
the reformer (a),
the revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
the good planner (a),
the man behind the scenes (a),
the mediator Cc),
	
the internationalist Cc)
(a)	 = classified as agentic
(c)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on NcAdams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
Table 3.3.(2): Possible adiectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-64)
Period I Possible adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
-	 defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1964	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c),
kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c),
open (c), cooperative (c)
(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1964-69)
Dr al-Turabi's account of the period between 1964 and 1969 shows
strong signs of agentic personality, stemming from agentic motives and
characters (imagoes). His account provides both further evidence of
previous findings and some new elements of his personality. Among the
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previously identified characters (imagoes), "the revolutionary" and
"the passionate" seem to be dominant in this period. In addition to
this, a newly identified agentic character, "the hero" and "the com-
petitor", strengthen the agentic aspect of this period. If one
character is chosen to represent the overall image (or picture) of his
account of the 1964-69 period, it will be "the revolutionary". This
character indicates an agentic motivation (especially power motiva-
tion) and some aspects of personality described by adjectives such as
radical, courageous, critical, and explosive. The character is
underlying the period and backing other characters, such as "the pas-
sionate", "the hero" and "the competitor".
His account of the October Revolution is of particular importance
in this phase. Crucial among the previously identified characters is
that of "the revolutionary". This comes across in his account of his
speech on 9 September 1964. It is clearly Dr al-Turabi's perception
that this speech constituted the actual start of the revolution, and
that the initiative of the October Revolution was taken by him and the
members of the Islamic movement.
Another previously identified character is that of "the pas-
sionate", also an agentic character. This is clear from his rather
contradictory admission, namely that he led the revolution despite not
knowing about the consequences of the revolution. This suggests that
he could become excited / heated easily. His account makes us recall
the episode about his radical activities in his secondary school - he
did not understand much about political matters, but he nonetheless
frequently organized demonstrations. Dr al-Turabi seems to have two
conflicting characters, "the passionate" and "the good planner" (dis-
cussed in Chapter 2) - he could sometimes act just with passion and
without plans.
The October Revolution also throws up a new character of Dr al-
Turabi, namely that of "the hero" - another agentic character and to
some extent related to the character of "the revolutionary". This
character indicates aspects of his personality which can be described
by adjectives such as "self-projecting" and "overconfident". A "self-
projecting" aspect is apparent in his story about his activities and
role in the revolution. He claimed and emphasized that he and the
Islamists played the heroic (or central) role in the revolution and
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other people like the communists did not. His negative account of the
communists in the revolution seems to reflect this self-projecting
aspect of "the hero". An "overconfident" aspect of "the hero" is
apparent in his accounts of the reasons why he did not become a minis-
ter in the transitional cabinet (he said the military officers were
scared of him) and why he became the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the
University of Khartoum (he said the predecessor ran away).
The story of the leadership struggle also brings out evidence of
his agentic personality which seeks "control", "leadership", and
"influence". It throws up a new character of "the competitor",
indicating adjectives such as competitive, offensive, clever, and
shrewd. This is apparent in his account of the leadership struggle
between himself and his rivals like al-Rashid al-Tahir and Jafar
Shaikh Idris. He seems to have utilized the re-structuring of the
organization and the establishment of the ICF to compete for the lead-
ership.
(3) NEW FINDINGS (1964-69)
Table 3.3.(3) summarizes two new characters which have emerged from
the 1964 to 1969 period, together with the adjectives which are asso-
ciated with these characters.
Table 33.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1964-69)
Period	 Characters	 Possible adjectives
1964	 the hero (a)	 self-centered (a), strong (a),
-	 overconfident (a), active (a)
1969
the competitor (a) competitive (a), offensive (a),
clever (a), shrewd (a)
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3.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TUR.ABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as
radical and critical) stemming from the character of "the revolution-
ary't (representing the image of his account of the period) seem to
have affected the underlying nature of the key developments in the
period.
(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
Whether or not the Islamic movement played an important role in the
October Revolution, two things appear to be clear: one is that the
movement positively involved itself in the revolution, and the other
is that the movement obtained one ministerial position in the transi-
tional government. Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality seems to
have helped to bring about these two developments.
Under a strong emotional pull (passion) towards the "image" of
freedom, which was stimulated by his study of the French Revolution,
some of Dr al-Turabi's main characters (iuiagoes), such as "the revolu-
tionary", "the critic", "the hero" and "the passionate" appear to have
emerged and become dominant. Dr al-Turabi consciously or uncon-
sciously acted the role of these characters and drove the members of
the movement into the revolution. This encouraged the movement's
positive participation in the revolution, although the members had
little idea of what the consequences would be.
Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality appears to have con-
tributed to the highly conspicuous nature of the activities of the
movement (compared to its size - some 2,000 hard-core members). These
in turn maximized the "image" of the movement's power and created the
illusion of a powerful movement. Because of this, other political
forces could not ignore the Islamic movement and allowed it to obtain
one ministerial position. Although there were a number of highly edu-
cated members in the movement, this achievement appeared to be dis-
proportionate.	 The success clearly stemmed in part from Dr al-
Turabi' s personality.
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(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
It seems that Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality, which seeks
"leadership" and "control", was behind the leadership struggle in the
1960s. Among his main characters, "the competitor" appears to have
become dominant and have been backed by other characters such as "the
critic", "the reformer", "the good planner" and "the winner". He was
seeking, consciously or unconsciously, to control the Islamic movement
in accordance with what he believed to be right. In order to control
the movement (or to win the competition for the leadership), Dr al-
Turabi adopted a two-step strategy.
The first strategy was to reduce the power of the secretary gen-
eral of the movement by reforming the structure of the organization.
This occurred when the secretary-generalship was held by al-Rashid al-
Tahir (1955- May 62) who was in prison from 1959 to 1963. Dr al-
Turabi maintained that the structure, a copy of the Egyptian one, was
un-democratic. He strongly criticized this point and persuaded the
members of the Executive Bureau (EB) and the secretary general to
introduce a collective leadership. He managed this by 1962. Now, the
secretary general was almost nominal and could not control the move-
ment.
The second strategy was to increase his own influence.
Fortunately the October Revolution offered him a good chance to do
this. As a result of his role in the October Revolution, he created a
strong image of "the revolutionary" about himself and gained popu-
larity among the members of the movement. On the basis of this popu-
larity, he became the secretary general of the movement in November
1964 (even though the power of the secretary general was now limited).
Then he managed to set up the ICF which he could fully control - he
became the secretary general of the ICF. It was supposed to be a
political wing of the main body, however the ICF seemed to have acted
as if it was the whole movement. Dr al-Turabi and his supporters
avoided using the official name of the main body, "the Muslim Brother-
hood". Through the 1965 general e1ctions, the weight on the main
body seems to have shifted more to the ICF. Dr al-Turabi expanded his
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influence through the ICF or by using it. In this context, al-Tahir,
who was the former secretary general of the movement and the most
powerful rival of Dr al-Turabi, and who had once had enormous power in
the organization, left the movement. Al-Tahir's departure indicated
the strength of Dr al-Turabi's influence within the movement.
The separation of the leadership between the main body and the
ICF, which occurred in 1966, seems to have been the last card which
the anti-Turabi group could deliver. Because of the pressure raised
by the anti-Turabi group, Dr al-Turabi resigned as the secretary gen-
eral of the main body, but remained a member of its EB. The overall
situation concerning the leadership of the whole movement seemed not
to change much. The ICF became quite a powerful organization and
nobody could challenge Dr al-Turabi's leadership any more. In 1969,
Dr al-Turabi became the secretary general of the main body again, and
the leadership struggle had virtually ended. Dr al-Turabi won the
competition for the leadership of the movement.
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CHAPTER 4: ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND LEARNING PERIOD
Chapter 4 has three sections. Section 4.1, gives the general descrip-
tion of the key developments in the Islamist movement during the
period from 1969 to the national reconciliation in 1977. This section
focuses on anti-regime struggles and on the internal developments of
the Islamist movement.
Section 4.2 gives Dr a1Turabi's account about those described in
the previous section.
Section 4.3, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's
personality and the key developments, assessing the impact of Dr al-
Turabi's personality on these developments.
4.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1969-77)
4.1.1 CHRONOLOGY
1969/ 5/25:Colonel Nimairi came to power following a
military coup. It was seen by the Islamists
as a communist coup.
1969/ 5/26:A1-Turabi was put in jail for the first time. (1)
1969-70	 :The National-Front (NF: united opposition front)
was formed.
1970/ 1/ 4:Nimairi announced the plan of a single party
system and the establishment of the Sudanese
Socialist Union (SSU).
1970/ 3/27-3l:Clashes occurred at Aba ('Abaa) island between
government troops and oppositions.
1971/ 7/19:A coup led by some communists and sympathizers
succeeded in seizing power for about 3 days.
1971/ 7/22:A counter-coup restored Nimairi to power.
1971/10/**:Nimairi officially became the President of Sudan.
1972/ l/**:The SSU was established by the regime.
1972/ 2/27:The Addis Ababa agreement was agreed.
1972/ 3/].8:The Addis Ababa agreement was signed.
1972/11:18:A1-Turabj was freed.
1973/**/**:Al_Turabi went abroad to give lectures.
:Al-Turabi met Sharif Husain al-Hindi.
1973/ 8/**:Al_Turabi returned from abroad.
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1973/ 8/30:Al-Turabi was put in jail again. (2)
1973/ 8/31- 9/**:The Shaban uprising failed.
1974/ 3/10:Al-Turabi was freed again.
1974-82
	
:Al-Turabi pursued the second major re-structuring
process of the movement's organization.
1974/**/**:Sadiq al-Mandi was released, went to London,
and became the president of the National Front.
1974/**/**:Libya agreed to arm and train the opposition
fighters.
1975/ 6/15:Al-Turabi was put in jail again. (3)
1975/ 9/**:An attempted coup occurred.
1976/ 6/**:Reported that an armed operation planned by the NF
was ready to act. Osman Khalid and others from
the movement were active in Libya.
1976/ 7/ 2:The NF carried out the armed uprising, but failed.
The Islamists were forced to re-think their
position and strategy.
1976/ 7/**:A1_Turabi's wife, Wisal, was put in jail.1
1976/late :Sadiq started to contact the Nimairi regime.
1977/ 4 or 5:Al-Turabi's wife was freed.
1977/ 7/l2:A secret meeting between Sadiq and Nimairi took
place at Port Sudan.
1977/ 7/**:Natjonal Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the
main part of the opposition became public.
1977/ 7/17:A1-Turabi was freed.
The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp	 Spring	 Su = Summer Au = Autumn	 Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
Sources: See Table C.(l): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).
4.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT
Between 1969 and 1977, Dr al-Turabi was imprisoned 3 times for approx-
imately 6 years in total: (1) from 26 Nay 1969 to 17 November 1972,
(2) from 30 August 1973 to 9 March 1974, (3) from 15 June 1975 to 16
July 1977. 2	During this period, two major anti-regime operations
occurred, the 1973 Shaban (Shac baan) 3 uprising and the 1976 armed
resistance. 4 Islamist sources believe that over these years an impor-
tant development in the Islamist movement occurred5 while Dr a1-Turabi
and other prominent members of the movement were together in prison.
They studied and discussed their future plans and made their vision
clear 6
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The 1969 military coup led by Nimairi was seen by the Islamists as
a communist coup. 7 According to el-Affendi, more than half of the
ministers of the first cabinet were regarded as either members of the
SCP or pro-communists and the rest were mostly from the left. 8 The
traditional forces (the Umina Party and the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP)) and the Islamists were antagonized by the Nimairi regime. The
bulk of the leaders of the Islamist movement were now in prison.9
Sometime between the coup and March 1970, a united opposition front
(the National Front (NF)) which advocated a democratic order with an
Islamic orientation, was formed and Sharif Husain al-Hindi (Shariif
1-lusayn al-Hindu) from the DUP became the president of the NF.'°
Sadiq al-Mandi later (in 1974) went to London and became the president
of the NF."
Meanwhile, the ansar ('ansaar) led by al-Hadi al-Mandi (al-Haadii
al-Mandii)' 2 in Aba ('Abaa) island became the stronghold of the NF
inside Sudan. Some leaders of the Islamist movement who were not in
prison joined the ansar in Aba island.' 3 The ansar in Aba island were
attacked by government troops in March 1970, and Nitnairi used Egyptian
MIG fighters to bombard the island. Some four thousand ground troops
were sent.' 4
 During the incident, between five and twelve thousand
people died on the island, and al-Hadi al-Mandi was killed as he tried
to escape to Ethiopia.'5
By July 1971, the central leadership of the Sudanese Communist
Party (SCP) led by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub (cAbd al .-Khaliiq Mahjuub)'6
had become antipathetic to the regime. On 19 July 1971, some of the
communists and communist sympathizers who were associated with the
majority group of the SCP carried out a coup and succeeded in seizing
power. However, a counter-coup occurred on 22 July and this restored
Nimairi to power.' 7
 Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub (the secretary general of
the Communist Party) and Shafi Ahmad al-Shaikh (Shafii' 'Ahmad al-
ayç) (the leader of the trade union) were executed as well as the
officers who had planned the first coup.' 8 As a result, the Communist
Party lost its influence dramatically.
In January 1972, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was estab-
lished.' 9 In March 1972, the Addis Ababa agreement was signed 2 ° and
the first civil war between the North and the South ended (1963-72),
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After his release in November 1972, Dr al-Turabi met student lead-
ers21 of the Islamist movement and encouraged them to continue an
anti-regime campaign. 22
 Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii) was one of the
student leaders at the time. 23 Makki visited Dr al-Turabi almost
everyday to discuss the situation and receive some advice from him -
every time it took about 5 - 6 hours. 24 Dr al-Turabi encouraged ?Iakki
to carry out a student uprising, which was to be known as the Shaban
uprising. 25	Just before the uprising, on 30 August 1973, al-Turabi
was put in jail again.
According to Abd al-Wahhab al-Afandi. ( cAbd al-Wahhaab al-
'Afandii), 26 the plan of the uprising was this:
(1) first: starting with a student uprising
(2) second: agitating the masses against the Nimairi regime
(3) third: calling for a general strike
(4) fourth: finishing with the involvement of the armed forces.27
The final stage (4), involvement of a part of the armed forces, was
(according to al-Afandi) supposed to be carried out by Sadiq al-Mandi.
However, Sadiq did not do so and the uprising failed. 28 Since Nakki
was one of the organizers of the uprising, he was arrested and put in
the same jail as Dr al-Turabi.29
In Narch 1974, Dr al-Turabi was freed again. Over the 15 months
which followed, he was able to talk regularly to his supporters. Has-
san Nakki, who was also freed, visited Dr al-Turabi's house almost
everyday. 30 Al-Afandi saw Dr al-Turabi in 1975 for the first time,
when Dr al-Turabi came to a meeting to give a lecture in the
University of Khartoum. 3 ' In those days, the students demanded con-
crete action against the regime and the situation was very volatile.32
From this period, Dr al-Turabi made new attempts to re-structure
the organization of the movement - this time, in order to increase the
power of the secretary general. This process was completed by the
1980s.33
According to al-Afandi, Dr al-Turabi had rejected armed action as
part of an Islamist strategy until the 1969 coup. However, he changed
his mind and adopted this strategy after the coup. 34 In June 1975, Dr
al-Turabi was imprisoned again.
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In July 1976, the NF, including the Umzna Party, the DUP, and the
Islamist movement, carried out an anti-regime armed operation, but
this resulted in a complete failure. 35 El-Affendi36 describes how the
operation failed:
'Launched on 2 July 1976, the operation went badly wrong. It
was plagued with numerous technical problems from the start,
and co-ordination between various participants was poor.
Workers at the radio station, with memories of two recent
failed coups, refused to co-operate, and plans for an alter-
native radio station did not work. The civilian support the
coup leaders counted on did not materialize. There was deep
mistrust between various groups after Sadiq, who controlled
the bulk of the fighters, said that he wanted a share of
power proportionate to his men, and wanted to exclude Turabi
from an agreed four-man council that was supposed to rule
when the operation succeeded. To make matters worse, the
commandos fired indiscriminately on any man in uniform, thus
mobilizing the whole army against them. The biggest problem
was the accidental early arrival of President Nimeiri, who
was due that morning from France. A central part of the plan
was to intercept Nimeiri and capture or liquidate him. The
error in timing foiled this plan, and the early inconclusive
shoot-out around Nimeiri's plane gave the operation away ear-
lier than planned. By early afternoon the operation was
effectively foiled, while only small pockets of resistance of
demoralized men with no food or water remained. The rein-
forcements promised from Libya never arrived, since Sadiq and
other leaders who were bringing them in turned back when they
heard of the failure of the operation on the radio.'37
Although the operation itself failed, the Nimairi regime moved
towards a national reconciliation. The Umina Party, the DUP, 38 and the
Islami,st movement accepted the reconciliation.39
	
In July 1977,
"National Reconciliation" btween Nimairi and the main part of the
opposition became public, and Dr al-Turabi was freed.
84
/ Chapter 4
4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT4°
4.2.1 IN PRISON (1969-72)
When the ansar led by al-Hadi al-Mandi in Aba island were attacked by
the government troops in March 1970, Dr al-Turabi sent a message from
prison to al-Hadi al-Mandi to encourage him. Dr al-Turabi wrote in
the message that he would support al-Hadi as long as al-Hadi fought
for Islam. The message was later found by the government. However,
because Dr al-Turabi did not sign the note, when it was found no one
realized who wrote it.
When the Addis Ababa agreement was signed on 3.8 March 1972, Dr al-
Turabi was still in prison. Dr al-Turabi did not oppose it strongly,
because the agreement was basically similar to his original proposal
(he had proposed a regional government for the South). However, he
thought that the agreement contained too many concessions to the
Southerners. He thought that the reason for the concessions stemmed
from a change of Nimairi's foreign policy. In those days, Nimairi had
broken with the USSR and was trying to woo the Western block. Dr al-
Turabi did not, therefore, give the Addis Ababa agreement his positive
support. While Nimairi dealt with the problem of the South by recom-
mending autonomy from the rest of Sudan, Dr al-Turabi argued that the
autonomy of the South should be dealt with as part of a coherent
program of regional government in the whole of Sudan, and that the
South should not be separated from the rest of the country in any
sense.
4.2.2 FREE (1972-73)
After his release from prison, Dr al-Turabi visited several countries,
such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the US, to give lectures. In London
he met Sharif Husain al-Hindi (Shariif Husayn al-Hindu), a DUP leader
and the president of the National Front. Dr al-Turabi asked al-I-Iindi
to come back to Sudan to lead the opposition movement inside Sudan,
however al-Hindi refused. Dr al-Turabi thought that some leaders,
including Sadiq al-Mandi, preferred to stay in the safe places abroad
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and were reluctant to come back to Sudan. Sadiq stayed in Libya for a
short time, but for most of his time he remained in the UK. 4 ' Dr al-
Turabi thought: "Whenever something happens in Sudan, I will return to
Sudan immediately regardless of the risk' t . Because of this attitude,
he did not stay abroad for long.
4.2.3 IN PRISON (1973-74)
As soon as he returned to Sudan he was put in prison again, shortly
before the Shaban (Shac baan) uprising. However, Dr al-Turabi kept in
contact with the members of the movement outside the prison and
virtually controlled the Shaban uprising. Sadiq al-Mandi was supposed
to arrange for some army units to take part in the uprising. Although
Sadiq seemed to have made contact with some of the military officers,
he did not do anything effective.
4.2.4 FREE (1974-75)
Dr al-Turabi was freed in March 1974. He knew that the security serv-
ices were shadowing him, but he shook them off and met many people
almost daily. He set up various organizations, making plans, regula-
tions, and budgets. He was very active in restructuring the organiza-
tion of the Islamist movement as well as expanding it.42
4.2.5 IN PRISON (1975-77)
The coinniunication between inside the prison and outside the prison was
fairly good. An armed operation was being planned by the opposition
parties who formed the National Front. Sharif Husain al-Hindi
(Shariif Husayn al-Hindu), from the DUP, was the main organizer of
the operation. Osman Khalid ( CUthmaan Khaalid), Ibrahim al-Sanus
('Ibraahiim al-Sanuus), Mandi Ibrahim (Mandii 'Ibraahiim) and Ahmad
Abd al-Rahman ( t Ahmad cAbd al-Rahmaan) were the main participants from
the Islamist movement and Khalid was the leader among them. Ahmad Abd
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al-Rahman was active in London and the other three were active in
military training in Libya.
On 2 July 1976, the NF carried out an armed uprising, but failed.
Although Dr al-Turabi was in a prison, he knew about what was going on
and gave some advice on the strategic aspects of the operation.
Muhammad Nur Sad (Muhammad Nuur Sa Cd), a retired army officer, was
supposed to bring the armed forces from Libya. But he was an
ambitious man who wanted to obtain power in his own hands. Sadiq al-
Mandi could not perceive this. Although they left Libya for Sudan, as
soon as they knew from the radio that the operation inside Sudan had
gone wrong and the situation was against the NF, they returned to
Libya. After the failure of the operation, Dr al-Turabi strongly sug-
gested that the members of the Islamist movement should act independ-
ently and should not rely on other parties any more. This decision
stemmed from deep disappointment with the other parties.
Although there was good communication between the members of the
Islamist movement inside and outside prison and the movement was
strongly involved in the operation, Nimairi could not find evidence of
the link between the main leaders of the movement who were inside
prison and the people who took part in the actual actions, he thought
at the time that the Islamist movement had little responsibility for
the operation.
Just after the armed operation, because Nimairi feared more
unrest, he put Dr al-Turabi)s wife, Sadiq al-Mandi's wife and some
other women in prison. They were regarded by the regime as poten-
tially dangerous. Dr al-Turabi's wife (Sadiq's sister) had vengeful
thoughts in those days, and could have mobilized the ansar and the
members and supporters of the Islamist movement.
The government condemned Sadiq al-Mandi to exile. The Libyan
authorities told Sadiq that he should take the responsibility for the
failed armed operation as the leader of the National Front. However,
Sadiq did not want to take responsibility. He went to Oxford and
remained as a postgraduate student. SadIq later decided to pursue a
reconciliation between the regime and the opposition, because he was
very afraid of being punished as the leader of the NF. He acted pri-
vately (not as the leader of the NF) in order to maintain his security
and that of the ansar. When the movement towards national reconcilia-
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tion became open, Dr al-Turabi told the authorities that unless they
released him and his colleagues from prison, he would not accept the
reconciliation and would not talk to Nimairi. Then Dr al-Turabi and
his colleagues were freed.
4.2.6 FREE (1977-)
When President Nimairi asked Dr al-Turabi to join the SSU, Dr al-
Turabi told Nimairi that he would join it on condition that Nimairi
would guarantee the freedom of the Islamist movement. As a result, Dr
al-Turabi succeeded in obtaining Nimairi's promise that he would
guarantee the freedom of the movement. 43
 The Islamists decided to
take advantage of the reconciliation in order to expand their move-
ment. "Freedom" was the crucial condition to the later development of
the Islamist movement.
4.2.7 THE ISLANISTS INSIDE PRISON
Dr al-Turabi was relatively satisfied with conditions inside prison.44
He could read any books he wanted, his health was good and his weight
increased. 45 Dr al-Turabi never worried about his situation and he
enjoyed his prison life, 46 Dr al-Turabi managed to keep in contact
with the other members of the Islamist movement outside the prison
secretly.47
During the prison period, Dr al-Turabi and his colleagues did not
waste their time. They studied various topics, such as economy, art,
social organization, and international relations. 	 They discussed
these inside the prison. They prepared for detailed plans and
programs in case they seized power later. Because of this prepara-
tion, the Islamist movement could later expand itself rapidly. The
experiences in prison were very useful and significant for the move-
ment.
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4.3 ANAEXSES
4.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-69)
Table 4.3.(1) lists the main characters (imagoes) which have emerged
from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his life story up to
1969.	 Table 4.3.(2) lists possible adjectives associated with those
characters which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality elements.
Table 4.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-69)
Period I Main characters (imagoes)
1932	 the critic (a),	 the resistant (a),
-	 the passionate (a),
	
the believer (a),
1969	 the winner (a),
	
the reformer (a),
the revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
the good planner (a),	 the hero (a),
the competitor (a),
the man behind the scenes (a),
the mediator Cc),
	
the internationalist (c)
(a)	 = classified as agentic
(c)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
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Table 4.3.(2): Possible adiectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-69)
Period J Possible adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
-	
defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1969	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a),
overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a),
offensive (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c),
kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c),
open (c), cooperative (c)
(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1969-77)
Dr al-Turabi's account of the period from 1969 to 1977 is again
dominated by agentic elements of personality. This period is marked
by some already identified characters, such as "the critic", "the
resistant", "the good planner", "the man behind the scenes", and "the
hero"	 A newly identified agentic character, "the pragmatist", shows
another aspect of Dr al-Turabi's personality. Of these characters,
"the resistant" seems to lead other characters and to represent the
overall image of his account of the 1969-77 period. This character
indicates some adjectives like defiant, resolute, determined, and
offensive.
Among the previous findings, signs of a "careful" personality
which stems from some characters like "the good planner" and "the man
behind the scenes" are present in his account. This is clear in the
story about his anonymous message which was sent to al-Hadi al-Nandi
and his successful secret contact with the members and supporters of
the Islamist movement.
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His account of the anti-regime struggles also suggests an aspect
of his agentic personality concerning friendship (may be called an
"agentic friendship"). People who have a strong agentic personality
tend to think that the proof of good friendship is the ability to come
to the rescue of one's friend (see Section 1.2.3). This aspect is
apparent in his criticism of those who stayed abroad and those who
returned to Libya on 2 July 1976. He virtually accused those people
of deserting their friends.
Another previously identified character is that of "the hero".
This is clear in his negative account about Sadiq al-Nandi. In Dr al-
Turabi's life story, he tends to describe himself as "the hero". Con-
sequently, his rivals were likely to be described as "the
incompetent". The negative accounts on Sadiq appear to be also a
reflection of a different aspect of his agentic personality. People
who have strong agentic personality tend to expect high performance in
tasks. The low performances of Sadiq (Dr al-Turabi perceived so) in
the failed operations, therefore, seemed to have made Dr al-Turabi
feel very frustrated. This in turn resulted in his negative account
about Sadiq.
The account about Dr al-Turabi's prison life and the study and
discussion inside prison appear to provide further evidence of his
"optimistic" personality.
	
He said that he never worried about his
situation and he enjoyed his prison life. Despite there was no
guarantee of his release, he was preparing for his future by studying
and discussing many subjects.
The 1969-77 period also throws up a new character of Dr al-Turabi,
"the pragmatist" - an agentic character. This is clear in the story
about the deal between Dr al-Turabi and Nimairi, in which the Islamist
movement obtained its freedom in exchange for support. The Islamists
decided to cooperate with Nimairi in order to achieve their goals.
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(3) NEW FINDINGS (1969-77)
The following table shows the new elements of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality which have emerged from the analysis of his life story cover-
ing the period between 1969 and 1977.
Table 4.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1969-77)
Period Character	 Possible adjectives
1969	 the pragniatist (a) pragmatic (a), flexible (a),
- 77	 calculative (a)
4.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as
defiant, determined, and resolute) stemming from the character of "the
resistant" (representing the image of his account of the period) seem
to have affected the underlying nature of the key developments in the
period. During the period from 1969 to 1977, the bulk of the leaders
of the Islamist movement were inside prison. The IslamIsts, however,
showed their determination to press forward their political campaign
despite difficult conditions. Their determination seems to have
stemmed from Dr al-Turabi' strong agentic character, that of "the
resistant".
In the 1969-77 period, the Islamists retained some optimism.
Their optimism seems to have been stimulated by Dr al-Turabi's atti-
tude inside and outside prison. This comes across in his followers'
comments (see notes). These are full of their admiration and surprise
at Dr al-Turabi's determined attitude. Dr al-Turabi's refusal to com-
plain over prison conditions, his efforts to study as much as pos-
sible, and his strict religious practices, for example, provided a
positive atmosphere inside prison and created confidence among his
followers that Dr al-Turabi was the right leader to follow.
Dr al-Turabi's positive thinking and optimistic personality which
particularly stem from his character of "the winner" appear to have
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also affected the Islamists' belief that the discussion and study
inside prison were significant for the development of the Islamist
movement. As for Dr al-Turabi, his imprisonment should not become a
symbol of "the loser" and should be, at least, a "footstep" for his
future victory ("the winner"). Dr al-Turabi, therefore, emphasized
the achievement inside prison, saying that the Islamist inmates
accumulated various kinds of knowledge, made detailed plans, studied
how to govern a country, and so forth.
Concerning the 1973 Shaban uprising and the 1976 armed operation,
it is clear that Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality had some impact on
these anti-regime struggles. Dr al-Turabi's main characters, such as
"the resistant" and "the revolutionary" appear to have become dominant
in both struggles.
In the 1973 Shaban uprising, Dr al-Turabi's role was clear. Dr
al-Turabi was the man who encouraged the student activists to carry
out the uprising, and the man who virtually controlled the uprising
from prison. Since the procedure of the Shaban uprising was similar
to the development of the October Revolution, it seems that Dr al-
Turabi was expecting another "October Revolution". 	 However, the
uprising failed. The reason for the failure was, perhaps, Dr al-
Turabi's misunderstanding of the true picture of the October Revolu-
tion, where he firmly believed that he and the Islamic movement had
taken the initiative.
Dr al-Turabi's personality stemming from the characters of "the
resistant" and "the revolutionary" seems to have also affected the
participation of the Islamist movement in the 1976 armed operation.
Compared to the case of the Shabal2 uprising, however, the impact of
his personality on this operation itself was less significant. This
is because the operation was not under Dr al-Turabi's control but that
of the National Front.
The impact of his personality was more apparent on the Islamists'
final decision not to "rely on other parties" in order to achieve
their objectives. This decision seems to have derived from Dr al-
Turabi's agentic personality which seeks "control" and "independence".
Dr al-Turabi blamed other parties for the complete failure of the 1976
operation. He appeared to have concluded that the main reasons for
the failure stemmed from the fact that he could not control the opera-
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tion and that the leaders of the action group of the HF (including
Sadiq) were incompetent. Because of this, Dr al-Turabi thought that
"the movement should act independently and should not rely on other
parties any more."
The armed operation failed and the Nimairi regime survived.
However, because the national reconciliation was agreed and the
Islainist movement obtained its freedom, which was proven during the
next period from 1977 to 1985, the consequence was not too bad for the
Islamists. The deal with Nimairi seemed to derive from Dr al-Turabi's
pragmatic personality which gave priority to achieving his goal of the
expansion of the Islamist movement.
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CHAPTER 5: THE ISLANIST MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NIMAIRI REGIME:
EXPANSION AND PRACTICE
Chapter 5 has three sections. Section 5.1, gives the general descrip-
tion of the key developments in the Islamist movement during the
period from 1977 to the collapse of the Nimairi regime in 1985. This
section focuses on the movement's expansion under the Nimairi regime.
The movement's activities concerning education, Islamic legal institu-
tions, and Islamic economic institutions are regarded as the key
developments during the period.
Section 5.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account covering the period,
although it does not necessarily cover all of the items discussed in
the previous section. This stems from the limitations to the
researcher's interview.
The final section, Section 5.3, gives the researcher's analyses of
Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the
impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.
5.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1977-85)
5.1.1 CHRONOLOGY
1977/ 7/**:"National Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the
main part of the opposition became public.
1977/ 7/17:A1-Turabi was freed.
1977/ 8/18:The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) was
established.
1978/ 2/**:Elections to the People's National Assembly were
held. Al-Turabi joined the Sudanese Socialist
Union (SSU).
1978/ 5/1O:The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan started operations.
1978-85
	
:The Islamic economic institutions were growing
and becoming diversified in membership.
1978/ 7/**Al_Turabi became secretary of information and
foreign relations at the SSU.
1979/**/**:Al_Turabi became Attorney General until Nay 1983
and was presidential adviser on legal and foreign
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affairs until March 1985.
By 1980 :Nimairi's supporters were limited to the people
in the security forces, the south, the SSU, and
the Islamist movement.
1980/**/**:Nimairi wrote his book entitled " Why the Islamic
Way ? "'
1983/ 5/**:Al_Turabi lost his job as Attorney General and
obtained the post of legal adviser. Al-Rashid
al-Tahir became Attorney General.
1983/ 3-8 :The SPLA was formed. 2 The second civil war
between the government and the rebels broke
out.
1983/ 6/**:The division of the South into three parts was
announced.
1983/ 8/**:The SPLA was officially formed.
1983/ 9/ 8:The introduction of Islamic laws (sharia) was
announced. This fuelled the civil war.
1983/ 9/**:Al_Turabi became an adviser of the president on
foreign affairs.
1983/ 9/25:Sadiq al-Nandi was imprisoned.
1984/ 4/**:l2 special prompt justice courts (staffed by the
Islamist movement and others) were established.
1985/ 1/18:Mahinud Muhammad Taha was executed.3
1985/ 2/**:Al_Tahir sent an anti-Islainist movement plea to
Nimairi.
1985/ 3/ 5:Vice President George Bush met Nimairi in Sudan.
1985/ 3/ 9:Al-Turabi and other leaders of the Islamist
movement were arrested.
1985/ 3/26:The National Gathering for the Salvation of the
Homeland (NGSH: anti-Nimairi, anti-Islamist) was
formed by the opposition organizations.
1985/ 4/ 6:General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab carried out
a military coup. The Nimairi regime collapsed.
The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring	 Su = Summer Au = Autumn	 Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).
5.1.2 SUTYIARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: EXPANSION AND PRACTICE
In July 1977, Dr al-Turabi was released, after the National Recon-
ciliation between Nimairi and the main part of the opposition became
public. Dr al-Turabi was then appointed by Nimairi, after the 1978
elections, as a member of both the 490-member Central Committee of the
Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) and the SSU Politbureau. 4
	In July
97
Chapter .5
1978, Dr al-Turabi became a secretary of information and foreign rela-
tions at the SSU.
	
In 1979 he became Attorney General..6
The Islamists had chosen cooperation with Nimairi in order to
expand their movement. 7 According to Hassan Makki, the movement's
development after the national reconciliation was the most important
one in the history of the Islamist movement. 8 The Islamists were
trying to put into practice their plans and programmes made inside
prison, such as those covering education, Islamic law, and the Islamic
economy. On the other hand, the Umma Party and the DUP went into
opposition again. 9
 By 1980, Nimairi's supporters were limited to mern-
bers of the security forces, people in the south, and members of the
SSU and the Islamist movement.10
The following sub-sections are intended to show how the Islamists
took advantage of the opportunities obtained from Nimairi, expanded
their movement, and put their plans and programmes into action during
this period.
(1) EDUCATION
Under the Nimairi regime, the Islamists were not so much intent on
changing educational programmes as on expanding their support in
schools. Gurdon points out two strong sections of Sudanese society on
which the Islamist movement stands: 'the first is among the urban
based petty traders and small industrialists, who are essentially
lower middle class entrepreneurs. ... The second power base is in the
Sudanese classrooms and lecture halls, ...
According to Abbas:
'In education, Nimairi's regime gave the NIF' 2 a free hand in
higher secondary schools in exchange for a task that the NIF
was more than willing to perform: keeping campuses quiet,
especially Khartoum University. ... The NIF enjoyed a
virtual monopoly of political activity in the schools, while
other political parties were forced to work underground. The
factionalism that bedeviled opposition student groups con-
tributed to the success of the NIF in controlling student
bodies, especially the Khartoum University Student Union, for
much of the period between 1978 and l984.'13
Like al-Afandi and Hassan Makki, who were recruited to the
Islamist movement during their secondary school period, many Sudanese
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students were recruited. When they graduated from university, they
moved into various fields and sectors in society as elites, such as
economic field, political field, and the armed and security forces.'4
The Islamist graduates were getting to hold important positions in
society. The more time passed, the more the influence of the movement
in elite circles increased. A former minister under President Nimairi
said that the expansion of the power of the Islamist movement started
from "schools". The Islamists knew the means by which they could
obtain the highest return with the lowest efforts.'5
(2) ISLAMIC LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Since the independence of Sudan on i. January 1956, Sudan had not had a
permanent constitution, until a permanent constitution was adopted in
1973. Up to 1973, several draft constitution had been under con-
sideration. In 1967-68, the ICF led by Dr al-Turabi had itself pro-
posed a draft Islamic cOflStjtutjOfl. 16 However, the debate on the con-
stitution was interrupted by the 1969 coup. In 1973, when the first
permanent Constitution appeared, Article 9 stated that 'the Islamic
Law and custom shall be main sources of legislation.'' 7	After the
National Reconciliation, a law commission was formed and this tried to
Islamize the existing laws.' 8	The head of this commission was the
Attorney General, Dr al-Turabi. However, only one act, the Alms
Treasury Act (an Islamic law), was passed by the People's Assembly.19
In May 1983, President Nimairi sacked Dr al-Turabi as Attorney General
and gave Dr al-Turabi the post of legal adviser. 20 Al-Rashid al-Tahir
became Attorney General. 2 ' Nimairi prepared for the new Islamic laws
excluding Dr al-Turabi. 22
 In September 1983 and the following year,
President Nimairi introduced the famous (or notorious) Islamic laws
(so-called September Laws based on the sharia (sharii c a)) and the
major change in the Sudanese legal system was finished. 23
 The laws
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introduced in the years 1983 and 1984 included:
(A) Civil Laws
(1) The Civil Procedure Act 1983
(2) The Civil Transactions Act 1984
(B) Criminal Laws
(1) The Penal Code 198324
(2) The Criminal Procedure Act 1983
(3) The Judiciary Act 1983
(4) The Sources of the Judicial Decisions Act 1983
(5) The Evidence Act 1983
(6) The Advocates Act 1983.25
El-Affendi describes an aspect of how the Islamist movement had
penetrated into the Islamic legal system:
'Nimeiri ... declared a state of emergency at the end of
April 1984. Twelve special "prompt justice" courts were set
up ... to speed up the process of implementation of the new
laws [Islamic laws]. These were staffed either by Ikhwan
[the Islamist movement] or by other enthusiasts of the new
laws. ... The momentum of the new changes ... enabled
Ikhwan to get rid of some of their key opponents in the
regime. '26
Although Dr al-Turabi himself had little "official" power in the
government at that time, some strong supporters and members of the
Islamist movement, like al-Mikasbifi Taha al-Kabbashi (al-Mikaashifii
Taha al-Kabbaashii) 27 from the High Court of Appeal, pressed ahead
with Islamization plans along the lines which the Islamist movement
wanted. 28 Al-Kabbashi described the situation in those days as fol-
lows:
'Before the introduction of the September laws [Islamic
laws ] 29 there was already a move towards Islamization of
laws. The government, for example, banned Sudanese tradi-
tional gambling. Dr al-Turabi was strongly involved in the
matter.
After the introduction of the September laws, because the
Islamists had been waiting for the sharia, we all, including
Dr al-Turabi, welcomed and supported those Islamic laws.
Between September 1983 and March 1984, three people, an Egyp-
tian, Dr Yusuf All (Yuusuf cAll), and I, became the leaders
of the implementation of the sharia. We gathered about 4,000
lawyers from around Sudan and called for their support of the
sharia. We also used television and radio for our job. In
April 1984, I was appointed by President Nimairi as a judge
of the High Court of Appeal. I also gave many lectures on
the sharia.
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In 1985, however, the relations between Nimairi and the
Islamists became worse. There were two main reasons for
this: firstly the US wanted to prevent the Sudanese economy
from being Islanlized, secondly Nimairi was fed up with the
Islamists' severe accusations against his near relatives.'30
As a result of the expansion of the influence of the Islamist
movement in the legal system, the invisible conflict between President
Nimairi and Dr al-Turabi seemed to have increased. President Nimairi
had Dr al-Turabi arrested on 9 March 1985 and started to attack the
Islamist movement openly. To quote The Guardian: 'Yesterday [24 March
1985), the President again attacked the Brotherhood [Islamist
movement], by ordering the revision of all verdicts and sentences
passed by courts previously controlled by Brotherhood members.'3'
Concerning the case of Nahmud Muhammad Taha ( Mahmuud Muhammad
laha), the belief that Dr al-Turabi was involved in the case of Mahmud
Muhammad Taha is incorrect. Moreover, there seems to exist another
confusion. Some believe that an item on apostasy was in the 1983
penal code, but it was not. To quote Sudan Update:
'In 1985 there was an international outcry when the Nimeiri
government used this article [Article 3 of the 1983 Judicial
Source Act, known as "free interpretation") to sentence the
leader of the Republican Brothers, Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed
Taha, aged 76, to death for "apostasy" - a charge for which
he had not been tried and which did not exist in the statute
book. '32
So, despite the non-existence of the apostasy code, the judge33
used Article 3 to change the charge from sedition to apostasy by his
own decision.	 -
(3] ISLAMIC ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Some scholars argue that the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) was
established under the initiative of the Islamist movement. However,
the reality seems to be more complicated.
According to Ahmed, President Nimairi talked with Prince Muhammad
al-Faisal Al Saud (Muhammad al-Faysal 'Aal Sac uud) 34 about estab-
lishing an Islamic bank in February l976, while Dr al-Turabi was
still in prison. The FIBS was established in August 1977 and started
its operations in Nay 1978.36
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Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi ( cAbd al-Rahiim Mahmuud Hamdii), who was
at the time an economic consultant for Prince al-Faisal at the Saudi
investment office, told the researcher as follows:
'I advocated the movement's support for Nimairi during my
imprisonment between 1969 and 1970, but Dr al-Turabi and
other leaders did not agree with me. When I was freed in
1970, I officially resigned from the Islaniist movement,
although I kept in contact with the movement in private. In
1976, when Prince al-Faisal made a proposal about the estab-
lishment of the FIBS, Nimairi accepted the proposal.
Nimairi, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Bank of
Sudan, and the Speaker of the House of Representative visited
me to discuss and pursue the project. I received some advice
on legal matters concerning the establishment of the FIBS
from Dr al-Turabi in private, but Dr al-Turabi did not play a
practical role in establishing the bank.'37
How important Dr al-Turabi's role was in developing the idea of
the establishment of the FIBS is given different emphasis by different
people involved. Ahmad All Abdalla ('Ahmad cA].i cAbd Allaah), who is
currently the secretary general of the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB)
of the Bank of Sudan, did say specifically that the "idea" of the
establishment of the FIBS came from Dr al-Turabi. 38
	He told the
researcher:
'Dr al-Turabi used to tackle the question of an Islamic econ-
omy as a part of the Islamist movement, which could not be
avoided in order to establish an Islamic state. Dr al-Turabi
was thinking how to transform the existing interest-involved
banking system into a no-interest Islamic banking system.
Establishing an Islamic bank in Sudan became the first step
to realize the idea. Dr al-Turabi's thoughts and ideas were
shared with the members of the movement. However, lack of
capital inside Sudan was the main obstacle to establish an
Islamic bank. Meanwhile, many members of the Islamist move-
nient, some of whom escaped after the 1969 coup from Sudan,
were living in the Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia. The
Islamists improved their relations with the Muslims in those
countries and tried to establish an Islamic bank. As the
result of their efforts, the FIBS was established as the
first Islamic bank in Sudan. I do not attribute everything
to Dr al-Turabi alone, but Dr al-Turabi was certainly leading
the Islamist movement and the idea came from him.'39
After the introduction of the Islamic laws (sharia) in September
1983, the procedure of transforming the banking system from an
interest-based conventional banking system to a non-interest Islamic
banking system was accelerated. 4 °
the banking system was Islamized.4'
A year later, in September 1984,
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The FIBS had a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) in order to make
sure that all activities of the bank corresponded with Islamic laws.
To quote Ahmed:
'The SSB enjoys a high degree of independence from the bank
management. It is appointed by shareholders in the General
Assembly. The bank management refers to the SSB for advice
on executing operations without contravening Sharia rules.'42
Some scholars point out a strong connection between the FIBS and
the Islamist movement led by al-Turabi in those days (1978 - 1985).
For example, Jamal argues that, 'Sudan's Muslim Brethren [the
Islamists] found themselves well placed to dominate this system [the
Islamic banking system) in Sudan.' 43 Table 5.l.(1) gives the names of
senior personnel in the FIBS in the financial year 1984.
Table 5.l.(1): Senior staff of the FIBS (1984)
Board of Directors:
(1) Prince Muhammad al-Faisal Al Saud (Chairman)
(2) Ibrahim al-Tayyib ('Ibraahiim al-Iayyib)44
(3) Ahmad Salah Jamjum ('Ahmad Salaah Jamjuum)45
(4) Ahmad al-Najar('Ahmad al-Najaar)46
(5) Ainin Aqil Attas ('Amiin c Aqill cAttaas)47
*(6) Bashir Hassan Bashir (Bashiir Hasan Bashiir)48
*(7) Musa Husain Daral (Muusaa 1-lusayn Daraar)49
(8) Muhammad Salih Baharith (Muhammad Saalih Baahaarith)5°
*(9) Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (Muhammad Yuusuf Muhammad)51
(10) Abd al-Hamid Abd al-Razaq (cAbd al-Hamiid cAbd al-Razaaq)52
(11) Abdalla Omar Nasif ( cAbd Allaah c umar Nasiif)53
(12) Omar Abd al-Rahman Azam (cUmar cAbd al-Rahmaan CAzaam)54
(13) Abd al-Aziz Abdalla ( cAbd al_ CAziiz cAbd Allaah)55
*(14) Yassin Omar al-Imarn (Yaasiin cjJmar al-'Imaam)56
(15) Yusuf Abd al-Rahman (Yuusuf cAbd al-.Rahmaan)57
Secretary:
Abbas al-Bakhit Musa ( cAbbaas al-Bakhiit Nuusaa)58
Executive Management:
General Manager:
A1-Baqr Yusuf Mudawi (al-Baaqr Yuusuf Mudawii)59
Deputy General Manager:
Al-Hajj Abdalla Khalid (al-Haajj cAbd Allaah Khaalid)6°
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General Manager's Assistants:
* Ahmad Ibrahim al-Turabi ('Ahmad 'Ibraahiim al-Turaabii)61
Abdin Abmad Salama ( CAabdiin 'Ahmad Salaama)62
* Rabi Hassan Ahmad (Rabii c Hasan 'Ahmad)63
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB):64
Al-Siddiq al-Darir (al-Siddiiq al-Dariir)65
Awadalla Salih (cAwad Allaah Saalih)66
Siddiq Abd al-Hay (Siddiiq cAbd al-Hay)67
* Yusuf Hamid al-Aiim (Yuusuf Haamid al_CAlim)68
* Hassan Muhammad al-Bayli (Hasan Muhammad ai-Bayiii)69
Sources: The FIBS, Annual Report: 1984 (Khartoum: 1985), p. 2.
The notes on the staff are based on Dr al-Turabi's
comments obtained in the researcher's interview on 25
January 1995.
* = Described by Dr al-Turabi as member of the Islamist
movement.
Among the staff, Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad, Yassin Omar al-imam, and
Rabi Hassan Ahmad are famous leading figures of the Islaniist movement.
In addition to this, Bashir Hassan Bashir, Nusa Husain Daral, Ahmad
Ibrahim al-Turabi, Yusuf Hamid al-Aiim, and Hassan Muhammad al-Bayli
were described by Dr al-Turabi as members of the Islamist movement
(see Dr al-Turabi's comments in the notes). It seems to the
researcher that there is no doubt about the strong link between the
FIBS and the Islamist movement.
As for the performance of the FIBS, it seems to have done quite
well. Ahmed assesses the FIBS as successful by pointing out the
spread of its branches and the growth in the size of its deposits over
the period 1979-86.° According to the annual report for 1984, 71 it
listed 9 branches in the capital (Khartoum), 6 branches outside the
capital and 3 subsidiary companies.72
According to Taha, in 1980 the Islamist movement owned about 500
companies. 73 In 1989 its capital inside the country was more than 500
million dollars, and outside the country about 300 million dollars.74
However, Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi denied Taha's claim. 75 It is dif-
ficult to obtain information which proves which is correct.
On 27 March 1985, when food riots flared in Khartoum, three build-
ings were heavily damaged: a branch office of the SSU, the Meridian
Hotel, and the FIBS. 76 To quote The Guardian:
'While the students were chanting "we will not be ruled by
the World Bank, we will not be ruled by the IMF," the urban
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poor took up a different cry - "we are hungry.t The prices
of bread and sugar have risen by 33 per cent in the past
three days, and fuel went up by between 60 and 75 per cent a
fortnight ago. None of these price rises have been formally
announced by the Government.'77
The FIBS had been criticized by the mass-media on the grounds that
it was responsible for the starvation in Sudan. 78 This related to the
so-called "dura crises" (dura (ura: millet). According to Kurita,
the FIBS not only supported the export of dura to Saudi Arabia, but
also (around 1984) had bought up dura. 79 However, Abd al-Rahim Nahmud
Hamdi, who was at the time the deputy general manager of the FIBS,
gave the researcher a different view:
'The accusation against the FIBS was a fabrication which was
originally conspired by pro-Nimairi state governors. In
those days, while the influence of the Islamists led by Dr
al-Turabi on the economy was getting strong, that of the pro-
Nimairi group was getting weak. The left elements in the SSU
were especially frustrated with this situation. The media
was practically controlled by ex-communists. Everything was
planned by the pro-Nimairi group in order to undermine the
reputation of the FIBS and the Islamist movement.	 All
allegations were brought into court and were later proven
false. I told the governors that if they could find even
"one sack" of dura, they should confiscate it and put me in
jail. The accusation against the FIBS was completely falla-
cious. '80
The FIBS later claimed that A1-.Ayyam (the Arabic daily newspaper),
which first brought up the issue, had apologized to the FIBS in the
press on 3 October 1985.81
On 5 March 1985, the then US Vice President, George Bush, visited
Nimairi in Sudan and advised Nimairi to do something about the
Islamists. 82 On 9 March 1985, Dr al-Turabi was sacked from the
government and arrested together with his Islamist colleagues. 83 On 6
April 1985, General Abd al-Rahinan Suwar al-Dhahab ( cAbd al-Rahman
Suwaar al-Dhahab), Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, 84
 carried out a military coup and removed President
Nimairi from power, while Nimairi was in Egypt.85
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52 DR AL-TIJRABI'S ACCOUNT86
Dr al-Turabi initially had no intention of joining the government.87
However, because President Nimairi invited him to join the
government 88 and the Shura (Shuuraa) Council 89 of the Islamist move-
ment suggested to Dr al-Turabi that he should accept Nimairi's invita-
tion, he decided to do so.
Since President Nimairi promised Dr al-Turabi at the beginning
that he would guarantee the freedom of the Islamist movement, Dr al-
Turabi chose cooperation with President Nimairi as a strategy.
Nimairi was always suspicious of Dr al-Turabi, but Dr al-Turabi was
concentrating on his own goals. His hidden purpose was to utilize the
state system in order to expand the Islamist movement and practice the
plans and programmes of the movement.
Regarding to his relationship with the regime, Dr al-Turabi main-
tained that the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) was virtually an
Islamic movement and not a socialist one. He sometimes criticized
President Nimairi openly. President Nimairi was suspicious about Dr
al-Turabi and was afraid of Dr al-Turabi's strong influence inside the
government. 90
 Although his official post was Attorney General (1979-
83), he did many jobs which normally the Foreign Minister did.
As the Islamization of society moved ahead and Dr al-Turabi's
influence increased, President Nimairi wanted to concentrate attention
on his own role in the development. 9 ' President Nimairi removed Dr
al-Turabi from the post of Attorney General in May 1983 and ordered
officials not to come into contact with Dr al-Turabi. However, since
many of those officials were former students of Dr al-Turabi, the
officials and Dr al-Turabi kept in contact. There were many former
students of Dr al-Turabi inside the government. In those days, many
new Islamic organizations, such as Islamic banks and Islamic insurance
companies, were being formed. Sadiq al-Mandi had no influence in this
field.
The Islamists' also increased their influence inside the army. The
Islamists had not opposed the army since the national reconciliation,
and approached it through the government, particularly through the
army's educational frameworks. 	 Dr al-Turabi persuaded Nimairi to
Islamize the army.	 Dr al-Turabi succeeded in introducing religious
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programmes in military education. After the breaking out of the sec-
ond civil war between the government forces and the SPLA led by John
Garang in 1983, the Islatnists openly supported the army and opposed
the SPLA.
Immediately after the departure of the US Vice President George
Bush from Sudan, Dr al-Turabi talked with President Nimairi on 6 March
1985. Dr al-Turabi told President Nimairi that he would tell Nimairi
openly if there were any disagreements between theni and that he would
not betray Nimairi as long as Nimairi trusted him. Dr al-Turabi told
Nimairi, however, that if Wimairi arrested him, the government would
collapse. Nimairi said that he agreed with Dr al-Turabi.
On Friday 8 March, Dr al-Turabi met the President in a mosque as
usual for Friday prayer. However, on that occasion, the President not
only shook his hand but also held him quite strongly. 92 Dr al-Turabi
realized that President Nimairi bad decided to arrest him. On 9 March
1985, in the early morning, Dr al-Turabi was arrested and taken to
Western Sudan together with other members of the Islamist movement.93
Dr al-Turabi was then isolated from the other members and put in
prison in El-Obeid (A1-'Ubayyid).
When Dr al-Turabi was in prison in El-Obeid, there was a plan to
enable his escape. Dr al-Turabi's supporters asked Colonel Muammar
al-Qadhafi (Mucammar al-Qadhdhaafii), the Libyan leader, to help and
al-Qadhafi said that he would think about it. Because Dr al-Turabi
trusted the members and power of the Islamist movement, he was never
afraid for his future.
5.3 ANALYSES
5.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-77)
Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the
analysis of his life story between 1932 and 1977 are those listed in
Table 5.3.(l).	 Possible adjectives stemming from those characters,
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which may describe Dr al-Turabi's personality, are listed in Table
5.3. (2).
Table 5.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (ima goes) (1932-77)
Period I Main characters (irnagoes)
1932	 the critic (a),
	
the resistant (a),
-	 the passionate (a), 	 the believer (a),
1977	 the winner (a),	 the reformer (a),
the revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
the good planner (a),	 the hero (a),
the competitor (a),
	
the pragmatist (a),
the man behind the scenes (a),
the mediator (c),
	 the internationalist (c)
(a)	 classified as agentic
(c)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on Mc.Adams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
Table 5.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-77)
Period I Possible adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1977	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a),
overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a),
offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a),
calculative (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (C), sociable (c),
kind (c), conciliatory (C), internationalist Cc),
open Cc), cooperative (C)
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(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1977-85)
Dr al-Turabi's account of the period between 1977 and 1985 shows signs
of both agentic and communal elements of personality. Among the
previously identified agentic characters, "the hero" and "the winner"
are dominant. This period, however, seems to be marked by two newly
identified agentic characters, "the expansionist" and "the persuader",
and one communal character, "the cooperator". Since 1964 for the
first time, a communal character has emerged in the 1977-85 period.
This communal character, however, is not purely communal, i.e. it
includes both communal and agentic elements. "The expansionist" seems
to be the main character representing the image of his account of the
period and indicates adjectives such as expansionist, ambitious,
active, dominant, and influential. This character is backed by other
characters mentioned above.
Signs of his "self-projecting" element of personality are apparent
in Dr al-Turabi's account about Nimairi's fear for and jealousy of Dr
al-Turabi's influence. This "self-projecting" element of personality
stems from one of his main characters, namely "the hero", which is a
previously identified agentic character.
Further evidence of his agentic personality is apparent in the
account of Dr al-Turabi's strong confidence in the movement when he
was imprisoned. He firmly believed that the members of the movement
would rescue him from prison if his life was in danger. His strong
confidence seems to have stemmed from his character of "the winner",
which is described by adjectives such as strong, clever, patient, con-
fident, and optimistic.
His account of the cooperation with Niuiairi throws up two new
characters of Dr al-Turabi, i.e. those of "the expansionist" and "the
cooperator". The former, "the expansionist", is backed by the latter,
"the cooperator". In another words, for the purpose of the Islamist
expansion he became "the cooperator". These characters are apparent
throughout the 1977-85 period. "The expansionist" is an agentic
character and "the cooperator" is a communal character. In the case
of Dr al-Turabi, however, "the cooperator" appears to include agentic
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aspects too. This is because the motivation behind his cooperation is
obviously an achievement motivation (agentic motivation).
Another new character to come out is that of "the persuader"
also an agentic character. This comes across in the story that Dr al-
Turabi succeeded in persuading Nimairi to Islamize the army. This
character seems also to support the character, "the expansionist":
Islamizing the army can be seen as a part of the expansion of the
Islamist movement.
(3) NEW FINDINGS (1977-85)
Dr al-Turabi's life story covering the period 1977 to 85 has brought
forwards some new elements of his personality. 	 Table 5.3.(3) sum-
marizes these new elements.
Table 5.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1977-85)
Period Characters	 Possible adjectives
1977	 the expansionist	 expansionist (a), ambitious (a),
-	 (a)	 active (a), dominant (a),
1985	 influential (a)
the persuader (a)
	
persuasive (a), clever (a),
confident (a), eloquent (a)
the cooperator (c) cooperative (c), supportive (c)
5.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as
expansionist, dominant, and influential) stenuning from the character
of "the expansionist" (representing the image of his account of the
period) seem to have affected the underlying nature of the key devel-
opments in the period. The movement's activities concerning educa-
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tion, Islamic legal institutions, and Islamic economic institutions
under the Nimairi regime are all designed and carried out for the pur-
pose of the expansion of the Islamist movement. Dr al-Turabi's strong
agentic personality which seeks for expansion and control clearly
affected these activities.
During the period between 1977 and 1985, the Islamist movement was
seemingly incorporated into the Nimairi regime. However, the
Islamists were actually acting quite independently in the pursuit of
their own goals. The Islainists merely used the opportunities provided
by Nimairi as a strategy. This strategy seems to have been a reflec-
tion of some of Dr al-Turabi's characters, such as "the good planner",
"the pragmatist", "the man behind the scenes", "the cooperator", and
"the persuader".
The goals of the Islamist movement during this period were clear,
i.e. expansion of the movement and practice of their plans. 94 Nustafa
Osman Ismail told the researcher how the Islamists expanded their
influence on society as follows:
'Dr al-Turabi told us that every Islamist movement must go
through three stages: spreading ideas, establishing organiza-
tions, and establishing an Islamic society. 95 In order to
complete the first and second stages, Dr al-Turabi sent his
supporters to every field or sector of society and encouraged
them to become experts in their fields or sectors, such as
media, education, economy, security, army, health, and
engineering. Dr al-Turabi made sure that there were at least
several specialists who supported Dr al-Turabi and the
Islamist movement in every part of society.	 He was always
pushiig people towards main aims and objectives. Dr al-
Turabi was good at traiTforming his ideas into other people's
ideas. His ideas became the ideas of other people without
their noticing it. He was very flexible in choosing means
to achieve his goals. His cooperation with Nimairi was just
a strategic choice to achieve his main goals. '96
Yassin Omar al-Imam also gave the researcher information on how
the Islamists achieved their goals, particularly referring to Dr al-
Turabi's leadership style which seems to stem from his character of
"the man behind the scenes" as follows:
'Once Dr al-Turabi gave a mission to a leader of the move-
ment, he made the leader find the best means to complete the
mission. Dr al-Turabi trusted the leader and did not
instruct in detail. Dr al-Turabi's main task was to point
out the important points and the goal of the mission. This
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was Dr al-Turabi's way to train the leaders of the move-
ment.
It seems that after Dr al-Turabi made his goals clear, he did not
necessarily give detailed instructions on how to achieve such goals,
and that the members and supporters of the Islamist movement carried
out missions on behalf of Dr al-Turabi.
To summarize the situation of the 1977-85 period, it seems that
President Niinairi was, metaphorically, on a train which was run by the
Islamists and moving towards the goals already set by Dr al-Turabi.
Nimairi's plans and actions were effectively utilized by the Islamists
in the various fields and sectors in order to achieve the Islamist
goals. The establishment of the FIBS and the introduction of the
Islamic laws seemed to be such examples. Dr al-Turabi himself did not
take part in the actual establishment of the FIBS and the actual
introduction of the Islamic laws, however the result turned out as Dr
al-Turabi wanted. As far as Dr al-Turabi was concerned, his actual
involvements in those events did not mean much, what was important was
the achievement of his goals.
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSITION PERIOD AND POWER STRUGGLE
Chapter 6 has three sections. The first section, Section 6.1, gives a
general description of the key developments in the Islamist movement
during the period from 1985 to the 1989 military coup. This section
focuses on the formation of the National Islamic Front (NIF), its
first general elections in 1986, and the power struggle of the parties
between 1988 and 1989.
Section 6.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account of his main goals during
the period and of the key developments described in Section 6.1.
The final section, Section 6.3, gives the researcher's analyses of
Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the
impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.
6.]. GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1985-89)
6.1.1 CHRONOLOGY
1985/ 3/26- 4/ 5:Popular uprising against the Nimairi regime.
1985/ 4/ 6:General Suwar al-Dhahab carried out a military
coup. The Limairi government collapsed.
1985/ 4/ 9:Al-Turabi was freed.
1985/ 4/**:The National Islamic Front (NIF) was formed.
1986/ 3/**:The SPLA advanced, taking control of almost the
entire south.'
1986/ 4/**:The NIF won 51 seats in the elections and became
the third biggest party.
.1987/ l/**:The Sudan Charter was published.2
1987/ ll/**:Ali Osman Muhammad Taha 3 criticized Sadiq
al-Mandi over the cost of the battles of the
Sudanese army in the civil war, and called for
the resignation of Sadiq from his post as Defence
Minister.4
1988/ 5/15:The NIF was included in the coalition government
for the first time since the introduction of the
new multi-party system in 1986. Dr al-Turabi
became Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and
Deputy Prime Minister.
1988/ 7/**:A1_Turabi framed a draft Islamic penal code.5
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1988/1l/16:The DUP leader made a peace accord with the
leader of the SPLA in Addis Ababa.
1988/].2/18:The government foiled a coup attempt led by
officers who served under Nimairi.
1988/12/21:The Parliament effectively rejected the peace
accord of 16 November.
1988/12/28:The DUP withdrew from the government.
1989/ 2/ l:A new coalition government was formed.
Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and Deputy Prime Minister.
1989/ 2/20:The top army officers gave an ultimatum to the
government.
1989/ 3/25:Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mandi appointed a new
cabinet excluding the NIF members.
1989/ 4/**:The freezing of the Islamic law was decided by the
new government.
1989/ 6/18:A coup attempt to bring Nimairi back to power was
foiled.
1989/ 6/30:Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir successfully
carried out a coup and came to power. All
political parties were banned. Dr al-Turabi was
arrested together with other leading politicians.
The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring	 Su = Summer Au = Autumn	 Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).
6.1.2 StTh''1ARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
(1) THE FORNATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS
In April 1985, the National Islamic Front (NIF) was formed by the
Islamist movement. 6 To understand the significance of the formation
of the NIF, it would be useful to look back at the situation on the
eve of the collapse of the Nimairi regime.
At the end of the Nimairi era, the frustration and resentment of
the oppositions were directed against the Nimairi regime and the
Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi. To quote el-Affendi:
'The opposition forces grouped together and moved to topple
Ninieiri started in earnest. There was one thing these groups
agreed on: Ikhwan [the Islamists led by Dr al-Turabi] must be
excluded completely from the new order and punished severely
for supporting Nimeiri's excesses. ... NGSH was formed on
26 March and grouped together the major political parties and
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key professional organizations and trade unions which led the
protest against Nimeiri. It acted as a "parliament for the
uprising" and hostility to Ikhwan was a major unifying factor
among its disparate components.'7
Between late March and early April 1985, a number of mass
demonstrations turned into a popular uprising against the government.8
Although by the time of the uprising many senior leaders of the
Islamist movement were already imprisoned by Nimairi, 9
 the Islamist
movement kept its distance from the popular uprising and remained the
only political force which did not join the uprising.'0
After the collapse of the Nimairi regime, the Islamist movement
formed the National Islamic Front. Kurita seems to suggest that the
formation of the NIF was a "clever strategy" by the Islamists to sur-
vive in the new situation. Kurita points out that despite the
Islamists' record of supporting Nimairi and their position on the pop-
ular uprising, the movement survived by forming the NIF - in other
words, by assuming a different appearance.1'
To the researcher's knowledge, the organizational structure of the
NIF after 1985 was almost identical to the third structure of the
Islamist movement after 1974, except that the constituent assembly of
the NIF was convened every 3 years (see Diagram A.8.(3) in Appendix
(8)). 12 This seems to suggest that the establishment of the NIF was
nominal and involved little change in the nature of the movement.
According to el-Affendi, the Islamist movement not only survived,
but also showed its strength:
'The formation of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in April
1985 represented the culmination of the development of the
[Islamist] movement ... That NIF emerged in April, was
firmly in place by May, and was able to mount a major chal-
lenge to its opponents by the autumn [1985]...''3
The strength of the Islamist movement was going to be shown in the
1986 general elections.
After a one-year transitional period led by General Abd al-Rahman
Suwar al-Dhahab ( cAbd al-Rahinaan Suwaar al-Dhahab), the Transitional
Military Council (TMC) gave way to a civilian government.
In April 1986, general elections were held and the multi-party
system was restored.' 4
 264 seats out of the total 301 seats were con-
tested among the parties.' 5 The Umina Party won 100 seats and the DUP
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63.16 The NIF won 51 seats (23 out of 28 in the graduates' con-
stituencies and 28 out of 236 in the territorial constituencies) and
became the third biggest party in Sudan.'7
The NIF won about 19 per cent of the total contested seats, 82 per
cent of the total seats in the graduates' constituencies, and about 12
per cent of the total seats in the territorial constituencies. Table
6.l.(1) shows the performance of the NIF in the territorial con-
stituencies.
Table 6.]..(l): The 1986 elections: the NIF's performance
j territorial constituencies)
province	 elected
Khartoum
	
13
Eastern
	
1
Northern
	
4
Central
	
4
Kordofan
	
3
Darfur
	
2
Upper Nile	 0
Bahr al-Ghazal 0
"i Equatoria	 I 1
votes gained
187981
79509
113514
157374
81423
95099
3149
1937
5598
percentage*
29 8 %
18.31 %
30.26 %
13.21 %
15.23 %
15.53 %
9.36 %
23.43 %
6.66 %
* = percentage of the NIF's votes gained in each province
Source: The Sudanese Government, Election record: 1986
(Papers held in the parliament library at the parliament
in Omdurman).
N.B. Because of the civil war, the votes gained in Upper Nile,
Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria were very limited. 18 These
results do not show the true picture of the popularity of
the NIF in these provinces.
The NIF's success in the graduates' constituencies shows the
strong support among the educated. The NIF's gains in some of the
territorial constituencies, such as Khartoum province (29.8 %) and
Northern province (30.26 %), shows the relative popularity of the NIF
in urban areas.
117
Chapter 6
Table 6.1.(2) gives a comparison between the performances of four
parties - the Umrna Party, the DUP, the SCP, and the NIF - in the ter-
ritorial constituencies.
Table 6.l.(2): The 1986 elections: comparison between the parties
(territorial constituencies)
province
Khartoum
Eastern
Northern
Central
Kordofan
Umma IDUP
20.7). % 30.48 %
22.18 % 43.0 %
15.24 % 46.24 %
47.17 % 30.54 %
48.43 % 26.39 %
SCP	 INIF
5.60 % 129.8 %
1.41 % 118.31 %
1.6 % (30.26 %
1.21 % 113.21 %
0.15 % 115.23 %
Darfur	 61.47 % 16.70 %	 0.08 % 15.53 %
Upper Nile	 37.12 %	 3.83 %	 --	 9.36 %
Bahr al-Ghazal 31.18 % 	 --	 --	 23.43 %
Equatoria	 0.31 %	 --	 --	 6.66 %
underline = highest %in the province
Source: The Sudanese Government, Election record: 1986
(Papers held in the parliament library at the parliament
in Omdurman).
N.B. Because of the civil war, the results in Upper Nile,
Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria do not show the true
picture of the popiflarity of the parties.
Among the four parties, the Umrna Party was strongest in Central,
Kordofan, Darfur, Upper Nile, and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces, though the
results in the last two provinces do not show the true picture of the
popularity of the party. The DUP was strongest in Khartoum, Eastern,
and Northern provinces. This appears to show a traditional division
in the parties' strongholds: the Umina Party - rural areas, and the DUP
- urban areas. The NIF failed to obtain the highest percentage except
for in Equatoria province where the elections were affected by the
civil war. However, the votes of the NIF in Khartoum and Northern
provinces were the second highest, after the DUP, and this affected
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negatively the seats gained by the DUP. According to el-Al fendi: 'DUP
suffered erosion of its support in Khartoum, a traditional stronghold,
its share dropping from 53 per cent to just over 30 per cent.'19
On 26 April 1986, the first Constituent Assembly was held and it
elected Sadiq al-Nandi (Saadiq al-Mandii) Prime Minister by a majority
of 165 votes. 20 In the contest for the Prime Ninistership, Al! Osman
Muhammad Taha ( cAll cuthmaan Muhammad Taha) from the NIF won 49 votes
and a communist won 3 votes.21
On 6 May 1986, a new 20-man cabinet was announced by the Prime
Minister. The new portfolios were allocated between the parties as
follows:
Umrna :Defence, Energy, Industry, Finance, Cabinet Affairs,
Justice, Agriculture, Education, Animal Resources.
DUP :Foreign Affairs, Interior, Trade, Housing, Information,
Health.
SPs :Labour, Irrigation, Communications, Local Government.
NGSH :Unity and Peace.
SPs = Southern Parties
NGSH = National Gathering for the Salvation of the Homeland
Sources: Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 19 May 1986, p. 1.
El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, pp. 130 and 135.
The NIF was excluded from the new government and became the
largest opposition party in the parliament.
As far as Dr al-Turabi himself was concerned, he did not win a
seat. Although this failure., has been mentioned in many publications,
few have reported the results in detail. Dr al-Turabi stood in
Khartoum 7th district, Al-Sahafa and Jabra (al-ahaafa wa-Jabra: see
Map 6.1.(1)).
Table 6.l.(3) shows Dr al-Turabi's performance in the 1986 elec-
tions. Hassan All Muhammad Shabu (Hasan CAll Muhammad Shabuu), the
candidate from the DUP, was elected and Dr al-Turabi came second.
Although Dr al-Turabi could not win, he obtained 10,027 votes (43.9
per cent of the total votes).
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Table 6.l.(3): The 1986 elections: Dr al-Turabi's performance
Province: Khartoum
District: Khartoum 7th, Al-Sahafa and Jabra (al-Sahaafa wa-Jabra)
candidate	 party	 votes percentage
1) Bakraa Muhammad Socialist Arab Bath	 44	 0.2 %
Khaliil	 (Bacth)
2) Jacfar Hasan	 Gathering of Democrats	 49	 0.3 %
C Abaas	 and Communists
3) Hasan	 National Islamic	 10027 43.9 %
CAbd Allaah	 Front
al-Turaabii
4) Hasan CA1j	 Democratic Unionist
	 12372 54.0 %
Muhammad Shabuu
5) Sayyid 'Ahmad	 National Umzna	 120	 0.5 %
Muhammad
Khaliifa
6) Sulayniaan Dahab United National	 251	 1.1 %
Has i in
Source: The Sudanese Government, Election record: 1986
(Papers held in the parliament library at the parliament
in Omdurman).
Map 6.1.(].): Al-Sahafa and Jabra
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L2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89)
In the late 1980s, the DUP was fearful of the NIF's challenge to win
votes in urban areas. The DUP was planning to increase its popularity
by using the peace process with the SPLA. On the other hand, the NIF
was trying to obtain more popularity by using its commitment to
Islamization. The DUP and the NIF were always fighting with each
other to obtain more votes in urban areas. The Umrna Party regarded
the issues of peace-making and Islamization as a national issue and
did not use them in the party's interests.22
On 15 May 1988, the NIF was brought into the coalition
government23 for the first time since the re-introduction of the new
multi-party system in 1986. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Justice,
Attorney General, and Deputy Prime Minister.24
On 16 November 1988, the DUP leader made a peace agreement with
the leader of the SPLA in Addis Ababa. The Umzna Party basically sup-
ported the accord, because the contents were almost the same as the
1986 Koka Dam Declaration, 25
 which was made by the Umrna Party's
initiative. 26 The Umwa Party asked the DUP not to bring the 1988
accord into the parliament until the Umina Party made a deal with the
NIF. 2	However, the DUP did not wait and brought it into the parlia-
ment.28
On 21 December 1988, the Parliament effectively rejected the peace
accord of 16 November. 29 The Uinma Party and the NIF voted against the
DUP's' niotion.° The Umma Party did not oppose the contents of the
1988 accord, but opposed the hltimingtt and the "way" in which the DUP
was handling the issue. 3 ' This was the reason for the Uwina Party's
opposition against the DUP's motion.32
In the same month (December 1988), the coalition government (the
Umina Party, the DUP, and the NIF) decided to increase the price of
sugar. On 28 December, the declaration of the price rise caused a
massive demonstration. 33 The DUP thought that the demonstration might
trigger the collapse of the government, and decided to withdraw itself
from the government before the actual collapse, hoping that the DUP
would come to power after the collapse. 34 During that day (28 Decem-
ber), the DUP withdrew from the government. 35	On the other hand, the
Umina Party remained in the government and tried to calm down the
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situation by organizing a conference on the price of sugar. 36 As a
result, the government survived, but the DUP was out of the government
because of its speculation. The DUP now wanted to rejoin the
government.
On 4 January 1989, the Urnma Party, the DUP, and the NIF held a
meeting. 37	The three parties reached an agreement on the issues of
peace making and Islamization. 38 Meanwhile, the DUP was concerned
with the frustration of the army officers. The DUP related officers
hated the NIF and wanted the NIF to be excluded from the government,39
particularly, General Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil ( cAbd al-Majiid Haamid
a1ii1), the former Minister of Defence.4°
When several towns in the South fell into the hands of the SPLA,
Sadiq al-Mandi criticized the army as saying that there were six mis-
takes in the army's strategy. 4 ' The generals accepted his
criticism.42
On 1 February 1989, a new coalition government was formed. The
cabinet comprised 10 ministers from the Umin.a Party, 8 from the NIF,
and 5 from other political groupings. 43
 Dr al-Turabi became Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister.44
On 20 February 1989, the top army officers gave an ultimatum to
the government. The ultimatum, dated 20 February, was signed by 150
officers. 45
	It gave the regime 7 days to accept the D1JP-SPLA peace
accord and to form a broad-based government. 46 The ultimatum stemmed
from the common interest between the discontented elements in the army
and the DUP.4
On 25 March 1989, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mandi appointed a new
cabinet exeluding the NIF members. 48 The cabinet comprised 8 minis-
ters from the Umma Party, 6 from the DUP, 1 from the Communist Party,
2 from the trade unions, 1 independent, and 5 from other political
groupings. 49 In April 1989, the freezing of Islamic law was decided
by the new government.50
The power struggle between 1988 and 1989 was ended by a military
coup. On 30 June 1989, Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir success-
fully carried out a coup and came to power. Brigadier al-Bashir
announced the dissolution of all political parties. 5 ' Dr al-Turabi
was arrested together with the other political leaders during the
coup. 52	However, there is strong speculation that his arrest was a
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sham in order not to upset other politicians. Hassan Makki meaning-
fully told the researcher that Dr al-Turabi chose to go to prison for
6 months instead of appearing on Yassin al-Imam said that: 'Dr
al-Turabi did what he could, and then he trusted God. If YOU trust
God, after you did what you could, then God will complete things for
you. 's"
6.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT
6.2.1 DR AL-TURABI'S MAIN GOAL
The researcher sunimarized his assumption about Dr al-Turabi's main
goal during the period of 1985-89 and then showed the assumption to Dr
al-Turabi himself (14 January 1995). He asked him to correct it, if
necessary.
1985-1989
Main goal
To obtain power
correction: To take over the whole society
Dr al-Turabi corrected the main goal of the period 1985-1989 as "to
take over the whole society". He preferred the phrase an "Islamic
society" rather than an "Islamic state".55
6.2.2 THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS56
Dr al-Turabi did not change the name of the Islamist movement from the
Islamic Charter Front (or Muslim Brotherhood) to the NIF, but formed a
new organization to expand the Islamist movement in the whole of
Sudan. The Umina Party had supporters mainly in Western Sudan and
Northern Sudan and other parties (except for the Southerners) had
their supporters mainly in Eastern and Northern Sudan.	 The
Southerners obtained their supports mainly in Southern Sudan. 51	Dr
al-Turabi did not want the Islamist movement to be merely a regional
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movement, therefore he put "national" 58 - aiming at the whole Sudan.
The issue of naming was discussed among the Islamists and Dr al-
Turabi's idea was accepted, because the Sudanese Islamists were look-
ing for a name which represented the whole Sudanese nation.
During the period between 1964 and 1985, the name "Muslim Brother-
hood" never appeared, there was only the name "Islamic Charter Front
(ICF)". After Nimairi fell, the Islamists never used the name "ICF"
nor "Muslim Brotherhood". They used the name "Islamic trend
('Ittijaah 'Islaamii)" for a few weeks until the NIF was formed. The
name "Muslim Brotherhood" was not officially abolished, but the
Islamists did not use it any more. When Dr al-Turabi resigned as the
secretary general of the main body in 1966, the Sudanese "Muslim
Brotherhood" came to an end, and it remained only in history. It dis-
appeared completely.59
With regard to the reason for his defeat in the 1986 elections in
Al-Sahafa and Jabra, Dr al-Turabi believed that it was the result of
the united action of all the other parties which were against him.
Their antagonism stemmed from the achievement of the Islamist movement
during the Nimairi period.
6.2.3 POWER STRUGGLE (1988_89)60
Around February 1989, senior army officers demanded that the
government should supply the army not only with more food and ainmuni-
tion, but also with more information on the enemy. Sadiq al-Mandi did
not meet the demand of the officers. The officers were frustrated and
the soldiers were getting tired.
In those days, many of the high-ranking officers were either came
from DUP related families or associated with the DUP. Some of the
senior officers, who were close to the DUP, started to advocate their
support for the demands of John Garang (i.e. those put forwards in the
1988 peace accord), the leader of the SPLA. The DUP wanted recon-
ciliation with the SPLA, however, the NIF was advocating thoroughgoing
fighting against the SPLA. The NIF was an obstacle to the plans of
the PUP.
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In addition to this, there was another problem for the Dli?. In
general, the DUP's support came mainly from urban areas and the Umina
Party's support from rural areas. The DUP was losing its votes in the
cities, because the supporters of the Dli? were shifting to the NIF.
Because of this, the DUP wanted to undermine the WIF.
The DUP wanted to exclude the NIF from the government. They had
secretly contacted Sadiq al-Mandi and were putting pressure on him.
With this background, on 20 February 1989 the top army officers gave
an ultimatum to the government. Someone from the Mandi family
secretly told Dr al-Turabi that some senior officers had threatened
Sadiq and had advised him to exclude the NIF from the government.
Sadiq did not know what to do, but he wanted to remain Prime Min-
ister. This was the only thing clear to Sadiq. Consequently, Sadiq
excluded the NIF from the government.
In March 1989, when the NIF was excluded from the government, the
government was seeking to cooperate with the communists and abandon
the NIF. 6 ' At that time, there was also pressure from the West on the
Prime Minister. By 1989 the implementation of the Islamic laws was
already frozen, but in April 1989 there was a move to repeal the
Islamic laws themselves. In that time, the WIF carried out many
demonstrations on the streets. The plan to include communists in the
new government was a good target for the attacks against the
government. 62 The newspapers, which were influenced by the NIF, had a
strong effect in mobilizing the masses.63
During the period between 1985 and 1989, the NIF positively and
openly supported the armed forces.	 The NIF collected contributions
for the army. The Islamists visited the troops in the South to
entertain the soldiers (i.e. by light entertainment). 64 Osman IChalid
(Clithmaan aalid) was responsible for these activities in the NIF.
Except for the high-ranking leading officers who were close to the
DUP, the bulk of the core officers were very close to the NIF, because
Islam was becoming a trend in the army. 65
 Throughout Sudanese his-
tory, the elites in the government and the armed forces were
influenced by particular trends: initially a "nationalist" trend, then
a "socialist" trend, and finally an "Islamic" trend. In the l980s,
the elites had grown up with an Islamic trend. 66 Therefore, Dr al-
Turabi was confident that even if a coup happened, there would be no
125
Chapter 6
real danger to the NIF, and that after some time, the NIF would appear
again.
Dr al-Turabi knew that a coup, in favour of the Islamists, was
going to happen, but at the same time, he was also expecting a
counter-coup. He denied prior knowledge of the name of the coup
leader, but did not deny a close relationship to part of the army.
6.3 ANALYSES
6.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-85)
Table 6.3.(1) lists Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which
have emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his
life story up to 1985. Table 6.3.(2) lists possible adjectives asso-
ciated with those characters.
Table 6.3.(l): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-85)
Period Nain characters (imagoes)
1932	 the critic (a),	 the resistant (a),
-	 the passionate (a),
	 the believer (a),
1985	 the winner (al,	 the reformer (a),
the revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
the good planner (a), 	 the hero (a),
the competitor (a),
	
the pragmatist (a),
the expansionist (a),
	 the persuader (a),
the man behind the scenes (a),
the mediator (c),
	 the internationalist (c),
the cooperator Cc)
(a)	 = classified as agentic
(c)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on NcAdams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
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Table 6.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-85)
Period	 Possible adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1985	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a),
overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a),
offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a),
calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a),
influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable Cc),
kind (c), conciliatory (a), internationalist (c),
open (c), cooperative (C), supportive (c)
(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1985-89)
Dr al-Turabi's account of the period between 1985 and 1989 again
provides further evidence of agentic personality. It also throws up
two new agentic characters, "the analyst" and "the politician". The
main character representing- the image of his account of the 1985-89
period is "the competitor", which is an agentic character indicating
adjectives such as competitive, offensive, clever, and shrewd. This
character relates to other characters, in particular that of "the win-
ner" in the way in which the goal of "the competitor" is "the winner".
Dr al-Turabi and the Islamist movement were struggling to win the com-
petition for power.
His account of the formation of the NIF suggests an agentic ele-
ment of his personality, i.e. an expansionist aspect. This is
apparent in his account of the reason for his putting "national" in
the name of the new organization. He said that he wanted to expand
the Islamist movement in the whole Sudan and did not want the movement
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to be merely a regional movement, and for this reason he put
"national" aiming at the whole Sudan.
Further evidence of his agentic personality can be seen in his
attitude and the contents of his account about his failure in the 1986
elections. As a matter of fact, Dr al-Turabi initially did not men-
tion his failure in the researcher's interview. His account on this
was, therefore, in response to a specific enquiry from the researcher.
Moreover, his account of his failure in the 1986 elections sounds like
an excuse. This appears to be a reaction to his agentic personality
which prefers to show high performance and success, and to be "the
winner" and "the hero". For Dr al-Turabi, defeat or failure seemed to
be an extremely difficult concept to accept.
A new character of Dr al-Turabi, "the analyst" (an agentic charac-
ter: see Diagram- l.2.(3)), is thrown up from the account of his
analytic explanation of a trend among the elites in the government and
the army. Dr al-Turabi firmly believed that the current elites grew
up with an Islamic trend, and he has repeatedly expressed his view on
many occasions.
Another new character thrown up from Dr al-Turabi's account of the
1989 coup is, that of "the politician". This character indicates some
agentic aspects of his personality, such as careful, clever, and
shrewd aspects which relate to other characters like "the man behind
the scenes" and "the good p1annert. In the researcher's interview, Dr
al-Turabi sought to avoid sensitive points. Although he denied the
prior knowledge of the coup leader, he did not deny a close relation-
ship to part of the army. His attitude and the contents of his
account clearly indicate the character of "the politician".
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(3) NEW FINDINGS j1985-89)
Table 6.3.(3) summarizes new elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality
which have emerged from th 1985 to 1989 period.
Table 6.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1985-89)
Period Characters	 Possible adjectives
1985	 the analyst (a)
	
analytic (a), clever (a)
1989	 the politician (a) clever (a), careful (a),
shrewd (a), ambitious (a)
6.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as
competitive, offensive, clever and shrewd) stemming from the character
of "the competitor" (representing the image of his account of the
period) seem to have affected the underlying nature of the key devel-
opments in the period. The 1986 general elections and the power
struggle (1988-89) can be seen in the context of a struggle by Dr al-
Turabi and the Islamist movement to win the competition for power.
(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS
Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality seeking for "expansion" and
"control" and his objective to take over the whole society, seem to
have affected the formation of the National Islamic Front. Among his
personality elements, "cleverness" and "carefulness" stemming from his
characters of "the competitor" and "the good planner" are also
apparent in the formation of the NIF.
In short, the NIF was a result of Dr al-Turabi's careful planning
in order to succeed in the 1986 general elections, which would become
the first big test for the movement in the new situation. In this
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respect, the Islamists had to eliminate the movement's "negative
image" associated with the Nimairi regime. The Islamists, therefore,
tried to refresh its image by adopting a "new" name.
Despite the highly isolated situation of the Islamists before the
collapse of the Nimairi regime, the NIF fought relatively well in the
1986 elections. Consequently, the NIF won 51 seats and became the
third biggest party in Sudan after the Umma party and the DUP. This
relative success seems to be attributable to the Islamists' wise
strategy, i.e. the formation of the NIF.
(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89)
It seems that Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality (seeking for "power"
and "control") was again behind the movement's participation in the
power struggle between 1988 and 1989. Among his main characters, "the
competitor", "the winner" and "the man behind the scenes" seem to have
played important roles in the struggle, especially in the final phase
of it.
Since the National Reconciliation, the NIF had been consistently
supportive towards the army. This seems to have stemmed from Dr al-
Turabi's personality which tends to plan carefully for the future. Dr
al-Turabi appeared not to repeat his past unpleasant experiences of
the 1969 coup. The NIF's attitude and the educational influence on
the students, who later joined the army, created a pro-NIF group among
the officers.
When the NIF was excluded from the government in March 1989 and
the whole Islamic laws were about to be frozen, the Islamist officers
appear to have decided to finish the political instability and chaos
by seizing power. The Islamic laws were the most important achieve-
ments for the Islamists during the Nimairi period and they were even
the "symbol" of their victory. Losing "Islamic law" meant that the
Islamists had to become "the loser". Dr al-Turabi's strong character
of "the winner" could not allow such a thing. Despite a high risk,
the Islamists had to exercise "tawakkul (tawakkul: trust in God)" 67
 in
carrying out a coup.
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It seems to the researcher that the original plan and initiation
of the coup came from Dr al-Turabi, however, he left detailed points
of the plan and the timing of the action to his supporters - this was
his leadership style. 68 Therefore, as Dr al-Turabi said, he knew, a
coup was occurring, but he did not know who was going to carry it out.
As a whole, Dr al-Turabi appeared to play the role of "the man behind
the scenes". Because the coup resulted in the establishment of an
Islamic state, the power struggle ended in the victory of the
Islainists.
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CHAPTER 7: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE:
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS
It is widely believed that Dr al-Turabi has been the real power behind
the Sudanese government since 1989. The researcher agrees with this
view and regards Sudan as a "state-form Islamist movement led by Dr
al-Turabi". The reasons for this will be discussed in Section 7.1.
The Islamist movement after 1989, thus, includes both Sudanese
governmental activities and those of some institutions and organiza-
tions in the country. The activities of the Islainist movement after
1989 are covered in two parts - one concerned with domestic matters
and one concerned with foreign matters. The domestic matters are
dealt with in this chapter (Chapter 7) and the foreign matters are
discussed in Chapter 8.
Compared to the previous chapters, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 will
contain a larger amount of general description and a rather smaller
element covering Dr al-Turabi's account. The reason for the extensive
"general description" stems from the researcher's perception that the
activities of the Islamic state (or society) after 1989 are important
both as an outcome of the thinking and perceptions of the Islamist
movement, and as a reflection of the real character of that movement.
The establishment of an Islamic state (or society) had, after all,
been the main goal for the Islamists and the activities after 1989
have been the results of what the Islamists have wanted to realize.
The reason for the lesser emphasis on Dr al-Turabi's account derives
from the researcher's perception that the central aspects of Dr al-
Turabi's personality have become clear through the previous chapters.
Chapter 7 has four sections. The first section, Section 7.1,
gives the reasons why the researcher regards Sudan as a state-form
Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.
Section 7.2 gives the general description of the key developments
that have taken place in the Islamist movement since the 1989 coup.
The researcher, however, has limited the discussion to the period
going up to May 1995, at the latest.	 Section 7.2 covers Sudan's
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domestic policy, and specifically the government's programmes and
activities with regard to the political system, Islamic law, Islamic
economy, education, and defence.
Section 7.3 gives Dr al-Turabi's account of those items discussed
in the previous section, but it does not necessarily cover every
aspect of them.
The final section, Section 7.4, gives the researcher's analyses of
Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments assessing the
impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.
7.]. THE ISLANIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE
The researcher regards Sudan as a state-form Islamist movement led by
Dr al-Turabi. The researcher believes that the activities of the al-
Bashir government since 1989 have proven this point. The evidence for
Dr al-Turabi's leading role in Sudanese politics can be found in a
number of the key activities of the government, such as the introduc-
tion of the 1991 Islamic penal code, the Islamization of the Sudanese
economy, and Sudanese foreign policy towards the Gulf Crisis and the
Second Gulf War.
In addition to this, President al-Bashir t s recognition of Dr al-
TurabPs leading role in Sudanese politics and society supports the
researcher's view. In an interview with the researcher on 4 February
1995, President al-Bashir clearly showed his recognition of this role:
'In the Islamic movement, Dr al-Turabi's unique leadership
has created a new model, combining both tradition and con-
temporary life. His influence has had a great effect upon
current political events and the political history in Sudan,
so that he is not only leading Islamic society, but also
Islamic "history". He has managed to go one step further
than many other movements which tend to focus or' historical
roots rather than contemporary life. His way of thinking has
affected many parts of society, even reaching some of those
parties which were previously antagonistic towards the
Islamist movement. As a result of his efforts, the process
of making an Islamic state has been greatly facilitated."
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7.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-95)
7.2.1 CHRONOLOGY
1989/ 6/30:Brigadier Al-Bashir successfully carried out
a coup (the Salvation Revolution) 2 and came to
power. All political parties were banned.
Al-Turabi was arrested.
1989/lO/**:The Popular Defence Force (PDF) became an official
institution by the promulgation of the Popular
Defence Act.
1989/10-ll:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1989/11/**:Details of the Popular Defence Act were released
by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).
1989/1l/30:Al-Turabi was freed from Kober prison and placed
under house arrest.
1990/ 3/ 7:Al-Turabi was freed from house arrest.
1990/ 3/**:An attempted coup was reported (announced by the
regime).
1990/ 9/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1990/10/**:A new political system of "direct non-party
democracy" was approved by the conference for
National Dialogue on the Political System.
1990/ll/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1990/12/3l:Al-Bashir declared that the sharia (Islamic law)
will be fully and immediately implemented as of
the 1st January 1991.
199i./**/**:A "conservative" group (calling itself the Muslim
Brotherhood) split from the Islamist movement.
1991/ 3/**:Nine federal states were established by the fourth
constitutional decree.
1991/ 3/22:The new Islamic penal code was introduced.
1991/ 4/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1991/ 8/**:An attempted coup was reported (announced by the
regime).
1992/**/**:Economic 1ibra1ization measures were introduced.
1992/ 3f**:The curfew in Khartoum, which was introduced after
the 1989 coup, was shortened by one hour.
1992/ 4/**:An attempted coup led by pro-Nimairi officers was
reported (announced by the regime).
1992/ 7/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1993/ 8/**:The IMF suspended its financial support for Sudan.
1993/lO/16:The Revolutionary Command Council issued a decree
abolishing itself.
l993/10/l7:Al-Bashir became formally the president.
l993/lO/31:The curfew in Khartoum imposed since the
1989 coup was lifted by President al-Bashir.
1994/ 2/**:The nine federal states were re-divided into
twenty six states by the 10th constitutional
decree.
1994/ 2/ 4:A new advance against the SPLA in the South
was reported.
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The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring	 Su	 Summer Au = Autumn	 Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
Sources: See Table C.(l): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).
7.2.2 SUARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS
The researcher considers the government's policies as regards the
political system, law (legal developments), economy, education, and
defence as the most significant elements of domestic policy for the
purpose of this thesis. All of these are basically designed to
Islamize the Sudanese society. The realization of these policies by
the Islamist government, therefore, contributes to the consolidation
of the Islamist movement within the borders.
The Sudanese government published The National Charter for the
[sicJ Political Action on 7 April 1991. The charter had 70 articles
and outlined Sudan's domestic and foreign policies based on Islamism.
The researcher quotes some articles later from the charter - but since
some English expressions in the charter are grammatically incorrect
and are sometimes difficult to understand, he has tried to improve
those expressions by adding "[sic: correction or the researcher's
interpretation]" to those quotations.
(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The National Charter advocates a new political system. It is an
Islamist model of non-party democracy with Islamism. 3 This Islamist
model emphasizes an Islamic ideology, "real" popular participation,
and consensus in the political system. These elements are going to be
brought about through "popular congresses" and a "federal system."
Statements concerning the political system appear in Articles of
The National Charter, such as Articles 1, 2, 3, 17, and 20. Article 1
indicates the need for a new political system by criticizing both the
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socialist model (one-party democracy with socialism) and the capi-
talist model (multi-party democracy with capitalism). The Islamists
have said that in Sudan a multi-party system has failed mainly because
of partisan politics, and that a one-party system has failed mainly
because of one-man politics. 4 A non-party democracy with Islamism is,
therefore, an "Islamic alternative."
An emphasis on Islamic ideology is apparent in Articles 2, 3, and
17. Article 17 states that 'Sudan's political set-up is being founded
on the comprehensive political concept of its being a worship and
pledge to God' - this probably means that Sudan's political set-up has
been established, based on an Islamic faith. In Articles 2 and 3, two
Islamic elements, sharia (Islamic law) and shura (an Islamic concept
of consensus), are emphasized.
Another emphasis on popular participation is apparent in Articles
3, 18, and 20. In the new political system, popular congresses and a
federal system are seen as two important institutions that can deliver
real popular participation and consensus. The Islamists say that in
the past there was little space for the people to take part in the
decision-making process of the country, and that there lacked con-
sensus .
The following are some extracts from The National Charter concern-
ing the political system.
1. The conditions experienced by the Sudan and the interna-
tional and regional relations necessitate that a practical
mode of action, in conformity with the principles and values
of our people, should be sought; inspired by its history,
struggle, characteristics, authenticity and aspirations for a
promising future at a time which has witnessed the collapse
of the Marxist and socialist system and the imminent dis-
integration of the liberal capitalist one.
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2. The adoption of the Islamic Sharia and custom and the Fed-
eral System in our country [,] within the framework of com-
prehensive national unity [,3 has been a boosting [sic: has
given a boost] to our asset of nationalistic fruitful experi-
ence, [and has been] inaugurated and catered for by our
faithful sons throughout the decades, revolutions, uprisings
and nationalistic struggle.
3. And since the realization of the society of Sharia and
Custom and the Federal System necessitates popular participa-
tion in the system of government based on Shura and justice,
the masses had to be honestly consulted,
17. Sudan's political set-up is being founded on the com-
prehensive political concept of its being a worship and
pledge to God [sic: Sudan's political set-up has been estab-
lished, based on an Islamic faith];
18. Authority is a trust and a responsibility [sic: is based
on trust and the responsibility] of delegation practiced by
the people through its different popular congresses
20. The popular participation emanates from our keenness to
meet our responsibilities towards our Sudanese society
through the establishment of a political system that
guarantees real popular participation,
(a) Non-party democracy with Islamism:
Popular participation and consensus
based on popular congresses
This sub-section focuses on the Sudanese popular congresses through
which "real" popular partiipation and consensus are going to be
brought about.
Diagram 7.2.(1) shows the structure of the popular congresses of
Sudan. 7 The structure includes legislative and administrative bodies.
The judiciary is independent.
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Diagram 7.2.(l): Structure of the congresses
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Diagram 7.2.(l): continued
Li
(Se)	 ()
Local Council
{ a}
Council
Congress
{c,1}
Council Congrsses	 + 10% (se)
_____	 I
I	 I	 P.= Popular	 J.Committee
(se) (e)	 selected	 {a}	 (Se) (e)
I	 elected
r' 1	 n	 n+x
I	 Basic
I	 Congress
LS.	 f	 S. 1	 {c,1}	 s.
Basic Congresses (1 - n+x)
Geographical Constituencies
Direct Elections
L	 THE WHOLE POPULATION	 I
S. = Secretariat
(Se) = selected	 Ce) = elected
{c} = consultative body {l} = legislative body
{a} = administrative body
Sources: The Sudanese Government, Sudan's Political System: The
Basic Rule (sic: Rules] for the Popular Congress [sic:
Congresses] (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat,
n.d.), p. 20; Sudanow, June 1991, pp. 7-8; and January
1996, pp. 14-33.
Explanation of the system
The system presented in Diagram 7.2.(l) will be explained in the next
part, based on the publications of Sudan 's Political System and
Sudanow (June 199]. and January 1996).8
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Ci) Basic Congresses
The Basic Congresses are particularly important in the new political
system, because they are seen as a means of ensuring popular partici-
pation in the process of decision-making, and contribute to creating
popular consensus over important issues.
Under the new system, the whole population is divided into the
Basic Congresses, which are consultative and legislative bodies. In
this way, all of the population are given an opportunity to express
their opinions on important issues and to take part in the process of
decision-making.
Each Basic Congress has its Secretariat and its Popular Committee.
The members of the Popular Committee are elected by the members of the
Basic Congress, and are from among those members. The Popular Com-
mittees9 are administrative bodies.
(ii) Council Congresses
A Council Congress consists of some members of the Basic Congresses
(including all the members of the Popular Committees at that level)
and 10% complementary members (presumably representatives of various
sectors of society). The members of the Basic Congresses (except for
the members of the Popular Committees) who go on to the Council Con-
gress' are selected by the Basic Congresses (the means of selection is
not clear). The 10% complementary members are selected by the
governor (Wali (Waalii)) of the state concerned.
Every Council Congress has its Secretariat and its Local Council.
The members of the Local Council are elected by the members of the
Council Congress. The Council Congresses are consultative and legis-
lative bodies. The Local Councils are administrative bodies.
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(iii) Province Congresses
A Province Congress consists of some members of the Council Congresses
(including all the members of the Local Councils at that level) and
10% complementary members. The members of the Council Congresses
(except for the members of the Local Councils) who go on to the
Province Congress are selected by the Council Congresses (the means of
selection is not clear). The 10% complementary members are selected
by the governor of the state concerned.
Every Province Congress has its Secretariat and its Province Coun-
cil. The members of the Province Council are elected by the members
of the Province Congress. The Province Congresses are consultative
and legislative bodies. The Province Councils are administrative
bodies.
(iv) State Congresses
A State Congress consists of some members of the Province Congresses
(including all the members of the Province Councils), 10% com-
plementary members, and the representatives of the Sectorial Con-
ferences at state level which include Women's, Youths and Students,
Social and Cultural, and Economic Conferences. The 10% complementary
members are nominated by the governor of the state concerned and are
confirmed by the President.
Every State Congress has its Secretariat and its State Assembly.
The State Assembly consists of members who are elected by the members
of the State Congress and who are elected in the Geographical Con-
stituencies. The State Congresses are consultative bodies. The State
Assemblies are legislative bodies. The State Governments are adminis-
trative bodies.
The President nominates three candidates for the post of Governor
(Wall) of each State. One of them is elected as Governor by the mem-
bers of each State Assembly. The President also appoints State Minis-
ters for each State Government after consultations with each Governor
concerned.
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(v) National Congresses
The National Congress consists of some members of the State Congresses
(including all the members of the State Assemblies), 10% of com-
plementary members, and the representatives of the National Sectorial
Conferences which include Women, Youths and Students, Social and
Cultural, Economic, Defence and Security, Diplomatic, Administrative,
and Legal Conferences. The 10% complementary members are selected by
the President.
The National Congress has its Secretariat and the National
Assembly (parliament). The National Congress is a consultative body.
The National Assembly is a legislative body. The Federal Government
(Council of Ministers) is an administrative body. The President
appoints the member of the Federal Government.
The National Assembly consists of 400 members. Among 400, 125 are
elected by and from the members of the National Congress (5000 mem-
bers), and 275 are elected in the 275 Geographical Constituencies.
(vi) The President
The President is elected by Direct Election and his tenure is five
years. He is the supreme governor of the country and the supreme com-
mander of the Armed forces and security services. He has the power to
appoint, such as a first Vice-President, a second Vice-President, the
member of the Federal Government and the State Governments, and com-
manders of Armed forces and security services. Heading the Federal
Government and supervising the performance of the Federal Ministers
are examples of his responsibilities.
Sudan Focus, on 15 February 1995 reported the development of the
congress system as follows:
'President al-Bashir's first democratic elections at a
national level are scheduled to begin this March to culminate
next year [1996] in the election of a president. Sudan is
adopting a presidential system but without a Western style
multi-party basis.	 ... The process to elect state parlia-
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ments is already underway at the grass roots level and will
move upwards to elect the National Assembly.O
As this new system is in the process of implementation and has not
been sufficiently tested, it is too early to evaluate its effective-
ness.
(b) Non-party democracy with Islamism:
Popular participation and consensus
based on a federal system
The significance of a federal system also lies in the concepts of pop-
ular participation and consensus. 	 Under the federal system, the
country has been divided into many administrative units. In March
1991, nine federal states were established by the fourth constitu-
tional decree." In February 1994, the nine federal states were re-
divided into twenty six states by the 10th constitutional decree.'2
The 26 states now contain more than 70 provinces. 13 The creation of
smaller units stems from the perception that smaller units would pro-
mote popular participation in politics and decision-making, providing
motivation for state building and bringing about development.'4
Government officials also explained the reasons for the redivision
by contending that a smaller unit would be easier to manage.' 5
 It
would therefore be more effective in developing its human and economic
potential, and bringing about political, social and economic gains.'6
Moreover, these small administrative areas would help to enhance
security, to improve education, health, tax collection, and
agricultural out-put, and to help solve the problems of ethnic and
cultural diversity.' 7 Although the redivision would cost the
government about 5 billion Sudanese pounds, the cost was considered as
an investment.'8
Table 7.2.(l) shows the regions and states in Sudan, and Map 7.2
(1) shows the location of these states.
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Table 7.2.(l): Regions and states
regions
1. Northern
2. Eastern
3. Khartoum
4. Central
5. Darfur
6. Kordofan
7. Upper Nile
states
Northern, Nile River
Red Sea, Kassala, Gedaref.
Khartoum.
Gezira, Sennar, White Nile, Blue Nile.
Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur,
Western Darfur.
Northern Kordofan, Southern Kordofan,
Western Kordofan.
Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity.
8. Bahr al-Ghazal Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Warab,
Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes.
9. Equatoria	 Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria,
Mountain Sea.
states	 capitals
1. Northern (Al-Shainaaliiya)	 / Dongola (Dunqulaa)
2. River Nile (Nahr al-Nayl)	 I Al-Darner (al-Daamar)
3. Read Sea (Al-Bahr al-'Ahmar)	 / Port Sudan (Buurt Suudaan)
4. Kassala (Kasalaa)	 I Kassala (Kasalaa)
5. Gedaref (Al-Qadaarif)	 / Al-Gedaref (al-Qadaarif)
6. Khartoum (Al-Khartuum)	 / Khartoum (al-Khartuuin)
7. Gezira (Al-Jaziira)	 / Wad Medani (Wad Madanii)
8. Sennar (Sinaar)	 / Singa (Sinja)
9. White Nile (Al-Nahr al-'Abyad) 	 I Rabak (Rabak)
10. Blue Nile (Al-Nahr al-'Azraq)
	 / Damazine (al-Damaaziin)
11. Northern Darfur (Shamaal Daarfuul) / Al-Fasher (al-Faashir)
12. Southern Darfur (Januub Daarfuur) / Nyala (Niyaalaa)
13. Western Darfur (Gharb Daarfuul) 	 / Geneina (al-Janiina)
14. Northern Kordofan (Shamaal Kurdfaan) / Al-Obeid (al-'Ubayyd)
15. Southern Kordofan (Januub Kurdfaan) / Kadugli (Kaaduqlii)
16. Western Kordofan (Gharb Kurdfaan) / Al-Fula (al-Fuula)
17. Upper Nile (tAcaalaa al-Nayl)	 / Malakal (Malakaal)
18. Jonglei (Juunqlii)	 I Bor (Buur)
19. Unity (Al-Wanda)	 / Bentiu (Baantiyuu)
20. Northern Bahr al-Ghazal	 I Aweil ('Awiil)
(Shamaal Bahr al-Ghazaal)
21. Western Bahr al-Chazal	 I Wau (Waaw)
(Gharb Bahr al-Ghazaal)
22. Warab (Waaraab)	 I Warab (Waaraab)
23. Lakes (Al-Buhayraat)	 / Rumbek (Rumbiik)
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24. Eastern Equatoria	 / Kapoeta (Kabuuytaa)
(arq al-'Istiwaa'iiya)
25. Western Equatoria	 I Yambio (Yaatnbiyuu)
(Gharb al-' Istiwaa iiya)
26. Ilountain Sea (Bahr al-.Jabal) 	 / Juba (Juubaa)
Sources: Sudanow, March 1994, pp. 8-li.
Daliii ai-Huku(?) al-'Ittihaadii
(The Guide of the Federal Governnient), February i994
i'iap 7.2.(1): Sudanese states
1. Northern
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(2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
The Islaniization of the legal system is also an important element to
Islamize society or create an Islamic state. The National Charter
clearly advocates that the sharia (sharii c a: Islamic law) and custom'9
should be the sources of legislation (Article 17). It appears that
"custom" was put in the charter as a result of consideration toward
non-Muslims in Sudan. 2 ° However, the sharia is regarded as the main
component to realize comprehensive justice (Article 25).
The sharia includes various kinds of law, such as family law, con-
tract law, and criminal law. However, Islamic criminal law tends to
represent the "image" of the sharia and it has drawn considerable
attention. It is therefore of greatest significance when covering the
government's Islamizing policies. For this reason, this section
focuses on Islamic criminal law.
After the collapse of the Nimairi government in April 1985, the
application of the punishments of the Islamic penal code which had
been introduced in 1983 was suspended. 2 ' On 22 March 1991, a new
Islamic penal code was introduced under the al-Bashir government. It
applied to all (Muslims and non-Muslims) who lived in the North, and
was not applied to the South. Niblock has pointed out that: 'It was
almost identical to a draft code which had been drawn up by Dr. Hassan
al-Turabi in 1988, while he was serving as attorney-general in the
coalition government headed by Sadiq al-Mandi.'22
Among the penal codes, three of the most controversial elements -
those applying to apostasy, blasphemy, and theft - will be examined in
the following part.
(a) Apostasy
In the new penal code of 1991, Article 126 in Part XIII (Offences
relating to religions, insulting religious creed) covers the penalty
of apostasy. Article 126 runs as follows:
1) There shall be deemed to commit the offence of apostasy,
every Muslim who propagates for the renunciation of the
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creed of Islam or publicly declares his renouncement there
of by an express statement or conclusive act.
2) Whoever commits apostasy, shall be given a chance to
repent during a period to be determined by the court,
where he insists upon apostasy, and not being a recent
convert to Islam, shall be punished with death.
3) The penalty provided for apostasy shall be remitted
whenever the apostate recants apostasy before execution.23
Despite the inclusion of apostasy in the code, no charges of
apostasy have been brought since the introduction of the new penal
code in 1991. 24 The Islamist government seems to have been very care-
ful in applying the charge of apostasy (see Dr al-Turabi's personal
view "against" apostasy in his account in Section 7.3).
(b) Blasphemy
In the new Islamic penal code, Article 125 in Part XIII covers the
penalty of blasphemy:
'Whoever by any means publicly abuses or insults any of the
religious, their rights or beliefs or sanctifications or
seeks to excite feeling of contempt and disrespect against
the believers thereof shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term not exceeding one year or with fine or with whipping
which may not exceed forty lashes.'25
\\The attitude of the Sudanese government towards blasphemy has
become clear in the case of-Salman Rüshdie. Rushdie was sentenced to
death on the charge of "blasphemy" by Ayatollah Khomeini because of
his notorious novel, The Satanic Verses.26
The Iranian government maintains that Rushdie should be killed
wherever he is. The Sudanese government asserts that, first, the
punishment for blasphemy is imprisonment, a fine, or whipping; second,
Sudanese Islamic law can not be applied beyond the borders except for
some special offences (also see Dr al-Turabi's account about the case
of Rushdie in Section 7.3).
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Article 6, under the heading of "Offences Committed Outside the
Sudan", says:
1) The provisions of this act shall apply to every person who
commits: -
a. outside the Sudan an act which makes him a principal or
joint offender in any of the following offences:
i) offences against the state;
ii) offences relating to the regular forces;
iii) offences relating to counterfeiting coin or revenue
stamps where the offender is found in the Sudan.
b.
2) A person who has committed outside the Sudan any of the
offences punishable in the Sudan, shall not be punished in
the Sudan, where it is proved that such person has been
tried outside the Sudan before a competent court and has
served his sentence, or that he has been declared innocent
by such court.27
Despite the exaggerated image of an "extreme and dangerous" Sudan,
which has been portrayed in the Western media, reality presents a dif-
ferent picture. Compared to pro-Western Pakistan, whose blasphemy
code allows the death sentence, 28
 Sudan is much more moderate. Com-
pared to Iran, whose spiritual leader can sentence anyone to death
wherever the person lives, Sudan adheres to the written law.
(ci Theft
Article 170 in Part XVII (Offences against property) covers the
definition of capital theftäs follows:
1) There shall be deemed to commit the offence of capital
theft whoever [sic: has] covertly taken, with the intention
of appropriation, any movable property belonging to another,
provided that the property shall be taken out of its birz
[hirz: see 4] and be of a value not less than the (nisab
[nisaab: minimum amount]).
2) Covertness includes covertly violating the hirz and the
seizure of property openly or forcibly.
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3) Property belonging to another includes public property and
property of waqfs [waqf: endowment] and places of worship.
4) Hirz means the place where property is kept or the manner
in which the particular property or the similar types thereof
are normally kept or that of the custom of the people of the
country or the particular profession; and property shall be
deemed to be in hirz whenever it is guarded.
5) The nisab shall be a dinar [diinaar: monetary unit] of
gold weighing 4.25 grams or its value in money according to
what the Chief Justice may determine from time to time, in
consultation with the competent bodies.
6) Where a group of people participate in the taking, regard
as to the (nisab), shall be add Esic: added] to the total of
property taken and not to what each of them has individually
taken.29
Article 171 then covers the penalties of capital theft, including
amputation sentencing which has drawn considerable attention. The
article runs as follows:
1) Whoever commits the offence of capital theft shall be
punished with amputation of the right hand from the joint.
2) Where the offender is convicted for a second time, he
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than
seven years.3°
There is, however, an article which covers the remittance of the
penalty of had ftadd: fixed punishment, e.g. amputation] in capital
theft. Many criticisms against amputation sentences refer to the fact
that the "offender had to steal something to survive". People argue
that the harsh economic sftuation forces vulnerable people to commit
crime to survive, and this is not the individuals' fault, but the
government's responsibility. Article 172 runs as follows:
1) The penalty of had in capital theft shall be remitted in
any of the following cases:
a) where theft has taken place between ascendants and
descendants or between spouses or relatives of the
prohibited degree (arham {'arhaain: close relatives]);
b) where the offender is in a case of necessity and does
not take from that property more than what is sufficient
to satisfy his need or the need of his dependents for
the sake of food or treatment, and not exceeding the
(nisab);
c), d), ... h) ... 	 31
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According to section ib, amputation penalty should be remitted if the
offender's situation forced him to steal something to survive.
Despite the inclusion of the amputation sentence in the code, the
Islamist government has clearly adopted a moderate policy in carrying
out such sentences. To quote News from Africa Watch (April 1991):
'Fortunately, the severe hudud [huduud: plural of had] penalties
(amputation) passed against convicted criminals since 1985 have been
commuted to terms of imprisonment, so there is no "backlog" of
prisoners awaiting these punishments.' 32 The Economist (June 1995)
also reported that: 'In some respects the government's ways are milder
than they used to be. Limbs are no longer cut off under sharia law;
'33
(3) ECONOMY (ISLAMIC ECONOMY)
Islamizing the Sudanese economy is another important policy of the
Islamist government. The National Charter outlines an Islamic economy
in Articles 31, 32, 35, and 36. These articles are as follows:
31. Our economic system is being [sic] based on the founda-
tion [sic: foundations] emanating from creed and religion;
since economic endeavour is but a worship and that material
benefit is a means for facilitating ways of life for the
individual to perform the rites of God as requested, as
mankind is combined of spiritual and material needs for
humans in a way to make life more prosperous and less diffi-
cult.
32. Our economic system is based on the devotion to God the
Almighty as being the Owner of the whole Universe;
35. We are committed to the economic freedom which avails the
chance to competition and benefit without letting loose to
that competition harmful to the interest of the society. And
the government is obliged to combat monopoly and organize
economy in a way to realize the lawful objectives without
infringement on the individuals interests or causing harm to
the legally obtained prosperity. The government shall
encourage private ownership and provide all legal guarantees;
it could not be confiscated or jeopardized except for the
sake of public interest according to the provisions of sharia
and together with equitable compensation.
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36. The aspired economic system shall incorporate com-
prehensive reform of all economic institutions so as to cope
with the required social change, replacement of the tradi-
tional modes with the Islamic ones, cancellation of usury,
adoption of the principle of profit and loss sharing and
focussing on the human perspective through the best utiliza-
tion of manpower and channelling of resources for production,
to boost the benefit of the individual and that of society.34
Articles 31 and 32 assert that Islamic religion is the foundation
of the Sudanese economic system. Article 35 advocates "economic free-
dom based on competition" and "private ownership" with the condition
that these are not harmful to the interests of society. 35
 Article 36
then calls for the replacement of the traditional modes with "Islamic"
ones - i.e. cancellation of "usury" and the adoption of the principle
of "profit and loss sharing". These are the key elements of an
Islamic banking system and practically represent an Islamic economic
system. This section, therefore, focuses on the Islamization of the
Sudanese banking system.
Before the 1989 coup, the Islamization of the banking system was
unstable. It effectively involved two steps forwards and one step
(maybe two steps) backwards. Many banks which applied Islamic modes
of banking after September 1984 dropped the Islamic mode of operation
when Nimairi was overthrown in April 1985. 36 With the new Islamist
government, however, the Islamization process has been steadily moving
forwards. 37 The Islamic central bank, the Bank of Sudan, has been
taking an important role in the current Islamization process. To com-
prehend the process, it is useful to note the brief history of that
process in Sudan.
The initial driving force of Islamization was taken by some pri-
vate Islamic Banks, such as the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) which
started its operations in May 1978.38 It was not the Bank of Sudan,
which was established in February 1960 as a Western-style central
bank.
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In August 1984, the FIBS organised a symposium on the issue of an
Islamic banking system. 39
 In the symposium, to which representatives
of all the commercial banks in Sudan were invited, Dr al-Turabi 4O
 gave
a lecture on the purposes of Islamization of the banking system (see
Dr al-Turabi's account in Section 7.3).
After the introduction of the Civil Transactions Act in September
1984, the banking system was supposed to be fully Islamized, but it
did not work properly. Ahmed points out that:
'In practice, the originally non-Islamic banks' managements
did not apply Islamic modes properly because they were dis-
satisfied with them. These conventional banks applied
mudaraba, musharaka, and murabaha only formally in their
ledger books and in the reports submitted to the Bank of
Sudan. Moreover, policymakers in the Central Bank were also
discontented with the procedure of transforming the banking
system. They considered it as a mere political decision
imposed by the government without being preceded by adequate
detailed studies. '41
In addition to this, with the collapse of the Nimairi government in
April 1985, the full Islamization programme was neglected and 'many
commercial banks dropped Islamic modes of operation.'42
After the 1989 coup, under the strong guidance of the Islamist
government, the full Islamization programme was re-started. From 30
October to 21 November 1989, the National Conference for Economic Sal-
vation (NCES) was held under the initiative of the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council (RCC) which called upon the participants to discuss some
important issues, such as food security, balanced development and the
banking system. 43 The conference submitted recommendations and these
were endorsed by the Council of Ministers and NRC on 26 November
l989.
The Secretary General of the Sharia (Sharii c a) Supervisory Board
(SSB) of the Bank of Sudan, Ahmad Au Abdalla ('A1jmad cAli cAbd
Allaah), is the key figure of the current Islamization process. In
the researcher's interview in January 1995, Abdalla told the
researcher that all the banks in Sudan were given a one-year
preparatory period in 1990 to adjust their practice to a full Islamic
153
Chapter 7
mode, and by the end of 1990 no bank was allowed to practise any
interest-involved transaction inside Sudan.45
The Sharia Supervisory Board of the central bank was set up in
March 1992 46
 and is the main driving force of the Islamization
programme. The central SSB controls all other banks through the sub-
SSBs in those banks. At the time in January 1995, the central SSB
listed the following names as its members:
1. Chairman : Al-Siddiq al-Darir (Al-Siddiiq al-Dariir)47
2. Sec. Gen.: Ahmad Au Abdalla ('Ahmad cAlj cAbd Allaah)48
3. Member	 : Sabir Muhammad Hassan (Saabir Muhammad asan)49
4. Member : Muhammad Hashim Awad (Muhammad Haashim CAwad)SO
5. Member	 : Ahmad Majzub Ahmad ('A mad Najzuub 'Ahmad)51
6. Member	 : Mustafa Zakariya (Mustafaa Zakariyaa)52
7. Member	 : Muhammad Birayma (Muhammad Birayma)53
8. Member	 : Siddiq Abd al-Hay (Siddiiq cAbd al-Hay)54
9. Member	 : Shaikh al-Jazuli (Shaykh al-Jazuulii)55
10. Member	 : Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur ('Ahmad Majuub Haajj Nuur)56
In the researcher's interview with Dr al-Turabi on 14 January
1995, Dr al-Turabi showed considerable knowledge about each member of
the SSB (see notes). To the researcher's knowledge, most of the SSB
members had been committed to the Islamic cause and the Islamist move-
ment for a long time. This suggests that Dr al-Turabi has had a
strong influence on the banking system in Sudan.
Ahmad Au Abdalla had known Dr al-Turabi personally since 1966 and
admitted to the researcher that the "idea" of the Islamization of the
Sudanese economy came from Dr al-Turabi. 57 Abdalla said that Dr al-
Turabi was always very serious about how to turn the idea into
reality, and his idea resulted in the establishment of the first
Islamic bank (i.e. the FIBS) in Sudan.
After the good example of the FIBS, other Islamic banks followed
and the experience of Islamic banking increased. These examples and
experiences seemed to have contributed to the Islamization of the
whole economy in Sudan.
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(4) EDUCATION
The government's policy on education is also designed to Islamize the
Sudanese society. Although articles in The National Charter concern-
ing education only advocate the important roles of education in secur-
ing national unity (Article 52) and in social and economic development
(Article 53), the researcher believes that "Islamizing society" is the
core of the government's education policy. This is apparent in one of
the government's policies, namely the "massive expansion" of higher
education which has drawn considerable attention. This section
focuses on this issue.
In the history of the Islamist movement, education has always been
the core strategy of the movement and is still used as a vehicle for
social change. 58 It can be said that without great efforts in educa-
tion the Islamist movement would not have succeeded.
The Islamist movement originally started as a student circle in
the GMC and it has now become the driving force of the state. The
movement attracted the students both in the secondary schools and in
the universities. Those who were influenced by the movement during
their school period were later to play important roles in many part of
society. At the same time, the Islamists used education to re-educate
young officers in the military schools - a strategy which resulted in
the expansion of their influence in the army.
As history witnessed, many current leaders who are guiding the
society joined the movement as students, and this phenomenon is still
continuing. The control over the student union, thus, has always been
an important issue.
The policy of massive expansion stemmed from the National Salva-
tion Revolution's declaration on educational reform in higher educa-
tion in December l989. Lt.Gen. al-Bashir announced a number of
decisions on that occasion. These decisions, as reported by Sudanow,
were the following:
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'1. The doubling of admission numbers to higher educational
institutions, as from the next academic year (1990/91).
2. The affiliation of all higher educational institutions.
3. All higher education institutes and colleges are to be
put under the appropriate university to allow these
universities to offer diplomas and other lower degrees,
other than the bachelor degree.
4. The establishment of a Sudanese university for science
and technology as of the next academic year, from the
nucleus of the present polytechnic institute.
5. The establishment of new universities and giving the new
regional ones assistance.
6. The universities and other higher institutes shall work
out a plan to increase their financial resources and to
be able to cope with the planned extension of higher
education.
7. The revision of the admission systems to higher
education.
8. The completion during the current academic year of the
preparatory studies on the adoption of the Arabic
language as the medium of instruction.
9. The amending of the current laws of the universities and
other higher education institutes relating to the
implementation of these decisions.T6°
Within half a decade, the number of universities has increased
dramatically. From 1990 to 1995, 25 universities were established
around the country. New student enrollment increased from 5,000 in
1989 to 30,000 in 1993.61	 Table 7.2. (2) lists the Sudanese
universities in existence in May 1995.
156
1955 (-1993)
1956
1963
1966
1975
1978
1990-
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
probably 1990
1990
1991—
probably 1991
199].
1991
probably 1991
probably 1991
1991
1991
1992
1993
1993
1995-
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
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Table 7.2.(2): Universities in Sudan (May 1995)
name
	 (town)	 establishment
Cairo University, Khartoum branch (Khartoum)
Khartoum University {from GMC}(Khartoum)
Omdurman Islamic University (Omdurman)
Ahfad University for Women (Omdurman)
Juba University (Juba){moved to Khartoum in 1989}
Gezira University (Wad Madani)
Bahr al-Ghazal University (Wau)
Eastern University (	 *
Umdom University (	 *
First of September University (Darfur)
Kordofan University (El-Obeid)
Northern University (
	
*
Koran University (Omdurnian)
Sudanese University for Science and Technology
{from Khartoum Polytechnic Institute}(Khartoum)
Upper Nile University (Nalakal)
Sudan Open University {by media}
Kassala University (Kassala)
International African University,
{from African Islamic Centre} (Khartoum)
Malakal University (Upper Nile)
Wau University (Bahr al-Ghazal)
Zalingay University (Zalingay)
Al-Fashir University (Al-Fashir)
Al-Imam A1-Mandi University (Kosti)
Al-Azhari University (Omdurman)
Nilein University {from Cairo Univ.}(Khartoum)
Dalang University (Dalang)
Dongola University (Dongola)
Niyala University (Niya1)
Nile Valley University
{from Atbara Mechanical College}(Atbara)
Red Sea University (Port Sudan)
Sennar University (Sennar)
( * ) = The town is unknown to the researcher
Sources: Personal contact with Dr Bashir al-Shaikh (Bashiir
a1-ay), Principal of the University of Khartoum,
in May 1995.
Sudanow, June 1990, p. 15; March 1992, p. 40; and
March 1993, p. 19.
There exist some confusion and problems in this massive expansion.
Some have pointed Out that because of insufficient staffing and poor
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facilities there has been a drop in the quality and standards of
education. 62
 This raises the question as to why the government is
carrying out this policy with virtually no resources. The answer to
this can be found in an interpretation that the main purpose (or per-
haps hidden aim) of the policy is to create government supporters,
massively and quickly. The regime is inculcating the young elite with
its Islamist values through universities. The government's main con-
cern seems to have been the acceleration of the Islamization of
society, and not the quality and standards of education.
(5) DEFENCE
The government's policy on defence is another important element in
Islamizing society. Articles 12, 54, 55, and 63 in The National
Charter relate to the matters of defence and national unity (the most
important concepts underlying defence). Article 12 points out the
importance of national unity. Article 54 advocates that the country's
defence is the responsibility of all the Sudanese. Article 55 says
that the armed forces are the protectors of the unified peoples of
Sudan. In addition to this, ordinary people are expected to share the
responsibility of defence through popular defence (i.e. the Popular
Defence Force), and should be trained and armed (Article 63). Article
54 points out that discouragement of unity, sovereignty and integrity
should be regarded as treason, and jihad should be regarded as an
instrument to be used against every internal I external threat - the
war in the South is regarded as a jihad. The following are the arti-
cles mentioned above.
12. We stipulate that national unity is a vital affair in
facing internal and external challenges and Eis] necessary
for realization of security, stability and welfare of the
people of the Sudan
54. The country's defence and safeguard of its unity,
sovereignty and integrity is the responsibility of all the
Sudanese; discouragement shall be regarded as treason for the
country, the nation, its belief and its Islamic belonging.
And jihad, in the respect, shall be regarded as binding, to
safeguard the society against every internal or external
threat.
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55. The Armed Forces is the protector for [sic: are the pro-
tectors of] the unified peoples of the Sudan and its assign-
ment is to protect the country and its frontiers; its faith
to the people and allegiance to its soil shall be regarded as
genuine protector for its Constitution, unity, values,
heritage and progress.
63. The training and armament [sic] of the people is prereq-
uisite to the consolidation of the jihad's values and con-
firmation of the basic role of the Popular Defence in backing
the Armed Forces and the other regular forces.63
The issues of the regular army (armed forces), the Popular Defence
Force (popular defence), and the war in the South are regarded impor-
tant in terms of national defence. For this reason, this section
focuses on these issues.
(a) Regular army
Controlling the armed forces is an important step towards Islamizing
society, because without the security of the regime any other policies
of Islamization will be shattered. Sudanese history clearly
demonstrated the critical role of the armed forces, especially the
army, in affecting political stability. The immediate task of the new
government after the 1989 coup was, therefore, to establish control
over the armed forces.
During the first several years (1989-92), many cases of attempted
counter-coups were reported. This seems to indicate that the
government had a problem with the army, but it also suggests the
effectiveness of the policy which they adopted, because the government
survived those counter-coup attempts. The following list shows the
"reported" cases of attempted counter-coups after al-Bashir's coup.
** Reported cases of attempted coups **
[1989]
1989
[1990]
1990
1990
1990
Oct. -Nov
March
September
November
(unconfirmed b y the regime)64
(announced by the regime)65
(unconfirmed by the regime)66
(unconfirmed by the regime)67
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[1991]
199].	 April	 : (unconfirmed by the regime)68
1991	 August	 : (announced by the regime)69
[1992]
1992	 April	 by pro-Nimairi : (announced by the regime)70
elements
1992	 July	 : (unconfirmed by the regime)7'
[1993 - 1995]
	
none
Immediately after the 1989 coup and since then, many officers in
the armed and security forces were dismissed. To quote the EIU
Country Report: Sudan (no.3, 1989): '... Revised estimates for the
number of men who had been forced to retire were 350 for the army, 370
for the police, eleven for the prisons and all the top ranks in the
fire brigade and game parks service.	 '72 To quote Sudan Democratic
Gazette ( September 1991 issue):
'Two years after taking power the Islamic Fundamentalist
junta in Sudan has almost completed its purge of the Sudanese
armed forces and civil service. Figures so far available
show that at least 3,000 officers have either been executed,
imprisoned, detained or dismissed. This number does not
include non-commissioned officers and men, of whom tens of
thousands fall into the same four categories of execution,
imprisonment detention or dismissal.'73
The government seems to have taken advantage of the coup attempts
to eliminate oppositional officers from the armed and security forces
and consolidate its power. As a result, the proportion of the
officers in the armed forces who support the Islamist movement
increased.	 The crucial point here is the linkage between a more
Islamist army and one which is less liable to coup attempts.
To the researcher's knowledge, no coup attempts were reported
between 1993 and 1995. This seems to be an indication that the
government has succeeded in establishing control over the armed
forces. It therefore appears now to be quite difficult for the oppo-
sition to implement a successful military coup against the Islamist
regime.
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(b) Popular Defence Force
The significance of the Popular Defence Force is that the government
can mobilize society through the PDF for their purposes. The main
purpose is that of "changing- society", in other words Islamizing
society. The PDF is used as a "re-educational institution" for this
purpose. Although The National Charter points out that the basic role
of the popular defence is as a 'backing" for the armed forces, the
researcher believes that the central role of the "new" PDF after 1989
lies in Islamizing society.
The origin of the Popular Defence Force can be found in the 1985 -
1986 period. 74
 In those days, the government was using militias in
order to reverse the trend in which the army had continuously lost
territory to the SPLA. The militias were recruited from particular
groups, such as the Massariya (al-Massaariiya) and Baqqara (al-
Baqqaara). 75 Its main role was to reduce the burden on the army and
to complement it.
The PDF became an official institution in October 1989 by the
promulgation of the Popular Defence Act. 76 It appeared that the PDF
aimed at a militarization of the "whole population" and was a part of
the process of changing society. The government wanted to change
people's way of thinking and attitude, and the PDF was used in this as
a re-educational institution. Sudanow reported President al-Bashir as
saying that:
'It [the PDF) is designed to provide the Sudanese people with
the opportunity to receive comprehensive training, broad
enough to engender a profound remolding and re-education of
the Sudanese nation on new lines. Military instruction will
form a part of this training, which will embrace almost every
aspect of life in an effort to imbue the Sudanese people with
the values and qualities of patience, perseverance, dignity,
ambition, solidarity and sacrifice. These values and
qualities are indispensable if Sudan is to be transformed
into a state of abundance, peace and prestige. Equipped with
these, Sudan will certainly follow the right path in the
jungle of international politics.'77
The researcher, however, suspects that there exist two other hid-
den aims for the PDF. The first aim is to reduce the impact and power
of the army over political issues, and the second aim is to resist a
possible military intervention by foreign forces.78
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The PDF now contributes to the decentralisation of power of the
army. To quote Sudan Focus:
'One achievement the NSR is particularly proud of is the
establishment of huge security and military organizations,
motivated by a new security drive in which the power of the
military figures less and less. A policy to militarise the
civilian population has led to the creation of a large Popu-
lar Defence Force (PDF). ... it is widely believed that the
army's victories in the south and southern Kordofan were only
made possible by the support of the PDF.'79
The dependence of the army on the PDF makes the impact and power
of the army over political issues weak. This means that even if some
officers in the army, who oppose the Islamist line, want to carry out
a successful military coup, the weakened position of the army makes it
more difficult to control the coup environment.
With regard to the second aim which the researcher suspects, i.e.
to resist a possible military intervention by foreign forces, it is
evident that since Sudan's independence, the Sudanese have always felt
a fear of military intervention, initially by the Egyptians and now by
American allies. Some real cases, such as the Second Gulf War and the
Somali operation have perhaps given this Sudanese feeling some
realism. The Sudanese know the inferiority of their military equip-
ment, thus they have to complement it with a strong fighting spirit
and large numbers of fighters (i.e. the whole population).
In 1990, several issues of Sudan Update gave accounts of the PDF.
To quote Sudan Update:
'The leadership of the PDF has prepared a plan for ... the
training of all the Sudanese people to carry arms in five
years' time, announced the commander of the PDF.
Addressing a graduation ceremony of more than a thousand PDF
infantry troops in Bahr al-Arab ... [the commander] affirmed
their commitment to complete the training of 150,000 of PDF
before [30th June 1991].'80
'Students admitted to higher institutes and universities
this year are to undergo military training at the PDF camps
from 1 December 1990 to 1 February 1991, ... As for
girls, the PDF administration will organise the training
programme	 '81
Training in the PDF became compulsory to newly admitted
university students and government officials. Groups of government
officials and employees who came from a similar field were put in a
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camp to take training sessions - both military and non-military ones.
Those trained in a camp could voluntarily take part in actual fighting
at any time. There also seems to be a by-product - a Sudanese
university teacher told the researcher that: "The PDF provides some
opportunity for people to know each other who have never met before,
and to share common problems and solutions concerning their jobs."82
In addition to the PDF, there exists "National Service" in Sudan.
This does not mean military service, but various kinds of service for
society, such as medical services, which are normally allocated to the
medical doctors and students. Sudan Update reported that: 'It has
been decided to make national service compulsory for every Sudanese
between 18 and 30 years of age for a period of 36 month.' 83
 This
national service appears to be used similarly to the PDF as a re-
educational institution for changing society.
(C) War in the South
For the purpose of the Islamization of the South, the Islamist
government has been making great efforts to gain control over the
South, where a civil war (the Second Civil War) has been taking place
since 1983 between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the
government forces. In order to gain control over the South, the
government has been using the armed forces and the PDF in fighting.
The ar efforts of the Islamist government in the South are regarded
as part of jihad. Between 1989 and 1994, the government seems to have
sought to resolve the problem in the South mainly by force.
Diagram 7.2.(2) is intended to show the development of the Second
Civil War from 1989 up to 1994.
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Diagram 7.2.(2): The Second Civil War (1989-94)
SPLA	 Militia	 Armed forces
I__ __
SPLA-Anya-nya II
integration
1989 ------: -------------[PDF
(some remained)-:
May 1991
Mengistu's fall	 Aug.91 split
(Riak Machar,Lam Akol)
SPLA-M :	 I SPLA-U
(John Garang)
----
1989 al-Bashir
Dec.92 split
(Alfred Lado Gore)I 'p
Aug.93
PRNSS
1994 -----
'I,- -
--x--
mid- 94 : Government
controled all major
Sep.94	 towns in the South
(Machar)	 (Akol)
set up	 claimed
SSIM	 SPLA-U
9L1	 '4,.(The war is continuing.)
SPLA
	
= Sudan People's Liberation Army:
Aug. 1983, John Garang.
PDF
	
= Popular Defen	 Force: 1985-86 / 1989, government.
SPLA-M = Sudan People's Liberation Army - Mainstream:
Aug. 1991, John Garang, Dinka domination.
SPLA-U = Sudan People's Liberation Army - United:
Aug. 1991, Riak Nachar and Lam Akol, Nuer domination.
Forces of Unity: Sep. 1992, William Nyuon, joined SPLA-U in 1993.
PRMSS = Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan:
Aug. 1993, Alfred Lado Gore, Equatoria tribes.
SSIM	 = Southern Sudan Independent Movement:
Sep. 1994, Riak Machar.
SPLA-U	 Sep. 1994, Lam Akol claimed.
After the 1989 coup, the power of the SPLA started to decline
rapidly with a number of splits and internal disputes (see Diagram
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A.9.(l): Civil wars in Sudan in Appendices).
	 The government took
advantage of this situation and increased its controlled areas.
On 8 February 1994, The Independent reported the decline of the
SPLA and the advance of the government troops in the following terms:
'Barring divine intervention, the Sudanese army will shortly
retake the last towns in the south held by rebel forces,
establish its presence along the roads linking them and cut
the rebels off from Uganda, their haven and supply route.
Two years ago the SPLA controlled most of southern Sudan, but
a calamitous split in the movement in 1992 allowed the
government to retake almost all the towns and roads.'85
Map 7.2.(2) is meant to show the increase of the government con-
trolled areas during the period between August 1992 and February 1994.
Nap 7.2.(2): Increase of government-controlled area
August 1992
	
February 1994
Sources: The Guardian, 28 August 1992 (photocopy);
El Pais, 6 February 1994.
As Map 7.2.(2) shows, the government achieved some success in
their military campaign in the South. This success, however, seems to
have caused outside opinion to view the war increasingly as a "reli-
gious war' t and created a negative image of religious persecution by
the government.
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Sudan consists of about 73% Muslims, about 18% animists, and 9%
Christians. 86
 Many Christians and Southerners live in the North
peacefully together with the Muslims, and many Muslims live in the
South, too. However, between 1989 and 1994, there was a strong
tendency for observers, particularly in the Western media, to portray
the Sudanese civil war as a religious war between the "Northern Mus-
lims" and the "Southern Christians".
This tendency seemed to stem partly from the SPLA's strategy.
Despite the fact that the Second Civil War between the government
troops and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had actually
started before the introduction of the 1983 Islamic Laws (sharia),87
the SPLA often claimed that the Islamic Law was the main cause of the
civil war. It seems that the SPLA wanted to exploit the view of reli-
gious war, in order to obtain sympathy and support from the Christian
West.
Meanwhile, the government tried to discourage the view of reli-
gious war, despite the usage of the term, jihad - a religious term in
Islam. From 1989 to 1994, while the government was continuing its war
efforts, it also undertook a dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims
in Sudan.
In May 1991, the chairman of the RCC's political committee, Brig.
Plo Yukwan, told the religious leaders of both Muslims and Christians
at a meeting that: 'Religion should not be a factor of division
between the Sudanese. '88 This statement was made in order to launch
an inter-religious dialogue and to promote mutual understanding
between the Muslims and Christians in Sudan.
In October 1994, on the occasion of an inter-religious dialogue
conference in Khartoum, the establishment of the Inter-Religious
Dialogue Association (IRDA) was decided in order to promote the reli-
gious dialogue between the Muslims and Christians in Sudan.89
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7.3 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT
Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, the texts of Dr al-Turabi's account
were put together exclusively from the researcher's interviews with Dr
al-Turabi. Because of this, the researcher did not use the form of
quotation in those sections.
In this chapter and Chapter 8, however, the texts of Dr al-
Turabi's account are composed of two types of material - one obtained
from the researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi, and one from pub-
lished materials. For this reason, the researcher uses the form of
quotation.
Because information on the general description of events is more
detailed and extensive in this period, there has been less possibility
to cover every aspect of it within the framework of Dr al-Turabi's
account.
7.3.1 DOMESTIC POLICY
The researcher summarized his assumptions about Dr al-Turabi's goals
after 1989. The researcher then showed the assumption concerning
domestic matters to Dr al-Turabi himself and asked him to correct it,
if necessary.
1989-
Main goal:
(concerning domestic matters)
To consolidate the position of the Islaniist movement in Sudan
correction: To realize all plans and strategies for an
Islamic society
Dr al-Turabi corrected the main goal concerning domestic matters after
1989 as "to realize all plans and strategies for an Islamic
society" 90
In his short-term plans, Dr al-Turabi explained his goal to the
researcher that:
'The basic pattern of the development of the Islamist move-
ment is a Continuous cycle of two developments - horizontal
167
development
Sudan
sLge 1	 ----	 stage
horizontal	 vertical
quantity	 quality
umrna93
siage 3
	 ----	 stage
horizontal	 vertical
quantity	 quality
_ _ Ii
now and	 near future	 future
jtnmediat future
up to 1989
Chapter 7
development and vertical development. Horizontal development
means quantitative development and vertical development means
qualitative development. '91
Diagram 7.3.(l) is meant to show Dr al-Turabi's idea about the devel-
opment of the Islamist movement. 92
 "Stage 1" refers to the develop-
ment of the movement up to 1989, i.e. a small Islamist movement
(including a political party) expanded and succeeded in establishing
an Islamic state. "Stage 2" refers to the period after 1989, i.e. the
movement has been consolidating itself within the state borders (this
is discussed in the later sections of this chapter). "Stage 3" refers
to the movement's development in the near future, i.e. the movement
will expand beyond the borders. The preparation for "Stage 3" has
already started and can be seen in the Sudanese foreign relations (see
Chapter 8).
Diagram 7.3.(1): Development of the movement
--party ------------state ---- - umma -----------------
society	 (beyond the state borders)
Dr al-Turabi gave a further explanation of the task of Stage 2 as
follows:
'The principles of the Islamist movement has now been estab-
lished in Sudan, this completed a horizontal development,
i.e. a quantitative development inside Sudan.
The next short-term plans, therefore, would pursue a
vertical development, i.e. a qualitative development of
society. In this stage, it is important to improve the qual-
ity of society based on Islamic values. These include the
qualitative improvement of production, human relations,
political life, economic life, and religious life. In such
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society, people will care more about others, not only them-
selves and their own families. Democracy, though not Western
democracy, will be more prevalent. The integration of
science, art, and religion will increase. As for education,
the level of Sudan will reach an international standard
within 10 years and this will not be so difficult.'94
In 1994, Dr al-Turabi told Mideast Mirror about Sudan's efforts
for a qualitative development as follows:
'Sudan now has an Islamic state which is debating from an
Islamic perspective such issues as the structure of
government, the electoral system, the constitution, the
appropriate form of shura (consultation), how Islam can
inform economic development, what institutions are needed to
do so, and what does it mean to have an Islamic bank or
insurance firm. The debate also covers questions such as
Islamic justice, and how best to develop music and the
arts.
Dr al-Turabi wanted to make Sudan an ideal model of an Islamic
society. In the interviews with the researcher in January 1995, Dr
al-Turabi said that:
'The Islamic take-over of power in 1989 constituted only a
beginning towards the creation of a real Islamic society. We
have to show a good model of an Islamic society to the world.
Showing a good example is important. We will show a real
democracy. We will show economic development.'96
In the interview with the researcher, Dr al-Turabi emphasized
"society" and distinguished government from society. It is, there-
fore, useful to note Dr al-Turabi's views on the role of government in
s oci e"y.
On 10 Nay 1992, Dr al-Turabi was invited to a one-day debate with
a group of American academics of Islam and Middle Eastern Studies,
which took place in Florida, in the United States. In the debate, Dr
al-Turabi talked about Islam, government, politics, the West, and the
Sudanese efforts to create a real Islamic society. Dr al-Turabi's
account was taped and was published in Arthur Lowrie's edited book:
Islam, Democracy, the State and the West.
The following are quotations from Dr al-Turabi in Lowrie's book
which provide background to his conception of the role of government
and society in an Islamic society.
'The authority of government is limited because sharia is the
higher law. ... The Koran entrusts authority to the people
and not to the government.'97
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'Islam has always accommodated and gradually integrated
society through social action and through social institutions
rather than government, and that will remain the case in the
Sudan. '98
'It is quite true that in the short term, we need a
strong government in the Sudan. One of our problems is that
we have always had a weak coalition government without suffi-
cient authority to bring about a measure of discipline, to
take steps which are not extremely popular, and to resist the
immediate popular reaction in pursuit of satisfaction of
society. But the consensus I am seeking, I don't wish to
bring about through authority because that won't be con-
sensus.
'The government now is doing many things simply as lead-
ership, and it will probably withdraw. '100
7.3.2 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
In the debate in Florida, Dr al-Turabi denied the criticism that
Islamic movements were not democratic. He pointed out that Islamists'
common objections to democracy stemmed from their judging democracy by
association with the West not by its concept. It appears that Dr al-
Turabi supported the concept of democracy, but not a Westernized
democracy. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'There has been in Islamic literature quite an argument about
whether or not we should adopt a notion [such as democracy],
even if we like the notion, ... Some of the objections to
democracy are just to the foreign word itself, ... people
Islamists] also judge democracy by association, not by what
It essentially means grammatically -- government by the
people -- but by what irhas come to mean in the West. Along
its historical course in the West, it has become associated
with secularism, and that is definitely anathema to Islamic
movements; with politics which is amoral if not immoral, and
that's definitely something objectionable; and with cutthroat
competition for power, and that doesn't sound very religious,
does it ? ... If you scrutinize the model of the [Islamist]
movement itself, it's highly democratic [in its real
meaning]. '101
In 1990, Dr al-Turabi in an interview published in Sudan Update
criticized both multi-party and single-party systems. 	 Sudan Update
reported this as follows:
'The leader of the Islamic fundamentalists in Sudan [Dr al-
Turabi] claimed that although Sadiq al-Mandi had ruled the
Sudan under the multi-party "democratic" system, this type of
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democracy had failed and did not benefit the Sudanese people.
He also referred to the one-party system as a failure under
Nimeiri. '102
Dr al-Turabi again emphasized his views on political systems in
the Florida debate. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'I don't think that parties are essential to the democratic
process ... They [Sudanese people] were asked what the best
political order was, and they knew that a multi-party system
in the Sudan would not be democratic because political
parties or a government governed by the House of Khatmiyyah
and the House of the Mandi was a dynastic thing. ... People
would vote for the Nandi, because of his great-grandfather,
because of his [great-grandfather's] achievement in the 19th
century. ... People don't ask their sheikh questions.
I'm not a believer in a single party myself. In our own
movement, I avoid the movement is becoming a madhhab
[madhhab: religious creed] or a single school of law."°3
As far as the issue of federalism is concerned, Dr al-Turabi has
been consistently advocating decentralized political system and feder-
alism for a long time. Sudan Update of 20 April 1990 reported a talk
by Dr al-Turabi as follows:
'Dr Turabi told his audience that the NIF was the only hope
for the Sudan and would continue to rule the country to
prepare the ground and transform the Sudan into an Islamic
state embodying federalism.'104
In the Florida debate, 1992, Dr al-Turabi explained the situation
in Sudan concerning decentralization and federalism as follows:
The Islamic [Islamist] movement in the Sudan is a highly
decentralized movement, .not only regionally with headquarters
and branches and chapters, but also functionally.
Of course, you don't want to decentralize the country to
the point that centrifugal forces will shatter it. But,
still, federalization is sought not only for the South but
for all parts of the Sudan, for Darfur, for Kordofan, for
Jezira and so forth. Meanwhile, government is actively
trying to insure the balance of these centrifugal forces by
building roads and communications systems so that people
could feel that they are autonomous administratively but
united politically.
Normally in the Sudan, a military takeover would last
about three years before they ever think of decentralizing
power. It took Aboud five years to think of decentralizing
his power by setting up a central parliament and allowing
each province to go its own way to some measure. But in the
Sudan now, almost two years after the event [the 1989 coup],
there has already been a high degree of reorganization. They
are embarking on the federalization of the Sudan, and that
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means that power would have to be distributed and shared by
all the different regions, not by local military commanders
but also by local councils and local parliaments. There is a
very powerful local government program now being imple-
mented. '105
In February 1994, the nine federal states were re-divided into
twenty six states by the 10th constitutional decree.	 Dr al-Turabi
made a statement concerning this decentralization policy which implied
that he had some responsibility for it. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in
Sudan ow):
'"The current division of states is not final, and more
decentralization is expected in the future if so required",
announced Dr Hassan Abdalla Al-Turabi before a symposium held
by the Federal Government Committee at the TNA. 1-le added
that the current division of the provinces would be under
constant review, and called on the TNA to bear in mind the
geographical and economic factors as well as manpower and
natural resources, transportation and regional considera-
tions. In this connection, Dr Al-Turabi suggested that
poorer states would be well advised to seek integration with
richer ones.'106
7.3.3 LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Mideast Mirror of August 1994 reported that Dr al-Turabi had proudly
claimed that Sudan was the only country in the world with a decentral-
ized legal system. This is another aspect of decentralization which
Dr ai-Turabi covered relating to the Sudanese legal system. To quote
Dr al-Turabi (in Mideast Mirror):
'[Sudan] is the only country in the world with a decentral-
ized legal system, under which adherents of each religion
abide by their own faith's family and personal status laws,
where Islamic law does not apply to non-Moslems even though
85 percent of Sudanese are Moslems.'107
Dr al-Turabi also told in the Florida debate about the Sudanese
family law and the civil law as follows:
'Family law is part of religion. It's personalized in the
Sudan. ... Of course, the civil law is universal; you can-
not personalize it; you cannot regiorialize or federalize it
because a contract law is a contract law all over the
country. '108
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Concerning the new Islamic penal code (criminal law) introduced on
22 March 1991, Dr al-Turabi explained the situation in Sudan to the
Florida conference as follows:
'Criminal law has also been decentralized. ... There is a
national code, but the South, because it is predominantly
inhabited by non-Muslims, is absolved from the Islamic
punishment. ... In the North there will be some non-Muslims
but they are told that it is a dry country. You have to
accept this fact if you are living in the North."°9
Dr al-Turabi expressed his personal views on tapostasyvv and the
execution of ?Iahmud Muhammad Taha in the Florida debate as follows:
'The limit ... is the question of apostasy, if someone
deliberately and professedly says that I'm no longer a Mus-
lim. The traditional view in the time of the Prophet was he
was left alone, unless he actually changed sides and joined
the other side in the state of war between Mecca and Medina.
Then it was legitimate to deal with him just like an enemy
alien, in battle he can be killed like anybody else. Later
on, the Muslims somehow theoretically came to adopt the view
that apostasy is punishable by death.
Now, people have to address this problem: whether
apostasy should be established as a capital crime punishable
by capital punishment ? It was solved very differently in
Sudan; to become punishable it has to be more than just
intellectual apostasy. It would have to translate into not
only sedition but actually insurrection against society. So
this is how it is defined. ... If you read the definition
itself, it is just like treason; it reads like treason.
I personally have views which run against all the
madhhabs [religious creeds] on the status of women, on the
testimony of non-Muslims, on the law of apostasy, and people
argue with me and some people probably think I border on
apostasy.
[With regard to the case of Mahmud Muhammad Taha]
Apostasy was not in the penal code, ... But the judge said
that ... it didn't have to be in the penal code. This is no
longer the case. The penal code tells you that you have to
refer to the text. Everything is contained inside the text
and not beyond the text. But under Nimeiri, the code was
poorly drafted; it was drafted in three days, and it was the
old penal code with just insertions of five or six provi-
sions. I would say that this was definitely a bad deci-
sion.
Concerning another point in the Islamic penal code, Dr al-Turabi
gave his view on the application of "blasphemy" to the Rushdie case.
In August 1994, Dr al-Turabi was reported in the newspaper, Asharq Al-
Awsat (Al-Sharq Al-'Awsat) as saying that: 'The judgements of Islamic
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law [blasphemy code] do not apply to individuals [e.g. Rushdie] who
live abroad.''1'
7.3.4 ECONOMY
In August 1984, at a symposium organized by the FIBS, Dr al-Turabi,
Presidential Adviser at the time, gave a lecture on the purposes of
the Islamization of banking system. In his lecture, Dr al-Turabi said
that:
'Where Islamic legislation is concerned, life's complexities
cannot be divided into their various socio-economic and
political aspects; they are all parts of the nations's drive
towards the worship of God.
	
Bearing this in mind,
politicians should work closely with economists, 	 '112
In the Florida debate, 1992, Dr al-Turabi mentioned the Islamic
economic system as follows:
'The Islamic economic system is one of freedom. Society is
autonomous when it comes to production and when it comes to
ownership and property. In theory, property belongs to God,
not to the government and not to the individual, but it's
individuals who are the trustees of it."
In the same debate, Dr al-Turabi explained the Sudanese economic
privatization by denying the role of International Monetary Fund (IMF)
in it. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
"rhe sharia itself is a limitation on government. This
explains perhaps why rlimited] government in the Sudan,
inspired by this model [of Islam], is now privatizing, even
the economy.
This is not because the IMF has imposed this model; the
IMF is still at loggerheads with the Sudan over many issues.
tn fact, if this privatization were introduced as IMF-
inspired, it would have immediately provoked a reaction. You
know how IMF measures are responded to in all parts of the
world.
In the Sudan, there has been complete price decontrol,
complete not gradual; complete withdrawal of subsidies from
petroleum, from sugar, from bread; and complete floating of
the pound, not just a devaluation; all without a reaction.
'114
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7.3.5 EDUCATION
In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi indicated the role of education in
society as follows:
'I plead with everybody [in the Islamic movements} that we
aren't a political movement exclusively. We are a religious
movement for the education and spiritual development of the
individual, and we have much more substantial achievements in
the field of reforming society, in changing individuals and
in moral education than in politics."5
On the occasion of the Native Administration Conference which was
held in January 1995 over a three-week period. Dr al-Turabi described
the conference as a re-educational training session. In the
researcher's interview, Dr al-Turabi indicated the role of education
in the context of changing society as follows:
'More than a thousand representatives of all the Sudanese
tribes have participated in the conference. It has not been
a three day conference, but rather one of three "weeks", and
it has actually been an re-educational programme. The
government is teaching the tribal leaders about a new spirit,
as opposed to an old tribalism, and a new spirit in the eco-
nomic, moral, religious, cultural and military fields.
Changing society, that is, changing sufis, tribal leaders,
students, women and so on is very important.'116
Dr al-Turabi showed his emphasis on education and society, by
saying that: 'In the hereafter, if I believe I am going to be
rewared, I think 90% of my reward will be for my work in society and
education. '117
In January 1995, Dr al-Turabi told the researcher his optimistic
perspective on the Sudanese education level: 'As for education, the
level of Sudan will reach an international standard within 10 years
and this will not be so difficult.'"8
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7.3.6 DEFENCE
Dr al-Turabi explained in the Florida debate how the army became sup-
portive towards the Islamists as follows:
'What most people didn't know is that the army, like the rest
of the modern sector in the Sudan, had [sic: has] gone
Islamic. Officers just represent the other elites ... Abboud
was a nationalist ... Nimeiri, the socialist, ... So today
it was bound to be an Omar Beshir. If you pick a random
sample from the army, most of them would be Islamists,
because of where they come from. Candidates are taken from
schools and most schools are dominated by Islamists."19
Dr al-Turabi explained, in the Florida debate, his views about the
relations between the army and ordinary people and the role of army in
society and in political instability. His views indicate his ideas of
the foundation of the Popular Defence Force and the future of the
army. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'It is unfortunate that in our country the military became a
separate profession. This is not typical of Islamic society.
In Islamic society, the military is not a separate profession
from the people. Everyone should be trained and then in
times of emergency, people should be called upon, and you can
mobilize an army of millions. Of course, you always need a
small standing army to preserve technology and discipline.
I think the best idea is to dissolve the army, just dis-
solve the army in society, so to speak. The idea of a popu-
lar defense force goes some way to do that. But people
should organize for their own defense. If the army needs to
broaden its base, then it can call upon these forces. Other-
wise, these forces are people who are engaged in their daily
occupations and go onlyhen they are needed.
But in the Sudan, in particular, there has been
quite a gap between military and civilian, and this explains
perhaps some of the political instability and the military
take-over; after a while the civilians become very jealous --
and it's mostly the civilian elites who initiate the uprising
--, and the people follow them although most of the uprisings
not necessarily popular. ... We want to overcome this.'12°
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In the researcher's interview in January 1995, Dr al-Turabi
described the battles in the South as part of jihad. 121 It appears
that Dr al-Turabi saw the war as a defensive war, because he explained
the meaning of jihad in the Florida debate as follows:
'The word jihad is actually a reciprocal word in its verbal
formation; it means a struggle against the other, so it is
essentially a defensive enterprise and not an offensive
one. '122
7.3.7 DR AL-TURABI'S SATISFACTION WITH THE SITUATION IN SUDAN
IN JANUARY 1995
In the researcher's interview with Dr al-Turabi in January 1995, Dr
al-Turabi expressed his satisfaction with the current situation in
Sudan in relative terms:
'If I look ahead, there still exists a gap between an
idealistic situation of an Islamic society and reality.
Therefore, I think that it is not enough and Sudan should
move ahead. However, if I look back, I feel that Sudan has
traveled .quite a distance. Sudan is better, especially com-
pared to other Muslim dominated countries which should have
been in more advanced stages in terms of an Islamization of
the society because of their richness in Islamic legacies and
material. The progress of Sudan is much faster and Sudan is
in a more advanced stage than those countries."23
7.4 ANALYSES
7.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-89)
Table 7.4.(1) lists Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which
have emerged from the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's life story covering
the period between 1932 and 1989. Table 7.4.(2) lists possible adjec-
tives (describing personality elements) associated with those charac-
ters.
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Table 7.4.(l): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-89)
Period I Nain characters (imagoes)
1932
	
the critic (a),	 the resistant (a),
the passionate (a),	 the believer (a),
1989
	
the winner (a),	 the reformer (a),
the revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
the good planner (a), 	 the hero (a),
the competitor (a),	 the pragmatist (a),
the expansionist (a),
	
the persuader (a),
the analyst (a),
	
the politician (a),
the man behind the scenes (a),
the mediator (c),
	 the internationalist (a),
the cooperator (c)
(a)	 = classified as agentic
(c)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
Table 7.4.(2): Possible adjectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-89)
Period I Possible adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
-	
defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1989	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (ar, innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a),
overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a),
offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a),
calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a),
influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a),
analytic (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c),
kind (c), conciliatory (C), internationalist (a),
open (c), cooperative (c), supportive (c)
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(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1989-95)
As was mentioned, Dr al-Turabi's account in Chapter 7 is not a life
story. However, it still contains psychological information indicat-
ing Dr al-Turabi's personality elements. His account, related to the
domestic matters of the Islamic state covering the period between 1989
and 1995 at the latest, clearly gives further evidence of previous
findings and new elements of his personality.
Further evidence backs the previous findings - Dr al-Turabi's
account again shows strong signs of agentic personality. The charac-
ter which represents the overall image of his account of this chapter
seems to be "the reformer". It indicates some aspects of personality
described by adjectives, such as innovative, progressive, radical,
critical, originative, and creative. This main character strengthens
the underlying motivation of reform (agentic motivation) in the
period, and backs some of the previously identified characters like
"the analyst" and "the man behind the scenes".
Of many agentic elements of personality, innovative and progres-
sive elements of personality stemming from Dr al-Turabi's character of
"the reformer" are apparent in his account of short-term plans. This
is clear in his emphasis on changing society and his preference for a
"stage" approach or "step by step" approach to changing society.
Among previously identified characters, Dr al-Turabi's character
of "èhe analyst" is apparent in his analytic accounts about the con-
cept of democracy and the role of army. This character to some extent
relates to another character, "the reformer", because the purpose of
analysis is reform. In this sense, it can be seen that the latter,
"the reformer", is backed by the former, "the analyst".
Another previously identified character is that of "the man behind
the scenes". This comes across in Dr al-Turabi's statement concerning
decentralization policy. Despite him having no official position in
the government, he was talking as if he had some responsibility for
it. His attitude implies that he influenced the government policy
from behind the scenes. As mentioned before, in the case of Dr al-
Turabi, this character should be seen as an agentic character.
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Evidence of Dr al-Turabi's "radical" element of personality, which
again stems from his agentic character of "the reformer", is apparent
in the account about his personal views against some religious creeds.
He said that he was personally against the religious creeds on the
status of women, the testimony of non-Muslims, and the law of
apostasy.
Moreover, his agentic personality which seeks for autonomy and
independence is apparent in his emphasis that the IMF had nothing to
do with the Sudanese economic policy. His account seems to also indi-
cate another agentic element of personality - i.e. a defiant element.
Further evidence of his agentic personality is clear in the
account of his satisfaction with the situation of Sudan. His agentic
personality, in this case, stems from his achievement motivation
towards Islamizing society. He expressed his satisfaction with the
Islamization of Sudan by comparing other Muslim countries. People
high in achievement motivation tend to derive satisfaction from own
work - for Dr al-Turabi, Islamizing Sudan was his own work. People
high in achievement motivation also tend to show a strong and con-
sistent preference for experiences of feeling competent and doing bet-
ter in the performance of tasks - in this case, the task was to
Islamize society.
A new character identified from the 1989 to 1995 period is that of
"the law-abider", suggesting a law-abiding element of personality.
This character has become apparent in his accounts about the case of
Mahmu Muhammad Taha and Salman Rushdie. He said that Taha should not
have been executed, because at that time "apostasy" was not in the
penal code. He also said that the Sudanese "blasphemy" code could not
be applied to Rushdie who was not in Sudan. His accounts clearly show
a law-abiding element of his personality.
(3) NEW FINDINGS (1985-95)
The following table shows the new findings of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality elements which have emerged from the analysis of his account
concerning domestic matters of the Islamic state from the 1989 to 1995
period.
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Table 7.4.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95)
emerged from the analysis of his account concerning
domestic matters
Period Characters	 Possible adjectives
1989	 the law-abider (a) law-abiding (a), rigid (a),
- 95	 reasonable (a)
7.4.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Dr al-Turabi's personality elements stemming from the character of
"the reformer" (representing the image of his account in Chapter 7)
seem to have affected the overall direction of government policy in
the period. Government policy as regards the political system, legal
developments, economy, education, and defence can be seen as a
"reform" towards the Islamization of society.
(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Therais little doubt that the adoption of the new political system of
"direct non-party democracy and federalism was a result of Dr al-
Turabi's strong influence.
Stemming from some agentic characters such as "the reformer" and
"the critic", Dr al-Turabi's critical attitude towards non-Islamic or
un-Islamic things appear to have affected the adoption of "non-party
democracy'. Dr al-Turabi was not satisfied with Western style democ-
racy (i.e. the multi-party system) and wanted to establish a more
suitable democratic system for the Sudanese people, based on Islamic
culture and values. In his account, Dr al-Turabi pointed out some un-
Islamic aspects of Western democracy. Dr al-Turabi also argued that
the two traditionally most powerful political parties in Sudan, the
Uznzna Party and the DUP, were not democratic. He contended that people
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voted for their leaders without thinking and the leaders of both
parties were hereditary. For this reason, Dr al-Turabi concluded that
the Western style multi-party system was not appropriate in Sudan.
In addition to this, Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality
which seeks autonomy and independence seems to have also partly
affected the policy of non-party democracy. In general, he rejects
patterns which are the works of others, therefore he tends to seek or
create "new" things, "different" things, or "own" things on which he
can exercise his full influence. For Dr al-Turabi, the "non-party
democracy" was an Islamist version (or his version) and it was neither
a Capitalist nor a Socialist version.
Dr al-Turabi's consistent advocacy of federalism backed by his
strong will (determination) and patience seems to have affected the
government's policy of federalism. His idea of federalism can be
traced back to 1964. Since then, he had been advocating that a fed-
eral government system was the only solution for the Sudanese prob-
lems. The researcher recalls the description of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality given by Yassin Omar al-Imam, Dr alTurabi's close friend and
leading figure in the movement since 1960s. Al-Imam said that: 'Dr
al-Turabi has a very strong will and extreme patience. He does what
he wants regardless of time or how difficult it will be. If he says
he wants to do something, he will keep trying no matter how long it
takes.'
L2i LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
There is little doubt that Dr al-Turabi had a strong influence in the
legal field. Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic element of personality, his
emphasis on the unity of Sudan, and his step by step approach seem to
have all affected the inclusion of the word "custom" in the declara-
tion concerning the basis of the Sudanese law - i.e. "the Sudanese law
is based on the sharia (Islamic law) and custom." It seems that it
was necessary for the government to include the word in order to
Islamize society gradually with unity. Because of the inclusion of
the word "custom", however, some Islamists (e.g. members of Hizh al-
Tahrir (Hizb al-Tahriir)) were critical, and said that Sudan was not a
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true Islamic state, advocating that a true Islamic state must be based
on "only" the sharia.
A further sign of the influence of Dr al-Turabi's personality is
apparent in the contents of the Sudanese criminal law and the
government's attitude towards some actual cases, such as the case of
Salman Rushdie and the suspension of hud penalty for theft. His per-
sonality elements stemming from his character of "the reformer" seem
to have affected the relatively moderate punishments for blasphemy
(the more "conservative and fundamentalist thoughts in Islam" tend to
justify severe punishments). Sudan does not adopt the death penalty
for blasphemy, while some countries like Pakistan and Iran do. Dr al-
Turabi's law-abiding element of personality appears to have affected
the government's attitude towards the case of Salman Rushdie. The
Sudanese government has never said that Rushdie should be killed
wherever he is. The government appears to stick to the written text
of the law strictly - the Sudanese blasphemy code does not include
death penalty and it can not be applied to someone who lives outside
Sudan. Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic element of personality appears to
have also affected the government's policy over the suspension of hud
penalty (i.e. amputation) for theft - amputation always draws strong
criticism from some Western countries. To the researcher's knowledge,
during the period between 1989 and 1995, no amputation sentence was
carried out.
Despite the image of an extreme and dangerous Sudan, which has
beer portrayed in the Western media, the reality seems to present a
more moderate picture. This has much to do with Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality.
(3) ECONOMY
As we have found in Section 7.2, Dr al-Turabi's strong influence on
the "reform" of the economy (i.e. the Islamization of the Sudanese
economy) is clear. His commitment to Islam and his strong agentic
personality which seeks high performance in tasks (in this case,
"doing better" than others in terms of Islamization) seem to have been
behind the Sudanese case.
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This comes across in the attitude of the Sudanese Islamists
towards the Islaniization of economy. They have been more "serious"
than any other Islamists in the world. Despite low performance in
real economic development, they claim and emphasize that Sudan's econ-
omy is truly Islamic. They are very proud of their achievement in
Islamizing economy - even the Iranians do not emphasize the Islamic
aspect of their economy any more. This uniqueness appears to derive
from Dr al-Turabi's personality.
(4) EDUCATION
Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality stemming from his character of "the
reformer", based on his strong achievement motivation towards Islamiz-
ing society, seems to have affected Sudan's commitment to a massive
expansion of higher education after 1989, which is another unique
point. To the researcher's knowledge, there were only 6 universities
before 1989, but 30 universities in Nay 1995. There may be some cases
of nominal promotion from the status of college or institute to the
status of university, but the figure seems to show, at least, the
government's enthusiasm for this policy.
Dr al-Turabi's account of education showed how he valued education
highly and saw education as the important tool for changing society,
in other words, Islamizing society. Despite insufficient staffing and
poop facilities, the government has been enthusiastic in the educa-
tional expansion. It seems that they are creating massive
governmental support by inculcating young elites with Islamist values
through universities. The government's main concern seems to be more
over quick Islamization of elites than over the quality and standards
of higher education.
(5) DEFENCE
The combination of Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality which
seeks for control and his analytic approach towards the army appear to
have affected the government's success in controlling the army.
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Although many cases of attempted counter-coups were reported between
1989 and 1992, no coup attempts were reported between 1993 and 1995.
It seems that the government exploited those coup attempts to "reform"
the army, i.e. the elimination of the anti-Islamist elements from the
army. In addition to this, Dr al-Turabi's analytic account about the
army, in which he described the possible reason for the political
instability and the military take-over, suggests the Islamists' clear
policy and vision concerning the army.
As with the case of education, Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality
stemming from his character of "the reformer", based on his strong
achievement motivation towards Islamizing society, seems to have
strongly affected the creation of the new PDF. His careful and
analytic elements of personality which can be seen in his accounts
about the army and the PDF appears to have also shaped the nature of
the PDF. The government has been using the PDF mainly as a re-
educational institution for the purpose of the Islamization of
society. The government can mobilize the whole population through the
PDF for their purposes - both military and non-military purposes.
Another influence of Dr al-Turabi's personality can be seen in the
Islamists' commitments with regard to both the civil war in the South
and inter-religious dialogue between Iuslims and Christians in Sudan.
His agentic elements of personality which seek to conquer (e.g.
aggressive and offensive elements) may have affected the military
campaign in the South. The combination of his other agentic elements
of personality (e.g. clever and calculative elements) and some com-
munal elements of personality which seek for unity and communication
seems to have affected the government's policy over discouraging the
view of religious war by promoting the inter-religious dialogue.
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CHAPTER 8: THE ISLA1'IIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE:
EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER
One of the areas of concern to the Islamist movement in Sudan since
1989 has related to the outside world. It is very important, there-
fore, to analyze how Sudan's relations with the outside world have
developed over the period, identifying in particular the specifically
Islamist dimensions of foreign policy.
Chapter 8 has three sections. The first section, Section 8.1,
gives a general description of the key developments of the Islamist
movement in the external field after 1989. The researcher, however,
has limited the discussion in this section to the period going up to
the end of 1993.	 Where there is material of particular relevance
falling in the years since 1993, this is mentioned - as occurs in sec-
tion 8.1.2.(3). Section 8.1 includes Sudan's foreign policy, its
international relations with other countries and the activities of the
Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC).
Section 8.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account of those matters dis-
cussed in the previous section, but does not necessarily cover every
aspect of them.
The final section, Section 8.3, gives the researcher's analyses of
Dr äl-Turabi's personality and the key developments of the movement
assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these develop-
ments.
8.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-93/ SOME UP TO 95)
8.1.1 CHRONOLOGY
1989/ 6/30:Brigadier al-Bashir successfully carried out a
coup and came to power.
1990/ 8/02:Iraq invaded Kuwait.
1991/ 1-2 :The Second Gulf War occurred.
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1991/ 4/25-28:The First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference
(PAIC) was held in Khartoum.
1991/ 5/2l:Ethiopia's President Mengistu was ousted.
1991/lO/30:The Madrid Talks began.
1991/1l/16-17:The First Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference
was held.
1992/ 1/**:In Algeria, the second round of elections were
canceled.
1992/ 4-5 :Al-Turabi toured Western Europe and North America.
1992/ 5/26:A1-Turabi was attacked by a Sudanese (former
Karate champion) in Canada.
l992/**/**:The UN General Assembly issued a condemnation on
Sudan's human rights record.
1992/12/ 9:US troops landed Somalia.
1993/ 2/1O:Al-Bashir met the Pope in Khartoum.
1993/ 4-5 :A conference on religious dialogue was held.
1993/ 8/ 9:The IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights.
1993/ 8/l7:America added Sudan to the list of countries which
support terrorism.
1993/ 9/l3:The peace accord between Israel and the PLO was
signed.
1993/lO/13:Al-Turabi met Pope John Paul II for the first
time in the Vatican City.
1993/1O/2l:The reconciliation between John Garang's
SPLA-Mainstream and Riak Machar's SPLA-United,
which was mediated by the US, finally failed.
1993/late 11:Al-Turabi met President Rabbani in Afghanistan.
1993/12/ 2-4:The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum.
1993/12/29:The archbishop of Canterbury refused the
invitation of the Khartoum regime to visit Sudan.
l993/12/30:Sudan expelled the British ambassador in
Khartoum.
1994/ 1/ 4:The Sudanese ambassador in London was expelled.
1994/ 3/**:The first peace talks with the SPLM, under the
patronage of the Inter-Governmental Authority for
Drought and Development (IGADD), were held.
1994/ 8/14:Carlos, the notorious international terrorist,
was arreste by the Sudanese police in
Khartoum, extradited to France, and was arrested
by the French police on 15 August.
1994/10/ 8-lO:The Second Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference
was held in Khartoum.
1995/ 3/ 3:The American Marines withdrew from Somalia.
1995/ 3/30- 4/ 2: The Third PAIC was held in Khartoum.
The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring	 Su = Summer Au = Autumn 	 Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
Sources: See Table C.(l): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-951.
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8.1.2 SUILARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER
(1) THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY
The researcher believes that the foreign policy of the Islamist
government is basically designed to expand the regime's influence
beyond Sudan's borders. Although The National Charter does not make
this point clear, the (apparently hidden) expansionist policy seems to
be the core of Sudan's foreign policy, and is backed by the concept of
the umina which Dr al-Turabi talked about (see Dr al-Turabi's account
in Sections 7.3 and 8.2).
Article 70 in the charter proclaims a non-interference policy, but
perhaps this carries no more and no less weight than similar policies
proclaimed by Western states. US foreign policy, after all, is not
one of true non-interference. In a sense, Sudan's expansionist policy
can be seen as part of self-defence to protect the regime's Islamist
values and programmes.
Chapter 8 focuses on the regime's efforts to expand its influence
in two dimensions, The first dimension covers the relationship
between the Sudanese Islamist government and governments of neighbor-
ing and other Middle Eastern countries. The second one covers the
(government-backed) activities of the Popular Arab and Islamic Con-
ference.
The articles concerning Sudan's foreign policy (Articles from 64
to 70) in The National Charter lay down the principles guiding foreign
policy. Articles 67 and 70 indicate Sudan's strong concern over the
Palestine issue and the position of neighboring countries. The fol-
lowing are Articles 64, 65, 67, and 70 of the charter:
64. The Sudan is part and parcel of the Islamic, Arab and
African nations endeavouring to realize Arab, African and
Islamic unity; its foreign policies and international rela-
tions are being established on the basis of commitment to the
principles of freedom, justice and peace and combat of all
forms of oppression, racial discrimination and hegemony and
also on the endeavour to realize welfare and prosperity of
all mankind and utilize our foreign policy in consolidating
of [sic] our efforts in building the country and boosting of
[sic] its progress, security and stability.
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65. The foreign policy shall confirm the basic principles
concerning the country's higher policies in a way to serve
[sic: that serves] the internal policy aiming for the
country 's dignity, unity, independence and catering of public
interest according to the experienced realities.
67. The Sudan is strongly backing and really consolidating
all Arab, African and Islamic issues headed by the people of
Palestine's liberation [sic] and eradication of the South
Africa's racist regime.
70. The Sudan shall comply with the international and
regional pledges, agreements and charters, and shall function
through the international and regional organization to real-
ize justice, mutual cooperation, good neighbourliness on the
basis of mutual respect, benefit and non-interference in
others' internal affairs and shall specifically undertake to
promote political, economic and cultural relations with all
countries of the neighbourhood to realize the security, peace
and prosperity of its nations.1
(2) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
There is evidence that the Sudanese Islamist government, between 1989
and 1993, was trying to expand its influence beyond Sudan's borders -
in the neighboring region and in the Middle East. To achieve this
goal, Sudan adopted different methods according to the political posi-
tion of the regime in the country concerned, the proportion of Muslims
in the country (and the strength of the Islamist movement there), and
the geographical location-of the country. Of all, "political posi-
tion" was the most important element and related to a number of dif-
ferent attributes: the country's attitude towards Sudan; its policy
towards Islamism; its policy towards the Sudanese opposition (particu -
larly the SPLA); and its relationship with the United States. The
United States was particularly important due to having the power to
influence a government's policy, and taking an antagonistic position
against the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.2
The Islamist government seems to have adopted more direct means
against clearly anti-Sudanese (or anti-Islamist) regimes than less
anti-Sudanese regimes, and towards the neighboring countries rather
than some Middle Eastern countries. Sudan's relations with other
countries were greatly affected by this dimension.
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This section is divided into two sub-sections: (a) Sudan and its
neighbors, and (b) Sudan and the Middle East. The following list
shows the countries concerned.
Sub-section (a): Sudan and its neighbors
(i) Egypt, (ii) Libya, (iii) Chad, (iv) CAR, (v) Zaire,
(vi) Uganda, (vii) Kenya, (viii) Ethiopia, (ix) Eritrea,
(x) Saudi Arabia.3
Although Saudi Arabia is separated from Sudan by the Red
Sea, all of these countries are classified as Sudan's
immediate neighbors.
Sub-section (b): Sudan and the Middle East
(1) Algeria, (ii) Iran, (iii) Iraq, (iv) PLO,
(v) Tunisia, (vi) Yemen.4
The listed Countries and the PLO are covered on the basis
of being considered important in ternis of Sudan's
regional foreign relations.
(a) Sudan and its neighbors
(i) Egypt
Egypt, throughout history, has been the most important country to
Sudan. Egypt's geographical location, bounded by Sudan to the south,
and its high Muslim composition (more than 80% of the population are
Muslims) 5
 provided an important basis for the Egyptian-Sudanese rela-
tions. Since Sudan's independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium
in 1956, however, the relationship between Sudan and Egypt has not
improved very much. When al-Bashir came to power in 1989, there were
already some seeds of tension between the two countries. Egypt's
anti-Islamist position was one of them. After the assassination of
President Anwar Sadat ('Anwar al-Saadaat) by the Egyptian Islamists in
1981, the regime led by President Husni Mubarak (usnii Mubaarak) made
its anti-Islamist position clear.
	
Egypt's good relationship with
America was another seed of tension.	 In the 1980s, US aid became
essential to the Egyptian economy. 6	The border dispute over the
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Halaib (Halaayb) region which started in 1958 was another source of
tension. The protection E gyp t offered to Nimairi after April 1985 was
another - Niniairi antagonized the NIF during the final period of his
rule.
Sudan's efforts to expand its influence regionally between 1989
and 1993, seem to have resulted in increasing tension between Sudan
and Egypt. This tension can be seen in four aspects of the relation-
ship between the two countries - these are Egyptian concern over
Sudanese attempts to spread Islamism (Dr al-TurabPs influence on
Egyptian Islamists), the Southern issue (Egypt's influence on the
SPLA), the impact of the Gulf Crisis (Sudan's pro-Iraqi position dur-
ing the crisis), and the Halaib (Halaayb) issue (the border dispute).
The Egyptian regime had a strong concern over Sudanese attempts to
spread Islamism in Egypt. Dr al-Turabi's influence on Egyptian
Islamists who oppose the regime of President Mubarak appear to have
provoked the Egyptian president. President Mubarak often blamed Dr
al-Turabi for his influence on Egyptian Islainists. In August 1991,
for example, President Mubarak criticized Dr al-Turabi in the follow-
ing terms: 'The problem is Hassan, who is playing a very dangerous
game.' 8
 In September 1991, President Mubarak again accused Dr al-
Turabi of undermining the relationship between Egypt and Sudan.9
Around April 1992, President Mubarak publicly blamed Dr al-Turabi for
the problems in the relations between Egypt and Sudan.'°
In addition to this, the Egyptian government was accusing the
Sudanese government of not only supporting the Egyptian Islamists, but
also of sending Sudanese Islamists into Egypt. Sudan Update of 30
September 1992 reported that the Egyptian government feared that Egyp-
tian and Sudanese Islamists would establish de facto Islamic liberated
areas in Southern Egypt.11
Egypt's interference in Sudan's Southern issue (Egypt's influence
on the SPLA) was another source of tension. Egypt appears to have
tried to undermine the Sudanese Islamist regime by supporting the
SPLA. The Sudanese government, in any case, frequently accused Egypt
of helping the Sudanese rebels. For example, Sudan Update of 1 June
1990 reported that the Sudanese government accused the Egyptian
government of receiving a delegation from the SPLA-Mainstream.' 2 In
July 1990, Sudan Update reported John Garang as saying that President
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Nubarak ws a pragmatist and a likable person.' 3 Sudan Update of 30
September 1992 again reported that the Sudanese government had accused
the Egyptian government of helping Sudanese rebel activities in
Southern Sudan.'4
During the Gulf Crisis (started by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990), the tension between Egypt and Sudan became extremely
high. This high tension was mainly caused by the difference between
the political positions of the two countries towards Iraq (and
presumably America) - Sudan was pro-Iraq (and anti-America) and Egypt
was anti-Iraq (and pro-America).
A military threat was then raised from the Egyptian side. On 27
September 1990, President Mubarak warned Sudan that: 'Egypt would not
hesitate to take out any Iraqi missiles positioned in Sudan.'' 5
 This
statement was the reaction to the local media reports which said that
Sudan obtained missiles from Iraq in order to threaten the Aswan High
Dam.' 6
 Although Egyptian military invasion did not occur, the Second
Gulf War (January - February 1991) and the Somali operation (December
1992 - March 1995) made the Sudanese feel such an intervention more
realistic.
The Halaib (Halaayb) issue was the oldest source of tension
between Egypt and Sudan. The tension created in the other dimensions
discussed above seems to have fuelled the border dispute. In January
1992, Sudan gave a licence of oil exploration to a Canadian company in
the Halaib region, and this triggered off a new round of border dis-
putè.'
On 4 April 1992, a Sudanese police station in the Halaib region
was attacked by Egyptian military men and two Sudanese policemen were
killed.' 8 President Mubarak said in a message to Lt.Gen. al-Bashir
that it was an "individual and unintended incident." 9 Early in Sep-
tember 1992, an Egyptian army unit was sent into the Halaib region;
and this was considered as an annexation attempt. 2 °
 In December 1992,
the Sudanese Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Chairman of the UN
Security Council stating allegations against the Egyptian government
over the Halaib region. 2 '	 In response to the Sudanese action, the
Egyptian Foreign Minister said that:
'Egypt had not ceased to exercise its sovereignty since the
signing of the 1899 accord and affirmed that the current
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Egyptian [military] presence in the area north of the 22nd
parallel was to protect Egypt's borders against incursion,
particularly by terrorist groups whose activity has expanded
recently. '22
In January 1993, Professor Ahmad All Hakim ('Ahmad cA].i I-Iaakim),
said that historical evidence proved that Halaib was Sudanese and 'the
Egyptian government had previously approved the transfer of the admin-
istration of }talaib to Sudan.' 23 In addition to this, a Japanese
archaeological mission had carried out its research and pointed out
that: 'The prevailing Beja culture in Halaib confirms that the area
belongs to Sudan culturally.'24
The Guardian of 19 February 1993 reported that: 'In the last two
months, Egypt's military presence has grown to an estimated 2,000
men.' From 22 to 26 February 1993, the third session of the Egyptian-
Sudanese committee on the Halaib region was held in Khartoum. 25 In
June 1993, the Sudanese government demanded the withdrawal of the
Egyptian military forces from the Halaib region before the Organiza-
tion of African Unity Summit Conference which was going to be held on
28 June.26
At the end of 1993, the border dispute was still continuing.
Egypt's growing military presence in the Halaib region and the mili-
tary threat raised by Egypt during the Gulf Crisis seem to have
created a great threat to the Sudanese regime. Table 8.l.(1) is
intended to show the military balance between Egypt and Sudan. The
gap between the military equipment of Sudan and Egypt is obvious. The
military balance suggests- that Sudan would have little chance in
defeating Egypt in a conventional battle.
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Table 8.l.(l): Military balance between Sudan and Egypt (1993-94)
	
Sudan	 Egypt
Total Armed Forces (active) 	 72,800	 430,000
Army
Main Battle Tanks (NBT)	 250	 3,167
700 M-60A1
20 M-60A3	 747 M-60A3
80 M1A1
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL) 	 100	 275
Air Force
Combat Aircraft	 51	 546
8 MiG-2l 100 MiG-21
3 MiG-23 110 F-16A,C
Armed Helicopters	 2	 74
M-60A1, M-60A3, M1A1	 = types of tanks
Mig-21, Mig-23, F-16A,C = types of aircraft
Source: The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's,
1993), Pp. 113-115 and 129.
(ii) Libya
Libya's geographical position, bordered to the south-east by Sudan,
and its mostly Muslim population (most of them are Sunni Muslims)27
provided an important basis for Libyan-Sudanese relations. The
political position of Libya led by Colonel Muainmar Qadhafi (Mucaimnar
al-Qadhdhaafii) was more or less sympathetic towards the Islamist
movement led by Dr al-Turabi, on the grounds that both sides were
anti-American when al-Bashir came to power. Libya supported the 1976
armed operation organized by the Sudanese opposition (including the
Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi) against the Nimairi regime
which was seen as being pro-American. In the l980s, the US already
regarded Libya as one of the states which supported international ter-
rorism. 28 The US increased its pressure on Libya and imposed an eco-
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nomic embargo in 1986. 29 Thus, there was the foundation for a good
relationship between Libya and Sudan.
The Sudanese-Libyan relationship, between 1989 and 1993, can be
divided into two phases: initial enthusiasm for Sudanese-Libyan
integration, followed by a subsequent cooling down of that enthusiasm
after mid-1992. The latter seems to have stemmed from Libyan skep-
ticism about Sudan's expansionist policy and Dr al-Turabi's real
intention behind the integration.
The enthusiasm for the Sudanese-Libyan integration can be traced
back to about a month after Omar al-Bashir's coup. The dialogue about
the future co-operation between the two countries was reported in
early August 1989.° The integration process between the two
countries officially started seven months later. In March 1990, Cal.
Qadhafi and Lt.Gen. al-Bashir signed a declaration of integration
between Libya and Sudan - the declaration envisaged the integration of
the two countries' political, economic, defence, social, and foreign
policies. 3 ' On 1 September 1990, another step towards Sudanese-Libyan
integration was made. Libya and Sudan reached an agreement on forming
a general secretariat for the integration. 32 The following day, on 2
September, an agreement on security cooperation was reached. 33 On 20
October 1990, Qadhafi arrived in Sudan to address the concluding ses-
sion of the National Dialogue Conference which adopted the Libyan-
style political system. 34 In early March 1991, the Sudanese Minister
of Justice announced that an agreement on judicial integration between
the" two states had been concluded in Tripoli. 35 In November 1991, the
Secretary-General of the Sudanese-Libyan integration committee
announced that the integration process was moving ahead steadily as
planned. 36	He also confirmed that Libya was supplying Sudan with
approximately 6,100 tonnes of oil products monthly. 37 In February
1992, the Libyan Secretary for the Sudanese-Libyan Integration Affairs
told a Sudanese media delegation in Tripoli that:
'We have two options: either integration for economic pro-
gress, or to remain weak and backward. ... The integration
process is proceeding through three main channels. The first
is political, the second is economic and the third is legal.
The volume of trade between the two countries has
increased enormously. Libyan exports to Sudan over the last
ten months have amounted to US$ 45 million in the private
sector alone despite the existence of transportation diffi-
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culties. ... Libya had received various Sudanese products
notably sesame, sugar, meat, gum arabic and fodder.'38
Despite the initial enthusiasm for the Sudanese-Libyan integra-
tion, from mid-1992 until the end of 1993 there was little evidence of
progress in the integration project. 39 The cooling down of the
enthusiasm seems to have started from the Libyan side and stemmed from
Libyan skepticism about Sudanese intentions. Sudanese intentions over
integration were initially seen as economic, i.e. to ease Sudants
desperate economic situation, gaining cash, food and oil from Libya.40
However, the Libyans later suspected that the real intentions of the
Sudanese government were of an Islamist nature.
The Libyans feared that if the integration went ahead, Libya would
be controlled by the Sudanese Islamists. The Libyan government was
basically secularist and the Libyans were not keen on creating an
Islamic state like Sudan. This was apparent in the following reports.
Around mid-1991, it was reported that Col. Qadhafi had accused Dr al-
Turabi of destabilizing Libya by sending trained Islamist fighters.41
In late 1991, there was speculation about Lt.Gen. al-Bashir's visit to
Libya - it was said that al-Bashir went there to apologise to Col.
Qadhafi for Dr al-Turabi's speech (see note).42
The relationship between Sudan and Libya from 1989 up to the end
of 1993, as a whole, was relatively good. Sudan maintained its full
support for Libya and opposed UN sanctions against Libya. In December
1993, the Second PAIC adopted a resolution on Libya as follows:
'The conference declared its support for Libya, following
multi-faceted attacks on her sovereignty, and urged Arab and
Islamic countries to ignore the embargo imposed on the
country. '3
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(iii) Chad44
Chad, bordered to the east by Sudan, has a population of which almost
50% are Muslims who live in the north, about 7% who are Christians,
and most of the remainder hold animistic beliefs. 45 By 1989, the
political position of Chad led by President Hissene Habre was anti-
Libya and pro-America, while that of the Sudanese Islamists was pro-
Libya and anti-America. In the late 1980s, there was fighting between
Libya and Chad, and the US supported the latter. 46 Since Sudan shares
a long common border with Chad, Chad's political position constituted
a potential threat to the Islamist Sudan. In addition to this, there
were many Muslims in Chad whom Sudan could influence. Therefore,
there existed the foundation for a bad relationship between Chad and
Sudan.
Sudan's efforts to create a more pro-Sudanese regime in Chad after
1989, created tension between Habre's regime and al-Bashir's Islamist
regime. By the late 1990, the relationship between the two
governments deteriorated. In December 1990, however, the Habre regime
collapsed and a pro-Sudanese government was established. After
December 1990, therefore, the relationship between the new Chadian
government and the Sudanese government improved.
In late 1989, for example, the Habre government accused the
Sudanese and Libyan governments of supporting the Chadian opposi-
tioi It is said that the Chadian opposition was fighting with some
Libyan forces, the so-called "Islamic Legion", against the Chadian
government forces inside Sudanese territory, in Darfur region. 48 On
the other hand, Sudan accused Chad of supporting the SPLA.49
Sudan's efforts, however, seem to have finally resulted in the
overthrow of the Habre regime and in the establishment of a pro-
Sudanese regime. By the end of November 1990, the Chadian government
forces were defeated by the Patriotic Salvation Movement, the Chadian
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opposition, and on 1 December 1990, Chad's President, Hissene Habre,
fled to Cameroon. 5 ° In late December 1990, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir visited
Ndjamena, the Chadian capital, and was reported as saying that Sudan
would give all possible assistance to the new government under Presi-
dent Idriss Deby. 5 ' Between December 1990 and December 1993, the
relationship between Chad and Sudan was relatively good and friendly.
(iv) CAR52
The Central African Republic (CAR), bounded by Sudan to the east, has
a population of which about one-third are Christians and the remainder
hold animist beliefs 53 - there is no report of a Muslim community
which the Sudanese Islamists could influence. When al-Bashir came to
power in 1989, the CAR had strong ties with France (the former
colonial power), but not with the US. At that time, there was no
specific foundation for tension between the CAR and Sudan.
Between 1989 and 1993, the CAR's political position towards the
Sudanese Islamist government was not hostile. This was perhaps in
part due to the non existence of a Muslim community in the CAR which
Sudan could influence. During the period, there was little news of
tension between Sudan and the CAR, and the relationship between the
two countries was relatively good.
(v) Zaire54
Zaire, bordered by Sudan to the north, has a population which mainly
follow traditional African beliefs 55 with small groups of Christians
and Muslims. 56 The political position of the Zairian regime led by
Mobutu Sese Seko seems to have been affected by some Western powers,
such as the US, France, and Belgium. After 1986, there was growing
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international pressure on the Mobutu regime concerning the violation
of human rights. 57 In June 1989, Mobutu visited the US and returned
with a loan of US$20 million from the World Bank. 58 There is some
evidence, therefore, that when al-Bashir came to power in Sudan,
Mobutu was able to take advantage of the situation and improve rela-
tions with the US.
During the period from 1989 to 1993, although the Sudanese
Islamist government pointed out some connection between the Zairean
government and the SPLA in 1990, the stance of Zaire was relatively
neutral. The Zairean regime seems not to have seriously contacted the
SPLA. The Sudanese government appears also not to have seriously con-
ducted its expansionist policy towards Zaire. Perhaps for these
reasons, the relationship between Sudan and Zaire, between 1989 and
the end of 1993, was relatively good.
(vi) Uganda6°
Uganda, bordered by Sudan to the north, has a population of which more
than 60% are Christian with a small Muslim minority. 6 ' The political
position of the Ugandan regime led by Yoweri Nuseveni was marked by
its strong support for the SPLA. It was reported that the Ugandan
government and the SPLA had reached an agreement on the secret mili-
tary cooperation on 29 March 1989.62 Thus, when al-Bashir came to
pow'r in Sudan in June 1989, there was a foundation for tension
between Uganda and Sudan.
Between 1989 and the end of 1993, the relationship between Sudan
and Uganda was very bad. While the Sudanese government frequently
accused the Ugandan government of supporting the SPLA, the Ugandan
government criticized the Sudanese counterpart for spreading Islamism
into Uganda. Despite the official agreement of non-interference
reached by April 1990, 63 the governments of Uganda and Sudan both seem
to have been secretly supporting each other's opposition.
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Sudan's accusation against Uganda of supporting the SPLA, for
example, appeared in August 1992. According to Sudanese military
sources, the Ugandan government helped Garang who was supervising the
operations of his SPLA faction from Uganda. 64
 In October 1992, Uganda
was reported as denying Sudanese allegations that Uganda had sent its
soldiers to the border in order to support the SPLA. 65 In addition to
this, it was reported in February 1993 that Uganda was continuing to
supply arms and ammunitions to Garang's SPLA. 66 In August 1993, The
Guardian also reported Uganda's supply to the SPLA. 67 On the other
hand, Afr.ica Confidential of 26 October 1990 pointed out that the
Sudanese government was arming the Ugandan opposition, the Uganda
People's Democratic Army (UPDA: not Islamic), in the North of
Uganda 68
Uganda's accusation against Sudan, on the other hand, was mainly
related to the Islamist dimension. During that period, the Ugandan
regime was strongly concerned with the Islamist activities in the
Ugandan territory. In July 1990, Radio SPLA reported that the Ugandan
government accused a number of Sudanese Islamists, who were working
with the Islamic Dawa (Dacwa) Organization 69 in Uganda, of interfering
in Ugandan internal affairs. 70 These individuals were expelled. 71
 In
February 1993, it was reported that Uganda had sought support from the
West to prevent "Eastern Black Africa" from been conquered by Islam.72
However, because Uganda's efforts had gained little result, President
Museveni decided to negotiate directly with the Sudanese government,
even"
 offering assistance to the negotiations between the Sudanese
government and Garang's SPLA faction.73
(vii) Kenya74
Kenya is bordered by Sudan to the north, and most of the Kenyan popu-
lation follow traditional African beliefs, though there is a sig-
nificant Christian community and a smaller Muslims community. 75
 The
political position of the Kenyan regime led by Daniel Arap Moi towards
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Sudan seems to have been affected by the regime's bad relations with
other neighbours. In the late 1980s, Kenya had problems with Ethiopia
and Uganda76
 - both countries share longer borders than Sudan. When
al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, Kenya had too many problems else-
where to be able to support the SPLA positively.
Between 1989 and 1993, there was tension between Sudan and Kenya.
The Sudanese government accused the Kenyan government of supporting
the SPLA, 7
 while the Kenyan government accused Sudan of supporting
the Keriyan Islamic Party and of spreading Islam in Kenya and eastern
Africa. 78
 Despite each other's accusations, the tension between the
two countries remained at a relatively low level. In addition to
this, Kenya appears to have been more interested in the role of media-
tion between the Sudanese government and the SPLA.
The relatively low tension between the two countries seems to have
stemmed from the relatively low level of interference of the two
governments towards each other's opposition - especially from the
Kenyan side. In June 1991, it was reported that Kenya was taking a
strictly neutral stand in terms of the Sudanese civil war. 79 On 23
March 1992, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir announced that the Kenyan President,
Daniel Arap Moi, had agreed to a non-aggression pact when the Kenyan
President visited Khartoum on 20 March.8°
Meanwhile, Kenya showed interest in mediating in the conflict
between the Sudanese government and the SPLA. On 13 June 1990, the
Sudanese ambassador to Zimbabwe was reported as saying that Kenya and
Nigeria had shown their interest in mediating in the conflict between
the Sudanese government and the SPLA. 81 In March 1993, the Speaker of
the Sudanese Transitional National Assembly (TNA) thanked Kenya's
President Daniel Arap Mo! and two other presidents, Nigeria's Presi-
dent Ibrahim Babangida and Uganda's President Museveni, for their role
in the peace efforts between the Sudanese government and the rebels.82
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(viii) Ethiopia83
Ethiopia, bordered by Sudan to the west, has a population of which
great majority are Christians (Ethiopian Orthodox) and small minori-
ties are Muslims and followers of animist beliefs. 84 In the 1980s,
the pro-Soviet Mengistu government was fighting against its rebel
forces, such as the Eritrean Poeple's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the
Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF). While the Mengistu government
was supporting the Sudanese rebels (the SPLA), the successive Sudanese
governments had been supporting the Ethiopian opposition (including
the EPLF and TPLF) since 1984. 85 Thus, when al-Bashir came to power
in Sudan in 1989, there was already high tension between Ethiopia and
Sudan.
The Ethiopian-Sudanese relationship, between 1989 and 1993, can be
divided into two phases: the first phase, from 1989 until the fall of
President Mengistu's government in May 1991, in which the relationship
between Sudan and Ethiopia deteriorated; and the second phase, from
Nay 1991 to the end of 1993, in which the relationship improved.
In the first phase, both governments were supporting each other's
opposition. 86 In October 1989, Sudan accused Ethiopia of supporting
the SPLA, when the SPLA captured the town of Kurmuk (Kurmuk) on the
Ethiopian border. 87 However, in May 1991, President Mengistu fled to
Zimbabwe and his government collapsed. 88 As a result, the SPLA lost
its main supply source. 89 The Daily Telegraph of 30 May 1991 reported
tha Lt.Gen. al-Bashir congratulated the leaders of the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) on their victory over Nengistu.9°
In the second phase, between May 1991 and December 1993, Sudanese-
Ethiopian relations improved. In June 1991, the leader of the EPRDF,
Ata Meles Zenawi, became the interim president of Ethiopia. 9 ' After a
three-year long suspension of services, on 9 November 1992, the air-
contacts between Sudan and Ethiopia were reopened as a sign of the
improvement of relations. 92 To the researcher's knowledge, the rela-
tionship between the two countries, from 1992 up to the end of 1993,
was friendly.
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(ix) Eritrea93
Eritrea, bounded to the north-west by Sudan, has a population of which
the bulk are Christians or Muslims and the remainder are followers of
the traditional African religions. 94 Until Eritrea's independence in
May 1993, this region was part of Ethiopia. Therefore, the relation-
ship between Eritrea and Sudan here means the relationship between the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF: including both Christians
and Muslims) 95
 and Sudan. At the time of the late 1980s, the EPLF was
fighting against the pro-Soviet Nengistu government and backed by suc-
cessive Sudanese governments. 96	According to Sudanow, 'Sudan has
hosted Eritrean liberation movements since l984.' When al-Bashir
came to power in Sudan, therefore, the foundation was there for a good
relationship between the EPLF and Sudan.
From 1989 up to Eritrea's independence in Nay 1993, the relation-
ship between the EPLF and the Sudanese Islamist regime was very good.
After Eritrea's independence, however, the Eritrean-Sudanese relation-
ship deteriorated. Eritrea's fear of the Sudan's influence on the
Erjtrean Islamists was the main cause of the deterioration.
The initial good relationship between the EPLF and Sudan stemmed
mainly from Sudan's continuous support of the EPLF and its cause.
Sudanow, the Khartoum-based monthly magazine (practically controlled
by the Islamist government), pointed out that: 'President Isias
Afwerki is well aware of the role played by the present Sudanese
government in bringing him to power.' 98 Between 1989 and 1993, there
were some events which provided evidence of this good relationship.
For example, in early January 1992, joint military maneuvers between
the Eritrean and Sudanese navies were held in the Red Sea. 99 On 10
January 1992, Dr al-Turabi arrived at Asmara and was welcomed by the
Eritran radio as a friend of the Eritrean revolution and people.'°°
Dr al-Turabi was officially received by the secretary to the general
secretariat of the Eritrean interim government.101
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Between 23 and 25 April 1993, the UN-supervised referendum on
independence was held and the Eritrean people chose national independ-
ence.'° 2 Sudan Focus stated that while Egypt was against the inde-
pendence of Eritrea, Sudan strongly supported it. 1 0 3
 24 May was
chosen as the independence day and Eritrea joined the UN on 28 May
1993. 104 Lt.Gen. al-Bashir and a high delegation from Sudan took part
in the celebratIon of the Eritrean independence.'05
After Eritrean independence, however, the Eritrean president,
Isiyas Afwerki, turned his back on Sudan. This seems to have stemmed
from Afwerki's fear of Sudan's influence on the Eritrean Islamists.
In December 1993, President Afwerki, accused the Sudanese government
and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi of supporting an
Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean Jihad, in military training
and cross-border military attacks. 106 Although Sudan refuted the
Eritrean accusation, this row seems to have become the turning point
of the relations between the two countries. It was clear that the
Sudanese government was upset about Eritrea's antagonistic attitude
towards Sudan which helped Eritrea's independence. The relationship
between Sudan and Eritrea became very bad. Sudan Focus pointed out
President Afwerki's concern about the Islainist element in Eritrea as
follows:
'President Afwerki is doubtless aware of the impact of Islam
on his country's politics. Ever since his days as a freedom
fighter with the EPLF, the front - despite its notable Muslim
\ contingent - has been viewed with suspicion by many within
the Eritrean Muslim community. Indeed this even led to fre-
quent inter-fighting btween the EPLF and the Eritrean Jihad
during the liberation war. While the Muslim population in
Eritrea is believed to outnumber other communities there,
president Afwerki is criticised by his Muslim opponents for
knowingly forming a Tigre (predominantly Christians)
dominated government. '107
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(x) Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's geographical position, facing Sudan across the Red Sea,
and its exclusively Muslim composition (about 85% of the population
are Sunni Muslims and about 15% are Shia Muslims), 108
 provided an
important basis for Saudi-Sudanese relations. In June 1982, Fand ibn
Abd al-Aziz (Fand ibn CAbd al_cAziiz) became the king of Saudi
Arabia. 109
 Despite Saudi Arabia's strong Islamic tradition, the Saudi
government's anti-Islamist and pro-American position became clear in
the 1980s. During the Iran-Iraq war, mainly because of the regime's
fear of the spread of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the Saudi
government backed Iraq together with the US."° When al-Bashir came
to power in Sudan in 1989, therefore, there was a potential tension
between Saudi Arabia and Sudan.
Before the Gulf Crisis, started by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990, the tension between the Sudanese Islamist government and
the Saudi government was relatively low. After August 1990, however,
the relationship between Sudan and Saudi Arabia deteriorated. Sudan's
opposition to the Western interference in the Gulf Crisis, which
caused Sudan's pro-Iraqi stance, and Dr al-Turabi's influence on the
Saudi Islamists who also opposed the Western interference, seemed to
be the main causes.
In August 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi
attitude - clearly in favour of the Americans - provoked anti-Saudi
sent'Iment among the Sudanese Islamists. It was reported that anti-
Saudi demonstrations took place in Khartoum, which caused considerable
damage to the premises of the Saudi embassy, with demonstrators shout-
ing anti-American, anti-Egyptian and anti-Saudi slogans. 11 ' On 6 Sep-
tember 1990, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir made the position of Sudan on the Gulf
Crisis clear: (1) The problems between Muslim countries should be
solved among the Muslim countries; (2) The problems should be solved
through dialogue." 2
 In the same month, Dr al-Turabi, was reported as
having visited Saudi Arabia in secret." 3
 This was seen as Dr al-
Turabi's attempt to stop Western interference, but failed. Sudan's
pro-Iraqi position resulted in the losses of foreign aid. In October
1990, it was reported that Sudan's losses, because of the Gulf Crisis,
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were more than 1.7 billion Us dollars and Sudan had become one of the
ten states most affected by the crisis.'"
The Second Gulf War occurred between January and February 1991,
and the Iraqi forces were defeated by the US-led forces. The war
raised strong anti-Western (particularly anti-US) sentiment among the
Islamists around the world. Dr al-Turabi took advantage of this
sentiment and held the First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference
(PAIC) in Khartoum in April 1991. The conference strongly criticized
the Western interference in the Arab and Islamic affairs.
It was evident that the Saudi monarch was increasingly concerned
about Sudan's influence on the Saudi Islamists and the growing
Islamist activities both inside and outside the kingdom. Dr al-
Turabi's account suggested his strong influence on the Saudi Islamists
(see Section 8.2). In June 1991, a number of Sudanese Islamists were
reported to have been expelled from Saudi Arabia." Middle East
International of 11 June 1993 reported that the Saudi King made his
strongest speech yet against Islamist terrorism at the id (cud)
speech."6
After the war, the Saudi Islamists, who were opposing the Saudi
government, apparently become more active. In May 1993, the Committee
for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) was set up in Riyadh by a
group of Saudi notables who were known Islamists, but promptly banned
by the Saudi authorities." 7
 According to The Economist, the aim of
the CDLR was 'to act as an independent human-rights commission and,
mor important, to enforce what the founders saw as declining Islamic
standards in the wake of the Gulf war."8
Meanwhile, the Saudi government seems to have also supported the
Sudanese rebels in order to undermine the Sudanese Islamist
government. In October 1990, the Sudanese government accused the
Saudi government of receiving a number of Sudanese rebel leaders and
of granting them a large amount of financial support.' 19
 In late May
1992, al-Bashir accused Saudi Arabia of assisting the rebel SPLA.12o
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(b) Sudan and the Middle East
(1) Algeria
Algeria has a mostly Muslim population, 1 2i.
 which provides a strong
incentive for the Sudanese Islamists to approach. In the late 1980s,
the anti-Islamist position of the Algerian regime led by Chadli Bend-
jedid (aajiilii bin Jadiid) was clear. 122
 In 1987 and 1988, clashes
between Algerian Islamists and the security forces were reported.'23
In the opposition, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist
movement, was one of the most powerful groups. When al-Bashir came to
power in Sudan, therefore, there was a foundation for tension between
the Algerian regime and the Sudanese regime in terms of Islamism.
Between 1989 and 1993, there was evidence of a strong link between
the Sudanese Islamists and the Algerian Islamists. This link was
tolerated by the Algerian regime for the first several years, but
eventually raised tension between the Algerian government and its
Sudanese Islamist counterpart, especially after 1992.
The Islamist link between Algeria and Sudan was apparent in a num-
ber of reports produced during the period. For example, in April
1991, it was reported that an Algerian Islamist took part in the First
Popular Arab and Islamic Conference held in Khartoum.' 24
 On 5 January
1992, Sunday Telegraph reported that: 'A sum of $12 million donated by
both' Iran and rich Gulf-based Islamic businessmen has been deposited
in the Faisal Islamic Bank in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to help
the FIS." 25
 Between 2 and 4 December 1993, the Second PAIC was held
in Khartoum and a delegation from the FIS was reported to have parti-
cipated the conference.'26
The Algerian regime's crackdown on the Islamists started in 1991,
when the regime was making a commitment to the parliamentary elections
which were actually the first free elections in the Arab world -
except for some cases in Lebanon. 127
 The Islamists were taking part
in the elections, and in December 1991, the FIS had won the first
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round.' 28 Fearing the high probability of the Islamists' victory in
the second round of elections which were due to be held on 16 January
1992, the Algerian army moved in on 11 January 1992, and next day, the
second round of elections were cancelled. 129
 The FIS was banned and
thousands of its members were put in jail. 1 The Economist reported
that most of the Algerian Military and middle-class people regarded
the FIS as a plague to be eliminated.'3'
The Algerian government started to accuse Sudan of supporting the
Algerian Islamists after the cancellation of the elections in January
1992. In March 1993, the Algerian government recalled its ambassador
from Khartoum accusing Sudan of supportIng the Algerian Islamists
together with Iran.' 32 Between 1992 and 1993, the relationship
between the Sudanese government and the Algerian government was basi-
cally not very good.
The French government, which had strong interests in Algeria,
however, had noticed that Dr al-Turabi's influence over the Algerian
Islamists could be utilized in order to calm the situation in which
the fighting between the Algerian security forces and the Algerian
Islamists was escalating. This seems to have resulted in the Second
PAIC's resolution on Algeria which called for a dialogue in Algeria
between the Islamist groups and other political groups.' 33
 To the
researcher's knowledge, however, this did not actually improve the
situation in Algeria during the period - but it did improve the rela-
tions between Sudan and France, especially in 1994.134
(ii) Iran
Iran has a population of which the great majority are shia Muslims,
the large minority are Sunni Muslims, and the smaller minorities are
Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians.' 35
 The political position of the
Iranian regime in 1989 was pro-Islamist, anti-America, and anti-
Iraq.' 36 Iran became an Islamic state by a popular Islamic revolution
in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the US supported Iraq
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in order to stop the spread of the Iranian Islamic revolution to the
Gulf region. According to Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, of all Arab
countries Syria alone supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.137
However, Sudan led by Sadiq al-Mandi seems to have been sympathetic
towards Iran during the war. This comes across in the following
report. In early September 1989, an Iranian daily newspaper pointed
out that: 'Sadiq al-Mandi had invested in a policy of cordiality with
the Islamic Republic, and could never bring himself to do anything by
way of appealing to the US, Iraq, and the reactionary regimes in the
region'. 138 When al-Bashir came to power, therefore, there was the
foundation for a good relationship between Iran and Sudan.
Contrary to expectations, the relationship between Iran and Sudan
from 1989 to 1993 was relatively cool (also see Dr al-Turabi's account
in Section 8.2). This was apparent in the 1989-90 period in which
Iran and Sudan quarrelled, and in 1993 when Sudan experienced serious
oil shortages. Sudan tried to improve the relations with Iran, par-
ticularly during the period between 1990 and 1992, and succeeded to
some extent, but the relatively cool relations remained. Despite
this, allegations of the strong link between the Iranian Islamists and
the Sudanese Islamist were sometimes reported
The initial quarrel and rather cool relations between Iran and
Sudan, between 1989 and mid-1990, seemed to have stemmed mainly from
Iran's misunderstanding of the nature of the new Sudanese regime.
Iran appears to have thought that the position of al-Bashir's regime
was nti-Islamist - Dr al-Turabi and other leading Islamists had been
arrested at that time (the researcher believes this arrest was a
sham). In August 1989, a commentary on Iranian television criticized
the goals of al-Bashir's new government, saying that they were
"ambiguous".' 39
 In protest to this commentary, on 27 August 1989, the
Sudanese Information Ninister announced that Sudan recalled its ambas-
sador to Iran.' 4 ° In early September 1989, an Iranian daily newspaper
criticized al-Bashir for visiting Iraq (August 1989) 141 in order to
please Saddam Husain's Iraqi regime.' 42 On 25 April 1990, the Iranian
radio criticized al-Bashir for resorting to suppressive measures to
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control Sudan, concerning the coup attempt which took place in Sudan
in March.'43
Due to Sudan's efforts, the relationship between the two countries
improved a little. It came after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August
1990. The pro-Iraq stance of Sudan resulted in Sudan's financial dif-
ficulties and this might be one of the reasons why Sudan started to
woo Iran. In late September 1990, it was reported that Sudan was
totally dependent on Iran, Iraq and Libya for its necessary money and
j•44 In October 1990, a member of the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil (RCC), Col. Sulayman (Sulaymaan), said in Iran that: 'We recognise
the Islamic republic of Iran as the hope of the Islamic uznzva and the
leading force in achieving victory for the oppressed forces." 45
 In
December 1990, it was reported that the Chairman of the RCC, Lt.Gn.
al-Bashir, visited Iran and expressed his government's intention to
use Iran's experience in Islamization as source of inspiration.'46
Both of the statements by Sulaynian in October 1990, and al-Bashir in
December 1990 sounded flattering, but it appeared that Sudan's wooing
Iran gained some positive results, which followed from 1991 as finan-
cial and trade agreements. On 13 December 1991, the Iranian Presi-
dent, Au Hashemi Rafsanjani, arrived in Khartoum heading a large
delegation of 157, 80 of whom were military and intelligence person-
nel.' 47	On this occasion, Iran agreed to a loan of 250 million US
dollars for Sudan to buy arms from China.' 48
 On 15 January 1992,
Teheran Radio reported that, as part of a trade package, 100,000
tonns of oil would be exported to Sudan on a monthly basis.'49
The seemingly good relations between the two countries from 1990
to 1992, appears to have provoked the worry of Western and pro-Western
countries, and have raised speculation about the strong relations
between Sudan and Iran. There was a tendency for Western and pro-
Western countries to link Iran with anything against their interests,
including terroristic activities occurred in those countries. In
March 1992, the Sudanese opposition in Cairo accused Iran of sending
its troops to assist the Sudanese government.' 50
 On 10 October 1993,
Sunday Telegraph reported an allegation that Iranians were training
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Somalis in Sudan. 1 51
 On 14 October 1993, A1-Hayat reported an allega-
tion made by a London-based institute that Iran had transferred a huge
amount of money through Dr al-Turabi to finance Islamist activities
around the world.152
Despite the strong speculation and expectation of the observers,
the relationship between the two countries seems not to have improved
beyond more than a pragmatic level. This was apparent in the follow-
ing reports. In March 1993, it was reported that because of the
serious oil shortages a number of Sudanese officials visited Iran
seeking for Iran's help, but the negotiations had collapsed and Sudan
could not receive anything.' 53
 Iran demanded that a European country
should be the guarantor of the payment for the Iranian oil.' 54
 This
suggested that Iran was quite pragmatic and was not keen on helping
another Islamic state at its own expense. To quote The EIU Country
Report:
'Tehran's pragmatic faction, led by Au Akbar Hashemi Rafsan-
jani, the Iranian president, appears to want to distance
itself from an almost universally-reviled regime, and, in
turn, gradually reverse its own international isolation.
Khartoum's efforts towards closer ties with Iran, far from
being ideological in nature, are largely economic. Its main
hope is a restoration of oil supplies from Iran, which have
dried up since January [1993), reportedly because Tehran is
demanding advance payment before any further oil supplies are
released to Khartoum."55
(iii) Iraq	 -
Iraq has a large Muslim population (about 95% of total) of which more
than half belong to the Shia sect.' 56 Despite the high Muslim com-
position, the Iraqi regime led by President Saddam Husain (Saddaam
Husayn) was basically pursuing a secular line of policy. In 1989, the
political position of the regime was in short anti-Iran, pro-America,
and anti-Islamist. This position mainly stemmed from the war with
Iran. Iraq was backed by the US and many other countries, and fought
to undermine the Islamic state, Iran. As mentioned in the section of
Iran, Sudan led by Sadiq al-Nandi (before al-Bashir came to power)
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seems to have been sympathetic towards Iran. When al-Bashir Caine to
power, therefore, there was a potential for tension between Iraq and
Sudan.
Despite the potential tension, Sudanese-Iraqi relations between
1989 and 1993 were good. This was attributable to two different
strategies pursued by the Sudanese government. The first strategy,
adopted between 1989 and 1990, involved an attempt to improve rela-
tions with Iraq in order to obtain some financial and military support
from Iraq. Unfortunately, this strategy did not work properly because
of the Gulf Crisis started by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990, and the Iraqi defeat in the Second Gulf War. The Sudanese
Islamist regime, therefore, initiated a second strategy of Islamist
expansion during the Gulf Crisis, taking advantage of the Islamists'
opposition to Western interference in the Gulf. Sudanese policies
towards Iraq after the Gulf Crisis were clearly put more emphasis on
the Islamist basis than on gaining financial and military support from
the outside world, in so far as on the latter grounds they would have
sided with the UN in the Second Gulf War.
Sudan's first strategy involved its attempts to improve relations
with Iraq for the purpose of obtaining some financial and military
support from Iraq. There was little doubt that Sudan saw Iraq as a
great Arab power in the region. Sudan's attempts to improve relations
with Iraq come across in the following report. In August 1989, before
his visit to Iraq Lt.Gen. al-Bashir made a statement that the previous
Sadi al-Mandi government's attitude towards Iraq was wrong and the
relationship between Sudan and Arab countries was miss-evaluated.157
The first strategy was interrupted because of the outbreak of the
Gulf Crisis.	 On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Gulf
Crisis began. On the same day, the UN Security Council passed a
resolution which demanded the iuunediate and unconditional withdrawal
of the Iraqi troops. 158
 On 6 August 1990, the UN Security Council
imposed the toughest sanctions in its history on Iraq.' 59
 On 8 August
1990, President Saddam Hussein announced the annexation of Kuwait.160
On the same day, President Bush warned Hussein that there would be war
if Hussein crossed the line which had been drawn in the sand by the
first US troops who had arrived in Saudi Arabia.161
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As the Western pressure on Iraq increased, the Sudanese Islamist
regime started to adopt the second strategy of Islamist expansion,
taking advantage of the Islamists' opposition to Western interference
in the Gulf. Firstly Sudan made its pro-Iraqi position clear, On 4
August 1990, in the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) (Dr al-
Turabi is anti-ICO, see note) ,162 Sudan, together with Jordan,
Mauritania, Yemen and the PLO abstained from voting in a resolution
condemning Iraq and calling for an immediate withdrawal of Iraq's
forces - Libya and Djibouti did not participate in the vote. 163
 In
addition to this, on 6 September 1990, the Sudanese government made
its position towards the Gulf Crisis clear. To quote Sudanow:
'We believe that the safety and security of the two holy
shrines and the surrounding areas as well as other sites of
Islam are among our fundamental responsibilities. ... we
stand against the foreign armies' presence to protect the
Islamic holy lands. ... We insisted that dialogue within
the Arab world should be adopted as the basis for solving the
problem, which results from differences between the members
of the same family. We were encouraged and supported in our
efforts to halt the escalation towards war and to hold
negotiations. ... We believe in the possibility of reaching
a solution to the differences which have arisen among our
brothers in the Gulf.t164
The Sudanese advocated the two points: (1) The problems between Muslim
countries should be solved among the Muslim countries and (2) The
problems should be solved through dialogue.
Despite Sudan's efforts, the Gulf Crisis moved towards a war. On
29 N' vember 1990, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force
to liberate Kuwait if Hussein did not withdraw by 15 January 1991.165
In the early morning of 17 January 1991, the US-led UN forces attacked
Iraqi targets by air and the Second Gulf War started. 166
 On the same
day, the Sudanese government issued a statement saying that: 'Although
Sudan rejected the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, ... the concentration
of foreign troops was part of a policy of imposing "hegemony to
safeguard foreign interests and to ensure Israeli military supe-
riority".' 167
 On 24 February 1991, ground operations began, and the
next day, the Iraqi troops started to withdraw from Kuwait. 168 On 27
February 1991, President Bush declared the liberation of Kuwait and
the defeat of Iraq.' 69 It was believed that the Americans had taken
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advantage of the war in order to reduce Iraqi military capability
which had become a great threat to the national interest of the US.
Meanwhile, the Sudanese Islamists were attempting to create their
own international Islamist movement covering the whole world (the
strategy of Islamist expansion - a step towards the creation of the
uinzna), criticizing the ICO as un-Islamic. This resulted in the open-
ing of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) organized by Dr
al-Turabi (see Section 8.l.2.(3)). Between 25 and 28 April 1991, Dr
al-Turabi convened the First PAIC in Khartoum. In early December
1993, the Second PAIC was held and a resolution was passed concerning
Iraq. To quote a summary of the resolution:
'The conference commended the steadfastness of the Iraqi
people in the face of the allied embargo, condemned the
aggression inflicted on Iraq by the ex-colonial powers, and
called for the formation of a delegation to prove avenues of
reconciliation between Iraq and Iran.'17°
The Islamist regime seems to have put more emphasis on the
Islamist basis than on gaining financial and military support from the
outside world. This is apparent in the fact that the Sudanese
government did not change its pro-Iraqi position, despite the huge
losses stemming from its position - Sudan suffered from severe eco-
nomic and political difficulties. It was reported in late September
1990 that:
'The regime's decision to side with Iraq ignores the fact
that over the past twenty years or so, over 50% of Sudants
foreign aid came from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and a further
large percentage fromThther Gulf States linked with Kuwait
through the Gulf Cooperation Council. Sudan is now totally
dependent for financial assistance and oil from Iraq, Iran
and Libya.''71
On 22 October 1990, Sudan's losses as a result of the Gulf Crisis were
reported to reach more than 1.7 billion US dollars.' 72 Sudan was
classified as one of the most affected countries, according to the
report. On 12 November 1990, it was reported that at least 27,000
Sudanese working in Iraq and Kuwait had returned home and about
150,000 more were expected to follow as the result of the Gulf
Crisis 173
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(iv) PLO
Most of the Palestinians are Muslims, but there are also many
Christians. 174
 In November 1988, the chairman of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization (PLO), Yasir Arafat (Yaasir CArafaat), accepted UN
Resolution 242, which involved the renunciation of terrorism and the
recognition of Israel.' 75
 The PLO was not the government of the
Palestinians, but it acted as such. The political position of the PLO
remained basically anti-Israeli and anti-American. Although the PLO
was a nationalist organization and not an Islamist one, the Sudanese
Islamists led by Dr al-Turabi had been supporting the PLO for a long
time. When al-Bashir came to power, therefore, there was the founda-
tion for a good relationship between the PLO and Sudan.
During the period between 1989 and 1993, the relationship between
Sudan and the PLO was very good. The Sudanese Islamist regime was
consistently supporting the Palestinians, both nationalists (e.g. the
PLO) and Islamists (e.g. llamas (Hamaas)). There was evidence of a
strong link between Sudan and both the PLO and Hamas. For example, on
6 September 1991, Arafat held talks with Hamas at Khartoum.' 76
 On 7
September 1991, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir met the delegation of llamas, which
expressed its appreciation for Sudan's continuous support for the
Palestinians.' 77
 On 31 October 1993, the PAIC announced that both
Hamas and Fatah (Fath: the main group of the PLO) were invited to the
Second PAIC due to be held in early December 1993.178
Despite the different natures of the leadership of Dr al-Turabi
and Chairman Arafat - Dr al-Turabi as an Islamist and Chairman Arafat
as a nationalist - the relationship between the PLO and Sudan was very
strong. This seems to have stemmed from two main factors: one was
their common stance opposing Israeli occupation, and the other was Dr
al-Turabi's influence. The latter also had two factors: one was the
long-lasting friendship between Chairman Arafat and Dr al-Turabi, and
the other was Dr al-Turabi's idea - he wanted to absorb Arab nation-
alists into a broader Islamist movement (see Sections 8.1.2.(3) and
8.2).
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During the Gulf Crisis and the Second Gulf War, the PLO took a
pro-Iraqi stance together with Sudan, 179
 and Arafat frequently visited
Khartoum. This is apparent in the following reports. In the meeting
of the Islamic Conference Organisation, on 4 August 1990, the PLO
abstained from voting in a resolution which condemned Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait.' 8 ° On 13 August 1990, Arafat stayed several hours in
Khartoum.' 8 ' On 18 February 1991, Arafat stopped over at Khartoum.'82
After the Second Gulf War, on 30 October 1991, the Madrid peace
talks started. This move resulted in the peace accord between Israel
and the PLO signed on 13 September 1993. Harnas made its opposition to
the peace accord clear. On the same day, the representative of Harnas
in Khartoum said that the peace accord would be the worst disaster to
the Palestinians.' 83
 Although Dr al-Turabi and the Sudanese
government were not very happy about the peace process between the PLO
and Israel, they avoided criticism of the PLO. On 14 September 1993,
the Sudanese Foreign Minister said that: 'The Sudanese people respect
the will of the Palestinian people."84
The Sudanese Islamists basically opposed the peace process,
however, they were always supporting the PLO (see Dr al-Turabi's
account in Section 8.2) and taking a mediatory role between the PLO
and Harnas. Sudan's commitment to the mediatory role was evident, for
example, in the Khartoum meeting between the PLO and Hamas in Septem-
ber 1991, and the PAIC's invitation to both Hamas and Fatab to the
Second PAIC. The resolution of the Second PAIC concerning the
Palstinian issue clearly showed the position of the Sudanese
Islamists. To quote a summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC:
'The Palestinian issue is a crucial one for both Arabs and
Muslims. The conference reaffirmed its commitment to the
Palestinians' right of self-determination and an independent
state with its capital Jerusalem, as well as their inherent
right to strive for repossession of occupied Palestinian ter-
ritories. The conference therefore rejected the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, because it is not in line with Muslim aspirations.
Full support was given to the unified jihad and resistance
demonstrated throughout the Palestinian uprising; other
Palestinian factions were urged to respect these aspirations
and resolve their differences through serious dialogue, to
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avoid inter-factional feuding and assassinations.
The conference called upon all Islamic and Arab
governments to refrain from normalizing relations with
Israel, appealed for wide support for the Palestinian upris-
ing, and also commended the efforts of the Secretary-General
of the Conference, Dr Turabi, in establishing a dialogue
between the various Palestinian factions and thus bringing
them together in a united front against Israel."85
(v) Tunisia
Tunisia has a population of which the great majority are Muslims and
small minorities are Christians and Jews. 186
 Despite the strong
Islamic tradition, the Tunisian government led by Habib Bourguiba
(Habiib buu Ruqayba) had been pursuing a secular policy since 1957.187
Between 1986 and 1987, President Bourguiba (presidency: 1959-1987)
made its anti-Islamist position clear. Zayn al-Abidin Ben All (Zayn
al_CAabidiin bin cAli) was appointed by Bourguiba to lead the anti-
Islamist campaign. l88
 Many Islamists were arrested, including the
members of the Nanda (Nanda) movement led by Rashid al-Ghanushi
(Raajid al-Ghanuushii). Although Ben Ali was initially less hostile
to the Islamists than Bourguiba,' 89
 the Tunisian regime led by Ben All
after the 1987 bloodless coup kept its anti-Islamist position. There-
fore, when al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, there was a foundation of
tension between Tunisia and Sudan.
prom 1989 to the end of 1993, the strong link between the Sudanese
Islamists and the Tunisian Islamists was obvious. The Tunisian
government had frequently accused the Sudanese Islamists of supporting
the Tunisian Islamists who were opposing their government. Mainly
because of this reason, the relationship between the two governments
deteriorated.
The strong link between the Islamists of Tunisia and Sudan was
apparent in the following reports related to Rashid al-Ghanushi.
About a month after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on 6 September 1990,
The Independent reported that al-Ghanushi, who had been visiting Sudan
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in the previous week, had called upon the Muslims in the world to
mobilize and declare jihad against the foreign forces building up in
the Gulf region.' 9 ° According to the report, al-Ghanushi criticized
the US for supporting the Zionist entity and criticized Egypt for bec-
oming the faithful guardian of the US.' 9 ' Sudanow also reported that
al-Ghanushi took part in the First PAIC (April 1991) and called for
Islamic unity and jihad against what he called as "Satanic interna-
tional alliance."92
Tunisia's accusation against Sudan also came from al-Ghanushi
related incidents. On 11 June 1991, it was reported that the Tunisian
Interior Minister accused al-Ghanushi of using a Sudanese passport and
of having been planning a coup against the Tunisian government. 193
 In
October 1991, the Tunisian government had decided to recall its ambas-
sador from Khartoum, criticizing Sudan for the continuous support to
al-Ghanushi's Nanda movement.' 94
 In early August 1992, A1-Hayat
reported that the Tunisian government had decided to close its embassy
in Khartoum and accused Sudan of training Islamists from the Maghrib
(al-Magrib) countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia).'95
The disadvantage of the Sudanese government became clear. In
October 1991, Dr al-Turabi was reported as admitting that the Sudanese
authorities had issued a diplomatic passport to al-Ghanushi. 196
 A
Sudanese diplomat also told the researcher that Sudan had issued a
Sudanese passport to al-Ghanushi.' 97
 During the year of 1993, the
tension between the Sudanese and Tunisian governments remained the
same.
(vi) Yemen
In 1989 the process of unification between the Yemen Arab Republic
(YAR: North Yemen, tribal society) led by Ali Abdalla Salih (CAli cAbd
Allaah Saalih) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY:
South Yemen, Marxist country) led by Ali Salim al-Bayd ( cAll Saalim
al-Bayd) was taking place. The population of both the YAR and the
PDRY was almost entirely Muslim, 198 and in the YAR particularly there
219
Chapter 8
were many Islamists.	 This provided an important basis for the
Sudanese Islamists to approach. When al-Bashir came to power in
Sudan, there were no specific signs of tension between Sudan and both
the YAR and the PDRY.
From Yemen's unification in Nay 1990 up to December 1993, the
relationship between Yemen and Sudan was relatively good. Despite the
link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Yemeni Islamists during
this period, 199 the relationship between the two governments remained
almost the same.
The relatively good relationship between Yemen and Sudan is
apparent in the following reports. Republic of Yemen Radio reported,
between 4 and 11 May 1991, that Sudan and Yemen held economic and
trade talks in Sana, Yemen. 20 ° On 11 September 1993, it was reported
that the Yemeni delegation arrived at Khartoum for the sixth session
of the joint ministerial committee between Yemen and Sudan. 20 ' In
September 1991, Sudan and Yemen jointly denied allegations made by
Sudanese opposition sources in Yemen who accused the Sudanese author-
ities of sending Islamists to Yemen in order to attack the Sudanese
opposition.202
There was a link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Yemeni
Islamists during the 1990-93 period. This Islamist link, however, did
not damage the relationship between the two governments. This seems
to have stemmed mainly from the good relationship between President
Au Salih and the Yemeni Islainists. The Islamist Islah ('Islaah:
restration) party, which joined the ruling coalition through the
peninsula's first free multi-party elections in April 1993,203 was
apparently supportive towards President Au Salih.
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(3) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC)
The foreign policy of the Islamist government is basically designed to
expand the regime's influence beyond Sudan's borders. This policy is
carried out partly through non-governmental organizations (NGO). The
Popular Arab and Islamic Conference led by Dr al-Turabi, technically a
NGO, is the main body and vehicle to support Sudan's foreign policy of
Islamist expansion. Effectively, the Islamist movement led by Dr al-
Turabi expands beyond Sudan's borders with the support and protection
of the government. The relationship between the government and the
PAIC indicates the fusion between "state" and "Islamist movement",
which constitutes the reason why Sudan can be seen as a state-form
Islamist movement.
Between 1991 and 1995, the PAIC was held three times; the First
PAIC was held in April 1991, shortly after the Second Gulf War; the
Second PAIC was held in December 1993, after the historic peace agree-
ment between Israel and the PLO; and the Third PAIC was held in March-
April 1995. The PAIC contributed to the expansion of the influence of
both Dr al-Turabi and the Sudanese government beyond Sudan's borders.
During this period, Dr al-Turabi was the elected Secretary General of
the PAIC, and the conference played a unique role in mediating and
uniting the different groups and movements around the world. The con-
ference was essentially "Islamist", but it included non-Islamist ele-
ments" (which caused some confusion among participants in the Third
PAIC).
The First PAIC was held in Khartoum between 25 and 28 April 1991,
only a couple of months after the Second Gulf War between Iraq and US-
led UN forces. The conference constituted evidence that the policy of
Islamist expansion was at the core of Sudan's foreign policy. This
came across in the way that Sudan was maintaining its pro-Iraqi posi-
tion, despite the enormous pressures (both economic and political) and
huge losses (mainly foreign aid) stemming from its position. The
regime valued the PAIC, so it maintained a pro-Iraqi position for the
purpose of obtaining support from people who opposed Western inter-
ference. How Sudan valued the PAIC was apparent in a statement in
Sudan News which described the conference as 'a major event in Muslim
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history' and 'the most significant event since the collapse of the
Caliphate.' 204 Sudan News was published by the Sudan Information
Office in the Sudanese embassy in London. Sudan News also reported:
'[The PAIC] was the first occasion where representatives from
mass movements from all over the Muslim world came together
in one place. All major movements in the Muslim world from
Malaysia to Morocco were represented. ... [The participants
came from] Egypt, Jordan, Syria, PLO, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Britain, America, ex-Yugoslavia, Bul-
garia, Rumania, ... [and so on].'205
Dr al-Turabi's success in organizing the conference largely
stemmed from the resentment and frustration of the people in the Arab
and Islamic world against Western interference in the Gulf and against
the subsequent Second Gulf War. Dr al-Turabi sought to use the con-
ference as an opportunity to unite world movements which had similar
feelings against western domination and influence.
The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum between 2 and 4 December
1993, after the historic accord between Israel and the PLO signed in
Washington in September 1993. Over 500 delegates from almost 85
countries around the world, including Africa, Asia and Europe, parti-
cipated in the conference. 206
	This conference was marked by its
rather delicate position on the peace accord. The PAIC basically
opposed the peace process between Israel and the PLO. This was evi-
dent in the resolutions of the Second PAIC which rejected the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement. 207
 However, Dr al-Turabi had avoided criticizing
the 'Ralestinian-Israeli peace accord in his speech at the opening ses-
SiOn. 208
 Dr al-Turabj's aftitude seems to have been a reflection of
his careful consideration for his close friend, Chairman Arafat. In
addition to this, the conference provided an opportunity for dialogue
between Hamas (the main Islamist group which opposed the peace accord)
and Fatah (the main group of the PLO). 209
 The conference called for
serious dialogue between different Palestinian groups in order to
avoid inter-factional fighting. 2 10
The Third PAIC was held in Khartoum from 30 March to 2 April,
1995. The conference convened over 300 delegates from more than 80
countries around the world. 211
 The third PAIC focused on three
issues: the Western attack against Islam, the status of minorities in
the world, and the Palestinian question. 212 The conference, however,
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drew people's attention to a rather different point - the nature of
the membership. The third conference witnessed some confusion among
the delegates in their understanding of the "title" of the conference
which reflected the nature of the membership. Sudan Update reported
an incident in which Shaikh Muhammad Bashir (Shaikh Muhammad Bashiir),
an African Muslim from Benin, proposed the removal of the word "Arab"
from the title of the conference, claiming that it would create racial
discrimination among the Muslims. 213
 This proposal was supported by
other non-Arab delegates and the majority voted in favour of changing
the title. 214
 Dr al-Turabi, however, postponed any changes until next
year. 215
 It is clear that the non-Arabs interpreted the word "Arab"
as "Arab Muslims", and felt the use of the word unfair because there
were "African Muslims", "Asian Muslims", and so on. However, the word
"Arab" in the PAIC did not originally mean "Arab Muslims", but "non-
Islamist Arabs".
The PAIC was essentially Islamist, but it had been including non-
Islamist elements, i.e. non-Islamist Arabs, since the first con-
ference. Asharq Al-Awsat (Al-Sharq Al-'Awsat) reported, on the occa-
sion of the First PAIC, that: 'Some days ago a strange gathering was
convened in Khartoum that brought together a number of atheists and
fundamentalists.' 216 When Dr al-Turabi was planning to convene the
First PAIC, he was already thinking about including Arab nationalists,
Nasserites, and Arab leftists whose first identities were not
Islamist, but Arab. 217 Without recognizing Dr al-Turabi's plan to
absorb non-Islamist Arabs into a wider Islamist movement led by him-
self, it would be difficult to understand the rather strange member-
ship of the conference. Because a change from 'Popular Arab and
Islamic Conference (PAIC)' to 'Popular Islamic Conference (PlC)' would
result in the exclusion of non-Islamist Arab members, such a change
would not be acceptable to Dr al-Turabi.
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8.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT
8.2.1 FOREIGN POLICY
The researcher summarized his assumptions about Dr al-Turabi's goals
after 1989. He then showed the assumptions concerning foreign matters
to Dr al-Turabi himself and asked him to correct it, if necessary.
1989-
Main goals:
(concerning foreign matters)
To secure the stability of Sudan in Africa
correction: To relate Sudan to Africa
To expand the influence of the Islamist movement around the
world
correction: none
Dr al-Turabi corrected one of the main goals concerning foreign mat-
ters as "to relate Sudan to Africa" and added: 'In the past, Sudan was
mostly looking towards the Middle East, but now Sudan is looking
towards both the Middle East and Africa.' 218 It is important to note
that "Africa" here means Sudan's neighbours on the African continent,
particularly Egypt, Libya, Chad, the CAR, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Eritrea. He did not correct the other goal, "to expand
the .nf1uence of the Islamist movement around the world". Dr al-
Turabi's goals concerning foreign matters after 1989 will be
simplified as "to expand the Islamist movement beyond the borders".
In his own explanation of his long-term plans, Dr al-Turabi
explained his goals to the researcher as follows:
'The long-term plans would pursue horizontal development.219
One might say that this is "expansionism", but it is com-
pletely different from that of imperialists. Opening towards
the world is the most important point at this stage.
Geographical distances between states, i.e. whether states
are geographically close or not, do not matter, because
today's transport and media have virtually shortened the dis-
tances between states. The goals of the umma are, for exam-
ple, to establish a collective defence of Muslims, to
increase the understanding of non-Muslims about Muslims, and
so on.
Since things happen faster these days, the creation of a
single Islamic community will not take too long. The current
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terrible situation in most of the Islamic world will also
contribute to the speed-up of such a development, because
only a "shock" will wake up people. Without a shock, people
will not think seriously. To take an analogy, unless one's
illness becomes worse one will not think to see a doctor
seriously. In this sense, the current bad situation sur-
rounding Muslims is perhaps good for us. People in the Arab
world and Africa are getting aware of their situation, The
Western people always try to keep these people as a sub-human
group, and use them as consumers who buy Western goods. Some
foolish people are trying to suppress us, but the more they
suppress us, the more we increase our frustration and an
explosion is inevitable. The change of the world by such an
explosion will be much faster than that by the normal evolu-
tion. '220
The establishment of the uw.ma seems to be the core of Dr al-
Turabi's long-term plans. Sudanow reported Dr al-Turabi's description
of the umzzza as involving one international community with open fron-
tiers, a homogeneous order, and a limit to central political authority
as opposed to the Western concept of nation-state, having rigid bor-
ders and a paramount national interest. 22 ' Dr al-Turabi warns against
"narrow clannishness" and "chauvinist nationalism". 222 However, Dr
al-Turabi's approach is at the same time realistic, as he does not
seek to rush to eliminate the existing borders. For him, the existing
borders are not an immediate problem. It may be easier to understand
this with reference to the European Union, where borders are gradually
becoming less significant. Dr al-Turabi similarly envisages a gradual
approach in the Islamic world.
Dr al-Turabi pointed out that in the umrna there should be adminis-
trative decentralization, and a variety of denominations in Islam
should be tolerated, as long as an essential minimum of Arabic and a
common standard of the sharia were kept. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in
Sudanow):
'Nationality and religious denomination are not absolute
standards of discrimination. There are higher religious and
human values that guarantee equal status and basic rights of
human beings without regard to domicile or denomination.
The Islamic commonwealth [the umrna) should not be constituted
as a monolithic structure, and should observe administrative
decentralization ... The sources and the general principles
of Islamic jurisprudence are universal, but no particular
school of law need prevail throughout the Muslim world.
There is no standardization of language or cultural forms as
long as an essential minimum of Arabic is assured everywhere
225
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and that social life-styles observe the common standards of
the "sharia".'223
Another key element in Dr al-Turabi's long-term plans was his
challenge to the world order. He wanted to "correct" the world order
which is currently controlled by some powerful Western countries,
because he believed that ."justice" hardly existed. 224
 He pointed out
that: 'The United Nations is undemocratic and unfair. The world media
is also unfair.' 225
 In the Florida debate, Nay 1992, Dr al-Turabi
gave his view of the existing world order in the following words:
'Those who enjoy an advantage now under the present world
order in economic relations between North and South, in the
United Nations structure, in the area of monopoly of informa-
tion or technology or armaments, will see that Islam con-
stitutes a challenge, because if it seeks justice, then it
seeks to have someone concede a little bit so that we
ultimately reach an equitable equation.
We just seek to correct the world order. We just seek to
express our Islamic values. I personally have been advising
governments and Islamic movements to exhaust all means of
peaceful dialogue [to correct the world order] because, as a
religion, islam is better expressed peacefully.'225
At a practical level, Dr al-Turabi's criticism of the UN was
reported in Impact International of May 1995 issue. To quote Dr al-
Turabi (in Impact International):
'The UN is supposed to be an organisation of equal and
sovereign states, but it has been turned into a hand-maiden
of the Veto powers. Surely this arbitrary power has to go
and the UN turn into an organisation that is based on equal-
ity of rights and equality of participation. It is not
realistic for the UN th try to become a world government and
impose Euro-American social, economic, financial, military
and political regimes over every other member state.
The role and the structure of the Security Council
are very much dated. The UN's powers should instead vest in
the General Assembly of the world nations. Similarly the
International Court of Justice could be strengthened.'227
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8.2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
As mentioned before, Dr al-Turabi's account does not necessarily cover
every aspect of the general description. In this sub-section, his
account does not cover all the countries discussed in Section
8.1.2. (2).
In the researcher's interview, 17 May 1994, Dr al-Turabi gave the
following account of the international role he wanted to pursue:
'It is time to create a close relationship among the Muslims
in the world, improve the quality of our life, to defend our-
selves, to promote peace, and so forth. I will visit every-
where in the world - Africa, Europe, central Asia, Asia,
America and so on. I believe that all kinds of people would
come to listen to me.'228
(1) SUDAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS
In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi described the general nature of
the relationship between Sudan and neighboring countries, as he saw it
in May 1992:
'I know most of the heads of states in the Arab world and in
Africa, especially those who are neighbors of the Sudan
The Sudan, on the whole, is probably leaning now more to
Africa than to the Arab world: (a) because relations with
Saudi Arabia and Egypt are a little bit cold now, to say the
\ least and (b) because the Sudan has an open frontier now, a
very cordial relationship people-to-people, not only
government-to-governmeiit, with Ethiopia and Eritrea. And
relations have improved dramatically with Uganda, with Kenya
and with Central Africa. Chad, of course, is only the exten-
sion of the Sudan, or Sudan is extension of Chad.
So the Sudan is probably now in its foreign relations closer
to Africa than to the Arab world.
Well, we are a threat in the sense that we export our
[Islamic] model by radiation. We don't have sufficient money
to actually go; we don't have a military force that can by
conquest expand the territory of Islam.'229
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Ia) Egypt
Between 1989 and 1993, there was increasing tension between the Egyp-
tian government and the Sudanese government. Egypt's anti-Islamist
position and Egypt's strong concern over Sudanese attempts to spread
Islamism fuelled the tension.	 In this context, Dr al-Turabi
criticized, in the Florida debate, the attitude of President Mubarak
of Egypt and his government towards Sudan and Islam:
'I think the reason why Egypt is so anxious and so frightened
[about Sudan] is because they see the fragility of their own
set-up. Egypt is twice as powerful as the Sudan. Econom-
ically, it's 50 times more powerful than the Sudan. Its army
is 100 times bigger than Sudan's.	 Why should Egypt fear the
Sudan so much ? They are almost panicking. It's because
they see that the situation is very precarious and that Islam
can really prove their undoing. But this is only so at the
level of government. ... Hosni Mubarak definitely has an
obsession with Islam, he was there close to Sadat when he was
shot; he thinks that Islam is a personal threat, not a
political threat to him, and he is obsessed with it. But if
the regime changes - the Egyptians may feel that it would be
wiser to allow Islam to express itself and for the state to
give some leadership in expressing the values of Islam and
Islamizing some of the institutions.'230
(b) Ethiopia / Eritrea
Between 1989 and 1993, the Ethiopian-Sudanese relationship was greatly
affected by Sudan's support. for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
and the fall of Mengistu's government. Up to May 1991 the governments
of Ethiopia and Sudan were each supporting the other's opposition, and
this resulted in a bad relationship between the two countries. In the
Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi briefly mentioned Ethiopia, referring to
Nengistu's fall. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'At one time, Ethiopia had an interest in destabilizing the
North [Sudan] as reciprocation for the North hosting all
those Eritreans and for probably sympathizing with the cause
of an independent Eritrea. Once Mengistu fell, it made quite
a difference, and the South [Sudan] now [May 1992] is not
holding together as one South.'231
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(c) Saudi Arabia
Before the Gulf Crisis (August 1990 - January 1991), which was created
by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was little overt tension
between the Sudanese Islamist government and the Saudi government.
After August 1990, however, the relationship between the two
governments deteriorated. Sudan's opposition to Western interference
in the Gulf Crisis, which caused Sudan's pro-Iraqi stance, and Sudan's
influence on the Saudi Islamists (opposition to their government) seem
to have been the main causes.
Dr al-Turabi, in the Florida debate, described his activities in
Saudi Arabia during the Gulf Crisis. In the debate, he implied
Western conspiracy against the Arab solution of the crisis. To quote
Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'[ King Fand) told me he thought that Saddam was not going to
extend his military onslaught into Saudi Arabia; he was quite
sure about that. He was told otherwise, of course, by his
American advisors. And I asked him: "Did you invite them ?"
And he said: "Well I did not, but they would have come
anyway. And it would have been very bad if I did not invite
them."
An Arab solution was feasible; I have absolutely no doubt
about it. I spoke personally, and we spoke as a delegation,
to Saddam Hussein. And I spoke personally also and in a
group to King Fand. Both of them were open to it, except
that later on, the Saudis told me -- not just any Saudis,
Saudis who matter -- that they were advised not to allow Sad-
dam, ..., to get away. They were told to abstain from any
"\Arab initiative and not to entertain any such Arab solu-
tion. '232
In the same debate in Florida, Dr al-Turabi described his views
about the situation in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War. He criticized
the Saudi Arabian government's attitude towards Islam and predicted a
considerable rise in Islamist activities against the Saudi monarchy.
To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'After the Gulf war, things have changed a lot. 	 ... Espe-
cially in Saudi Arabia, the whole religious legitimacy of the
regime has been destroyed. All religiously oriented people,
all of them criticize the regime as irreligious. It is
dynastic. The banking system is based on ribs. The laws are
in fact secular, although they call them by different names,
not to expose their secularity. ... All this has suddenly
come to public consciousness now, even though most people
have known it all along.
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I have been receiving many Islamists because there is so
much propaganda hostile to Hasan Turabi ... that I have
become a curiosity for those who don't know me. ... So many
[Saudi] people are coming to the Sudan, and we get all the
reports we need about Saudi Arabia. We get all the leaflets,
all the books, all the sermons on tape, and it is something
most unusual.
The Saudi family is the base of society through mar-
riages, tribal affiliation, and alliances, and although it
disposes of a lot of money so it can bribe people into
silence. ... King Fand is in quite a mess; he doesn't know
what to do. ... Between the Islamists and the monarchy
itself the confrontation is not so pronounced, but it's all
over the place, in mosques and through freely distributed
leaflets, which you'll find every morning on your fax
machine. ... This is a very safe way of distributing
leaflets, which the Saudis are capable of because everybody
has a fax machine.
I don't think that Saudi Arabia is going to change
regimes tomorrow or after tomorrow. But the process is in
motion, and it will take its course sooner or later; I have
no doubt about that.'233
(2) SUDAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST
(a) Algeria
Between 1989 and 1993, there was a strong link between the Sudanese
Islamists and the Algerian Islaniists. This link was tolerated by the
Algerian secular government for the first several years, but
evenually raised tension between the governments of Algeria and
Sudan, especially after 1992 when the second round of elections, in
which the Algerian Islamists were going to win, was cancelled.
On 20 December 1991, before the first round of the Algerian par-
liamentary election (26 December), Dr al-Turabi predicted Algerian
future. According to Sudan Update, Dr al-Turabi said that Algeria
would become another Islamic republic and advised it to seek unity
with the Islamic Republic of Iran.234
In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi expressed his views concerning
the Islamist movement in Algeria as follows:
'The [Islamist] movement, .. in Algeria, didn't just erupt
three years ago. The movement has a long background, but
people only noticed it when it became political.
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I've been to Algeria, and I have never seen more reli-
giosity. If you are late one minute after the first call for
the morning prayers, you would never find a place in the
mosques.
It is not at all just a political movement of support for
political Islam or rejection of political post-independence
Algeria; it is a religious movement at the personal level.
People are praying all night and all day. They are closer to
the Koran.'235
On 3 December 1993, The Independent reported Dr al-Turabi as
saying about Abbasi Nadani ( cAbbaasii Madanii), the leader of the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS):
t] spoke to Abassi Nadani before the elections in Algeria. I
met him in the Middle East, once in Algeria itself. And I
asked him: "What's your programme like ? What are you going
to do after the elections ? Have you started a dialogue with
the French ? Have you begun talking to other European states
? And he just said: "No, no, we just want to win the elec-
tion. "'236
Dr al-Turabi criticized the Western influence on the Algerian
government, whose army interrupted the second round of elections in
January 1992. To quote Mideast Mirror of 31 August 1994:
'It seems unfortunately that the West does not believe in
democracy as an absolute global value. If it is a democracy
that ushers in Islam, the West is prepared to curb it. This
is what happened repeatedly in Turkey, and is currently hap-
pening in Algeria.'237
In December 1994, The Guardian reported a Western accusation
against Sudan that Sudan was supporting the Algerian rebels.238
According to the report, Dfal-Turabi had replied to the accusation by
saying that the charges were US inventions in order to destroy
Sudan.2"
(b) Iran
Contrary to the expectations of some observers, the relationship
between the two Islamic states, Iran and Sudan, from 1989 to 1993 was
relatively cool. Despite this, allegations of a strong link between
the two Islamic states were sometimes reported.
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Dr al-Turabi expressed his rather low opinion about the role of
the Iranian revolution in the current pan-Islamic movements. To quote
Dr al-Turabi (in Sudanow):
'Islam appeared on the world scene as the prevalent popular
force in contemporary Islamic societies. ... The Iranian
Revolution was a land-mark in this new development. But the
Gulf War [1991] did more than anything else to arouse the
Muslim masses and give impetus to the international
manifestation of pan-Islam.'24°
In response to the allegations of a strong link between Iran and
Sudan, Dr al-Turabi denied, in the Florida debate, the presence of
Iranian forces in Sudan or any strong relationship between the two
countries. He also pointed out that there would be little for Sudan
to learn from Iran. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'Well 5,000 Iranian guards. The latest figure is 180,000
They are fighting the war in the South ! ... No, honestly,
I'll tell you the truth; I hope you t 11 believe me. I don't
know if there is a Military Attache in the Iranian Embassy.
But there is not a single military, there are no technicians,
and we don't buy arms from Iran. ... The only thing that is
bought from Iran is vehicles.
The Sudan enjoys much more intensive relations with China
than Iran, and with Pakistan and Malaysia. 	 ...	 It's not
really a very significant relationship with Iran.	 ...	 I
have no problem with dealing with Iran personally. I've
always worked towards closer relationship with the Shia to
overcome the sectarian divide that has plagued the Muslims
for more than 1400 years. Actually, I would have liked to
see better relations between Sudan and Iran. But for the
present, it doesn't amount to a great deal.
With respect to the experience of Iran, the Sudanese
movement is 40 years old. That goes way beyond Khomeini, and
we don't feel that we have much to learn from Iran really.
Speaking to them, I don't think that they have developed
Islamic banking better than in the Sudan, or even anything
close to how Islamic banking has developed in the Sudan, or
even the change of the legal system or educational system.
There are hardly any Sudanese studying in Iran.
There are more Sudanese in America, students and otherwise,
than in Iran.'24'
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(C) Iraq
During the period from 1989 to 1993, the relationship between the
Sudanese Islamist government and the basically "secular" Iraqi
government was good. This stemmed mainly from Sudan's strategy of
Islamist expansion, not from its sympathy for secular Iraq. Sudan
maintained a pro-Iraqi position to unite Arabs and Muslims who opposed
Western interference to the region for the purpose of creating the
umma. Dr al-Turabi was clearly trying to bring together the Islamist
movements in the world in a challenge to the West.
During the Gulf Crisis, 1 October 1990, Dr al-Turabi warned the
West in a press conference at Amman, Jordan, that:
'In the case of the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, the
members of Islamic movements would join Iraq and participate
in the war effort through demonstrations, fighting and
attacks on foreign interests around the world.'242
The Independent of 2 October 1990 reported Dr al-Turabi as saying
that there existed some flexibility in the Iraqi position, but they
would determine to go to war if necessary.243
Dr al-Turabi's account in the Florida debate clearly indicates the
real reason why Sudan supported Iraq - Sudan's pro-Iraqi position
stemmed mainly from its own strategy of Islamist expansion, not from
its sympathy for secular Iraq. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'Actually, before the advent of the foreign forces in Arabia,
"sympathies were against Saddam; all Islamic movements pro-
nounced against the occupation of Kuwait. They didn't care
very much for Kuwait, of course, because Kuwait is not some-
thing that is very popular in the Muslim world. They have so
much money, and they have abused that money. And the conduct
of their rulers is known to be very bad. ... But formally,
everybody pronounced against the initiative of Saddam. But
that was completely transformed.
Saddam Hussein is known not to be an Islamist, and he's
famous, infamous actually, in the Muslim world as being very
hostile to the Islamic movement. ... So nobody admired him
because of Islam and nobody fell into his slogans of Jihad.
But people like Saddam Hussein, and even people like
Qaddhafi, sometimes represent resistance, ... an assertion
of Arab identity and a rejection of being assimilated,
dominated or integrated into the West. So it is only this
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aspect which moves the Muslims. ... [The war] was seen in a
broader context of a confrontation with the West. People
thought that ulterior motives were more important than the
pretext of protecting the sovereignty of Kuwait.
I'm sure Islamists can speak to Saddam today, and he owes
them something. We approached him on many other issues.
He was going to ban religious parties; we advised him that
this would be proof that he was hypocritical after he had
raised all those slogans. He ultimately changed the formula;
he is not banning religious parties, per Se, any more.'244
In an interview with the researcher, Dr al-Turabi described Saddan
Husain's personality in terms of him being loyal to his friends, but
very cool and cruel to his enemies.245
(d) PLO
During the period between 1989 and 1993, the Sudanese Islamists con-
sistently supported the Palestinians, both nationalists (e.g. the PLO)
and Islamists (e.g. Hamas). Although, the Sudanese Islamists basi-
cally opposed the peace process between Israel and the PLO, they still
supported the PLC and took a mediatory role between the PLO and Hazizas.
In the Florida debate, May 1992, Dr al-Turabi expressed his views
about the role of Islaaists in the Palestinian cause as follows:
'In the short term, I have to be a realist. I don't see what
the Islamic movement can do for Palestine. But there is no
question that Islamists all over the world feel a very
"intense association with the Palestinian cause and feel that
Jerusalem belongs to all the Muslims and not just to Arabs.
I am sure that if Islamic movements ultimately become
Islamic states, and if all Islamic states in concert tried to
do something about the Palestinian cause, definitely, it will
change the balance ... and it would have an impact on the
destiny of Palestine.'246
In the same debate, Dr al-Turabi explained the position of the
Sudanese Islamists towards the Madrid talks. 247
 Although he, and the
Sudanese Islainists, were not very happy about the talks between the
PLO and Israel, they avoided criticizing the PLO.
'For one people to oust another people completely and to
occupy their territory was considered not legitimate.
I'm sure that no one who is fair would have accepted it
[Israeli occupations]. People say it's practical; it hap-
pened, and it's in everyone's interest to forego the past and
try to work out a solution.
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[The Palestinian) Islamists have not been involved [in
the Madrid talks]; they are not negotiating. The Sudan, as
an Islamic state, has said no to the Madrid talks. But do
you realize that it was the only Arab state that said no ?
Do you realize that Yasser Arafat, as an act of necessity,
couldn't say no ? So they [the Sudanese Islamists] felt that
we should not try to be better than Yasser Arafat himself or
to embarrass him, or to undercut him. Having said our word,
we kept silent; we had made our opposition clear and that was
it. v248
Dr al-Turabi's commitment to the mediatory role between the PLO
and llamas is apparent. In early January 1993, Dr al-Turabi announced
that Arafat's Fatah (Fath: PLO's main faction) and llamas agreed to set
up joint committees in order to boost the intifadah ( ' Intifaada:
Palestinian uprising) in the occupied territories. 249
 Dr al-Turabi
also praised Arafat for his efforts to promote Palestinian unity.250
After Israel and the PLO signed the peace accord on 13 September
1993, Dr al-Turabi again expressed his basic position towards the
peace process between Israel and the PLO. Sudan Update of 22 October
1993 reported Dr al-Turabi as saying that the Palestinian-Israeli
accord did not mean real peace, but submission. 251
 However, Dr al-
Turabi called for people not to sabotage it.252
On 3 December 1993, the middle day of the three-day conference of
the Second PAIC, The Independent reported Dr al-Turabi's views about
the peace accord. He repeated his basic position towards the develop-
ment between Israel and the PLO - he opposed the peace process, but
avoi4ed criticizing the PLO as they were acting on the basis of neces-
sity, and he called for unity among the Palestinians. To quote Dr al-
Turabi (in The Independent):
'I [Dr al-Turabi] personally know Arafat very well. He is a
close friend of mine. ... He spoke to me before he signed
[the PLO-Israel accord]. He came here to Sudan. And I am
now putting his case to the others - not as something that is
right, but as something of necessity.
What could Arafat do ? He ran out of money. His army
stopped. There were the refugees, the 10,000 prisoners in
Israeli jails. Even a municipality is better than nothing.
Look, I know what the Palestinian opposition are saying.
I know that what Arafat has accepted is even less than
the so-called international resolutions that demand a total
235
Chapter 8
Israeli withdrawal. B,ut I say to both Palestinian parties:
"Don't convert your political controversy into political
violence and conflict into civil war." They can talk to each
other.	 t253
The Second PAIC adopted a resolution on the Palestinian issue and
the peace accord between the PLO and Esrael.254
(e) Tunisia
From 1989 to 1993, a strong link between the Islamists of Tunisia and
Sudan was evident. The Tunisian government tightened its security
measures against the Islamists who were opposing their government, and
frequently accused the Sudanese Islamists of supporting the Tunisian
Islamists. In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi criticized the anti-
Islamist policy of the Tunisian government as follows:
'Look at Tunisia, for example; it's just a security
apparatus. And a security apparatus cannot determine the
future of a whole country.'255
8.2.3 POPULAR ARAB AND ISLANIC CONFERENCE (PAIC)
The activities of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference can be seen
in the context of Sudan's policy of Islaniist expansion. The PAIC was
effetively a vehicle to expand Sudan's version of Islamism beyond
Sudan's borders. The positive response which Dr al-Turabi gained from
some circles when he organized the First PAIC stemmed from the resent-
ment and frustration of people in the Arab and Islamic world over
Western interference in the Gulf and over the subsequent Second Gulf
War. Dr al-Turabi sought to use the conference as an opportunity to
unite world movements (including both Islamist and non-Islamist move-
ments) which had similar feelings against western domination and
influence.
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Dr al-Turabi told the researcher of an episode concerning his mi-
tial efforts to organize the First PAIC.
'Before the [Second Gulf] war, I toured many countries
including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran as a private
person. Saudi Arabia tried to prevent me from organizing the
First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference, because the Saudis
feared that I would unite Islamic movements around the world
being against Saudi stance on the Gulf Crisis. The Saudis
tried to bribe me with money. I refused their offer. The
US, then, criticised Saudi Arabia for receiving me.'256
In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi explained how he succeeded in
organizing the First PAIC, emphasizing the significance of the Second
Gulf War. He emphasized the participation of the African Muslims, and
the inclusion of non-Islamist elements into the basically Islamist
conference. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):
'I personally owe a lot to the Gulf war, because without it I
could not have organised the "Popular Arab and Islamic Con-
vention," which has now become an institution.
It was the first time that we could persuade so many
Africans [African Muslims] to join Arabs and Asians. Arabs
and Asians used to come to Islamic conferences a great deal;
they had known each other for many years. But Africans came
in strongly for the first time, and Europeans, the British
Islamic Party, people from America, from Eastern Europe; for
the first time they attended such conferences.
One other very significant development is that many Arab
nationalists, many Nasserites, many Arab leftists, excluding
the hard core communists who chose to stick with their com-
munism in spite of all the developments, but most of the
leftists and the nationalists came to that conference. And
"they accepted to join a conference which is essentially
Islamic and to assign-the post of Secretary General to some-
one like myself who is known to be Islamist.
They [Arab nationalists, Nasserites and leftists] have
been disillusioned by their own record in government and in
the economy. They achieved very little. ... They knew it.
It's now not only a dialogue between Islamists and
nationalists as it used to be, but it's almost positive
cooperation. '257
On 30 March 1995, Dr al-Turabi addressed the participants at the
opening session of the Third PAIC in the Friendship Hall.	 He
described the PAIC as the unity of the Muslim nation and the will of
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an independent umzna. 258
 He also stated that the PAIC was a true and
direct representation of the Muslim people.259
In his address at the Third PAIC, Dr al-Turabi repeated his posi-
tion and criticism against the West. He pointed out that "Human
Rights" were used as a pretext to attack Islam, and that some NGOs
were deliberately working against Islam. 26 ° He called for the
restructuring of the United Nations because it was unfair. To quote
Dr al-Turabi (in New Horizon):
'We should work for the restructuring of the United Nations
with a view to introducing a system comprising free plat-
forms, egalitarian procedures and global representation.
Today there is one dominantly [sic: dominant] power in the
world, that of the USA, in favour of Israel, resulting from
past relations and cooperation and response to Zionist pres-
sure inside the USA and the western democracies.t26'
Dr al-Turabi also criticized the current development of the normaliza-
tion between Israel and the Arab states as being false and submissive,
and called upon the Arabs to seek real peace among themselves instead
of relying on the initiative of the West.262
After the Third PAIC, Dr al-Turabi evaluated positively the
achievements of the PAIC in terms of the expansion of its influence.
To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Impact International):
'The 3rd PAIC had a much wider geographical representation
than before. ... The most important thing is that this Con-
ference is developing into a structure and branching out in
the various allied field of activity. ... I am sure the
Conference will continue to evolve in relation to the chal-
lenges that face the.. Muslim world. ... The Conference
served as a truly free and common platform for all issues of
Islamic concern. '263
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8.3 ANALYSES
8.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-89)
Table 8.3.(1) (the same as Table 7.4.(l)) lists Dr al-Turabi's main
characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the study of Dr al-
Turabi's personality from his life story up to 1989. Table 8.3.(2)
(the same as Table 7.4.(2)) lists possible adjectives associated with
those characters.
Table 8.3.(1): Dr al_TurabiVs main characters (imagoes) (1932-89)
(the same as Table 7.4.(1))
Period Main characters (iniagoes)
1932	 the critic (a),	 the resistant (a),
-	 the passionate (a),	 the believer (a),
1989	 the winner (a),	 the reformer (a),
the revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
the good planner (a), 	 the hero (a),
the competitor (a),	 the pragmatist (a),
the expansionist (a),	 the persuader (a),
the analyst (a),	 the politician (a),,
the man behind the scenes (a),
the mediator Cc),	 the internationalist Cc),
the cooperator (c)
(a)	 = classified as agentic
(c)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
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Table 8.3.(2): Possible adlectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-89)
(the same as Table 7.4.(2))
Period I Possible .adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1989	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a),
overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a),
offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a),
calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a),
influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a),
analytic (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c),
kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c),
open (c), cooperative (c), supportive (c)
(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TtJRABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT 11989-95)
Similarly to Chapter 7, Dr al-Turabi's account in Chapter 8 is not a
life story. However, his account concerning foreign matters covering
the period between 1989 aid 1995 at the latest, provides further evi-
dence of previous findings and some new elements of his personality.
Among the previously identified personality elements, agentic ele-
ments are again dominant in his account. The main character
representing the image of his account of this chapter is that of "the
expansionist", indicating adjectives such as expansionist, ambitious,
active, dominant, and influential. This character is backed by other
characters, in particular those of "the challenger" (a newly
identified agentic character) and "the internationalist" (a communal
character).
Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality which seeks expansion is
clear in his main goals concerning foreign matters after 1989 and his
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long-term plans. In the case of Dr al-Turabi, this "expansion" means
the expansion of the Sudanese Islamist movement beyond Sudan's borders
- i.e. towards African neighbours and towards the rest of the world.
Dr al-Turabi said that opening towards the world was the most impor-
tant point.
Another example of an agentic element of personality is clear in
his accounts which show his sense of superiority in terms of the
achievement of the Sudanese Islamist movement. His sense of supe-
riority comes across in his criticism against Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
particularly against President Mubarak and King Fand. This is
apparent in his strong confidence of him doing better than other lead-
ers in dealing with Islam. This aspect is also clear in his account
of the conversation with Abbasi Madani which suggests Dr al-Turabi's
sense of superiority to Nadani in terms of the planning and programme
of the Islamist movement. Further evidence of his sense of supe-
riority appears in the case of Iran. He said in his account that:
'With respect to the experience of Iran, the Sudanese movement is 40
years old. That goes way beyond Khomeini, and we don't feel that we
have much to learn from Iran really.' In his accounts, Dr al-Turabi
proudly pointed out that Sudan was in a more advanced stage than Iran
and Saudi Arabia in terms of the Islamization of society.
Further evidence of agentic elements is apparent in his criticism
against the West and the UN. This seems to stem from some of his main
characters, such as "the critic" and "the reformer". The criticism is
ofte associated with the Western hegemony over the Muslim nations in
general. In this context, he strongly accused the West of treating
the Muslims unfairly, doing them injustice, and being responsible for
the bad situation of the Muslims.
There are several accounts indicating one previously identified
character, namely that of "the analyst". This is apparent in his
analytic accounts of the future of Saudi Arabia and of Saddam Husain.
Dr al-Turabi firmly believed that the Saudi Islamists would change the
political situation in the country sooner or later. Dr al-Turabi's
unemotional analysis of the Iraqi president indicates the true picture
of a rather cool relationship between Dr al-Turabi and President
Hus a in.
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Another previously identified character is that of "the' prag-
matist". This is apparent in his account of relatively good relations
with "communist" China - the communists had been Dr al-Turabi's enemy.
In addition to this, Dr al-Turabi's account about his position toward
the development between Israel and the PLO - he opposed the peace
process, but refrained from accusing Arafat and the PLO on the ground
of "necessity". His acceptance of the concept of necessity seems to
stem from his pragmatic personality.
Dr al-Turabi's support for Arafat seems to have also derived from
his agentic friendship. For an agentic person, a good friendship is
the ability to come to the rescue of one's friend. In the case of Dr
al-Turabi, he appears to have been obliged to support Arafat who was
one of his closest friends and had many problems. This element also
comes across in his account of the goals of the uuiina - one of them is
'to establish a collective defence of Muslims.' As for Dr al-Turabi,
"to create the umEa" partly means "to come to the rescue of his fellow
Muslims".
His optimistic personality and an aspect of positive thinking have
repeatedly emerged in his account from 1932. Further evidence of this
element appears in his following account: 'the current bad situation
surrounding Muslims is perhaps good for us.' In his life story and
accounts, he tended to take advantage of seemingly negative events,
such as his prison life during the 1970s, and extracted maximum
returns from them.
Among the previous findings, his relatively invisible communal
elements of personality, which seek unity and cooperation, are also
present. This is apparent in his accounts about the umzna and the
PAIC. In his accounts since Chapter 2, Dr al-Turabi has repeated his
opinion against sectarianism, and has been taking a mediatory role
between different groups. It is important, however, to note that his
communal elements of personality are almost always affected by his
agentic motivations.
Concerning the new findings during the 1989 - 95 period, one new
character is thrown up, i.e. that of "the challenger" - an agentic
character. This comes across in Dr al-Turabi's accounts of his long-
term goals and plan., and of how he succeeded in organizing the PAIC
for the first time. Dr al-Turabi said that he wanted to "challenge"
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and correct the world order, which was currently controlled by some
powerful Western countries, because he believed that "justice" hardly
existed. The First PAIC was also held in the context of the challenge
against the Western hegemony over the Arab Islamic world. Without
such a context, Dr al-Turabi could not have united Islamist as well as
non-Islamist Arab movements around the world.
(3) NEW FINDINGS (1985-95)
Table 8.3.(3) suinniarizes new elenients of Dr al-Turabi's personality
which have emerged from the analysis of his account concerning foreign
matters of the Islamic state from the 1989 to 1995 period.
Table 8.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95j
emerged from the analysis of his account concerning
forei gn matters
Period Characters	 Possible adjectives
1989	 the challenger (a) challenging (a), defiant (a),
-	 courageous (a), critical (a),
1995	 patient (a), energetic (a)
'8.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TIJRABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOMENTS
Dr al-Turabi's personality elements stemming from the character of
"the expansionist" (representing the image of his account in this
chapter) seem to have affected the overall direction of the
government's foreign policy after 1989. This policy should be
understood within the concept of the umina (as Dr al-Turabi conceived
it), because Sudan is a state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-
Turabi. Dr al-Turabi explained his strategy on the development of the
Islainist movement (see Section 7.3), in terms of the movement shifting
from "stage 2" to "stage 3" (the stage of the umzna).
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(1) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In the Islamist dimension, Dr al-Turabi's personality had a strong
impact on Sudan's relations with other countries. His agentic per-
sonality elements which seek expansion, influence, and control, espe-
cially in terms of Islamism, seem to have negatively affected Sudan's
relations with the governments of Egypt, Libya, Uganda, Eritrea, Saudi
Arabia, Algeria, and Tunisia. The tension between the Sudanese
government and those governments was often associated with Dr al-
Turabi's relation to and influence on the Islamist oppositions in
those countries. Those countries accused the Sudanese government and
sometimes Dr al-Turabi personally, of spreading Islamism and of sup-
porting the Islamist oppositions in their countries. Even Libya was
sceptical of Dr al-Turabi and concerned about his influence on the
Libyan Islamists. Dr al-Turabi's clear goals and strong agentic per-
sonality seem to support these accusations.
There was also evidence of the impact of Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality on Sudan's relations with other countries in other dimen-
sions. For example, Dr al-Turabi's sense of superiority in terms of
the Islamization of society, which stems from his agentic personality,
appears to have resulted in the rather cool relations between Sudan
and Iran.	 Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic element of personality seems to
have affected Sudan's good relations with the PLO.
	 Dr al-Turabi's
agen'èic friendship towards Yassir Arafat appeared to have also
affected such relations.	 While Sudan was opposing the development
between the PLO and Israel, Sudan was always supportive towards Arafat
and the PLO. Dr al-Turabi's agentic elements of personality which
largely stem from his character of "the challenger" appear to have
affected Sudan's pro-Iraq stance since the Gulf Crisis. Sudan's pro-
Iraqi position projected Sudan as a defiant challenger against the
Western hegemony over the Arab and Islamic world. Dr al-Turabi used
this image of Sudan as the basis of the First PAIC.
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(2) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC)
Dr al-Turabi's agentic and communal elements of personality which
derive from some of his main characters: "the expansionist", "the
challenger", "the critic", "the believer", "the mediator", and "the
internationalist", seem to have affected the establishment and
activities of the PAIC. There is little doubt that the PAIC was
established to expand the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi to the
world. The PAIC is one of Dr al-Turabi's vehicles for creating an
Islamic community, the wizma, in the context of challenging the Western
powers whom Dr al-Turabi believes are the main sources of injustice in
the world order. Dr al-Turabi's communal elements of personality
(affected by agentic motivations) seem to have also influenced the
PAIC's activities of mediating and uniting different groups and move-
ments around the world. In his account, Dr al-Turabi pointed out the
inclusion of African Muslims and "non-Islamist" Arabs in the PAIC as
significant.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been to understand the Islamist movement
in Sudan.	 Compared to other Islamist movements in the world, the
Sudanese Islamist movement has had some unique aspects. The
researcher believes that the uniqueness of the Sudanese movement
stemmed from Dr Hassan al-Turabi's personality. For this reason, the
researcher chose a "psychological approach" based on personality
psychology. The researcher chose McAdams' life-story model of
identity as the basic theoretical foundation of the analysis of Dr al-
Turabi's personality. The researcher then developed his own approach
by using the life-story model. One of the unique aspects of the
researcher's approach is the distinction between historical informa-
tion (general description) and psychological information (Dr al-
Turabi's account). The significance of the latter lies in its
psychological "meaning" rather than its historical facts. Most of Dr
al-Turabi's accounts are regarded as psychological information and are
used to understand his personality alone.
It has become clear that, between 1932 and 1995, Dr al-Turabi's
personality was built around his Islamist identity, and was dominated
by a strong agentic trend. This agentic trend is apparent in his
predominantly agentic characters (imagoes) which had emerged from the
study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his account covering that
period (see Table 9.l.(l) and Table 9.1.(2)). 	 Although there were
some communal characters, it is important to note that Dr al-Turabi's
communal characters had some agentic aspects. This seems to have
stemmed from his strong agentic motivations, namely power motivation
and achievement motivation. The character of "the cooperator", for
example, is originally a communal character. In the case of Dr al-
Turabi, however, this character could not be regarded as purely com-
munal, because he played the role of "the cooperator" in order to
achieve his goals, i.e. the expansion of the Islamist movement.
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Table 9.(1): Dr al-Turabj's main characters (imagoes) (1932-95)
Period j Main characters (imagoes)
1932	 the
the
1995 the
the
the
the
the
the
the
the
the
the
critic (a),
	 the resistant (a),
passionate (a),	 the believer (a),
winner (a),	 the reformer (a),
revolutionary (a), the first person (a),
good planner (a),	 the hero (a),
competitor (a),	 the pragmatist (a),
expansionist (a),	 the persuader (a),
analyst (a),
	
the politician (a),
law-abider (a),	 the challenger (a),
man behind the scenes (a),
mediator (c),
	
the internationalist (c),
cooperator (c)
(a)	 = classified as agentic
(a)	 = classified as communal
Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but
some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.
Table 9.(2): Possible adjectives which describe
Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-95)
Period I Possible adjectives
1932	 critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a),
-	
defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a),
1995	 offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a),
faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a),
clever (a), patient (a), confident (a),
optimistic (i), innovative (a), progressive (a),
radical (a), originative (a), creative (a),
courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a),
ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a),
careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a),
overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a),
offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a),
calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a),
influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a),
analytic (a), law-abiding (a), rigid (a),
reasonable (a), challenging (a), energetic (a),
balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c),
kind (a), conciliatory (c), internationalist (C),
open (C), cooperative (c), supportive (c)
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Among Dr al-Turabi's main characters., there were some particularly
dominant characters in different periods of his life, i.e. his
dominant characters changed over the different periods. For example,
while some characters like "the revolutionary" and "the competitor"
were dominant in the 1964-69 period (Chapter 3), "the resistant" and
"the critic" became more dominant in the 1969-77 period (Chapter 4).
1.hi1e characters like "the expansionist" and "the hero" were dominant
in the 1977-85 period (Chapter 5), "the competitor" and "the winner"
became more dominant in the 1985-89 period (Chapter 6). In the 1989-
95 period (Chapters 7 and 8), characters like "the reformer" and "the
expansionist" were more dominant.
In addition to this, the image of Dr al-Turabi's account of each
period (or chapter) was represented by one particular character. "The
revolutionary", for example, represented the image of Dr al-Turabi's
account of the 1964-69 period, and "the resistant" for the 1969-77
period. These characters help us to understand the overall develop-
ment of the Islamist movement from 1964 to 1995. The Islamist move-
ment had been developing on the line of the images of "the revolution-
ary" (1964-69) - "the resistant" (1969-77) - "the expansionist" (1977-
85) - "the competitor" (1985-89) - "the reformer" and "the
expansionist" (1989-95). Table 9.1.(3) lists the characters
representing the image of Dr al-Turabi's account of each period
between 1964 and 1995.
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Table 9.(3): The characters representing each period
Period Heading of chapter	 Main character
1964-69 Beginning of the Islamist movement the revolutionary
Chap. 3
	
(a)
1969-77 Anti-regime struggle and learning 	 the resistant (a)
Chap. 4	 period
1977-85 The Islamist movement within the 	 the expansionist
Chap. 5
	
Nimairi regime: expansion and 	 (a)
practice
1985-89	 Transition period and power	 the competitor
Chap. 6	 struggle	 (a)
1989-95	 The Islamist movement as a state:
Chap. 7	 Consolidation within the borders 	 the reformer (a)
Chap. 8 Expansion beyond the border 	 the expansionist
(a)
Through the assessment of the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality
on the movement, the strong relationship between Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality and the key developments of the movement has become clear.
For example, his characters, such as "the revolutionary" and "the pas-
sionate" affected the positive involvement of the movement in the
October Revolution. His strong agentic elements of personality which
der?ved from his main characters, such as "the resistant", "the
revolutionary", and "the man behind the scenes" affected the move-
ment's anti-regime struggles. His agentic elements of personality
stemming from his strong motivation towards the expansion of the
Islamist movement, affected the movement's cooperation with Nimairi.
His personality elements stemming from his character of "the reformer"
affected the relatively moderate contents of the Sudanese criminal
law. His strong commitment to the creation of the umma and his per-
sonality elements stemming from his characters like "the expansionist"
and "the challenger" affected the quality of the international rela-
tions between Sudan and other countries.
To conclude, it would be possible to say that Dr al-Turabi's per-
sonality, to a great extent, determined the activities of the Islamist
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movement in Sudan. The researcher hopes and believes that his
psychological approach (which may be called a "socio-political per-
sonality analysis") has contributed to a better understanding of the
Islamist movement in Sudan.
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al-'Awwaliya' wa-al-Saalihiin wa_al_ cUlamaa' wa_al_uc raa' fii
al-Suudaan (The Book of the Stories of the Holy people, the Good
people, the Scholars, and the Poets in Sudan) (A1-Khartuum: Jaamicat
al-Khartuum, 1985).
5. sufi (suufii): 'Islamic mystic. The term should not be used, or
appropriated, by those mystics who are not Muslims or who do not root their
mysticism in the Koran fal-Qur'aan]. ... it derives from the Arabic word suE
[suufJ meaning 'wool', in reference to the garments of the early Muslim
ascetics.' Ian R. Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam (London: Curzon
Press, 1992), p. 236.
6. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p. 160.
7. The Qadiriya is a major sufi order named after Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (CAbd
al-Qaadir al-Jiilaanii) who established a reputation by his preaching in Bagh -
dad (Badaad) in the 12th century. Netton, A Popular Dictionary, p. 201.
8. Au S. Karrar, The Sufi Brotherhood in the Sudan (Illinois: Northwestern
Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 21-23.
9. IbnDayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p.128. " Wa-qiil saafara
ilaa taqalii wa-sallaka fii-haa CAbd Allaah al-Hainmaal jadd al-Shaykh Hamad
walad al-Turaabii. " "Sallakà" is the second-form verb and means "he
clarified". "Jadd" means "grandfather".
10. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p. 162.
11. The Nandi is 1itera11y, "the One who is Rightly Guided" ... [andj is a
figure of profound esehatological significance in Islam and a title often
claimed by diverse leaders throughout Islamic history.' Netton, A Popular Dic-
tionary, p. 156.
12. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p. 164.
13. Ibid., pp. 166-173.
14. Ibid., p. 172.
15. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi at his Popular Arab and Islamic Conference
(PAIC) office in Khartoum, 7, 9, 14, and 16 May 1994, and an interview with
Professor Dafalla al-Turabi at his office in the University of Khartoum, 24
January 1995.
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16. See Appendix (1): The Turabi family.
17. See Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan.
18. Dafalla (Hassan's brother) came to Wad al-Turabi with his mother in 1943.
When she died of a pregnancy related illness in a hospital near Wad al-Turabi,
Hassan and his father were in El-Roseires. Interview with Professor Dafalla
al-Turabi, 24 January 1995.
19. Hassan's eldest brother, Muhammad (Muhammad), was a teacher in Rufaa.
Ibid.
20. See Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident.
21. When Hassan was in the second grade of the secondary school, Dafalla was a
lecturer at the faculty of engineering in the Gordon Memorial Collage.
Dafalla advised Hassan that the faculty of law at the GMC took new students
every two years, and unfortunately there would be no recruitment in two years'
time, therefore if he wanted to study law as soon as possible he must finish
his secondary school in one year's time, otherwise he had to wait another
year. Hassan asked the headmaster of the secondary school, Mr Lewis Brown, to
allow him to skip the third grade. Mr Brown gave Hassan his permission, but
told Hassan that he should do it on his own responsibility. Interview with
Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, 24 January 1995.
22. See Appendix (4): Development of the GMC.
23. Arthur L. Lowrie (ed.), Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round
Table with Dr Hasan Turabi (Florida: the World & Islam Studies Enterprise,
1993), pp. 66-67. This round table was actually held on 10 May 1992.
24. Interview with Dr Hassan al-Turabi, 7 May 1994.
25. The Maliki school is one of the four main law schools of Sunni Islam,
named after the founder Nalik b. Anas (Naalik b. 'Arias). Netton, A Popular
Dictionary, p. 159.
26. Interview with Dr al-Turbi, 7 May 1994.
27.Ibid.
28. Lowrie, Islam, Democracy, p. 46.
29. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 7 Nay 1994.
30. Although Dr al-Turabi did not reject the researcher's small gift, he
reluctantly accepted it mentioning his father's behaviour. This happened when
the researcher held out a small gift in front of him before starting the first
interview on 7 May 1994.
31. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 7 Nay 1994.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
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35. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 9 May 1994.
36. Ibid.
37. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 25 January 1995.
38. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi, 7, 9, 14, and 16 May 1994.
39. According to Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, his father did not necessarily
oppose female education. In those days, educational oppertunities were very
limited not only for girls, but also for boys. Although his sisters could not
receive official education, all of his half sisters (daughters of his father's
second wife and third wife) received college level education. Interview with
Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, 24 January 1995.
40. See Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident.
41. This was his first encounter with communist ideology. The second
encounter was in his college period. The beginning of the development of Dr
al-Turabi's antagonistic attitude against the communists will be examined in
(c) Higher education.
42. Lewis Willian Brown (1908-1994) was the headmaster of Hantoub Secondary
School from 1946 to 1956.
43. Nimairi later carried out the 1969 military coup and became the President
of Sudan.
44. See Appendix (4): Development of the GMC.
45. The faculty had different departments. Hassan chose one of the depart-
ments of Western law, but also attended an optional course in the department
of Islamic law. He was awarded a prize for work in Islamic law during the
period from January 1954 to March 1955. 	 The University College of Khartoum
incorporating the Gordon Memorial College and the Kitchener School of Medi-
cine: \Report and Accounts (to 31st December,l955) (London: Blades East &
Blades, p. 19.
46. The Islamic Liberation Movement (the ILM) was set up by Babikir Karrar
(Baabikir Karraar) in 1949.
47. According to Dr al-Turabi, after the establishment of the ILN, Karrar
rejected communism because of its atheism, but he did not abandon his
socialist ideas. He later left the Islamic movement in the college and formed
a socialist-oriented organization.
48. The researcher has not found any other reference to this statement of Nas-
ser' s.
49. Dr al-Turabi emphasized this point.
50. The "actual leader" was Dr al-Turabi's perception. He became the leader
of the movement in 1964.
51. A1-Ghazali (1058-1111) Iran,Iraq,etc; a great Islamic philosopher: Abduh
(1849-1905) Egypt; a famous reformer: Al-Nawdudi (1903-1979) India,Pakistan;
the founder of the Islamic Society: Al-Banna (1906-1949) Egypt; the founder
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of the Muslim Brotherhood: Qutb (1906-1966) Egypt; a major ideologue of the
Muslim Brotherhood. See Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations.
52. The law studied was, of course, western law and not Islamic law.
53. Sadiq is Muhammad Ahmad al-Mandi's great grandson. He was born on 25
December 1936 and later became the prime minister.
54. See Appendix (4): Development of the GMC. The University of Khartoum was
established in 1956.
55. Dr al-Turabi said that he met Sadiq al-Mandi in 1954 for the first time
when Sadiq was in the University College of Khartoum as a first year student.
56. According to Sadiq al-Nandi, the reason for the transfer was administra-
tive trouble with the college authority and not the problem Dr al-Turabi men-
tioned. Sadiq entered the school of science in the college in 1953, but did
not attend the first and second terms and attended only the third term. When
the third term ended in 1954, despite the initial agreement between the col-
lege authority and Sadiq that he could move to the second year, the authority
told him that he had to repeat the first year. However, the authority offered
an alternative of going to Oxford. Sadiq accepted the offer, took the
entrance examination of the University of Oxford, and entered the university
in 1954.	 Interview with Sadiq al-Mandi at his house in Omdurman, 19 January
1995.
57. The Umma Party was led by Abd al-Rahman al-Nandi (cAbd al-Rahmaan al-
Mandii) up to 1959 and by Siddiq al-Nahai (Siddiiq al-Nandii) up to 1961. The
party then split into two sections. One was led by al-Hadi al-Mandi (al-
Haadii al-Mandii) up to 1970 and the other by Sadiq al-Mandi. After the death
of al-Hadi, the party was re-united and has been led by Sadiq up to the time
of writing. The core of the party is the al-Mandi family.
58. Najib was the initial leader of the free officer movement which carried
out the military coup and overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952. He
brokered the establishment of the National Unionist Party (NUP) in Sudan in
October 1952. The NUP supported the union between Egypt and Sudan.
59. The Arabic word 'Ansaar means "followers". In Sudan, the term particu-
larly refers to the followers of the al-Nandi family.
60. The Mandist movement in Sudan was a powerful Islamic movement which
started when Muhammad Ahmad (Sadiq's great grandfather) declared himself as
the Mandi in 1881 and resulted in the establishment of the Mandist state.
61. The group was composed of members of various nationalities, such as Iraqi,
Jordanian, Egyptian, and Sudanese.
62. In the early 1950s, Arafat was an undergraduate student at the University
of Cairo and was studying civil engineering. He later formed Fatah (Fath) in
1959 and became the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1969.
63. Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the
Palestinian Revolution (London: W.H. Allen, 1990), p. xxiii.
64. Gowers and Walker support general idea. 'None of the three Palestinians
[Arafat, Zoheir al-Alami and Salah Khalaf) could speak much English, ...'
Ibid., p. 24.
258
Chapter 2
65. The official name of the movement was the Muslim Brotherhood adopted in
1954. However, Dr al-Turabi avoided the use of this name, because he did not
want the movement to be seen as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
See Sub-section (C) Higher education.
66. Al-Rashid (two years senior to Hassan) graduated from the faculty of law
at the GMC in 1955, joined the National Unionist Party in 1965, and later
became the attorney general under the Nimairi regime in 1983.
67. There were very few Sudanese staff in the university.
68. Hassan and Wisal were married later in 1961, and she has been Hassan's
only wife. Mrs al-Turabi described Hassan as having been a very intelligent
teacher. According to her, he was quiet, but quite strict, and he did not
accept any kind of stupidness and laziness. 	 Interview with Mrs al-Turabi, 20
April 1994.
69. Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub (Muhammad 'Ahmad Mahjuub), a former Prime Minister
(65-66,67-68,68-69), wrote in his autobiographical book that: 'A young lawyer,
Rashid Tahir Bakr, had been trained in my Chambers and I had made him my
junior partner. t Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial: Reflections on
Arab and African Politics (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974), p. 183.
70. Some may have objection to this, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account and is
a part of his "life story".
71. According to Wisal, the marriage between Hassan and her was semi-arranged
by her mother and brother (Sadiq). During Hassan's London period, Wisal's
mother met Hassan in Britain when she visited her son, Sadiq, who was in
Oxford. Wisal's mother was very much impressed by Hassan, and when she came
back to Sudan, she told Wisal that Hassan was a very pious man and often
quoted the Koran. In those days, in general, members of the Mandi family
chose their partners within the family group. However, at that time, Sadiq
believed it right that a well-educated and brilliant Sudanese man should be
able to marry a woman from the Mandi family. This idea was accepted by other
family members, partly because such an inter-family marriage might strengthen
the Máhdi family. Interview with Mrs al-Turabi, 20 April 1994.
72. Al-Tahir was released in 1963.
73. According to Dr al-Turabi, after al-Tahir's imprisonment, Muhammad was
unofficially undertaking the leadership role. He served until 1964 as the
official leader.
74. See Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution.
75. NcAdams, The Stories, p. 90.
76. Ibid., p. 13.
77. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
78. Parents are important sources of images. 	 Ibid., p. 60.
79. Family, society, and culture are all major sources of images. Religion is
also an important source of images. Ibid., pp. 60-64.
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80. See Diagram l.2.(3): A simplified structure of the life-story model. Also
see Section 1.2.3.
81. Religion is an important source of ideological setting. McAdams, The
Stories, pp. 80-82.
82. See Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations.
83. See Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution.
84. Main characters or imagoes often reflect one's ideology, and are often
fashioned on models provided by significant people. In the case of Dr al-
Turabi, a character like "the reformer" may be a reflection of his ideology.
Another character like "the mediator" may be fashioned on the model provided
his father. "The believer" may be a result of the influences of both ideology
and his father.	 McAdams, The Stories, p. 130.	 Also see Diagram l.2.(3) and
Section 1.2.3.
85. McAdams, The Stories, p. 288.
86. According to McAdams, a person's identity is the story itself. See
McAdams, The Person, p. 759.
87. In practice, the same numbers were allowed to be used, e.g., there might
be three "l"s.
88. PAlO stands for the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference. 	 See Chapter 8.
NIF stands for the National Islamic Front.
	 See Chapter 6.
89. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 May 1994.
90. James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Niddle East (US: 1-lar-
per Collins, 1990), pp. 92-93 and 103.
91. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki at his home in Khartoum, 21 May 1994.
92. Interview with Mr al-Imam at his office in Khartoum, 6 February 1995.
93. Iterview with Mr Hamdi at his office in Khartoum, 9 January 1995.
94. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki, 21 May 1994.
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Notes: Chapter 3
1. Hassan's name was already on the list of the teaching staff of the
university calendar 1962-1963 as well as the calendar 1964-1965. University
of Khartoum Calendar 1962-1963 (Government Printing Press), p. 42; and
University of Khartoum Calendar 1964-1965, p. 45.
2. The terni "the Islainist movement" is used to refer to the Islamic movement
led by Dr al-Turabi after November 1964.
3. According to Dr al-Turabi, the youth leader of the movement, Au Abdalla
Yaqub (cAli cAbd Allaah Yac quub), took the initiative of the anti-communist
campaign in November 1965. At that time, Dr al-Turabi was in the Blue Nile
region and later came back to Khartoum to join the campaign. Interview with
Dr al-Turabi, 14 May 1994.
4. Nimairi (Numayri±) later promoted himself up.to
 Field Marshal. See Appen-
dix (7): Military ranks.
5. In detail, see Tim Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of
Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985 (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 217-220.
6. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Nandi, 19 January 1995. According to him, there
was a disagreement concerning the coalition of the government between his
father, al-Siddiq al-Nandi (al-Siddiiq al-Mandii), who was the leader of the
ansar ('ansaar) which included the Umzva Party, and Abdalla Khalil. While al-
Siddiq al-Mabdi adovocated the coalition with the National Unionist Party
(NUP), Abdalla Khalil insisted the coalition with the People's Democratic
Party (PDP).
7. Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun:Political Power in Africa and the Coup
d'Etat ( London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), pp. 246-253.
8. For example, Khalid states the date on which a student was shot dead as "19
Octobe- 1964", while many other scholars state "2]. October 1964". 	 See
Nansou Khalid, The Government They Deserve (London: Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 201
9. When Yusuf Hasan wrote his article in 1967, he was the Director of the
Sudan Research Unit at the Faculty of Arts in the University of Khartoum. He
used several Arabic daily newspapers as the sourses. Yusuf Fadi Hasan, 'The
Sudanese Revolution of October 1964',in The Journal of!odern African Studies,
vol.5, no.4, 1967, pp. 491-509.
10. Ibid.
11. First, The Barrel, p. 261.
12. Ibid.	 Also see Niblock, Class and Power, p. 227.
13. Niblock, Class and Power, p. 227.
14. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan
(London: Gray Seal, 1991), p. 89.
15. Niblock, Class and Power, p. 225.
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16. Hasan, 'The Sudanese Revolution', p. 507.
17. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 78.
18. The US Government, Near East/South Asia Report: Muslim Brotherhood Move-
ment in Sudan 1944-1969 (US: JPRS Publications, 1985), p. 73. This is an
English translation of
liasan Makkii, Harakat al-'Ikhwaan al-Nuslimiin fii al-Sudan, 1944-1969
(The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Sudan, 1944-1969) (Al-Khartuum: Jaamicat
al-Khartuum, 1982).
19. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 76.
20. Ibid.
21. The researcher regards the ICF as a branch organization of the movement
since its establishment. The diagram was comfirmed by Dr al-Turabi himself in
the researcher's interview on 16 May 1994. However, it seems that el-Affendi
regards the ICF, at least between 1964 and 1966, as more than a branch organi-
zation. See el-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, pp. 67 and 86.	 Also see Appen-
dix (8): Chan ges of the organization's structure.
22. Interview with Mr Yassin al-Imam, 6 February 1995. According to al-Imam,
Dr al-Turabi and himself moved around Sudan for several months, calling for
people to participate in the ICF. Dr al-Turabi drove a car, which belonged to
the ICF, and met many people in many places. Al-Imam was impressed with Dr
al-Turabi's adaptability to the different environments.
23. The US Government, Near East, p. 76. This is Hassan Makki's description.
Dr al-Turabi gives a more detailed breakdown of what happened (see Dr al-
Turabi's account).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 78.
26. I)1d.
27. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 78.	 According to el-Affendi, the
main reason for al-Tahir's resignation was 'his opposition to all the major
political stances of the ICF.' Ibid.	 Yassin Omar al-Imam also pointed out
that al-Tahir was acting as if he was opposing to all the official policies of
the movement. According to al-Imam, for example, al-Tahir opposed earlier
elections, while the policy of the movement preferred earlier elections.
Interview with Mr al-Imam, 6 February 1995.
28. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 86.
29. Ibid., p. 88.
30. The contents of this sub-section are Dr al-Turabi's views and perception
of the development of the movement between 1964 and 1969. Interview with Dr
al-Turabi, 14 May 1994.
31. The issue of the liberation of the Islamic movement from the Egyptian
influence will be discussed in the next section.
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32. The symposium was officially permitted by the military regime. According
to el-Affendi: 'The regime decided that all restrictions on free speech would
be lifted for this debate.' El-Af fend!, Turabi's Revolution, p. 71.
33. According to Makkii: '[Dr al-Turabi] said "The issue of the south is a
constitutional one in the first place and aggression exists against the free-
dam of other people in the north and in the south alike. However, specific
circumstances have caused the situation in the south to escalate to a military
rebellion."'	 The US Government, Near East, p. 69.	 In addition to this,
to quote Alier: 'The view expressed in those debates was that the problem of
the South could not be solved without first establishing a deiiocratic system
of government in the country as a whole.' Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too
Nany Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990), p. 25.
34. Some may object to this point, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
35. Nakkii describes Dr al-Turabi's role in the revolution as follows: 'The
events of October elevated the status of the adherents of Islam, because the
main roles devolved upon them. Al-Turabi's stock also rose and his name
became brilliant, starting with the symposia, his support for the students
under the circumstances of the first revolution and his supervision of the
transport of the wounded, proceeding through his leadership of the Professors'
Council in the parade of mourning, the collective resignation, his contacts
with the politicians and his maneuvers, and up to the military figures' fall
from power, which resulted in the expansion of political opportunity on his
behalf.' The US Government, Near East, p. 70.
36. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
37. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
38. The contents of this sub-section are based on the interviews with Dr al-
Turabi on 14 and 16 Nay 1994.
39. According to Hassan Nakki (Hasan Nakkii), The Islamic Charter (with no
publication details) was published twice in early and late 1965. The charter
had foür chapters and Chapter Two stated 'the nature of the government would
be Koranic.' The US Government, Near East, p. 74.
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Notes: Chapter 4
1. Wisal was imprisoned once in 1970, when Niinairi attacked Aba island. So
her imprisonment in 1976 was for the second time. According to Wisal, because
she was a sister of Sadiq al-Mandi and the wife of Dr al-Turabi, Nimairi
feared her potential capability to mobilize the ansar, the Umraa Party, and the
Islamist movement. She was sent to a jail in Omdurman and stayed for 9 and a
half months from July 1976. Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi, 25 May 1994.
2. The dates are based on Dr al-Turabi's official prison record. Interview
with Dr al-Turabi, 25 January 1995.
3. Shaban is one of the names of a Muslim calender month.
4. Abd al-Rahim Nahmud Hamdi was imprisoned in 1969 together with Dr al-.
Turabi. According to him, inside the prison he advocated cooperation with
Nimairi, but the other members rejected it. Hamdi was released from the
prison in 1970 and officially resigned from the movement. Interview with Mr
Hamdi, 9 January 1995.
5. Interview with Mr Amin Hassan Omar at his office in Khartoum, 5 May 1994,
and interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 Nay 1994.
6. Ibid.
7. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 104.
8. Ibid.	 Woodward also pointed out the strong link between the coup and the
SCP: 'Relations did indeed begin quite well, with the SCP represented in the
new Revolutionary Command Council and the latter appointing a number of promi-
nent party figures to the cabinet, . . . 	 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898 - 1989:
The Unstable State (London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1990), p. 138.
9. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 105.
10. I^id.
11. Ibid., p. 109.	 However, Sadiq al-Mandi said that he was the head of the
NF from the begining and al-Hindi was his deputy. Interview with Mr al-Nandi,
19 January 1995.
12. Al-Hadi al-Nandi was Sadiq al-Mandi's uncle. From October 1961 to March
1970, al-Hadi and Sadiq were competing with each other for the leadership of
the Uinzzia party and the ansar. As a result, al-Hadi led the Hadi sect and
Sadiq led the Sadiq sect.
13. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 105.
14. Mahgoub, Jernocracy, p. 237.
15. Ibid., p. 238.
16. According to Niblock, there were two different groups within the Communist
party, "conditionalists" and "cooperators". The former, the majority group,
led by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub (cAbd al-Khaliiq Nahjuub) insisted on conditional
support for the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The latter, the minority
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group, led by Muawiya Ibrahim (Mu c aawiiya 'Ibraahiim) called for unconditional
support for the RCC. In 1970, the RCC was trying to eliminate the "con-
ditionalists". Niblock, Class and Power, pp. 253-254.
17. Ibid., p. 256.
18. Ibid.
19. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 107.	 Nimairi always said the SStJ was
not a party. Tim Niblock, personal communication.
20. Niblock, Class and Power, p. 277.
21. Ahinad Osman Makki ('Ahniad cuthmaan Makkii), Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii),
Babikir Musa (Baabikir Muusaa), and Mustafa Osman Ismail (Mustafaa cUthmaan
'Ismaa c iil) were among them. Interview with Mr Babikir Musa at his office in
Omdurman, 19 January 1995, and interview with Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail at his
office in Khartoum, 22 January 1995.
22. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki, 21 May 1994.
23. When Makki entered the University of Khartoum in 1970, Dr al-Turabi was in
jail. Makki and other members thought that it was their duty to gain Dr al-
Turabi's release from jail. They carried out demonstrations and strikes in
March 1971. As a result of these activities, Nakki and his colleagues were
dismissed from the university. However, later in the year, they were allowed
to re-start their student careers. Makki was elected a member of the execu-
tive committee of the student union. In 1972, Makki met Dr al-Turabi as a
leader of the student movement. Ibid.
24. Makki told the researcher that he was impressed by Dr al-Turabi's patience
and optimism, and remembered Dr al-Turabi's words: "There is a job to do."
Makki also told the researcher of an epidode relating to Dr al-Turabi. One
day before the 1973 uprising, Makki had an appointment with Dr al-Turabi and
visited a place in Omdurnian. When he and his friend, Ahmad Osman Makki
('Ahma cUtlijilsan Makkii), arrived at the place to meet, an old dirty taxi
came. When they saw inside the taxi, they realized that the driver was Sadiq
al-Mandi and Dr al-Turabi wassitting on the seat next to Sadiq. Dr al-Turabi
was a man who moved around by himself and not a man who just stayed and used
other people. Ibid.
25. Ibid. A former minister under Nimairi did not remember this uprising.
Interview with a former minister, 18 July 1994.	 There are many publications
covering the period between 1969 and 1977, but few describe the details of the
event, except for the publications written by the Islamists themselves.
26. Al-Afandi participated in the Shaban uprising when he was a secondary
school student and was detained a day. Interview with Dr Abd al-Wahhab al-
Afandi at his office in London, 20 April 1994.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Interview with Dr Makki, 21 May 1994.
30. Ibid. Makki said that he felt he became part of al-Turabi's family.
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31. Interview with Dr al-Afandi, 20 April 1994.
32. Ibid.
33. See Appendix (8): Changes of the organizations structure and Diagram
A.9.(3): The third structure (after 1974).
34. Interview with Dr al-Afandi, 20 April 1994.
35. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 109.
36. Al-Afandi uses the spelling "el-Affendi" in his publications. See Preface
for the rules of spelling employed in this thesis.
37. El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, pp. 109-110.
38. While Muhammad Osinan al-Mirghani (Nuammad cuthmaan al-Miiranii) sup-
ported Nimairi, Sharif al-Hindi did not support Nimairi. Interview with Mr
Sadiq al-Mandi, 19 January 1995. Also see el-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution,
p. 113.
39. According to Sadiq al-Mandi, after the national reconciliation in 1977,
the Umma Party and the DtJP changed their mind and decided to oppose the
Nimairi regime again, while the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi decided
to support Nimairi.	 The Umina Party initially agreed to support Nimairi, on
condition that he adopted a democratic programme. However, because Nimairi
did not meet the condition, the Umzna Party decided to oppose him. Interview
with Mr Sadiq al-Nandi, 19 January 1995
40. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 Nay 1994.
41. According to el-Affendi, Sadiq went to London in 1974. El-Affendi,
Turabi's Revolution, p. 109.
42. See Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure and Diagram
A.9.(3: The third structure (after 1974).
43. According to a former minister under Nimairi, some people argued that the
Islamist movement should not continue to exist as an organized body if the
Islamists joined the SSU. However, Nimairi did not listen to them. Interview
with a former minister at Durham in Britain, 18 July 1994.
44. Dr al-Turabi described the conditions inside prison as follows: 'There was
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your freedom is curtailed. But it was very pleasant there in every respect.
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told the researcher that life outside the prison was too busy for her to do
her private things, and that life inside the prison was quite comfortable and
she could have time for herself. Therefore, she said as a joke that she
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The declaration states that: 'Repeal of the "September 1983 Laws" and all
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28 .Ibid.
29. The Guardian, 23 and 29 December 1988.
30. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Nandi, 19 January 1995.
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33. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mandi, 19 January 1995.
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35. The Guardian, 31 December1988.
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45. The Guardian, 23 and 27 February 1989.
275
Chapter 6
46. Sudan Studies, no.6, June 1989, p. 23.
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54. Interview with Mr al-Imam, 6 February 1995.
55. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.
56. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994, 14 and 25 January 1995.
57. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
58. The word "national" here is the translation of the Arabic word qawmi (qaw-
mu). The National Islamic Front = Al-Jabha al-'Islaamiiya al-Qawmiiya.
59. There is an Islamic group called the "Muslim Brotherhood" in current
Sudan. This group was once part of the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.
El-Affendi, Turabi's Rcvolution, p. 119.
60. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.
61. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
62. Sme may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
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64. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
65. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.
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Islam, Democracy, p. 22.
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Khartoum, 4 February 1995.
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Books, 1994), pp. 76 and 94.
36. Ahmed, 'Sudan', p. 77.
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al-Turabi.
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39. Sudanow, October 1984, p. 29.
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44. Ibid.
45. Interview with Dr Ahniad All Abdalla, 10 January 1995.
46. Ibid.
47. A senior lecturer in Islamic Law when Dr al-Turabi was a lecturer in Pub-
lic Law and Administration in the Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum
in the early 1960s. He has been a prominent supporter of an Islamization
programme. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.	 His name was also
on the 1984 name-list of the SSB of the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan.
48. Joined the Islamic movement around 1960 when he was an intermediate school
student. He met Dr al-Turabi for the first time in 1966. He graduated from
the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum in 1970. He joined the
Tadamon Islamic Bank in January 1983. He became the Secretary General of the
central SSB in March 1992. Interview with Dr Ahinad Abdalla, 10 January 1995.
Dr al-Turabi said that Dr Abdalla was the brightest leader in the field of
Islamic banking. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.
49. Joined the Islamist movement when he was a student. He worked at the IMF
before. Currently the govenor of the central bank. Interview with Dr al-
Turabi, 14 January 1995.
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University of Khartoum. Dr al-Turabi said that Professor Awad still regarded
himself as an Islamist. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.
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at the Bank of Sudan, 25 January 1995. Dr al-Turabi said that Dr Birayma was
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al-Turabi, 14 January 1995. His name can be found in the 1984 name-list of
the SSB of the FIBS.
55. A DUP member and a grand judge. 	 Dr al-Turabi said that Shaikh al-Jazuli
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January 1995.
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Turabi said that Professor Hajj Nur graduated from Khartoum University, and he
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Appendix (1): The Turabi family
The following diagram shows the members of the Turabi family.
Diagram A.1.(l): The Turabi family
CAbd Allaah	 Nafiisa
(d.1986)	 I	 (d.1943)
I C/thc Allaah	 The Second Wife
21	 13]	 I
CAbd al-I-Ialiim CAbd al-Salaam Nuc aawiya cAbd al-Khaalif two
(Saudi Ara.) PDF(d.1994) 	 sisters
CAbd Allaah	 The Third Wife
i i	 2	 3
'Ismaac iil	 'Ishaaq	 Yacquub	 two sisters
I	 21	 -
	
Muhammad	 DafC Allaah	 four sisters
International	 Khartoum Univ.
African Univ.	 engineering
Arabic	 (b.1/6/27)'
(b.1922)	 Hasan	 Wisaal
{b.1/2/32} 2	{b.25/7/39}
	
2	 (1)	 (2)
Saàiiq	 ciJasam	 _-cUmar	 Salmaa	 'Asmaat	 'Amaama
{b.20/lO/61}{b.30/8/65}{b.15/8/75} {b.12/11/66}{b.14/12/68}{b.5/8/78}
Sources: Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi at her house
in Khartoum, 25 May 1994.
Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, at his office
in Khartoum, 24 January 1995.
Dr al-Turabi's father, Abdalla ( cAbd Allaah), had three wives and
18 children. Dr al-Turabi was born as his third son. Dr al-Turabi's
father and mother are dead, but his father's second and third wives
are alive.
Dr alTurabi*s eldest brother, Muhammad (Muhammad), is a lecturer
in Arabic at the International African University in Khartoum and his
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second brother, Dafalla (Daf C
 Allaah), is a professor in engineering
at Khartoum University. Dr al-Turabi's half brother, Nuawiya
(Muc aawiya), is working in Saudi Arabia and another half brother, Abd
al-Khalif ( cAbd al-Khaalif) is dead. Abd al-Khalif joined the Popular
Defence Force (PDF) and died in a battle in the South on 22 February
1994, while he was a student at the faculty of engineering in the
University of Khartoum.
Dr al-Turabi himself has a wife and 6 children (3 male and 3
female). According to Dr al-Turabi, his children have not normally
used their family name "al-Turabi" in their schools, because the usage
of the name causes either too much trouble or too much respect. Some
of his brothers and sisters have been doing the same thing, he added.
To the researcher's knowledge, none of Dr al-Turabi's brothers or sons
has a high ranking official position in either the current regime or
the security apparatus.
Notes:
1. The official birthday is 1 January 1927, but the real birthday
is 1 June 1927.
2. The official birthday is 1 January 1932, but the real birthday
is 1 February 1932.
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Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools
in the northern Sudan
The table indicates the educational situation from the 1930s to the
1950s in Sudan. The attendance numbers in schools indicate the fact
that Hassan was brought up in a good environment and a privileged
home. The numbers also indicate that girls rarely attended schools in
those days.
Table A.2.(l): Attendance numbers in schools
in the northern Sudan
	
1936	 1939	 1944
Elementary	 boys 12,402	 n.a.	 19,381
education :	 girls	 2,927	 6,681
1948
26,074
n.a.
(1939-43)
Intermediate
education
(1944-47)
Secondary
education
(1948-50)
boys
girls
* boys
girls
1,847
114
2,255
313
801
37
1951	 1952	 1953	 1954
	
1955
Higher	 (the GNC)
education
	
317 I 492 J 531 I 601 I 580
(1951-55)
(year) = Hassan's study period
* excluding the number of Junior secondary education
Source: Mohamed 0. Beshir, Educational Development in the Sudan,
1898-1956, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969),
pp. 202 and 208.
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Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident
The Rufaa (Rufaa c a) incident was a riot which occurred in 1946, and
was led by Mahmud Nuhaniniad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the leader of
the Republican Party / Brothers. The riot resulted in the destruction
of the local government office building of the Anglo-Egyptian author-
ities in El-Hasaheisa.
The reason for Taha's action against the Anglo-Egyptian authority
was complicated. An-Na'im (al_Na c lim) explains the reason in the
introduction of his translation of The Second Message of Islam, a book
which was originally written by Mahmud Taha. To quote an-Na'im:
'In that year (1946] the colonial government of Sudan added
section 284A to the Sudan Penal Code forbidding the practice
of a severe type of female circumcision known as Pharaonic
circumcision (removing all the external genital organs of
girls). While vigorously opposed to the practice itself, the
Republican Party resisted the introduction of penal measures
as not only ineffective, but actually counter-productive.
The organization maintained that such deep-rooted social
customs could not be changed by imposing criminal sanc-
tion;. . ."
Taha opposed the authorities because he did not like the "way" in
which they were acting. 1-le used force to oppose them. To quote an-
Na'im again:
'Following speeches on the issue at a Friday prayer meeting
in the main mosque of the town [Rufaa c a], Ustadh Mahmoud
(Nahmuud Taha) led thousands of men across the Blue Nile into
the administrative center of the district, Hassaheissa [al .
-Hasaa Hiiaa], and succeeded in freeing the accused woman on
the spot.'2
Notes:
1. Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im (trans.)), The
Second Message of Islam (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1987), p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 4.
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Appendix (4): Development of the GMC
The following diagram is intended to show the development of the Gor-
don Memorial College from 1902 to 1956.
Diagram A.4.(l): Development of the GMC
The GMC (1902)
decision for the GMC to be a secondary
I institution (1924)
primary and military schools were removed
The new GMC (higher education) (1945)I '- secondary element was transferred
I
(Academic year:Jan.-Dec.)
The University College of Khartoum (1951)
1	 (Academic year:July-Narch)
The Kitchener School	 I The GMC
of Medicine
(opened in 1924)
The University of Khartoum (1956)
1902/Nov./8 The Gordon Memorial College was opened by Lord
Kitchener.
1924	 : The GMC was made a wholly secondary institution.
The primary and military schools were removed.
1945	 : The new GMC, with the status of a university college
(higher education), was born. Its secondary element
was transferred to Wadi Seidna (1945) and to
Hantoub-(1946).
1951/Sep./1 : The ordinance establishing the University College of
Khartoum came into force. The GMC and the Kitchener
School of Medicine were incorporated into the
University College of Khartoum, which was affiliated
to the University of London.
1956	 : The University of Khartoum. was established.
Sources: Gordon Memorial College Calendar 1950 and University
College of Khartoum Calendar 1952 - 54 (Khartoum: Middle
East Press) in Sudan Archive, Durham.
301
Appendix (5)
Appendix (5): Dr alTurabi's inspirations
When Hassan was in the GMC (1951-55), he studied the literature of
famous Islamic thinkers, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali (Muhammad al-
Ghazaalii), Muhammad Abduh (Muhammad cAbduh), Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi
('Abuu al_ t Ac laa al-Mawduudii), Hassan al-Banna (Hasan al-Bannaa'),
and Sayyid Qutb (Sayyid Qutb). 	 The researcher asked Dr al-Turabi
whether he was particularly influenced by any one of them. He
replied: 'It is very difficult to say, because each person had unique
aspects. For example, al-Ghazali was a traditional scholar, but he was
very open towards contemporary issues; Abduh had experiences of
Western culture; Mawdudi was very objective; al-Banna was partly sufi
and partly Islamist; Qutb was socialist in his earlier period."
The following are brief examinations of the similarities in
ideologies between these Islamic thinkers and Dr al-Turabi.
(a) Ghazali (1058-1111), Iran, Iraq, etc.
According to Rahnema:
'Ghazali identified the clergy and the ruling class as the
two forces that perpetuated the plight of the people.
Ghazali abandoned any thought of armed resistance or revolu-
tion against a tyrannical ruler. Ghazali separated the first
stage, of reawakening Islamic fervour, from the second stage,
of radical political action and change. While he rejected
" revolutionary change as a means of redressing socio-political
problems, he considered intellectual dissent and reform as
permissible and necessary.'2
Dr al-Turabi seenis to share Ghazali's critical attitude towards
the clergy and his emphasis on re-education of the people,
intellectual dissent, and intellectual reform. Dr al-Turabi says
that: 'the ulama should have a role in the procedure, not as the
ultimate authority determining what the law is, but as advisors in the
shura to enlighten the Muslims . . . ' He also advocates the gradual
development of the Islamist movement towards an Islamic state, as he
separates "horizontal development (stage 1)" and "vertical development
(stage 2)". According to Dr al-Turabi, the current Sudanese state was
in "stage 2".
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(b) Abduh (1849-1905), Egypt
According to Haddad:
'Abduh was a man of complexity and even contradiction.
Because his thought was a combination of the new and the old,
at times it appeared convoluted and vague. Deeply critical
of much Islamic orthodoxy prevalent at the time, he in fact
departed little from tradition in his writings and did manage
to work with the religious establishment.	 Dedicated to
change, he was in the end not a radical reformer but an
educator who felt keenly the need for consensus. 	 ... In
many ways his work amounted to a re-interpretation of Islam
for the modern world. ... It is also clear that he was
impressed with the role that democracy plays in providing
public constrains on the ruler, hence his emphasis on shura.
Abduh's efforts to infuse the Islamic heritage with
modern ideas ...
El-Affendi points out that: 'He [Dr al-Turabi] sits astride mod-
ernity and tradition, pragmatism and idealism, calculation and
faith.' 6 Dr al-Turabi emphasizes the re-evaluation of fiqh (fiqh:
traditional Islamic law) and positive application of ijtihad
('ijtihaad: interpretation). This appears in his books, such as The
Method of the IslamIc Jurisprudence and the Islamic Legislation and
The Issues of Reform: A Fundamental Methodological Direction. 7 Dr al-
Turabi's acceptance of the ideal of democracy and his emphasis on
shura (shuuraa: consultation), which was made clear in his book, The
Issues of Freedom and Unity; Consultation and Democracy; the Dialogue
of Religion and Art, 8 may be one of the results of Abduh's influence.
(c) Al-Mawdudi (1903-1979), India, Pakistan
According to Nasr:
'In fact, what distinguishes Mawdudi from the host of other
Islamic thinkers is his preoccupation with the administrative
functioning and the constitution of the Islamic state. It
was his aim to provide that the Islamic state above and
beyond an ideal would be a viable entity, superior indeed to
western and socialist models. ... In defining the shape of
the Islamic state Mawdudi borrowed widely and
indiscriminately from the West. The Islamic state would be
run by a modern machinery of government: an elected presi-
dent, a parliament, and an omnipotent judiciary. The rela-
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tions between these branches would be governed by checks and
balances meted out in a constitution. The success of the
Islamic state would hinge on its legitimacy in the eyes of
society. It was for this reason that Mawdudi, unlike most
Islamic revivalist thinkers who followed him, favoured
Islamization of society before the creation of the state. It
was for this reason that Nawdudi placed a great deal of
emphasis on education, and viewed Islamic revolution as a
piecemeal effort. ... Nawdudi's view of the Islamic state
as a viable system as well as a democracy ... Mawdudi viewed
the Islamic state as a democracy ... The Islamic state
should not be the enforcer of the Shari t a but the implementor
of the will of the people.
	
Ideally, popular will should
demand implementation of the Shari'a, ... Nawdudi argued
that the hudud punishments could be implemented only if a
society was thoroughly Islamized - .. .
Dr al-Turabi prefers the phrase "Islamic society" to "Islamic
state".'° He emphasises "society" and "education". Although the cur-
rent Sudanese government was established by a military coup, it seems
that Dr al-Turabi basically believes Mawdudi's approach is the best.
This may explain the reason why the current Sudanese government has
adopted the policy of "massive expansion" of higher education. If
people can be changed through education to accept the Isdiamic state,
the state will become more stable. The current government's approach
towards hudud punishments is also quite moderate. To quote The Econo-
mist: 'Limbs are no longer cut off under sharia law.' 11
 These
Sudanese policies might be one of the reflections of Mawdudi's
thoughts.
(d) Al-Banna (1906-1949), Egypt
According to Coinmins:
'While admitting that Islam validates parliamentary democ-
racy, Banna rejected any role for a multiparty system in an
Islamic state. ... Egypt's experience had shown that a mul-
tiparty system violates the fundamental Islamic value of
national unity by sowing divisiveness. Indeed, Banna
regarded Egypt's political parties as factions based on dif-
ferences among prominent personalities. He called for the
dissolution of all parties and the formation of a single
party to unify the nation, lead to independence, and strive
for internal reform. (p.136) ... For all of Banna's devotion
to organization and action, he seems to have intentionally
left vague his vision of how to transform Egypt into an
Islamic order.	 Yet he did describe the process in general
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terms. The first stage involved propagating the message
through public lectures, speaking on ceremonial occasions,
and publishing. In the second stage, the Brothers moved into
action with groups like the rovers, who developed physical
and martial skills in addition to further refining their
religious discipline. The final stage would bring the
Brothers' mission to fruition with the inauguration of an
Islamic order. He warned the Egyptian government that when
all peaceful means had failed, the Brothers would resort to
force and seize power to install an Islamic regime. Banna
stated that the Brothers did not choose violent upheaval, but
a revolt would inevitably result from the pressure of circum-
stances burdening the Egyptian people."2
Like al-Banna, Dr al-Turabi has come to his conclusion that
Western democracy, i.e. the multi-party system did not suit Sudanese
society. In his contribution to the book published in 1983, Voices of
Resurgent Islam, he wrote: 'While there may be a multiparty system, an
Islamic government should function more as a consensus-oriented rather
than a minority/majority system with political parties rigidly con-
fronting each other over decisions." 3 Although, Dr al-Turabi basi-
cally prefers "dialogue" to "violence", as he wrote in his book, The
Issues of Freedom and Unity; Consultation and Democracy; the Dialogue
of Religion and Art, 14 like al-Banna, he did not necessarily stick to
non-violent strategies.
(e) Qutb (1906-1966), Egypt
"\ According to Tripp:
'As an Egyptian whose country had been for most of his life
under British control, he had little difficulty in identify-
ing the specific enemy. However, it appears that his experi-
ence of living in the United States, where he was sent by the
Ministry of Education during the years 1948-1950, caused him
to see the enemy as a more generic and, in some respects,
more intrusive one. British imperialism was characterized
merely as one aspect of a more wide-ranging and sinister form'
of collective enmity - that of the secular, materialist,
individualist and capitalist West. ... In his view, Islam
seemed to have an answer to all current social and political
problems, ... (p.158) ... it was during this [prison period
[1954-1964] of confinement and hardship that Sayyid Qutb was
to write most of the works for which he subsequently became
famous. ... (p.160) ... During the ten years of his
imprisonment, the installments of this extensive Qur'anic
commentary were to appear regularly, representing, over time,
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the development of Qutb's thoughts about Islam. ... (p.161)
'15
Dr al-Turabi also visited the United States for the first time
during his Paris period (1959-64). He stayed in the US for about two
months and saw the society through his own eyes.16 He said that the
Americans were the most ignorant people in the world. 17 Like Qutb,
Dr al-Turabi was imprisoned for a long time - from 1969 to 1977 (not
continuously) - and he also did not waste his time and studied a lot.
Qutb's attitude in the prison might have influenced Dr al-Turabi.
Rahnema points out some common tendencies among the Islamic
thinkers, such as al-Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb, who did not receive
a formal Islamic training. He says that:
'The "outsiders", those without an official Islamic training,
were less bound by certain axiomatic, jurisprudential princi-
ples, less confined to a specific procedural framework, more
inclined towards innovation and more critical of the official
clergy. For them a synthesis between Islamic concepts and
modern values was possible and necessary.'18
Dr al-Turabi also studied Islam mainly with his father and did not
have a formal Islamic training. His attitude seems to share this com-
mon tendency - his call for tajdid (tajdiid: re-evaluation) of fiqh
(fiqh: traditional Islamic law) and positive application of ijtihad
('ijtihaad: interpretation), his strong motivational current of
innovation and progressive change, and his critical attitude towards
ulama (culamaah) as the official clergy of a state.
Notes:
1. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 9 May 1994.
2. Au Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed
Books, 1994), pp. 5-6.
3. Hassan al-Turabi, 'The Islamic State' in John L. Esposito
(ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1983), p. 245.
4. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.
5. Yvonne Haddad, 'Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform' in
Au Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books,
1994), p. 59.
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6. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in
Sudan (London: Gray Seal, 1991), p. 179.
7. Hasan al-Turaabii, Manhajiiyat al-Fiqh wa_al_Tariic
a1-'Is1aamii (The Method of the Islamic Jurisprudence and the
Islamic Legislation) (Al-Khartuum: Daar 'Iqra', 1987).
8. Hasan al-Turaabii, Qadaayaa al-flurriiya wa-al-Wanda;
al-Shuuraa wa-al-Diimuqraatiiya; al-Dim wa-al-Fann (The Issues
of Freedom and Unmity; Consultation and Democracy; the Dialogue
of Religion and Art) (Jidda: al-Daar al_Sa c udiiya, 1987).
9. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The
Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism? in Au Rahnema
(ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp.
106-107.
10. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.
11. The Economist, 24 June 1995, p. 23.
12. David Commins, 'Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)' in Ali Rahnema
(ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp.
136, 148, and 149.
13. Al-Turabi, 'The Islamic State', p. 245.
14. Al-Turaabii, Qadaayaa al-Hurriiya, p. 85.
15. Charles Tripp, 'Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision' in Au Rah-
nema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994),
pp. 158-161.
16. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 9 Nay 1994.
17. Ibid.	 -
18. Rahnema, Pioneers, p. 9.
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Appendix (6): eformation and French Revolution
The researcher believes that the influence of Dr al-Turabi's knowledge
of historical Western movements, i.e. the Reformation and French
Revolution, had some influence on his "ideological setting".
(a) Reformation
The Reformation was the religious and political reform movement in the
16th century Europe. It is said that it started in 1517 when Martin
Luther (1483-1546) criticized the Catholic Church openly. 	 To quote
The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia:
'A religious movement in 16th-century Europe that began as an
attempt to reform the Roman Catholic Church and ended with
the establishment of independent Protestant Churches. The
Reformation began on 31 October, 1517, when Martin Luther
nailed his 95 theses on the door of the castle church at Wit-
tenburg. Luther's attack on the sale of indulgences and, sub-
sequently, on papal authority and the sacraments (save bap-
tism and the Eucharist) was condemned by the pope and the
Holy Roman Emperor but gained the support of several German
princes.	 The consequent conflict was not resolved until
1555. In Switzerland, the Reformation was initiated by
Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) in Zurich in 1520, spreading to
Basle, Berne, and also to Geneva, where it was led by John
Calvin. In France, where Protestants were called Huguenots,
the Reformation became involved in a political struggle for
control of the Crown, giving rise to the Wars of Religion,
and in the Low Countries it fired the Revolt of the Nether-
lands against Spanish rule. In England, the Reformation had
three stages. Under Henry VIII papal authority in England
was destroyed. Thomas Cromwell's legislation (1529-36) cul-
minated in Henry's divorce from Catherine of Aragon and the
Act of Supremacy (1534), which proclaimed the king supreme
head of the English Church; in 1536 the dissolution of the
monasteries was authorized. Under Edward VI Protestanism was
established by the 1552 Book of Conmon Prayer, the accompany-
ing Acts of Uniformity, and the 42 Articles (1553)
Protestanism finally became the established Church of England
under Elizabeth I and a new Act of Supremacy was passed
(1559). In Scotland, the Reformation was influenced by John
Knox and Presbyterianism was established in 1592.'
Alan Isaacs and et al. (eds.), The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia,
(London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 604-605.
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(b) French Revolution
The French Revolution normally refers to a series of events which
occurred from 1789 to 1799. The popular revolution resulted in the
destruction of the monarchy and feudal system. The French Revolution
is often associated with the ideas of "freedom and equality". To
quote The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia:
'The overthrow of the French monarchy as a reaction to the
corrupt, feudal, and incompetent government of the Bourbon
kings. In 1789 Louis XVI was forced to summon the States
General but its Third Estate, opposing aristocratic attempts
to dominate proceedings, formed its own National Assembly.
Riots followed, the Bastille was stormed, the king was mobbed
at Versailles, and the Assembly (from July the Constituent
Assembly) promulgated the Declaration of the Rights of Man.
Feudalism was abolished and in September, 1791, a new con-
stitution was accepted by the king following his thwarted
attempt to flee France (the flight to Varennes). However,
his continuing uncooperativeness fostered the growing repub-
licanism of what became the Legislative Assembly
(October,1791) and then the National Convention (Septem-
ber,1792). The Convention proclaimed a republic and in
January, 1793, Louis was executed. The moderate Girondins,
discredited by France's war reverses, were now ousted by the
Jacobins and power passed to the Committee of Public Safety.
Under Robespierre the Committee conducted a Reign of Terror
in which thousands of suspected antirevolutionaries were
executed. His extremism, however, brought his downfall
(1794) and led to the establishment of the Directory (1795),
which struggled for four years with economic crises until
Napoleon's coup d'etat (1799) brought the Revolution to an
end.'
(Ibid., p. 283.)
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Appendix (7): Military ranks
The following table is intended to show the Sudanese military ranks
with Arabic names, English names, and ranking-marks.
Table A.7.(1): Military ranks
Mark
1
	
X []
2 x *** [3
3
	
x ** 1]
4
	
x * [3
5
	
x []
6
	
*** [3
7
	
** [3
8
	
* [1
9
	
[3
10
11
	
**
12
	
*
Arabic
fail aq
mushi ir
fariiq 'awwal
fariiq
liwaa'
and i d
caqiid
mu q a d d am
raa' id
naqiib
mulaazim
'awwal
mulaazim
English
Field Marshal
General
Lieutenant General
Major general
Brigadier
Colonel
Lieutenant colonel
Major
Captain
First lieutenant
Second lieutenant
e.g.
Nimairi
al-Bashir
I
al-Bashir
Nimairi, Garang
Sudanese Military Ranking-Mark (e.g. Lieutenant General)
310
Appendix (8)
Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure
Diagrams A.8.(1), A.8.(2), and A.8.(3) show the first, the second,
and the third structure of the organization of the Islamic / Islamist
movement respectively. These diagrams were drawn by the researcher,
based on the description written by el-Affendi, and later confirmed by
Dr al-Turabi.
To the researcher's knowledge, these structures are not mentioned
in any other non-Islamist sources. It may be suspected that the con-
stituent assembly and associated bodies are not formalized institu-
tions, but perhaps more informal meetings convened by Dr al-Turabi.
Diagram A.8.(l): The first structure
Constituent Assembly
elct	 elct
single
7-man Executive	 leader	 leadership
Bureau	 (strong power, autocratic)
Sources: El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, p. 67.
Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.
Diagram A.8.(2): The second structure (after 1962)
collective
leadership
Constituent Assembly
elect
Shura (Shuuraa) Council
elect
Executive Bureau
elct
'I,
secretary general
(weak power, almost nominal)
Movement' s
main body
continued
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Diagram A.8.(2): continued
branch organizations
(64)	 IF(64)	 etc.
PWF z Patriotic Women's Front
ICF = Islamic Charter Front
= the year of establishment
Sources: El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, pp. 67 and 97.
Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 194.
Diagram A.8.(3): The third structure (after 1974)
Constituent Assembly
(convene every 4 years)
Movement' s
main body
elect	 elect
Shura Council_'I'
40 men	 secretary general
	
then co-opt 20 men	 (relatively strong power)
	
(total 60 men)(4 years)	 (4 years)
approve	 nominate
I	 I
executive
politburo (ICF) 
J	
administrative bureau
loose tie
satellite organizations
	
SWVR	 YC	 ASM
	
ASU	 IDO	 NLAS etc.
SWVR = the Society of Women Vanguards of Renaissance
YSC = the Youth Society for Construction
ASM = the Association of Southern Muslims
ASU = the Association of Sudanese Ulama
IDO = the Islamic Dawa (Dacwa) Organization
NLAS = the Namariq Literary and Artistic Society
Sources: El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, pp. 111-112 and 115.
Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.
The process of the first re-structuring of the organization began
after the imprisonment of al-Rashid al-Tahir in November 1959 and was
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completed in 1962. The main differences between the first structure
and the second structure can be found in the form of the leadership
and the power of the leader. While the leader in the first structure
constituted the single leadership and his power was quite strong, the
power of the secretary general in the second structure was weak and
almost nominal because of the introduction of collective leadership.
The process of the second re-structuring of the organization began
in 1974 and was completed by the 1980s. The main changes of the
structures between the second structure and the third structure were
the promotion of the status of the ICF and the fact that the secretary
general now had more power and more independence than before. Prior
to the change, the ICF was just a branch organization of the movement,
but after the change, the ICF now became part of the main body. With
regard to the secretary general, before the change the post was almost
nominal and was elected by the members of the executive, however after
the change the secretary general was elected independently and had
more practical power.
These changes of the organization's structure were attributable to
Dr al-Turabi's efforts. He seemed to be seeking, consciously or
unconsciously, to control the Islamic movement. In the process of the
first re-structuring, Dr al-Turabi wanted to liberate the movement
from the Egyptian influence.
	
Dr al-Turabi won in the leadership
struggle and obtained the full autonomy of the movement. In the
process of the second re-structuring, Dr al-Turabi increased the power
of the secretary genera] and made sure of his control over the whole
movement.
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Diagram A.9.(1) is intended to show the development of the civil wars
in Sudan.
Diagram A.9.(l): Civil wars in Sudan
(1) The First Civil War (1955-72)'
Government Forces
1963 :Anya-nya was formed
I -- / --	1969 Nimairi
fighting
1972 :Addis Ababa Agreement
Anya-nya was to be absorbed into
the government forces
(2) The Second Civil War (1983-
mutiny
1975/ :Anya-nya II was formed ------ ____
with
government
(••—•••----) :
Continued
rebel
May 1983:beginning of - — - -
SPLA (John Garang)
Aug.83 official formation
Sep.1983 (Sharia)
1985 al-Dhahab
Militias —oriins of PDF
j11986
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Diagram A.9.(1): continued
1988	 SPLA-Anya-nya II
:1 integration	 [PDF']
(some remained)-: I
	
:1	 ----
Nay 1991	 :
Nengistu's fall :1 Aug.91 split
(Riak Machar,Lam Akol)
	
SPLA-N :
	
SPLA-U
(John Garang)
1989 al-Bashir
Dec.92 split
	 r
(Alfred Lado Gore)I *
Aug. 93
PRNSS
Sep.92 split
(William Nyuon)
Forces of Unity
later joined SPLA-IJ
mid-1994: Government
controlled all major
Sep.94
	
towns in the South
(Nachar)	 (Akol)
set up
	 claimed
SSIM	 SPLA-U
Feb.95
(Nyuon) (Nachar)
renamed SSIM
SPLA-U	
-\-
SPLA
	
= Sudan People's Liberation Army:
Aug. 1983, John Garang.
PD F
	
Popular Defence Force: 1985-86 / 1989, government.
SPLA-M = Sudan People's Liberation Army - Mainstream:
Aug. 1991, John Garang, Dinka domination.
SPLA-U = Sudan People's Liberation Army - United:
Aug. 1991, Riak Machar and Lam Akol, Nuer domination.
Forces of Unity: Sep. 1992, William Nyuon, joined SPLA-U in 1993.
PRNSS	 Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan:
Aug. 1993, Alfred Lado Gore, Equatoria tribes.
SSIN	 = Southern Sudan Independent Novement:
Sep. 1994, Riak Machar.
SPLA-U	 Sep. 1994, Lam Akol claimed.
SPLA-U	 Feb. 1995, William Nyuon claimed.
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(a) The origins of the Popular efence Force (PDF)
The origins of the PDF can be found in the 1985 - 1986 period, under
the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by General Abd al-Rahman
Suwar al-Dhahab ( cAbd al-Rahmaan Suwaar al-Dhahab), developing further
under the civilian government led by Sadiq al-Mabdi after 1986.
In the inid-1980s, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by
John Garang and backed by Ethiopia was increasing its control over
areas of the South. An article in The Guardian on 14 March 1986
reported: 'During the past year, the SPLA has gradually taken the
entire south, except for the main towns.' 2	Map A.9.(l) shows the
areas controlled by the SPLA in March 1986.
Map A.9.(l): SPLA-controlled areas in March 1986
Source: The Guardian,-14 March 1986.
(photocopy)
Another article in The Guardian reported: 'The northern army
{government forcesj has suffered heavy defeats and mass defections
many times over the past two years in the war in the south.' 4
 It
continued: 'For some months Khartoum has been arming southern groups
such as the Messariya, Baggara, Murle and, most recently, Acholi [ex-
Tigandan government troopsi, to fight with, or for, the government
forces against the SPLA.' 5 To quote Alier:
'The militia and the Murhallin were organized on the same
basis as Anya-nya II. The militias operate in some parts of
Equatoria, notably among the Mundari, Acholi and Madi and in
Western Bahr El Ghazal, among the Fertit tribes. Their most
notable operations have been against the unarmed civilians
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suspected of collaboration with the SPLA. Wau, ... was in
1987 divided into two war zones: one for the Dinka and Jur
civilian population and their police force and the other for
the Fertit population, its militia and a guard of the Sudan
army. ... The Murhallin, meaning those constantly on the
move, are recruited from the Baggara tribes of Southern ICor-
dofan, Southern Darfur, Western Bahr El Ghazal. ... The
Murhallin of 1988, usually armed with rifles, regularly took
advantage of unarmed local populations in Bahr El Ghazal and
Upper Nile. Though handicapped in the past by lack of
ammunition, the [second] civil war brought to the Murhallin a
source of ammunition, training and modern rifles from the
Sudan government. A considerable number of retired officers
and NCOs from the Baggara were re-employed from 1986 to
assist the Murhallin.'6
Anya-nya II started to fight against the SPLA some time in 1983.
It continued to do so until the integration between the SPLA and Anya-
nya II in 1988. During the period from 1985 to 1986, the government
used Anya-nya II and the tribal militias, such as the Fertit militias
and the Baggara militias, to fight against the SPLA. The main reason
for the employment of these militias seems to stem from the continuous
defeat of the government troops. The government troops were losing
their control of areas of the South day by day, therefore it seemed
that the government should use whatever means might be available to
reverse the trend.
The tribal militias were re-organized as the Popular Defence Force
and became an official institution in October 1989.8
(b) The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and its split
After the 1989 coup, the power of the SPLA started to decline rapidly
with a number of splits and internal disputes (see Diagram A.9.(l):
Civil wars in Sudan).
About a half month before the 1989 coup, Col. John Garang, the
leader of the SPLA, expressed his hope for power. 	 To quote The
Observer:
'HAVING won control over much of southern Sudan at the point
of a gun, Colonel John Garang, ... spoke in London last week
of how his organisation could gain democratic power over the
whole country, ... [John Garang] suggested that pressures on
the Government from the army, arising from the economic
crisis and the civil war, were such that an early resolution
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of the conflict seemed possible. He sketched a political
future in which the SPLA, under a new constitution, could
form the biggest party in the Sudanese parliament. In coali-
tion with the Democratic Unionist Party (currently part of
the Government), he said they would then be able to form a
government. '
To review the political situation in early 1989, the ultimatum of
the top army officers in February 1989 was secretly backed by the
DUP.'° In March 1989, the DUP returned to the government and the NIF
was excluded. It seems that John Garang and the DUP had made a secret
deal on the issue of power sharing. In these circumstances, Garang
could express his hope for power, however, his hope was destroyed soon
by the Islamist coup. It appeared later that the SPLA had reached its
peak.
In Nay 1991, the Mengitsu government of Ethiopia which had been
supporting the SPLA collapsed. Although Col. John Garang denied the
negative effects of Mengitsu's fall on SPLA activities," it seems to
have caused much damage to them. The SPLA lost its headquarters in
Addis Ababa, its radio station and supply routes from Ethiopia.'2
In August 1991, Commander Riak Machar split away from Col.
Garang.' 3 This was the first major split and the beginning of the
decline of the SPLA/N.
In November 1991, cooperation between Nachar's faction and some
Anya-nya IL groups, which still remained with the government after the
1988 SPLA-Anya-nya II integration, was rumored.'4
" In March 1992, Garang accused Nachar of helping the government.'5
In June 1992, William Nyuon, Garang's deputy, united the delega-
tions of the two SPLA/M factions during the Abuja peace talks.'6
In September 1992, Nyuon broke with Garang,' 7 and called his own
group "Forces of Unity".'8
In October 1992, Achol Marial quitted Nachar t s Nasir faction and
'called on Southerners "to do something about the present four key
players - Garang, Riek, Lam and William."''9
In December 1992, Alfred Lado Gore, veteran Southern politician
and ex-Garang ally, left Garang's movement.20
In March 1993, in order to oppose Garang's Torit faction, a unify-
ing attempt between Nyuon's SPLA Forces of Unity and Machar's Nasir
faction had been taken. 2 ' This attempt later resulted in the forma-
tion of the SPLA-United.22
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In August 1993, Alfred Lado Gore set up his own movement called
the Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan (PINSS).23
In October 1993, the US tried to intervene between Garang's Torit
faction (or SPLA-Mainstream) and Machar's SPLA-United. The US
prepared the Washington Declaration. Although the two leader agreed
the contents of the declaration, both of them disagreed their "titles"
on the declaration.	 Garang refused to sign the declaration as the
leader of the SPLA-Ilainstream, but signed on his own copy of the
declaration as the leader of the "whole SPLA". Machar refused to
accept Garang as the leader of the whole SPLA and also signed on his
own copy after he had crossed out the word "United". Each copy had no
counter-signature , thus the Washington Declaration failed.24
On 8 February 1994, The Independent reported the decline of the
SPLAs and the advance of the government troops, as follows.
'Barring divine intervention, the Sudanese army will shortly
retake the last towns in the south held by rebel forces,
establish its presence along the roads linking them and cut
the rebels off from Uganda, their haven and supply route.
Two years ago the SPLA controlled most of southern Sudan, but
a calamitous split in the movement in 1992 allowed the
government to retake almost all the towns and roads.'25
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Nap A.9.(2) is meant to show the drop of SPLA controlled areas.
Map A.9.(2): Drop of SPLA-controlled area
August 1992 February 1994
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Sources: The Guardian, 28 August 1992 (photocopy);
El Pais, 6 February 1994.
In April 1994, Lam Akol, Nachar's former ally, broke with
Machar.26
In September 1994, Nachar's SPLA-United announced the change of
its name. The new name was the Southern Sudan Independent Movement
(SSIN). Akol claimed that he was the leader of the SPLA-United.27
In February 1995, William Nyuon announced that the Southern Sudan
Independence Movement had dismissed Machar from the movement, and the
SSIN would return to its previous name "the SPLA-United".28
One of the main reasons for the split of the SPLA stems from
tribalism. Garang's faction is dominated by the Dinka tribe,
Machar's faction is dominated by the Nuer tribe, and Alfred Gore's
PRNSS is dominated by the Equatoria tribes. 29
	Another main reason
seems to be leaders' personal desire for power. Their tribalism and
personal desire come before their support for the southern cause.
Since the first split in 1991, these factions have been busy fighting
each other and have lost much - territories, external support, and
internal support.
Meanwhile, the Islamist government seems to have improved the con-
ditions in the South under the federal government system. Sudan News
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of 8 March 1995 reported that the rebels led by Lt. Zakaria Achol had
surrendered, and because of this, Yarol Province in Lakes State had
gained comprehensive stability which allowed people to live peacefully
and to cultivate their land.
Notes:
1. The civil war broke out in Southern Sudan in 1955 and it
developed into organized guerrilla warfare in 1963. Sudanow, July
1990, p. 3.
2. The Guardian, 14 March 1986.
3. Ibid.
4. The Guardian, 13 June 1986.
5. Ibid.
6. Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured
(Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990), pp. 255-256.
7. Ibid., pp. 251-255.
8. Sudan Update, 20 October 1989, p. 1.
9. The Observer, 18 June 1989.
10. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mandi, 19 January 1995.
11. The Guardian, 29 June 1991.
12. Middle East International, 14 June 1991.
13. The Guardian, 30 August 1993.
14. Sudan Update, 25 November 1991, p. 2; and 16 December 1991, p.
1.
15. Sudan Update, 30 March 1992, p. 1.
16. Sudan Update, 19 October 1992, p. 2. Peace talks between the
two parts of the SPLA and the Sudanese government were held in
Nigeria.
17. The Observer, 10 January 1993.
18. Sudan Update, 31 March 1993, p. 1.
19. Sudan Update, 18 November 1992, p. 1.
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20. The Observer, 10 January 1993.
21. Sudan Update, 31 March 1993, p. 1.
22. The Guardian, 2 November 1993.
23. EIU Country Report: Sudan, no.4, 1993, p. 19.
24. Sudan Update, 10 November 1993, P. 2.
25. The Independent, 8 February 1994.
26. Sudan Focus, May 1994, p. 2.
27. Sudan Update, 13 October 1994, p. 2.
28. Sudan News, 28 February 1995, p. 4.
29. Sudan Update, 22 October 1993, p. 3.
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Appendix (10): Ori ginal diagram of the Sudanese popular congresses
The following diagram is a photocopy of the original diagram of the
Sudanese popular congresses.
Diagram A.10.(1): Congresses
CONGRESSES
NA1TONAL SEC DRIAL CONFER	 NA1ONALSECIDRIALCONFERENCS
t!GAL
FEDRAL
CONGRESS
I STATE
=\ /=.\ ?__•\ ________ \IcoT11 • I (t.miic) ________
sTOp1ALBATSTA1ELEva
STATE
CONGRESS	 grAm
SL
PROVINCE
CONGRESS
COUNCIL.
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IMTAIJ*lt
BASIC
CONGRESS
DIRECT ELECTION
Source: The Sudanese Government, Sudan's Political System: The
Basic Rule [sic: Rules] for the Popular Congress [sic:
Congresses] (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat,
n.d.), p. 20.	 (photocopy)
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Appendix (11): Sadig al-Mandi's account of the position
of the Unirna Party and the Islamist movement
led by Dr al-Turabi
Former Prime Minister and Dr al-Turabi's former ally, Sadiq al-Mandi,
in an interview with the researcher on 19 January 1995, expressed his
frustration about the current situation and made clear his resentment
at some governmental actions and policies.
First, he did not see the military take-over as a necessary
vehicle for an Islamic program. Second, he was not satisfied with the
current legal system, especially with the criminal laws. Third, he
expressed his dissatisfaction with the Islamization of the banking
system. Fourth, he believed that jihad should be a defensive instru-
ment, thus he did not call what was happening in the South a jihad.
Fifth, he criticised the government's stance towards non-Muslims.
Finally, he was not satisfied with the government's attitude towards
the UN.
The following is the text of Mr Sadiq al-Mandi's statement to the
researcher, given in an interview at his house in Omdurman, 19 January
1995.
'You will find that opinion in the Nuslim world is divided
between two schools of thought: those who can be described as
secularists and those who can be described as Islamizers.
The secularists can be divided broadly into two groups: those
who really speak in terms of a Western agenda and those who
speak broadly in terms of a communist agenda. Within those
two groups, the Western agenda and the communist agenda,
there are many shades and differences, but they are broadly
those two. The Islamizers can be divided into, I believe,
three main groups: those who may be called the
authenticators, those who may be called the fundamentalists
and those who may be called the modernizers. Within those
groups, there are also many sub-divisions and shades of
opinions. I shall not go into that.
I believe that Dr Hassan al-Turabi, in terms of his
thinking, in terms of his education, in terms of his own
expressed opinion, must be labelled a modernizer. However,
the party he leads, the group he heads, must be labeled fun-
damentalist, because their opinions are really based on the
literature that has been published by the Muslim Brotherhood
movement in Egypt and their sub-groups. Therefore, you will
find in the whole performance of this movement a kind of con-
tradiction, a built-in schizophrenia.
We consider the Mandist movement as belonging to the
authenticators. The authenticators are those who are radi-
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cal, but would have nothing to do with the West, or foreign
opinion. They are radical reformers, but they believe that
reform must come from within and will not admit any reform
based on any inspiration from external elements. This is the
original Mandist message. However, this original message has
been to some extent moderated by the second imarn ['imaam:
leader] of the movement who has used certain methods, ideas
that have developed the Mandist position into one of moderate
modernizer. This position has been further developed by
myself in terms of books and so on that you can refer to, but
however I only mention all this, because I want to say where
the points are on which we agree with Hassan al-Turabi and
his movement, and those on which we disagree.
Basically, we have agreed on a strategy against communism
in the Sudan and we believe that we have achieved a lot in
terms of fending off communism in Sudan because in the late
50s, and in the mid-60s, coimnunism was a real threat in
Sudan, and this coalition between us has helped deter this
communist ambition. That is the first point of agreement
between us.
The second is that both our movements had at that time
realized that it is in the interest of Islam and in the
interest of Islamization that we oppose dictatorship. And
so, up to 1977, our real strategy was that of opposing mili-
tary dictatorship as such, whatever labels it takes. And
that led to our cooperation very closely in the overthrow of
the first dictatorship which ruled Sudan between 1958 and
1964, and also our cooperation against the second dictator-
ship between 1969 up to 1977. From then on, our views dif-
fered.
Also, we have cooperated about the issue of new ideas to
deal with the Southern problem. This cooperation prevailed
from 1958 up to 1977, when our views diverged. I am going to
say how they diverged later.
Also, up to 1983 we broadly agreed about the issue of
Islamization. However, in 1983, Nimairi introduced what he
called his Islamic rogram. Over that issue, our views radi-
cally diverted. They [al-Turabi etc.] considered it genuine
Islamization, we considered it fake and irresponsible and an
abomination. From then on, our views have diverged.
As far as the differences are concerned, a key issue was
over the attitude towards dictatorship. From 1977 onwards
they thought that they could serve Islam by cooperating with
the dictator.	 So they called Nimairi imam, accepted his
Islamization program and climbed on his bandwagon. We
rejected that and considered Nimairi a fake and an impostor.
From then on, their views on the possibility of cooperating
with dictatorship developed. They either themselves
initiated the coup of 1989 or cooperated with it. It is not
important what happened historically. The fact is that from
1977 onwards, they have accepted dictatorship as a possible
vehicle, as a necessary vehicle for an Islamic program, but
we have totally rejected that and still do so. We believe
that the Islamic program has got to come by democratic meth-
ods. So, this is a fundamental point of difference.
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A second fundamental point of difference is that we
believe that a fundamentally new formulation of Islamic
regulations, which is aware of Islam's authentic position and
aware of modern conditions, is necessary. They, however,
have accepted the general traditional position in Islamic
punishment.	 For instance, you could kill someone, could
execute someone for apostasy.	 We say that there is no
worldly punishment for apostasy. Apostasy is not had [hadd:
fixed punishment], but they think it is had. We say no.
There are so many such ideas of points of divergence over
criminal law.
They also consider certain Islamic financial instruments,
like inurabaha [muraabaha],' as legitimate measures to be
applied in modern banking systems. We believe this is rub-
bish. Those measures are suitable to conditions of rural
economy, but in the modern economy, they are irrelevant and
pointless. In fact, they lead to counter-productive results.
So, we believe all this business of their Islamization of the
banking system is rubbish and must be scrapped.
Also, we differ fundamentally on the issue of jihad
[jihaad: holy war]. We believe that jihad is a defensive
instrument and that the word jihad has a wide application to
mean all kinds of exertion, and it only comes to fighting
when you are under attack. Otherwise, there is no point in
it. So we don't call what's happening in the South, jihad.
They call it jihad. This is the point of fundamental dif-
ference.
Also, a point of fundamental difference is in relation to
the external world. They somehow subscribe to a traditional
view which regards the relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims as essentially hostile. So, you have two worlds: the
world of peace meaning the world of Islam, and the world of
war meaning the world of non-Muslims. We say rubbish. There
is a basis in Islam for relations with non-Muslims based on
peace as the norm. This is well authenticated in the Koran.
'. The verse is [........a Koranic verse .......]. God does
not prohibit you,. or deter you from cooperating and
sympathizing with people who have not been aggressive against
you and have not dealt with you in an unjust way. Anyway,
that is a point of major difference.
Another point of major difference is the point of dealing
with religious minorities, particularly in the South. They
say we, as Muslims, decide what is Muslim policy and give the
Southerners what are their rights within what we have already
decided. We say no. We decide, yes, what is Muslim policy,
but we must realize that in the context of the nation state
in which we coexist with other minority groups, we have got
to discuss with them their rights and agree upon those rights
and then, accommodate our position, accommodate their posi-
tion in our position. And therefore, we are prepared to halt
any process of Islamization until we have assured the non-
Muslim minority of the Sudan about their status as citizen
status and we believe this is important, because if you say
we will decide for you and you take it or leave it, they may
say we leave it and so secession follows. This is what we
believe is now happening.
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Also, we are, as Muslims, genuinely capable of entering
into external relations based on peace and cooperation with
Muslim and non-Muslim alike. We say that there is no problem
in our commitment to the UN charter, the UN charter for human
rights, and so on. Their position in this respect, we
believe, is ambivalent. When they talk to Western opinion,
they talk in terms of our ideas, but when they actually work
out their position, they work it on the traditional agenda of
considering non-Muslims as basically enemies. And this is a
matter which we think is most fundamental to the Muslim posi-
tion.
This is really a summation in our view of the whole
points relating to Turabi's position, relating to his party's
position relating to our position.'
Note:
1. 'Strictly, a means of making a profit. It is an arrangement to
provide financing for trading purposes in which a bank buys a com-
modity and sells it on at an agreed mark up or profit. The system
was devised to meet the requirements of classical doctrine and has
since been extended to cover a variety of financial transactions,
the mark up or profit being described as administrative costs,
development charges, etc.' Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspec-
tive: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law (London: Rout-
ledge, 1988), p. 253.
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Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC
The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum, 2-4 December 1993. The fol-
lowing are the quotations of a summary of the resolutions of the con-
ference from Sudanow (January 1994, pp. 17-18; Eiman A.El Boushi.
(trans.)). (Italic and notes: by the researcher)
Palestine
The Palestinian Issue is a crucial one for both Arabs and Muslims.
The conference reaffirmed its commitment to the Palestinians' right of
self-determination and an independent state with its capital
Jerusalem, as well as their inherent right to strive for repossession
of occupied Palestinian territories. The conference therefore
rejected the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, because it is not in line with
Muslim aspirations. Full support was given to the unified Jihad and
resistance demonstrated throughout the Palestinian uprising; other
Palestinian factions were urged to respect these aspirations and
resolve their differences through serious dialogue, to avoid inter-
factional feuding and assassinations.
The conference called upon all Islamic and Arab governments to
refrain from normalizing relations with Israel, appealed for wide sup-
port for the Palestinian uprising, and also commended the efforts of
the Secretary-General of the Conference, Dr. Turabi, in establishing a
dialogue between the various Palestinian factions and thus bringing
them together in a unite front against Israel.
Bosnia Herzegovina
Regarding the tragedy in Bosnia Herzegovina, where Serbs and Croats'
are attempting to eradicate Islam from Europe, the conference arrived
at the following resolutions:
1) Arabs and Muslims must back the people of Bosnia Herzegovina
through:
(a) Boycotting British and American commodities for a week as an
expression of resentment. The union of Islamic and Arab ports
should also cease loading and unloading shipments bound for
the Adriatic.
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(b) Boycotting the republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.
(c) Contributing $1 per person for the people of Bosnia
Herzegovina.
2) Requesting the U.N. to exempt the republic of Bosnia
Herzegovina from the arms embargo imposed upon the former
republics of Yugoslavia.
3) Lobbying the Security Council to enforce a strict embargo on
Serbia and Montenegro.
Somalia
The conference denounced the UN for sanctioning unjustifiable inter-
vention in the Horn of Africa, and called upon all Somali factions to
cease feuding and form a united front to guarantee peace and confront
the enemies of Somalia. The conference commended Arab and African
efforts to rehabilitate a nation ravaged by armed conflict. It also
called upon all peoples and governments to assist the Somali people by
providing food and medicine, and helping them to achieve stability in
the country.
Afghanis tan
The conference called for a halt to in-fighting between Nujahideen
[fighters] factions to prevent bloodshed between Muslims, and enable
reconciliation paving the way for an Islamic state in the country.
The conference alsQ announced that it is to set up a committee,
chaired by the Secretary-General of the conference, to bring about
reconciliation between Afghan leaders. It appealed to all Muslims to
assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.
Sudan
The Islamic Project underway in the Sudan has become a symbol of Mus-
lim aspirations. All Muslims should support Sudan by, among other
things, opposing attempts to impose sanctions and isolate the country
internationally.
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The conference urged Muslims to counter any resolutions adopted
against Sudan, and called upon Arab and Islamic institutions to sup-
port the unity of Sudan and its Islamic Project.
Iraq
The conference commended the steadfastness of the Iraqi people in the
face of the allied embargo, condemned the aggression inflicted on Iraq
by the ex-colonial powers, and called for the formation of a delega-
tion to probe avenues of reconciliation between Iraq and Iran.
Libya
The conference declared its support for Libya, following multi-faceted
attacks on her sovereignty, and urged Arab and Islamic countries to
ignore the embargo imposed on the country.
Yemen
The conference recommended the formation of a delegation to resolve
differences between the people of Yemen and to seek to maintain unity.
Lebanon
The conference supported the struggle of the Lebanese people against
the Israeli occupation, and urged Arabs and Muslims to provide
assistance to the people of Lebanon in order to counter the aggression
perpetrated against them.
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Kashmir
The conference called upon the government of India to comply with UN
resolutions regarding the right to self-determination of the people of
Jaminu and Kashmir, and respect for the human rights of Kashimiri Mus-
lims.
Azerbaij an
The conference condemned Armenia t s attack on Azerbaijan and called for
the immediate withdrawal of Armenia from all territories it has
occupied in Azerbaijan. It strongly urged Muslim countries to suspend
all cooperation with Armenia until it complies with these requests.
Muslim minorities
Concerning Muslim minorities in Asia, Africa, Europe, the conference
advocated:
1) The right to self-determination of the Muslim minority in
Burma, to enable them to practice Islam freely.
2) The Tajik Mujahideen and the people of Tajakistan generally.
3) Muslim minorities in Mitani, Kosovo, Senjak and the Muro Jihad
Movement.
Arab and Muslim unity
The conference committed itself to:
1) Shura (consultation), upholding human rights, the unity of the
constituent peoples of each country and protecting people from
fundamentalism2 which results from the suppression of
freedoms.
2) Forming a committee to set up a dialogue in Algeria between the
Islamic movement and other political groups.
3) On-going dialogue between Arab nationalists, Islamists and all
other Arab and Islamic movements to consolidate ties between
nations in an ever-changing world.
4) Womens' rights, as guaranteed in Islam.
5) Establishing a dialoguebetween different Islamic tendencies to
strengthen Muslim unity.
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6) Educating future generations according to the model of the
first three generations of Muslims, to imbue them with a love
of their country and wholehearted adherence to the Islamic
virtues of Nafi (Supererogation in prayers and charity), Ibsan
(worshipping God as if He can be seen) and Jihad.
7) Establishing Arab and Islamic institutions under the tutelage
of the conference to carry out its various activities.
Islamic-christian dialogue
The conference is greatly concerned with Islamic-Christian dialogue,
and will work tirelessly in Islamic Arab countries and elsewhere to
unify the views and efforts of people of faith against secularism.
The conference called upon Church leaders the world over to enter into
dialogue with Muslims. It wants the Islamic-Christian dialogue to
attract people to religion through the high moral values and the
nobility that it confers on all humans, irrespective of race, colour
or religion.
Notes:
1. At that time, when the resolutions were adopted, the Croats
were fighting against the Bosnian Muslims, but later in 1994 the
cease-fire was agreed between the Croats and the Muslims.
2. The term "fundamentalism" here seems to mean "extremism".
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Abbreviations
A
ADAR = Association for Dialogue Among Religions
ASM	 = Association of Southern Muslims
ASU	 = Association of Sudanese Ularna
B
C
CDLR = Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights
CIPF = Council for International People's Friendship
D
DUP	 = Democratic Unionist Party
E
EPLF = Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF = Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
F
FIBS = Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan
FIS	 = Islamic Salvation Front
FOP	 = Front of Opposition Parties
C
GIA	 = Armed Islamic Group
GMC	 = Gordon Memorial College
H
I
ICF	 = Islamic Charter Front
ICO	 = Islamic Conference Organisation
IDO	 = Islamic Dawa Organization
IFC	 = Islamic Front for the Constitution
IGADD = Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought
and Development
IL?!	 = Islamic Liberation Movement
IMF	 = International Monetary Fund
IRDA = Inter-Religious Dialogue Association
3
K
KSE	 Khartoum Stock Exchange
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N
N
NCES
NDA
NGSH
NIF
NLAS
NRC
NS CC
NSR
NSRCC
NIJP
0
P
PAIC
PCID
PDF
PDF
PDP
PLO
PPF
PRNSS
PTUC
PWF
Q
R
RCC
S
Abbreviations
= Legitimate Command and Modern Forces
= National Conference for Economic Salvation
= National Democratic Alliance
= National Gathering for the Salvation of the Homeland
= National Islamic Front
= Namariq Literary and Artist Society
= National Revolutionary Council
= New Sudan Council of Churches
= National Salvation Revolution
= Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation
= National Unionist Party
OAU	 = Organization for African Unity
OLF	 = Oromo Liberation Front
OLS	 = Operation Lifeline Sudan
= Popular Arab and Islamic Conference
= Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue
= Popular Defence Force
= Peace and Development Foundation
= People's Democratic Party
= Palestine Liberation Organization
= Popular Police Force
= Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan
= Patriotic Trade Unions Congress
= Patriotic Women's Front
= Revolutionary Command Council
SC?	 = Sudanese Communist Party
SFDA = Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SHRO = Sudan Human Rights Organization
SNA	 = Somali National Alliance
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V
W
x
Y
Abbreviations
SNM	 = Somali National Movement
SPLA	 Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-M = SPLA Mainstream
SPLA-U SPLA United
SPLM	 Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSB	 Sharia Supervisory Board
SSIM	 Southern Sudan Independent Movement
SSU	 = Sudanese Socialist Union
SUNA = Sudan News Agency
SWVR = Society of Women Vanguards of Renaissance
TIVIC	 = Transitional Military Council
TWA	 = Transitional National Assembly
TPLF = Tigray People's Liberation Front
UP	 = Umzna Party
USC	 = United Somali Congress
WCC	 = World Council of Churches
YSC	 = Youth Society for Construction
YSP	 = Yemen Socialist Party
z-
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Glossary of Arabic terms
A
ansar ('ansaar): followers of the Mandi
arham ('arhaam): close relatives, relatives of the prohibited degree
ashraf ('ashraaf): descendants of the prophet Muhammad
B
Bidiriya (Bidiiriiya): a tribal name
C
D
dawa (dacwa): call, invitation
dinar (diinaar): a monetary unit
* dura (dhura): millet
E
F
* Fatah (Fath): the main group of the PLO
Fuunj Sultanate (Saltana al-Fuunj): a 16th century sultanate
established in Sudan
G
H
had (hadd): fixed punishment
Hanafi (Hanafii): one of the four main law schools of Svnni Islam
Hanba1i ( Hanbalii): one of the four main law schools of Sunni Islam
Harnas (Hamaas): an Islamic movement
hirz ( . irz): place where property is kept
* Hizbolla (Hizb Allaah): an Islamic movement
hudud (huduud): plural of had
I
Ikhwan ('Ikhwaan): the shortened term of the Muslim Brotherhood
(al-' Ikhwaan al-Muslimuun)
Id ( C ud) : feast
Id al-Fitr (did al-Fitr): the feast of breaking the Rainadan
ihsan ('ihsaan): performance of good deeds
ijtihad ('ijtihaad): interpretation, independent judgment in a legal
or theological question
imam ('imaam): leader
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J
Jaaliyin (Jac aliyiin): an ethnic group name
jihad (jihaad): holy war, efforts for the sake of God
K
* Koran (al-. Qur'aan); the holy book of Islam
L
N
madhhab ( madhhab): religious creed
Nandi ( al-Nandii): the man who is believed to appear before the end
of the world and rightly guide the people
Maliki (Maalikii): one of the four main law schools of Sunni Islam
majlis al-shura (majlis al-shuuraa): the council of consultation
* mujahideen (mujaahidiin): fighters
murabaha ( muraabaha): an Islamic financial instrument
N
Nanda Movement (Haraka al-Nanda): an Islamic movement
nafi (nafl): supererogatory performance
nisab (nisaab): minimum amount
0
P
Q
R
Ramadan ( Ramadaan): the month of fasting, the 9th month of the
Mu.litn year
nba (ribaa): usury, interest
S
Shaban (Shac baan): the 8th month of the Muslim year
Shafii (Shaafi c ii): one of the four main law schools of Sunni Islam
Shia (Shii c a): a big branch of Islam
shura (shuuraa): consultation
sufi (uufii): Islamic mystic
Sunni (Sunnii): the main branch of Islam
sharia (al_jiarii c a): Islamic law
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T
tajdid (tajdiid): re-evaluation, renewal, reform
tawalckul (tawakkul): trust in God
tawhid (tawiid): unification, union
U
ularna (culamaa?): scholars, experts, the clergy
umina ('umma): Islamic community
(Jairna Party (Hizb al-'Umnia): a political party
V
w
wali (waalii): governor
waqf (waqf): endowment
* = English spelling is customary usage. See Spelling System
in Preface.
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Chronology
Table C.(1) shows the sources of the chronology and the meaning of the
abbreviations used in the chronology.
Chronology (1932-95), Table C.(2), includes selected events of Dr
al-Turabi's life and family, the Islamist movement, Sudan, and the
world. The selected events of the world are indicated by brackets
attached to the dates, e.g. (1948/M5).
Table C.(l): Sources and abbreviations
A
	
= El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution, 1991.
AL = Alier, Southern Sudan, 1990.
C	 = The Church Times.
D	 = Dockrill, The Collins Atlas, 1991.
E	 = The Economist.
EU = The Economist Intelligence Unit:
Country Report: Sudan.
EUP
	
The Economist Intelligence Unit:
Country Profile: Sudan, 1993/94.
F	 = The FIBS, Annual Report: 1985.
G	 = The Guardian.
GO = Gowers & Walker, Behind the Myth, 1990.
H	 = Haniid, The Politics, 1984.
I
	
= The Independent.
ID	 = Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi.
IM = Impact International.
Is
	
Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mandi.
IT = Interview with Dr Hassan al-Turabi.
1W = Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi.
ly = Interview with Mr Yassin al-Imam.
K	 = Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan', 1993.
KH
	
Khalid, The Government, 1990.
L	 = Lowrie, Islam, Democracy, 1993.
N
	
Mitchell, The Society, 1969.
MA
	
Mahgoub, Democracy, 1974.
MD = Middle East Economic Digest.
ME = Middle East International.
NR	 = Niblock, 'Universalism', 1992.
NC = Niblock, Class and Power, 1987.
0	 = The Observer.
R	 = The Reuter.
SD
	
Sudan Democratic Gazette.
SF = Sudan Focus.
SN = Sudanow.
SS	 = Sudan Studies.
SU	 Sudan Update.
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SW = Summary of World Broadcasts.
T	 = The Times.
TA = Taha, The Second Message, 1987.
TU = A1-Turaabii, Al-Haraka, 1990.
US	 = US Government, Near East, 1985.
W	 = Warburg, Historical Discord, 1992.
WG = ITM, Third World Guide 93/94.
WO = Woodward, Condominium, 1979.
The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring	 Su = Summer Au = Autumn
	 WI	 Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information
The sources of the statements are mentioned in { }.
The order of the dates in { }: {day/month/year}
Examples: {NC.254}	 = Niblock, Class and Power, p.254.
{G.8/3/84} = The Guardian, 8 March 1984.
{IM.12/94.15} = Impact International, December
1994, p.15.
Publication details: See bibliography
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95)
1932/ 2/ 1: Hassan al-Turabi was born in Kasalaa, Eastern
Sudan {IT.7/5/94}.
1936/12/25: Sadiq al-Mandi was born {IW.25/5/94}.
1939/ 1/**: Al-Turabi entered an elementary school in Umm
Ruwaba {IT.7/5/94}.
1939/ 7/25: Wisal al-Mandi was born {IW.25/5/94}.
1943/**/**: Al-Turabi's mother died in El-Roseires
{ID.24/1/95}.
1944/ 1/**: Al-Turabi entered an intermediate school in Wad
Madani {IT.7/5/94}.
1944/**/**: Al-Turabi moved to a boarding school in Rufaa
{IT.7/5/94}.
1946/**/**: Al-Turabi joined the riot (the Rufaa Incident)
which was led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha
{IT. 7/5/94}.
1948/ 1/**: Al-Turabi entered a secondary school in Hantoub
{IT.7/5/94}.
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(1948/ 5): The Palestine War occurred {D.99,133}.
1949/ 3/**: The Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM) was set up
by Babikir Karrar {A.65}{NC.132}.
1951/ 7/**: Al-Turabi entered the Gordon Memorial College
(GMC) {A.75}.
1951/Au : Al-Turabi became a member of the ILM movement
{K.370}.
1952-53	 : The ILM's inner struggle and the 1953 dispute
{A.65}.
1954/ 1/13: The Egyptian cabinet decided to dissolve the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood {M.126}.
1954/ 3/ 1: Clash between the police and the Ansar occurred
{WO.142}.
1954/ 8/21: The Id Congress was held {A.52}. The ILM and the branch
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were united. The new
Islamic movement adopted the name "Muslim Brotherhood"
{A.52}. Abd al-Qadir became the leader of the movement
{A.52}.
1954	 : The Islamic movement became close to the Umma party
{A.55}.
1954/**/**: Al-Turabi became the leader of the University
branch of the Islamic movement {A.63}.
1954/ll/**: Abdel Nasser became the president of Egypt.
1955/ 3/**: Al-Turabi graduated from the Faculty of Law at
Khartoum University {L.11}.
1954/**/**: Sadiq entered Oxford University as an
undergraduate student {IS . 19/1/95}.
1955/Su	 : Al-Turabi went to London (London University) to
get a LLM degree {IT.9/5/94}.
l955/**/**: Al-Qadir resigned his post as the leader of the
Islamic movement and al-Rashid al-Tahir became
the leader {A.53}.
1955/12/**: The Islamic movement formed the Islamic Front
for the Constitution (IFC: a pressure group)
{A.57}.
1956/ 1/ 1: Sudan became independent {D.133}.
1956/**/**: The GMC became the University of Khartoum
{ NC. 128 }.
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1956/**/**: The Islamic movement set up its newspaper {A.68}.
1956/ 8/**: The International Students t Congress was held
in Prague {GO.23}.
(1956/10): The Suez War occurred {D.133}.
1957/ 2/**: The government rejected an Islamic Constitution
{A.58}.
1957/ 2/20: The government issued a concessional statement
in favour of Islam {A.58}.
1957/middle: Al-Turabi came back to Sudan and rejoined the
executive bureau of the Islamic movement {A.63}.
Al-Turabi became an assistant lecturer in law
at Khartoum University {IT.9/5/94}.
1958/11/17: A military coup was carried out by Ibrahim
Abbud {NC.217}.
1959/Su
	
	 : Al-Turabi went to Paris to obtain a PhD degree at
Sorbonne University {IT.9/5/94}.
1959/11/ 9: Al-Tahir was involved in a coup attempt and was
imprisoned {A.61 and 157}.
1960/Su
	
	 Al-Turabi first visited the United States for two
months {IT.9/5/94}.
1961/early: Al-Turabi married Wisal (Sadiq alMandPs sister)
{IT.9/5/94}.
1961/10/20: Al-Turabi's first son was born {IW.25/5/95}.
1961/Wi	 : Al-Turabi came back to Sudan as a break
{IT.9/5/94}. Al-Turabi became a representative
of the Islamic movement at the meetings of the
Front of Opposition Parties (FOP) {A.63}.
1962/ 5/**: Al-Tahir was replaced as the movement leader by
Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad {A.64}. A collective
leadership was emphasized {A.64}.
1963/ 1/**: Al-Turabi went back to Paris to complete his PhD
{IT.9/5/94}.
1963/**/**: Al-Tahir was released {A.78}.
l964/Su	 : Al-Turabi returned to Sudan and became a member of
the Executive Bureau (EB) of the Islamic movement
{A.75}. Al-Turabi became a lecturer at the
Department of Public Law and Administration in the
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Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum
{IT. 14/5/94},
1964/ 9/ 9: A symposium on the question of the South was held
at the University of Khartoum {IT.14/5/94}.
1964/10/14: The Patriotic Women's Front (PWF) was set up
{A.97}.
1964/10/21: A student meeting was held at the University of
Khartoum. The meeting was attacked by the
police and a student was killed by the police
{A.71}.
1964/10/22: Al-Turabi was in the funeral parade of the
student killed by the police {IT.14/5/94}.
1964/10/30: A civilian transitional cabinet was formed
{A.72}.
1964/**/**: Al-Turabi became the Dean of the Faculty of Law
at the University of Khartoum {L.l1}. Al-Turabi
became a member of the parliament {L.li.}.
1964/11/25: Al-Turabi was officially elected as the
secretary general of the Islamic movement {A.76}.
(beginning of the Sudanese Islamist movement)
1964/12/ 6: The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was set up, and
al-Turabi became the secretary general
{A.76}.
1965/early: Al-Turabi resigned from his job at the University of
Khartoum and started to concentrate on the
Islamist movement {IY.6/2/95}. The Islamic
Charter written by Dr al-Turabi was published by
the movement {US.74}.
1965/ 2/**: Al-Turabi issued his first communique as the
leader of the Islamist movement {TJS.72}{A.76}.
1965/ 2/23: Al-Tahir was chosen to represent the movement in
the second al-Khalifa cabinet {A.78}{K.337}.
1965/ 4/21: The ICF took part in the elections for the first
time and won 7 seats {US.76}{NC.228}.
1965/ 5/**: Mahjub formed a cabinet (First Nahjub Cabinet)
{ NC. 229 }.
1965/ 7/18: Al-Tahir resigned from the movement and joined
the National Unionist Party (NUP) {A.78}.
1965/ 8/30: Al-Turabi's second son was born {IW.25/5/94}.
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l965/**/**: The movement established the Patriotic Youth
Organization (PYO) {A.98}.
1965/11/ 8: The movement started its campaign against the
Sudanese Communist Party (SC?) {K.370}.
1965/11/ 9: The movement led demonstrations against the SC?
{K.370}.
1965/11/li: The SC? was banned {K.371}.
1966/**/**: Al-Turabi resigned as the secretary general of
the main body, but remained as a member of the
EB and as the secretary general of the ICF {A.86}.
Struggle and split between "the educationalist
school (anti-Turabi)" and "the political school
(pro-Turabi)" continued up to 1969 {A.87-89}.
1966/ 4/**: The ICF launched an anti-government campaign
{A.79}.
1966/ 6/**: Sadiq al-Nandi formed a cabinet {NC.229}.
1966/11/12: Al-Turabi's first daughter was born
{IW. 25/5/94}
1967/ l/**: Sadiq formed the constitutional commission {A.79}.
1967/ 5/**: Nahjub formed a cabinet (Second Mahjub Cabinet)
{A.84}.
1967/ 4/**: Babikir Awadalla, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court, resigned in protest against the
ban of the SC? {A.83}.
(L967/J6): The June War occurred {D.l35}.
1968/ 4/**: In the elections, al-Turabi did not win a seat
in Al-Masid (near his home town, Wad al-Turabi)
constituency {IT. l6/5/94}.
1968/ 5/**: Nahjub formed a cabinet (Third Mahjub Cabinet)
{K.338}.
1968/12/14: Al-Turabi's second daughter was born
{IW. 25/5/94}
1969/ 4/**: Al-Turabi was re-elected to the leadership of
both the main body and the ICF (i.e. the whole
movement) {A.88 and 159}.
1969/ 5/23: An Islamic constitution was basically agreed by
the parties and the deal was announced {A.l02}.
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1969/ 5/2EL: A military coup led by Colonel Iimairi occurred.
It was seen by the Islamists as a communist coup {A.104}.
1969/ 5/26: Al-Turabi was put in jail for the first time
{IT. 25/]./95}.
1969-70	 : The National Front (NF: united opposition front)
was formed {A.xiii}.
1970/ 1/ 4: Nimairi announced the plan of a single party
system and the establishment of the Sudanese
Socialist Union (SSU) {NC.254}.
1970/ 3/27-31: Clashes occurred at Aba island between government
troops and oppositions {MA.238}.
1971/ 7/19: A coup led by some communists and sympathizers
succeeded in seizing power for about 3 days {A.112}.
1971/ 7/22: A counter-coup restored Nimairi to power {NC.256}.
1971/1O/**: Nimairi officially became the President of Sudan
{K.388}.
1972/ 1/**: The SSU was established by the regime {A.107}.
1972/ 2/27: The Addis Ababa agreement was agreed {NC277}.
1972/ 3/18: The Addis Ababa agreement was signed {NC.277}.
1972/11:18: Al-Turabi was freed {IT.25/l/95}.
1973/**/**: Al-Turabi went abroad to give lectures
{IT.16/5/94}. Al-Turabi met Shari! Husain
al-Hindi. abroad {IT.16/5/94}.
?973/ 8/**: Al-Turabi returned from abroad {IT.16/5/94}.
1973/ 8/30: Al-Turabi was put in jail again {IT.25/1/95}.
1973/ 8/31- 9/**: The Shaban uprising failed {A.108}.
(1973/010): The October War occurred {D.135}.
1974/ 3/10: Al-Turabi was freed again {IT.25/l/95}.
1974-82	 : Al-Turabi pursued the second major re-structuring
process of the movements organization {A.111}.
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19741**/**: Sadiq al-Mandi was released, went to London,
and became the president of the National Front.
{A.].09}.
1974/**/**: Libya agreed to arm and train the opposition
fighters {A.109}.
1975/ 6/15: Al-Turabi was put in jail again {IT.25/l/95}.
1975/ 8/15: Al-Turabi's third son was born {IW.25/5/94}.
1975/ 9/**: An attempted coup occurred {A.109}.
1976/ 6/**: Reported that an armed operation planned by the NF
was ready to act {A.109}. Osman Khalid and others
from the movement were active in Libya {A,109}.
1976/ 7/ 2: The NF carried out the armed uprising, but failed
{A.109}. The Islamists were forced to re-think
their position and strategy {A.165}.
1976/ 7/**: Al-Turabi's wife, Wisal, was put in jail
{IW.25/5/94}.
1976/late : Sadiq started to contact the Nimairi regime
{A.112}.
1977/ 4 or 5: Al-Turabi's wife was freed {IW.25/5/94}.
1977/ 7/12: A secret meeting between Sadiq and Nimairi took
place at Port Sudan {H.5}.
1977/ 7/**: "National Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the
main part of the opposition became public {IT.l6/5/94}.
1977/ 7/17: Al-Turabi was freed {IT.25/l/95}.
1977/ 8/18: The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) was
established {F.l}.
1978/ 2/**: Elections to the People's National Assembly were
held {H.11}. Al-Turabi joined the Sudanese
Socialist Union (SSU) {H.11}.
1978/ 5/10: The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan started
operations {F.1}.
1978/**/**: Oil was discovered in Bentiu {AL.216}.
1978-85	 : The Islamic economic institutions were growing and
becoming diversified in membership {A.117}.
1978/ 7/**: Al-Turabi became secretary of information and
foreign relations at the SSU {A.1l4}.
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1978/ 8/ 5: Al-Turabi's third daughter was born {IW.25/5/94}.
1979/**/**: Al-Turabi became Attorney General until Nay 1983
and was presidential adviser on legal and foreign
affairs until March 1985 {A.115}{L.11}.
By 1980 : Nimairi's supporters were limited to the people
in the security forces, the south, the SSU, and
the Islamist movement {A.119}.
1980/ 8/**: Oil was discovered in commercial quantities
{EUP.23}.
1980/**/**: Nimairi wrote his book entitled " Why the Islamic
Way ? " {A.l21}.
1983/ 5/**: Al-Turabi lost his job as Attorney General and
obtained the post of legal adviser {A.126J.
Al-Rashid al-Tahir became Attorney General
{A.125}.
1983/ 5-8 : The SPLA was formed {AL.245,251}. The second
civil war between the government and the rebels
broke out {AL.245,251}
1983/ 6/**: The division of the South into three parts was
announced {A. 121}.
1983/ 8/**: The SPLA was officially formed {G.8/3/84}.
1983/ 9/ 8: The introduction of Islamic laws (sharia) was
announced {A.122,126}. This fuelled the civil
war.
1983/ 9/**: Al-Turabi became an adviser of the president on
foreign affairs {A.l26}.
1983/ 9/25: Sadiq al-Mandi was imprisoned {A.l23}.
1984/ 4/**: 12 special prompt justice courts (staffed by the
Islanlist movement and others) were established
{A.124}.
1985/ 1/18: Mahmud Muhammad Taha was executed {TA.15}{A.128}.
1985/ 2/**: Al-Tahir sent an anti-Islamist movement plea to
Nimairi {A.125}.
1985/ 3/ 5: Vice President George Bush met Niinairi in Sudan
{G.6/3/85}{A.128}.
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1985/ 3/ 9: Al-Turabi and other leaders of the Islani.ist
movement were arrested {A.129}.
1985/ 3/26: The National Gathering for the Salvation of the
Homeland (NGSH: anti-Nimairi, anti-Islamist) was
formed by the opposition organizations {A.130}.
1985/ 3/26- 4/ 5: Popular uprising against the Nimairi regime
{K.404-405}.
1985/ 4/ 6: General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab carried out
a military coup {NC.290}. The Nimairi regime
collapsed.
1985/ 4/ 9: Al-Turabi was freed {IT.25/1/95}.
1985/ 4/**: The National Islamic Front (NIF) was formed
{A.131}.
1986/ 3/**: The SPLA advanced, taking control of almost the
entire south {G.14/3/86}.
1986/ 4/**: The NIF won 51 seats in the elections and became
the third biggest party {A.141}.
1986/late : Al-Turabi's father died {ID.24/1/95}.
1987/ 1/**: The Sudan Charter was published (NR.31}{A.176}.
1987/].1/**: All Osman Muhammad Taha criticized Sadiq al-Mandi
over the cost of the battles of the Sudanese army in
the civil war, and called for the resignation of Sadiq
from his post as Defence Minister {R.25/l]./87].
1988/ 5/15: The NIF was included in the coalition government
for the first time since the introduction of the
new multi-party system in 1986 {G.13/6/88}.
Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Justice, Attorney
General, and Deputy Prime Minister {IT.l7/5/94}.
1988/ 7/**: Al-Turabi framed a draft Islamic penal code
{ NR. 35 }.
1988/11/16: The DUP leader made a peace accord with the
leader of the SPLA in Addis Ababa {G.l8/ll/88}.
1988/12/18: The government foiled a coup attempt led by
officers who served under Nimairi {G.23/12/88}.
1988/12/21: The Parliament effectively rejected the peace
accord of 16 November {G.23,29/12/88}.
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1988/12/28: The DUP withdrew from the government
{G. 31/12/88}.
1989/ 2/ 1: A new coalition government was formed
{SS.6/89.23J. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister
{IT 17/5/94}.
1989/ 2/20: The top army officers gave an ultimatum to the
government {G. 23,27/2/89}.
1989/ 3/25: Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mandi appointed a new
cabinet excluding the NIF members {SS.6/89.24}.
1989/ 4/**: The freezing of the Islamic law was decided by
the new government {K.411}.
1989/ 6/18: A coup attempt to bring Nimairi back to power was
foiled {G.20/6/89}.
1989/ 6/30: Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Basbir
successfully carried out a coup and came to
power {G.1/7/89}. All political parties were
banned (G.1/7/89}. Dr al'-Turabi was arrested
together with other leading politicians {A.190}.
1989/lO/**: The PDF became an official institution by the
promulgation of the Popular Defence Act
{SU.20/10/89.l}.
1989/10 .-il: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed)
{SU.3/11/89.2}.
1989/11/**: Details of the Popular Defence Act were released
by the RCC {SU.17/11/89.1}.
1989/11/30: Al-Turabi wa freed from Kober prison and placed
under house arrest {SU.1/12/89.4}{SU.20/12/89.4}.
1990/ 3/ 7: Al-Turabi was freed from house arrest
{IT 25/1/95}.
1990/ 3/**: An attempted coup was reported (announced by the
regime) {SU.20/4/90.l}.
(1990/ 8/ 2): Iraq invaded Kuwait {D.l15}.
1990/ 9/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed)
{SIJ.5/lO/90.4}.
1990/10/**: A new political system of "direct non-party
democracy" was approved by the conference for
National Dialogue on the Political System
{SU.l9/l0/90.3}.
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1990/11/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed)
{SU.19/l1/90.5}.
1990/12/31: Al-Bashir declared that the sharia law will be
fully and immediately implemented as of the 1st
January 1991 {SD.1/91.4}.
(1991/ 1-2): The Second Gulf War occurred {D.115}.
1991/**/**: A "conservative t' group (calling itself the Muslim
Brotherhood) split from the Islarnist movement
{G.4/l/94}.
1991/ 3/**: Nine federal states were established by the
fourth constitutional decree {SN.3/94.8}.
1991/ 3/22: The new Islamic penal code was introduced {NR.35}.
1991/ 4/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed)
{G. 1/5/9l}{SU.22/4/91.1}.
1991/ 4/25-28: The First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference
(PAIC) was held in Khartoum {SU.13/5/91.2}.
(1991/ 5/21): Ethiopia's President Mengistu was ousted
{SU.22/5/91. 2}.
1991/ 8/**: Riak Macher broke away from John Garang's SPLA
{G.30/8/93}.
1991/ 8/**: An attempted coup was reported (announced by the
regime) {SU.7/9/91.3}.
(1991/10/30): The Madrid Talks began {WG.469}.
.991/11/16-17: The First Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference
was held . in Khartoum {IM.l2/94.15}
1992/**I**: Economic liberalization measures were introduced
{EU,4th/93..6}.
(1992/ 1): In Algeria, the army moved in and the second round of
elections were canceled {E.4/4/92.l3}.
1992/ 3/**: The curfew in I(hartoum, which was introduced
after the 1989 coup, was shortened by one hour
{SU.19/3/92.2}.
1992/ 4/**: An attempted coup led by pro-Nimairi officers was
reported (announced by the regime) {G.18/4/92}.
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1992/ 4-5 : Al-Turabi toured Western Europe and North America
{IT. 17/5/94}.
1992/ 5/26: Al-Turabiwas attacked by a Sudanese (former
Karate champion) in Canada {SW.29/5/92}.
1992/ 5-6 : Abuja I (peace talks) was held in the Nigerian
capital {SU.20/5/92.l}{SU.4/6/92.1}.
1992/ 7/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed)
{SU. 29/7/92. 2}.
1992/ 9/**: William Nyuon broke away from John Garang's SPLA
{O. 1O/1/93}.
1992/**/**: The UN General Assembly issued a condemnation on
Sudan's human rights record {ME.4/2/94.18}.
(1992/12/ 9): US troops landed Somalia {G.lO/12/92}.
1993/ 2/10: Al-Bashir met the Pope in Khartoum {E.6/2/93}.
1993/ 4/26-30: A conference on religious dialogue was held
{SU. 21/4/93 .3}{ME.4/2/94.19}.
1993/ 4-5 : Abuja LI was held {SF.15/7/94.8}.
1993/ 8/ 9: The IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights
{SU.3/9/93.2}.
1993/ 8/17: America added Sudan to the list of countries
which support terrorism {SN.9/93.8}.
(1993/ 9/13): The peace accord between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) was signed
{T.14/9/93}.
1993/10/13: Al-Turabi met Pope John Paul II for the first
time in the Vatican City {IT.l7/5/94}.
1993/10/16: The Revolutionary Command Council issued a decree
abolishing itself {EU.4th/93.8}.
1993/10/17: Al-Bashir became formally the president
{EU.4th/93. 9}.
1993/10/21: The reconciliation between John Garang's
SPLA-Mainstreaxn and Riak Machar's SPLA-United,
which was mediated by the US, finally failed
{SU. 10/11/93 * 1-2}.
1993/10/31: The curfew in Khartoum imposed since the
1989 coup was lifted by President al-Bashir
{ SU. 10 / 11 / 93 . 3 }.
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1993/late 11: Al-Turabi met President Rabbani in Afghanistan
{EU.4th/93 . 21}.
1993/12/ 2-4: The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum
{SN. 1/94. 17}.
1993/12/29: The Archbishop of Canterbury refused the invitation of
the Sudanese regime to visit Sudan {C.31/12/93}.
1993/12/30: Sudan expelled the British ambassador in
Khartoum {ME.7/1/94.1O}.
1994/ 1/ 4: The Sudanese ambassador to the UK was expelled
{ME.7/1/94.10}.
1994/ 2/**: The nine federal states were re-divided into
twenty six states by the lath constitutional
decree {SN.3/94.8-9}.
1994/ 2/ 4: An attack on the Ansar al-Sunna in an Omdurman
mosque and a new advance against SPLA in the
South were reported {ME.18/2/94.15}.
1994/ 3/**: The first peace talks with the SPLM, under the patronage
of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and
Development (IGADD), were held {SF.15/7/94.8}.
(1994/ 4): The civil war between ex-North Yemen and ex-South
Yemen broke out {ME.13/5/94.3}.
1994/ 8/14: Carlos, the notorious international terrorist,
was arrested by the Sudanese police in
Khartoum, extradited to France, and was arrested
by the French police on 15 August {I.16/8/94}.
I994/ 9/ 5-13: The UN population conference was held in Cairo.
The Vatican took part in the conference, but Sudan
boycotted it MD.9/9/94.20}.
1994/10/ 8-10: The Second Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference
was held in Khartoum {IM.l2/94.15}.
(1995/ 3/ 3): The Americam Marines withdrew from Somalia
{T.4/3/95J.
1995/ 3/30- 4/ 2: The Third PAIC was held in Khartoum
{StJ.3/4/95.2}.
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